# IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE 

DARRYL COTTON<br>Defendant and Petitioner,

v.

The Superior Court, County of San Diego, Respondent.
LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity, Real Parties in Interest.

# EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF <br> PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND/OR PROHIBITION OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF AND REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE STAY 

VOLUME IV - EXHIBITS 16-18

Darryl Cotton
6176 Federal Blvd.
San Diego, CA 92114
Telephone: (619) 954-4447
Petitioner, Self-Represented

| EXH. | DATE | DESCRIPTION | PAGE <br> RANGE |
| :---: | :---: | :--- | :---: |
| 16 | $04 / 04 / 18$ | Notice of Motion and Motion to <br> Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action <br> (Lis Pendens) <br> [SDSC ROA 161, 189] | $629-1126$ |
| 17 | $04 / 05 / 18$ | Minute Order on Ex Parte Application <br> by Defendant Darryl Cotton to Shorten <br> Time for Hearing on Motion to <br> Expunge Lis Pendens and Oral Request <br> to Stay Case Due to Appeal | 1127 |
| 18 | $04 / 10 / 18$ | [SDSC ROA 12] | Plaintiff Larry Geraci's Opposition to <br> Defendant Darryl Cotton's Motion to <br> Expunge Lis Pendens <br> [SDSC ROA179-186] |

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Clerk of the Superior Court $\stackrel{E}{\text { L }}$
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APR 042018
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## SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1-10, INCLUDE, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
LARRY GERACI, and individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

TO EACH PARTY AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 13, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter
heard in Department C-73 of the above-entitled Court located at 110 Union Street, San Diego,
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 13, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter
may be heard in Department C-73 of the above-entitled Court located at 110 Union Street, San Diego,

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CASE NO.: 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF
ACTION (LIS PENDENS)
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DATE:
TIME:
DEPT:

JUDGE: The Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil
April 13, 2018
9:00 a.m.
C-73

California, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton, by and through his counsel Jacob P. Austin, will move for an order expunging the lis pendens recorded in the office of the Recorder of San Diego County as Instrument Number 2017-0129756 and filed in the above-referenced action on March 22, 2017, and an order awarding Defendant/Cross-Complainant reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

The motion is made upon the grounds that the Complaint lacks "probable validity" which can be established by a preponderance of the evidence in light of the evidence presented by Plaintiff.

The motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declaration of Darryl Cotton and Request for Judicial Notice, the pleadings and records on file in this action, and upon such other and further oral and documentary evidence which may be presented at the hearing on this Motion.

DATED: April 4, 2018
THE LAW OFFICE OF JACOB AUSTIN

By


Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant DARRYL COTTON

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Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton
(Representation limited to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens)

## SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual, Plaintiff,
vs.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
LARRY GERACI, and individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

CASE NO. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL

DARRYL COTTON'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS)

DATE: April 13, 2018
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
DEPT: C-73
JUDGE: Honorable Joel R. Wohfeil

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## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITES

Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton ("Cotton") hereby moves this Court to expunge the Lis Pendens (the " $\underline{L P}$ ") recorded by Plaintiff Larry Geraci ("Geraci") on his real property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego (the "Property") pursuant to CCP $\S 405.32$ for the following reasons.

As stated by the California Supreme Court, "[T]he lis pendens procedure [is] susceptible to serious abuse, providing unscrupulous plaintiffs with a powerful lever to force the settlement of groundless or malicious suits." Malcolm v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 518, 524. "Once a lis pendens is filed, it clouds the title and effectively prevents the property's transfer until the litigation is resolved or the lis pendens is expunged." BGJ Associates, LLC v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 952, 967. "Because of the potential for abuse and injustice to the property owner, the Legislature has provided statutory procedures (CCP $\$ 405.30$ et seq.) by which a lis pendens may be removed ('expunged')." Weil \& Brown, Cal. Practice Guide, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2017) ("Rutter Guide") $99: 422$ (citing Shah v. McMahon (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 526, 529). "[T]he lis pendens procedure provides a means by which a court may dispose of meritless real estate claims at the preliminary stage of a case." Shah, supra, at 529 (emphasis added).

CCP $\S 405.30$ et seq. was enacted to require proactive action by the trial court in the form of a "minitrial" on the merits in the preliminary stage of a case. As explained by the Court in Amalgamated Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1003, in analyzing the Legislature's intent in revising the $L P$ laws in 1992 and enacting CCP §405.32:

The financial pressure created by a recorded lis pendens provided the opportunity for abuse, permitting parties with meritless cases to use it as a bullying tactic to extract unfair settlements. [ $\#]$ The Code Comment thus states that section 405.32 "is intended to disapprove Malcolm. . . and other cases which have held that the court on a motion to expunge may not conduct a 'minitrial' on the merits of the case. This section is intended to change California law and to require judicial evaluation of the merits." (Code Com., 14A West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc., foll. §405.32, par. 3, p. 346, italics added.)

Amalgamated, supra, at 1012 (emphasis in original).
In Hilberg v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 539, 542, the Court stated: "We cannot ignore as judges what we know as lawyers - that the recording of a lis pendens is sometimes made not to prevent conveyance of property that is the subject of the lawsuit, but to coerce an opponent to settle regardless of the merits." (Citing Malcolm, supra, at 678.) Here, this action represents the very evil which CCP $\S 405.30$ et seq. was enacted to prevent. This action was filed with no probable cause to
maliciously (i) prevent Cotton's sale of the Property to a third-party bona fide purchaser and (ii) exert undue financial, emotional and psychological pressure on Cotton to coerce him into settling with Geraci.

## I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Cotton is the sole owner of record of the Property. ${ }^{1}$ In or around August 2016, Geraci first contacted Cotton seeking to purchase the Property. Geraci desired to buy the Property from Cotton because it met certain requirements of the City of San Diego ("City") to apply for and obtain a conditional use permit ("CUP") ${ }^{2}$ that would allow the operation of a Marijuana Outlet ("MO") ${ }^{3}$ at the Property. Over the ensuing months, the parties extensively negotiated the terms of a potential sale of the Property. (DC Decl. $12 ;$ VP $913,914$.

During these negotiations, Geraci made the following representations to Cotton: (i) he could be trusted as reflected by the fact that he operated in a fiduciary capacity as an IRS Enrolled Agent for many powerful and high-net-worth-individuals ("HNWI"); (ii) he is the owner and operator of Tax and Financial Center, Inc., an accounting and financial advisory services company, servicing HNWI and large businesses in a fiduciary capacity; (iii) he was a California Licensed Real Estate Broker, bound by professional and ethical obligations, to be truthful in real-estate deals; (iv) through his experts, who had conducted preliminary due diligence, he had uncovered a critical zoning issue that unless first resolved would prevent the City from even accepting a CUP application on the Property (the "Critical Zoning Issue"); (v) through his professional relationships, which included his HNWI clients that were politically influential, and through powerful hired lobbyists (some of whom used to work for the City in senior positions), he was in a unique position to have the Critical Zoning Issue resolved; (vi) he was highly qualified to operate a MO because he owned and operated multiple cannabis dispensaries in San Diego; and (vii) his employee, Rebecca Berry ("Berry"), was a trustworthy individual who could be trusted to be the applicant on the CUP application because she (a) managed his marijuana dispensaries, (b) held a senior position at a church and came across as a "nice old lady that had nothing to do with marijuana,"

[^0]and (c), consequently, would pass the stringent City and State of California background checks required to have the CUP approved (collectively, the "Qualification Representations"). (DC Decl. \{3.)

On or around October 31, 2016, Geraci asked Cotton to execute Form DS-318 (Ownership Disclosure Statement) ("Ownership Statement") - a required component of all CUP applications. (RJN 4.) Geraci told Cotton that he needed the executed Ownership Statement to show that he had access to the Property in connection with his planning and lobbying efforts to resolve the Critical Zoning Issue. (DC Decl. \$4.)

On November 2, 2016, Geraci and Cotton met at Geraci's office to negotiate the final terms of the sale of the Property. At the meeting, the parties reached an oral agreement on the material terms for the sale of the Property (the "November Agreement"). The November Agreement consisted of the following: If the CUP was approved, then Geraci would, inter alia, provide: (i) a total purchase price of $\$ 800,000$; (ii) a $10 \%$ equity stake in the MO ; and (iii) a minimum monthly equity distribution of $\$ 10,000$. If the CUP was denied, Cotton would keep an agreed upon $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit ("NRD") and the transaction would not close. In other words, the issuance of the CUP at the Property was a condition precedent for closing on the sale of the Property and, if the CUP was denied, Cotton would keep his Property and the $\$ 50,000$ NRD. (DC Decl. $\$ 5$.)

At the November 2, 2016 meeting, after the parties reached the November Agreement, Geraci: (i) provided Cotton with $\$ 10,000$ in cash towards the NRD of $\$ 50,000$, for which Cotton executed a document to record his receipt thereof (the "Receipt"); (ii) promised to have his attorney, Gina Austin ("Austin"), promptly reduce the oral November Agreement to written agreements for execution; and (iii) promised to not submit the CUP to the City until he paid the balance on the NRD. (DC Decl. q6.)

After Geraci and Cotton met on November 2, 2016, reached the November Agreement, executed the Receipt and separated - the following email communications took place that same day:

At 3:11 p.m., Geraci emailed Cotton a scanned copy of the Receipt which states:
Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd. CA for a sum of $\$ 800,000$ to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary) [T] Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of $\$ 800,000$ and to remain in effect until license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts [sic] on this property. [DC Decl. Ex. 1, pp. 4-8.]
At 6:55 p.m., Cotton replied:

Thank you for meeting today. Since we executed the Purchase Agreement in your office for the sale price of the property I just noticed the $10 \%$ equity position in the dispensary was not language added into that document. I just want to make sure that we're not missing that language in any final agreement as it is a factored element in my decision to sell the property. I'll be fine if you would simply acknowledge that here in a reply. [DC Decl. Ex. 1, p. 9 (emphasis added).]

At 9:13 p.m., Geraci replied: "No no [sic] problem at all" [Id. (emphasis added).]
In other words, the very same day on which the Receipt was executed, Cotton received a copy of the Receipt from Geraci and realized it could be misconstrued as a final agreement for the Property. Because Cotton was concerned, and wanted there to be no uncertainty, he requested Geraci confirm in writing the Receipt was not a final agreement. Geraci replied to Cotton's request for written confirmation; thereby clearly, unambiguously and indisputably confirming the Receipt is not a final agreement for Cotton's Property. Thus, Cotton refers to this email from Geraci as the "Confirmation Email." (DC Decl. ๆ8.)

Thereafter, over the course of almost five months, the parties exchanged numerous emails, texts and calls regarding various issues related to the Critical Zoning Issue, the CUP application and drafts of the final written agreements for the Property. ${ }^{4}$ However, Geraci continuously failed to make actual, substantive progress. Most notably, he failed to provide the final written agreements, pay the balance of the NRD, and to provide facts regarding the progress being made on the Critical Zoning Issue. (DC Decl. 49.) Regarding the Critical Zoning Issue, and also reflecting Geraci's general non-substantive replies and avoidance, the following text exchanges took place between Geraci and Cotton from January 6, 2017 and February 7, 2017:

Cotton: Can you call me. If for any reason you're not moving forward I need to know.
Geraci: I'm at the doctor now everything is going fine the meeting went great yesterday
supposed to sign off on the zoning on the $24^{\text {th }}$ of this month I'll try to call you later
today still very sick
Cotton: Are you available for a call?
Geraci: I'm in a meeting I'll call you when I'm done
Cotton: Thx
Geraci: The sign off date they said it's going to be the 30th
Cotton: This resolves the zoning issue?
Geraci: Yes
Cotton: Excellent
Geraci: On phone.. Call you back shortly..
Cotton: Ok
${ }^{4}$ See DC Decl. Ex. 1. (Fifteen (15) emails with attachments sent between Cotton and Geraci prior to the commencement of the instant suit between 10/24/16-03/21/17 containing all email communications between them.)

Cotton: How goes it?
Geraci: We're waiting for confirmation today at about 4 o'clock
Cotton: Whats [sic] new?
Cotton: Based on your last text I thought you'd have some information on the zoning by now. Your lack of response suggests no resolution as of yet.
Geraci: I'm just walking in with clients they resolved it its fine we're just waiting for final paperwork [Cotton Decl. Ex. 2, pp.1-4.]

These text communications were meant to and did induce Cotton into believing, relying and acting on Geraci's representations he was making progress on the Critical Zoning Issue (the "Text Communications"). (DC Decl. 19 $\mid 9-11$.)

On February 27, 2017, Geraci emailed Cotton: "Attached is the draft purchase of the property for 400 k . The additional contract for the 400 k should be in today and I will forward it to youl as well." (DC Decl. Ex. 1, p.13.) The cover email clearly states Geraci's intent of effectuating the oral November Agreement via two separate written documents (each for $\$ 400,000$ ). Notably, Section 18(i) states:

The parties shall be legally bound with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Agreement only if and when both Seller and Buyer have fully executed and delivered to each other a counterpart of this Agreement (or a copy by facsimile transmission). [DC Decl. Ex. 1, p.29.]

Thus, the language clearly reflects the parties were yet to be "legally bound" to "the purchase and sale of the Property" in February of 2017 and had yet to execute a final, legally binding agreement. Id.

On March 2, 2017, Geraci emailed Cotton a draft of the additional contract, the Side Agreement, that was supposed to provide for, inter alia, Cotton's $10 \%$ equity stake. (DC Decl. Ex. 1, pp.41-48.) The next day, Cotton replied:

Larry, I read the Side Agreement in your attachment and I see that no reference is made to the $\mathbf{1 0 \%}$ equity position as per my Inda-Gro GERL Services Agreement (see attached) in the new store. In fact para 3.11 [stating we are not partners] looks to avoid our agreement completely. It looks like counsel did not get a copy of that document. Can you explain? [5]

Geraci did not reply to Cotton's email. Geraci did not pick up when Cotton called later. Exasperated, Cotton followed up with Geraci via text wanting to confirm that Geraci had received the email and understood his concern - that the Side Agreement did not provide for his " $10 \%$ equity position" in the MO. Cotton texted: "Did you get my email?" (DC Decl. Ex. 2, p.4.) Geraci replied one minute later: "Yes I did I'm having her rewrite it now/.] As soon as I get it I will forward it to you[.]' (DC Decl. Ex. 2, p. 4
${ }^{5}$ DC Decl. Ex. 1, pp. $49-50$ (email) (emphasis added); pp.51-52 (Inda-Gro GERL Services Agreement (attachment)L
(the "Confirmation Text").) The Confirmation Text proves that on March 3, 2017 Geraci (i) was going to have Austin revise the Side Agreement to contain Cotton's " $10 \%$ equity position" in the MO and (ii) had previously received, acknowledged and consented to the terms contained in the "Inda-Gro GERL Services Agreement." Notably, Geraci does not refuse, refute, argue or so much as question Cotton's requests or statements as would be logical if the Receipt were the full agreement as now alleged.

On March 6, 2017, Geraci and Cotton spoke regarding revisions required to have the drafts accurately reflect the November Agreement. Cotton communicated his frustration with the delays and Geraci again promised to have Austin promptly correct the mistakes in the drafts. During that conversation, Cotton let Geraci know he would be attending a local cannabis event at which Austin was scheduled to be the headnote speaker. (DC Decl. $\| 13$.) Geraci later texted Cotton he could speak with Austin directly at the event: "Gina Austin is there she has a red jacket on if you want to have a conversation with her." (DC Decl. Ex. 2, p.4.)

The next day, March 7, 2017, Geraci sent the following email to Cotton:
Hi Darryl, I have not reviewed this yet but wanted you to look at it and give me your thoughts. Talking to Matt, the 10 k a month might be difficult to hit until the sixth month. . . can we do 5 k , and on the seventh month start 10k? [DC Decl. Ex. 1, pp.53-54 (email), pp.55-58 (draft Side Agreement).]
The facts that are demonstrated by the March Request Email are clear: Geraci had an established obligation to Cotton, requiring him to pay a minimum of $\$ 10,000$ a month, and is requesting of Cotton a concession from that obligation - specifically, that for the first six months of the operations of the MO, he be allowed to pay Cotton $\$ 5,000$ instead of the $\$ 10,000$ per month base as required per the November Agreement (the "March Request Email").

Attached to Geraci's email was a revised draft of the Side Agreement in Word format. This draft provides for, inter alia, Cotton receiving (i) $10 \%$ of the net profits of the MO and (ii) a minimum monthly payment of $\$ 10,000$. (DC Decl. at Ex. 1, p.55.) Furthermore, Attorney Gina Austin (who for several months represented Geraci - a Real Party in Interest to the related Writ Action against the City), was responsible for, and did draft versions of the contracts months after the November agreement indicating her awareness that no final agreement had been executed. The attachment of the last draft provided was dated "March 3, 2017" (the "Metadata Evidence"). (DC Decl. $\mathbb{1} 15$, Ex. 3 (screen-shot of the Metadata Evidence).)

On March 16, 2017, after having reviewed the revised agreement forwarded by Geraci on March 7, 2017, and discovering that it again did not accurately reflect the November Agreement, Cotton decided to follow up with the City regarding the Critical Zoning Issue personally. It was at this point that Cotton discovered that Geraci had been lying from the very beginning - Geraci had submitted a CUP for the Property on October 31 2016, before the parties even reached the November Agreement. (DC Decl. q16.) Geraci's submission was a direct contradiction of his (i) representation that a CUP could not be submitted until the Critical Zoning Issue was resolved and (ii) promise to not submit the CUP until he had paid Cotton the balance of the NRD. A Parcel Information Report provided by the City of San Diego, Development Services Department ("City Parcel Report") states the zoning of the Property was changed to "CO-2-1" (MO qualifying zone) on Januarv 14, 2016. (RJN 5, p.2.) In other words, the City Parcel Report makes clear the entire Critical Zoning Issue was a fraudulent scheme to (i) induce Cotton into executing the Ownership Statement - no zoning change was required to submit the CUP for an MO to the City on the Property - and (ii) to deceive Cotton into thinking that he required Geraci's unique and powerful political influence to resolve the alleged Critical Zoning Issue.

Later that same day, March 16, 2017, Cotton emailed Geraci, in relevant part, the following:
[W]e started these negotiations 4 months ago and the drafts and our communications have not reflected what we agreed upon and are still far from reflecting our original agreement. Here is my proposal, please have your attorney Gina revise the Purchase Agreement and Side Agreement to incorporate all the terms we have agreed upon so that we can execute final versions and get this closed. [T] I really want to finalize this as soon as possible - I found out today that a CUP application for my property was submitted in October, which I am assuming is from someone connected to you. Although, I note that you told me that the $\$ 40,000$ deposit balance would be paid once the CUP was submitted and that you were waiting on certain zoning issues to be resolved. Which is not the case. [7] Please confirm by Monday 12:00 PM whether we are on the same page and you plan to continue with our agreement. Or, if not, so I can return your $\$ 10,000$ of the $\$ 50,000$ required deposit. If, hopefully, we can work through this, please confirm that revised final drafts that incorporate the terms above will be provided by Wednesday at 12:00 PM. [DC Decl. Ex. 1, pp.59-60]
The next day, Geraci texted Cotton: "Can we meet tomorrow [?]" (DC Decl. Ex. 2, p.4.) Of note, Geraci, did not refute or dispute Cotton's factual assertions that Geraci had lied and submitted the CUP without, inter alia, paying Cotton the balance of the NRD and reducing the November Agreement to writing. Cotton replied via email:

Larry, I received your text asking to meet in person tomorrow. I would prefer that until we
have final agreements, that we converse exclusively via email.... To be frank, I feel that you are not dealing with me in good faith, you told me repeatedly that you could not submit a CUP application until certain zoning issues had been resolved and that you had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on getting them resolved. You lied to me, I found out yesterday from the City of San Diego that you submitted a CUP application on October 31, 2016 BEFORE we even signed our agreement on the 2 nd of November. There is no situation where an oral agreement will convince me that you are dealing with me in good faith and will honor our agreement. We need a final written, legal, binding agreement.

Please confirm, as requested, by 12:00 PM Monday that vou are honoring our agreement and will have final drafts (reflecting completely the below) by Wednesday at 12:00 PM. [DC Decl. Ex. 1, p. 61 (emphasis added).]

On March 18, 2017, Geraci replied to Cotton as follows: "Darryl, I have an attorney working on the situation now. I will follow up by Wednesday with the response as their timing will play a factor." (DC Decl. Ex. 1, pp.62-63.) Cotton, now understanding Geraci's deceitful nature, replied:

Larry, I understand that drafting the agreements will take time, but you don't need to consult with your attorneys to tell me whether or not you are going to honor our agreement. I need written confirmation that you will honor our agreement so that I know that you are not just playing for time - hoping to get a response from the City before you put down in writing that you owe me the remainder of the $\$ 50,000$ nonrefundable deposit we agreed to. [DC Decl. Ex. 1, p.64.) (emphasis added).]

Geraci's response to Cotton's three (3) written requests for assurance of performance was nebulous, and there was no finalization of the written agreements or confirmation of his intent to do so by Cotton's deadline.

Thus, Cotton, having been true to his word and waiting until March 20 had passed (without receipt of adequate assurance nor performance by Geraci, i.e., Geraci's breach of the November agreement) terminated the deal with Geraci on March 21, 2017 for breach: "To be clear, as of now, you have no interest in my property, contingent or otherwise." (DC Decl. Ex. 1, p.67.) Having anticipated Geraci's breach, Cotton had already lined up another buyer and then executed a written purchase agreement for the sale of the Property to Mr. Martin (the "Martin Sale Agreement"). (RJN 6, pp.182-196.) The next day, Geraci's counsel, Michael Weinstein ("Weinstein"), emailed Cotton the Complaint and the $L P$ filed on the Property. (DC Decl. $\|$ 18,19.) The Complaint is premised solely on the allegation the Receipt is the final written agreement for the Property (Comp. 97).

## II. DISCUSSION

## A. GERACI HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN OPPOSING COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE A LIS PENDENS PURSUANT TO CCP $\$ 405.32$.

CCP $\S 405.30$ provides, in relevant part, as follows:
At any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party . . . may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice... Evidence or declarations may be filed with the motion to expunge the notice. The court may permit evidence to be received in the form of oral testimony, and may make any orders it deems just to provide for discovery by any party affected by a motion to expunge the notice. The claimant shall have the burden of proof under Sections 405.31 and 405.32.
Thus, to avoid a motion to expunge under CCP $\S 405.32$, the burden is on the $L P$ claimant - here, Geraci - to establish the "probable validity" of the real property claim "by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. "If conflicting evidence is presented, the judge must weigh the evidence in deciding whether plaintiff has sustained its burden." Rutter Guide §9:436.2. As summarized and explained by

Miller \& Starr, California Real Estate, Chapter 10, Section D. 8 (December 2017 Update):

When expungement is sought on the basis that the real property claim lacks probable validity, the claimant who filed the lis pendens has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim has probable validity. The resolution of this issue, unlike the "failure to plead" grounds for expungement, requires the court to examine the factual merits of the claim. Written evidence or declarations may be filed, and the court may permit oral testimony; the court also may authorize discovery by the party moving to expunge. It is not sufficient for the claimant merely to make a prima facie showing of probable validity; the demonstration of "probable validity" requires a determination that it is more likely than not that the claimant will obtain a judgment against the Cotton on the claim. The court is required to weigh the evidence and make a preliminary determination based on the evidence submitted, of whether it is more probable than not, that the claimant will prevail on its real property claim. This determination must be made based on a preponderance of evidence, with the claimant bearing the burden of proof. Thus, the current statute deliberately rejects former law that the trial court is not required to conduct a "minitrial" of the action on the merits and cannot resolve conflicts in the evidence, and requires a hearing on the merits of the same nature as an attachment proceeding or a claim and delivery proceeding. [Emphasis added; internal citations omitted.]

Expungement of an improper $L P$ is mandatory, not discretionary - "the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim." CCP $\oint 405.32$ (emphasis added). Geraci cannot meet his burden of proof, thus, the $L P$ must be expunged.

## B. GERACI CANNOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE VALIDITY THAT THE RECEIPT IS THE FINAL AGREEMENT FOR COTTON'S PROPERTY.

In his Complaint, pursuant to which the $L P$ was filed, Geraci alleges the following four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract ("BOC"); (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Specific Performance; and (4) Declaratory Relief. (RJN 2.) The primary cause of action is the BOC (with
the other causes arising therefrom), which is predicated solely on the allegation the Receipt is the final written agreement for the purchase of the Property by Geraci. As alleged by Geraci in his Complaint:
(i) "On November 2, 2016, [Geraci] and [Cotton] entered into a written agreement for the purchase and sale of the [Property] on the terms and conditions stated therein." (Comp. 97.);
(ii) "On or about November 2, 2016, [Geraci] paid to [Cotton] \$10,000 good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of $\$ 800,000.00$ and to remain in effect until the license, known as a Conditional Use Permit or CUP is approved, all in accordance with the terms and conditions of the written agreement." (Comp. 98. .); and
(iii) "[Cotton] has anticipatorily breached the contract by stating that he will not perform the written agreement according to its terms. Among other things, [Cotton] has stated that, contrary to the written terms, the parties agreed to a down payment... of $\$ 50,000 \ldots$ [and] he is entitled to a $10 \%$ ownership interest in the [Property.]" (Comp. 911.$)$

Materially summarized, Geraci and Cotton are in accord that on November 2, 2016: (i) an agreement was reached for the sale of the Property; (ii) Cotton received $\$ 10,000$ from Geraci; and (iii) a document was executed by both parties on that day. However, the parties dispute what that executed document is. Cotton alleges the document, the Receipt, is just a "receipt" meant to memorialize his receipt of the $\$ 10,000$. Geraci, on the other hand, alleges the Receipt is the "final written agreement" for his purchase of the Property and that Cotton is lying about being entitled to a total $\$ 50,000$ NRD and a $10 \%$ equity stake in the Property - terms not contained in the Receipt.

Thus, the sole and case-dispositive issue in this action is a determination of whether the Receipt is a "receipt" as Cotton alleges or a "final written agreement" for the Property as Geraci alleges. The evidence is simple and clear. Geraci fraudulently induced Cotton into executing the Receipt; promising to have Austin promptly reduce the November Agreement to writing for execution. Geraci schemed to acquire the Property by misrepresenting the Receipt as the final agreement for the Property if the CUP is approved. ${ }^{6}$ Alternatively, if the CUP is denied, Geraci can simply breach his promise to pay the $\$ 40,000$

[^1]balance due on the NRD. But-for Cotton calling the City (discovering a CUP had been submitted in October of 2016), confronting Geraci about his lies and demanding him to perform or provide assurance of performance, Geraci's fraudulent scheme would have been successful.
"Fraud is a defense to breach of contract ... and the elements of contractual fraud are very similar to those of deceit. Courts analyzing tort cases often rely on contract cases (and vice versa), and may interchangeably cite the tortious deceit statutes (Civ.C. §§1709-1710) and contractual fraud statutes (Civ.C. §§1572-1573)." Rutter Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Claims \& Defenses $\mathbb{\$ 1 5 3}$ (citing Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Brodkin (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 206, 210-211; Bily v. Arthur Young \& Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 415; and 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts §767 (11 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ ed. 2017)).

Cotton, to prevail on this motion, must provide sufficient evidence to prove that Geraci will "more likely than not" fail to "obtain a judgment against [Cotton] on the [BOC] claim." CCP §405.30. He can do so by proving any one of the contractual fraud statutes for (i) Misrepresentation, (ii) Concealment, (iii) False Promise or (iv) Other Deceptive Acts. ${ }^{7}$ However, to not just prevail on this motion, but to demonstrate the complete lack of probable cause underlying this suit and the intentional malicious filing of the $L P$, Cotton establishes and proves the more difficult elements for the fraudulent tort of deceit and promissory fraud as defined by the California Supreme Court. In Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (internal citations and quotations omitted) the Court stated:

The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter'); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.
"Promissory fraud" is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud. [q]] An action for promissory fraud may lie where a [plaintiff] fraudulently induces the [defendant] to enter into a contract.

Misrepresentations. Geraci made, inter alia, the following misrepresentations: (1) Cotton's execution of the Ownership Statement was required to resolve the Critical Zoning Issue; (2) the alleged
${ }^{7}$ Civ.C. §1572(1) (Misrepresentation: "The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true."); Civ.C. §1572(3) (Concealment: "The suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact"); Civ.C. § 1572(4) (False Promise: "A promise made without any intention of performing it"); Civ.C. § 1572(5) (Other Deceptive Act: "Any other act fitted to deceive."; see Wells v. Zenz (1927) 83 Cal.App. 137, 140 (Describing this catchall provision as covering "all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise" and including deception by "surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and unfairness.")).

Critical Zoning Issue, unless first resolved with Geraci's unique and powerful political connections, prevented the submission of a CUP to the City; (3) he would pay Cotton the balance of the $\$ 50,000$ NRD before submitting the CUP to the City; (4) the Receipt would not be represented as the "final agreement" for the Property; (5) he would have his attorney, Austin, promptly reduce the November Agreement to writing; (6) he would provide Cotton a $10 \%$ equity stake in the MO; and (7) he would provide Cotton a minimum $\$ 10,000$ a month payment throughout the life of the MO (the "Seven Primary Misrepresentations").

Knowledge of Falsity. The (i) undisputed written admissions and communications by Geraci (most notably the Confirmation Email, the Confirmation Text, the Text Communications, and the March Request Email); (ii) the City Parcel Report; (iii) the fact the CUP was submitted by Geraci's agent, Berry, and accepted by the City in October 2016; and (iv) the language in the multiple drafts of the Purchase and Side Agreements prepared by Geraci's attorney, Austin, after November 2, 2016 clearly prove beyond any reasonable doubt that Geraci knew each of the Seven Primary Misrepresentations were false.

Intent to Defraud. Prior to the execution of any documents, Geraci provided his Qualification Representations and thereby characterized himself as a trustworthy, ethical, knowledgeable and politically influential individual that was uniquely positioned to help Cotton with resolving the Critical Zoning Issue and, consequently, getting a CUP approved on the Property. Thus, Geraci's Qualification Representations were material and had the intent and effect of deceiving Cotton into believing, relying and acting on Geraci's Seven Primary Misrepresentations. ${ }^{8}$

Justifiable Reliance. Based on Geraci's representations, it was reasonable and justifiable for Cotton to act as if Geraci was being truthful. "No rational party would enter into a contract anticipating that they are or will be lied to." Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993. Prior to discovering in March of 2017 that Geraci had submitted a CUP in October of 2016, Cotton, although upset at the lack of progress, had no reason to believe that Geraci was an unscrupulous individual. Thus, it was reasonable for Cotton to be induced by Geraci's representations into (i) executing the Ownership Statement, (ii) executing the Receipt, (iii) believing Geraci was diligently working on the

[^2]Critical Zoning Issue; (iv) believing Austin was working on reducing the November Agreement to writing for execution; and (v) forbearing from entering into a contract for the Property with a third-party ${ }^{9}$. It was not until Geraci refused to perform or even respond to Cotton's repeated requests for assurance of performance that Cotton justifiably terminated the November Agreement. ${ }^{10}$

Damage. It is impossible to convey in this action and motion the full scope of the irreparable and unconscionable physical and psychological damage Geraci has caused Cotton. ${ }^{11}$ However, at a minimum, Cotton is entitled to compensation for all harm caused by Geraci's breach of contract that was foreseeable. Civ.C. $\S 3300$. Some of Cotton's lost profits are recoverable as they were certain, under both the November Agreement and the original Martin Sale Agreement, he was guaranteed a monthly minimum of $\$ 10,000$. Civ.C. $\S 3301$. Furthermore, "once a person willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury, he 'is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.' (Civ.C. §1709.)" Fowler v. Fowler (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 741, 748. Here, to finance this meritless litigation, Cotton was forced to unconditionally sell his Property for a flat $\$ 500,000$ and he no longer has any equity or monthly payments even if the CUP is approved. (RJN 6, p.194.)
C. ALL OF GERACI'S ARGUMENTS ARE MEANT TO DISTRACT THIS COURT FROM THE UNDISPUTED AND CASE-DISPOSITIVE NATURE OF THE CONFIRMATION EMAIL AND OTHER EVIDENCE PROVING THE RECEIPT IS JUST A RECEIPT.
A review of the record of this action, and the related Petition for Writ of Mandate action Cotton filed against the City of San Diego ${ }^{12}$ reveals that Weinstein devotes the vast and overwhelming majority of his arguments to describing in painstaking detail, and proving with voluminous supporting evidence, the

[^3]${ }^{12}$ Darryl Cotton v. City of San Diego (Case No. 37-2017-00037675-CU-WM-CTL).
significant amount of time, energy, resources and capital that Geraci has invested in seeking to have the CUP approved. This is meant to distract the Court from the undisputed and case-dispositive nature of the Confirmation Email, the Confirmation Text, the March Request Email, the Metadata Evidence and testimony presented herein that completely remove all probable cause to support Geraci's allegation that the Receipt is the final agreement for the Property. Geraci's lengthy descriptions of his self-serving performance cannot be the basis of granting him a right of ownership to Cotton's Property. But, it does serve to distract the Court by creating the illusion - because he has invested "more than $\$ 300,000.00$ on the CUP process" - that he would only do so if he had a legal right of ownership to the Property. (Comp. 19.)

Previously, Geraci filed a Demurrer to Cotton's Cross-Complaint arguing, inter alia, the Statute of Frauds ("SOF") and the Parol Evidence Rule ("PER") should prevent admission of some of the written communications, especially the Confirmation Email, between the parties referenced above. This Court properly denied Geraci's Demurrer. However, even assuming, arguendo, the Court had ruled otherwise in the first instance, Geraci's reliance on the SOF and the PER is misplaced. First, "The doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of frauds may be applied where necessary to prevent either unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment." Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 27. Here, as described above, both unconscionable injury and unjust enrichment will occur if Geraci can misrepresent the Receipt as the final agreement for the Property. Second, the PER does not bar evidence of fraudulent promises at variance with terms of the writing: "[I]t was never intended that the parol evidence rule should be used as a shield to prevent the proof of fraud." Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass'n (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1182 (quoting Ferguson v. Koch (1928) 204 Cal. 342, 347).

Notably, the California Supreme Court in Riverisland referenced Tenzer, supra, in reaching its holding: "Tenzer disapproved a 44-year-old line of cases to bring California law into accord with the Restatement Second of Torts, holding that a fraud action is not barred when the allegedly fraudulent promise is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Considerations that were persuasive in Tenzer also support our conclusion here. The Tenzer court decided the Restatement view was better as a matter of policy. [Citation.] It noted the principle that a rule intended to prevent fraud, in that case the statute of frauds, should not be applied so as to facilitate fraud. [Citation.]" Riverisland, supra, at 1183
(emphasis added).
Litigation-hyperbole aside, it would be truly outrageous and violate all notions of justice, fairness and simple decency if Geraci could invoke the SOF or the PER to prevent his own written admissions proving his own fraud. Cotton has continuously sold and collateralized his remaining interest in the Property to finance this meritless litigation. If he loses - it is not an exaggeration, but a fact - Cotton will be destitute and homeless. ${ }^{13}$

## IV. CONCLUSION

The Receipt is the only piece of evidence Geraci has ever produced which APPEARS to grant him a right of ownership to the Property. Setting aside the other evidence referenced above (Geraci's anticipatory breach of the November Agreement and the fraud), the Confirmation Email alone is indisputably dispositive on this issue - the Receipt is just a "receipt" and not a "final written agreement" for the Property. Geraci had no probable cause to file this action and "recorded [the] lis pendens... to coerce [Cotton] to settle regardless of the merits." Hilberg, supra, at 542 ("We cannot ignore as judges what we know as lawyers - that the recording of a lis pendens is sometimes made ... to coerce an opponent to settle regardless of the merits.").

For the reasons forth above, Geraci cannot meet his burden and establish the probable validity that the Receipt is the final written agreement for the Property. Thus, respectfully, Cotton requests the Court order the $L P$ be expunged, award Cotton his attorneys' fees and costs ${ }^{14}$ (to be submitted by way of noticed motion upon this Court's ruling on this motion), and such other relief as this Court may find just and proper based on its factual findings at the hearing on this motion.

DATED: April 4, 2018

THE LAW OFFICE OF JACOB AUSTIN
ByACOB P. AUSTIN
Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant
DARRYL COTTON
${ }^{13}$ DC Decl. $921 ;$ RJN 6, p. 194 (Amendment to Martin Sale Agreement).
${ }^{14}$ Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1018 ("Under section 405.38, a prevailing party on a motion to expunge a lis pendens is entitled to recover attomey fees. The statute provides: 'The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attomey's fees and costs unjust.' ( $\$ 405.38$, italics added.)'). [Emphasis in original.]

Jacob P. Austin [SBN 290303]
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San Diego, CA 92108
Telephone: 619.357.6850
Facsimile: $\quad 888.357 .8501$
JPA@JacobAustinEsq.com
Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton
$\left[\begin{array}{c}\text { Clerk of the Superior Court } \\ E \\ \hline\end{array}\right.$
APR 042018
By: A. SEAMONS, Deputy
[Representation Limited to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens]

## SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

## COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
CASE NO. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
Plaintiff,
vs.
DARRYL COTTON, an individual; REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1-10, Inclusive, )

Defendants.
DARRYL COTTON'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXPUNGEMENT OF NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS)

DATE: April 13, 2018
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
DEPT: C-72
JUDGE: The Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
LARRY GERACI, and individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive,

Cross-Defendants.

I, Darryl Cotton ("Cotton" or "Defendant"), declare:

1. I am the owner of record of the real property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego (the "Property").
2. In or around August 2016, Geraci first contacted Cotton seeking to purchase the

Property. Geraci desired to buy the Property from Cotton because it met certain requirements of the City of San Diego ("City") to apply for and obtain a conditional use permit ("CUP") that would allow the operation of a Marijuana Outlet ("MO") at the Property. Over the ensuing months, we extensively negotiated the terms of a potential sale of the Property.
3. During these negotiations, Geraci made the following representations to me: (i) he could be trusted as reflected by the fact that he operated in a fiduciary capacity as an IRS Enrolled Agent for many powerful and high-net-worth-individuals ("HNWI"); (ii) he is the owner and operator of Tax and Financial Center, Inc., an accounting and financial advisory services company, servicing HNWI and large businesses in a fiduciary capacity; (iii) he was a California Licensed Real Estate Broker, bound by professional and ethical obligations, to be truthful in real-estate deals; (iv) through his experts, who had conducted preliminary due diligence, he had uncovered a critical zoning issue that unless first resolved would prevent the City from even accepting a CUP application on the Property (the "Critical Zoning Issue"); (v) through his professional relationships, which included his HNWI clients that were politically influential, and through powerful hired lobbyists (some of whom used to work for the City in senior positions), he was in a unique position to have the Critical Zoning Issue resolved; (vi) he was highly qualified to operate a MO because he owned and operated multiple cannabis dispensaries in San Diego; and (vii) his employee, Rebecca Berry ("Berry"), was a trustworthy individual that could be trusted to be the applicant on the CUP application because she (a) managed his marijuana dispensaries, (b) held a senior position at a church and came across as a "nice old lady that had nothing to do with marijuana," and (c), consequently, would pass the stringent City and State of California background checks required to have the CUP approved (collectively, the "Qualification Representations").
4. On or around October 31, 2016, Geraci asked me to execute Form DS-318 (Ownership Disclosure Statement) ("Ownership Statement") - a required component of all CUP applications. Geraci told me that he needed the executed Ownership Statement to show that he had access to the Property in connection with his planning and lobbying efforts to resolve the Critical Zoning Issue.
5. On November 2, 2016, Geraci and I met at Geraci's office to negotiate the final terms of the sale of the Property. At the meeting, we reached an oral agreement on the material terms for the sale of the Property (the "November Agreement"). The November Agreement consisted of the following: If the CUP was approved, then Geraci would,' inter alia, provide me: (i) a total purchase price of $\$ 800,000$; (ii) a $10 \%$ equity stake in the MO; and (iii) a minimum monthly equity distribution of $\$ 10,000$. If the CUP was denied I would keep an agreed upon $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit
("NRD") and the transaction would not close. In other words, the issuance of the CUP at the Property was a condition precedent for closing on the sale of the Property and, if the CUP was denied, I would keep my Property and the $\$ 50,000$ NRD.
6. At the November 2, 2016 meeting, we reached the November Agreement, Geraci: (i) provided me with $\$ 10,000$ in cash towards the NRD of $\$ 50,000$, for which I executed a document to record my receipt thereof (the "Receipt"); (ii) promised to have his attorney, Gina Austin ("Austin"), promptly reduce the oral November Agreement to written agreements for execution; and (iii) promised to not submit the CUP to the City until he paid me the balance on the NRD.
7. After Geraci and I met on November 2, 2016, reached the November Agreement, executed the Receipt and separated we had a series of email communications that took place that same day. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of all emails between Geraci and I.
8. The day I received a copy of the Receipt from Geraci, I realized it could be misconstrued as a final agreement for the Property. Because I was concerned, and wanted there to be no uncertainty, I requested Geraci confirm in writing the Receipt was not a final agreement. Geraci replied and I refer to this email from him as the "Confirmation Email."
9. Thereafter, over the course of almost five months, we exchanged numerous emails, texts and calls regarding various issues related to the Critical Zoning Issue, the CUP application and drafts of the final written agreements for the Property (included in Exhibit 1). However, Geraci continuously failed to make actual, substantive progress. Most notably, he failed to provide me the final written agreements, pay the balance of the NRD, and to provide facts regarding the progress being made on the Critical Zoning Issue.
10. Regarding the Critical Zoning Issue, Geraci and exchanged a series of texts. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of text messages between Geraci and I from January 6, 2017 and February 7, 2017.
11. These text communications made me think, among other things, that Geraci was being truthful about working on and making progress on the Critical Zoning Issue (the "Text Communications").
12. On March 3, 2017, I emailed Geraci regarding a draft agreement that was supposed to contain, inter alia, my $10 \%$ equity stake in the MO. Geraci did not reply to my email. Geraci did not pick up when I called later. I grew exasperated, and later followed-up with Geraci via text wanting to confirm that Geraci had received my email and understood my concern - that the Side Agreement did
not provide for my " $10 \%$ equity position" in the MO.
13. On March 6, 2017, Geraci and I spoke regarding revisions required to have the drafts accurately reflect the November Agreement. I communicated my frustration with the delays and Geraci again promised to have Austin promptly correct the mistakes in the drafts. During that conversation, I let Geraci know that I would be attending a local cannabis event at which Austin was scheduled to be the headnote speaker. Geraci later texted me that I could speak with her directly at the event.
14. I was unable to attend the event that night. However, I had grown suspicious of Geraci because of his continuous failure to accurately have Austin reduce the November Agreement to writing. So, I had already set in place a contingency plan. I requested the help of Mr. Joe Hurtado, a financial transaction adviser, and asked him to help me locate a new buyer for the Property. I asked him to attend the event so that he could tell Austin I would not attend to discuss the revisions to the agreement and so he could confirm with her directly that Geraci and I had not executed a final written agreement yet.
15. On March 7, 2017, Geraci sent me an email. Attached to Geraci's email was a revised draft of the Side Agreement in Word format. The embedded metadata to the Word file of the agreement states the file was created "March 3, 2017" and the author of the document is "Gina Austin (the "Metadata Evidence"). Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of screen shot of that Metadata Evidence.
16. On March 16, 2017, after having reviewed the revised agreement forwarded by Geraci on March 7, 2017, and discovering that it again did not accurately reflect the November Agreement, I decided to follow up with the City regarding the Critical Zoning Issue personally. It was at this point that I discovered that Geraci had been lying from the very beginning - Geraci had submitted a CUP for the Property on October 31 2016, before we even reached the November Agreement. Submitted herewith with the accompanying Request for Judicial Notice is a copy of a Parcel Information Report provided by the City of San Diego, Development Services Department ("City Parcel Report") that states the zoning of the Property was changed to "CO-2-1" (MO qualifying zone) on January 14, 2016.
17. On March 21, 2017, because Geraci neither responded to my requests for assurance of performance, provide the November Agreement reduced to writing as required per the November Agreement, and I had found out that he had lied to me about numerous matters, I terminated the contract with Geraci via email.
18. Because I had already anticipated Geraci's breach from his evasive language and failure
to confirm he would honor his end of the bargain, I had already lined up another buyer and I entered into a written purchase agreement for the sale of the Property to Mr. Martin (the "Martin Sale Agreement").
19. The next day, Geraci's counsel, Michael Weinstein ("Weinstein"), emailed me the Complaint and the lis pendens filed on my Property.
20. On January 25,2018 , I attended a hearing before Judge Wohlfeil on a motion to compel me to respond to certain discovery requests by Geraci. In my opposition to that motion, I described what I believed were the unethical actions by, inter alia, Austin and Weinstein. At the beginning of the hearing, Judge Wohlfeil told me that he knew them well and that he did not believe they would engage in the unethical actions I described in my opposition.
21. I have no other assets other than my Property. I have borrowed against the sale of the Property. If I lose this litigation, even assuming I do not have to pay Geraci's legal fees, the equity I would receive does not cover the debt that I owe. I have long ago exhausted all personal and professional sources of capital. I am facing daily financial hardship. If I lose this property, I will have no means by which to subsist.
22. I underwent an Independent Psychiatric Assessment (the "IPA") with Dr. Markus Ploesser. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the IPA.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on April 4, 2018 at San Diego, California.


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## E-MAILS BETWEEN COTTON AND GERACI 10/24/16-03/21/17



## Drawing

Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)<br>Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 12:38 PM<br>To: Darryl Cotton <darry@@inda-gro.com>

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

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From: darryl@dalbercia.us [mailto:darry|@dalbercia.us] On Behalf Of Darryl Cotton
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 12:37 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Subject: Test Send

Darryl Cotton, President

darryl@inda-gro.com
www.inda-gro.com
Ph: 877.452.2244
Cell: 619.954.4447
Skype: dc.dalbercia

6176 Federal Blvd.
San Diego, CA. 92114
USA

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A102 Site Plan - Proposed - Scheme B.pdf
399 K

## Agreement

1

Larry Geraci [Larry@lfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@lfcsd.net)
Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 3:11 PM

Fax: 858.630.3900

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## Cotton \& Geracl Contract.pdf 71K

Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Dàrryl Cotton:

Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, CA for a sum of $\$ 800,000.00$ to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marljuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applled to the sales price of $\$ 800,000.00$ and to remain in effect untillicense is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts on thls property.


## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

> A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the Identity of the individual who signed the document which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

## State of California

County of


On November $2, \partial 0 l l$ before me. $\frac{\text { Jessica Ne Ne ell Notary Pleblie }}{\text { (insert name and title of the officer) }}$
personally appeared Darryl Cotton and Larry Gran.
who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the persons) whose name (s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(les), and that by his/her/thair signatures) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the persons) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Signature fer
Duce (Seal)

## Re: Agreement

1 message
Larry Geracl [Larry@ffcsd.net](mailto:Larry@ffcsd.net)
Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 9:13 PM
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
No no problem at all
Sent from my iPhone
On Nov 2, 2016, at 6:55 PM, Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com) wrote:

## Hi Larry,

Thank you for meeting today. Since we executed the Purchase Agreement in your office for the sale price of the property I just noticed the $10 \%$ equity position in the dispensary was not language added into that document. I just want to make sure that we're not missing that language in any final agreement as it is a factored element in my decision to sell the property. l'll be fine if you would simply acknowledge that here in a reply.

Regards.

Darryl Cotton, President

darry|@inda-gro.com
www.inda-gro.com
Ph: 877.452.2244
Cell: 619.954.4447
Skype: dc.dalbercia
6176 Federal Blvd.
San Diego, CA. 92114
USA

NOTICE: The information contained in the above message is confidential information solely for the use of the intended reciplent. If the reader of this message is not the intended reciplent, the reader is notifled that any use, dlssemination, distributlon or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify Inda-Gro immediately by teiephone at 619.266.4004.

## Federal Blvd need sig ASAP

Larry Geracl [Larry@tfosd.net](mailto:Larry@tfosd.net)
Hi Darryl,

Can you sign and email back to me asap?

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900


IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specifically noted, any federal tax advice in this communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materials) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties: furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addresses. This email is considered a confidentiai communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have raceived this in error, please contact us at (858)576-1040 and return this to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of this confidentiai information, and you are not the intended reciplent, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Piease notify the sender of this facsimile immediately and arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

## Authorization to view and copy Building Records from the County of San D....pdf 35K

Authorization to view and copy Building Records from the County of San Diego Tax Assessor

I, Darryl Cotton, owner of the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, San Diego, CA (APN 543-020-02-00) authorize Abhay Schweitzer, Benjamin Peterson, and/or Carlos Gonzalez of TECHNE to view and make copies of the County of San Diego Tax Assessor Building Records.

## Signature



Date

## Federal Blvd Property

Larry Geraci [Larry@tfesd.net](mailto:Larry@tfesd.net)
Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 8:49 AM
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)

Hi Daryl,

Attached is the draft purchase of the property for 400k. The additional contract for the 400k should be in today and I will forward it to you as well.

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specifically noted, any federai tax advice in this communication (inciuding any atlachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materials) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters It addresses. This emall is considered a confidential communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have received this in error, please contact us af (858)576-1040 and return this to us or destroy If immediately. If you are in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immediately and arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

## 团 17-0226 Fed Blvd Comm Purchase v3 (First Draft).pdf 347 K

## AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

THIS AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY ("Agreement") is made and entered into this $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ , 2017, by and between DARRYL COTTON, an individual resident of San Diego, CA ("Seller"), and 6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST dated $\qquad$ , 2017, or its assignee ("Buyer").

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is mutually covenanted and agreed by Seller and Buyer as follows:

1. DEFINTTIONS. For the purposes of this Agreement the following terms will be defined as follows:
a. "Real Property": That certain real property commonly known as 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, Califomia, as legally described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof.
b. "Date of Agreement": The latest date of execution of the Seller or the Buyer, as indicated on the signature page.
c. "Purchase Price": The Purchase Price for the Property (defined below) is Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000.00$ ).
d. "Due Diligence Period": The period that expires at 5:00 p.m., Califomia time, on the date the CUP (defined below) is issued to Buyer or its designated assign.
e. "Escrow Agent": The Escrow Agent is: [NAME]
f. "Title Company": The Title Company is: [NAME]
g. "Title Approval Date": The Title Approval Date shall be twenty (20) days following Buyer's receipt of a Preliminary Title Report and all underlying documents.
h. "Closing", "Closing Date" and "Close of Escrow": These terms are used interchangeably in this Agreement. The closing shall occur on or at 5:00 p.m., Califomia time, on the date fifteen (15) days from the date Buyer or its designated assign is approved by the city of San Diego for a conditional use permit to distribute medical marijuana from the Real Property ("CUP"). Notwithstanding the foregoing, in no event shall Closing occur later than March 1, 2018, unless mutually agreed by the parties.
i. "Notices" will be sent as follows to:

Buyer: 6176 Federal Blvd. Trust 6176 Federal Blvd.

# San Diego, California 92114 

Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:

| with a copy to: | Austin Legal Group, APC 3990 Old Town Ave, A-1 12 San Diego, CA 92110, |
| :---: | :---: |
| Seller: | Darryl Cotton |
|  | Address: |
|  | City, State, Zip |
|  | Attn: |
|  | Fax No.: |
|  | Phone No.: |
| Escrow Agent: | [NAME] |
|  | [ADDRESS] |

2. PURCHASE AND SALE. Subject to all of the terms and conditions of this Agreement and for the consideration set forth, upon Closing Seller shall convey to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from Seller, all of the following:
a. The Real Property and all of Seller's interest in all buildings, improvements, facilities, fixtures and paving thereon or associated therewith (collectively, the "Improvements"), together with all easements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions in accordance with Section 5.b;
b. All other right, title and interest of Seller constituting part and parcel of the Property (hereinafter defined), including, but not limited to, all lease rights, agreements, easements, licenses, permits, tract maps, subdivision/condominium filings and approvals, air rights, sewer agreements, water line agreements, utility agreements, water rights, oil, gas and mineral rights, all licenses and permits related to the Property, and all plans, drawings, engineering studies located within, used in connection with, or related to the Property, if any in Seller's possession (collectively, the "Intangibles"). (Reference herein to the "Property" shall include the Real Property, Improvements, and Intangibles).
3. PURCHASE PRICE AND PAYMENT; DEPOSIT. The Purchase Price will be paid as follows:
a. Deposit. There shall be no Deposit required. It is acknowledged and agreed that Buyer has provided Seller alternative consideration in lieu of the Deposit.
b. Cash Balance. Buyer shall deposit into Escrow the cash balance of the Purchase Price, plus or minus prorations and costs pursuant to Section 15, in the form of cash, bank
cashier's check or confirmed wire transfer of funds not less than one (1) business day prior to the Close of Escrow.

## 4. ESCROW.

a. Execution of Form Escrow Instructions. Seller shall deposit this Agreement with Escrow Agent upon full execution of same by Buyer and Seller, at which time escrow (the "Escrow") shall be deemed to be opened. Escrow Agent shall thereafter promptly execute the original of this Agreement, provide copies thereof to Buyer and Seller. Immediately upon receipt of such duly executed copy of this Agreement, Escrow Agent shall also notify Seller and Buyer of the opening of Escrow. This Agreement shall act as escrow instructions to Escrow Agent, and Escrow Agent shall hereby be authorized and instructed to deliver the documents and monies to be deposited into the Escrow pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Escrow Agent shall prepare the Escrow Agent's standard-form escrow agreement (if such a form is required by Escrow Agent), which shall, to the extent that the same is consistent with the terms hereof and approved by Seller and Buyer and not exculpate Escrow Agent from acts of negligence and/or willful misconduct, inure to the benefit of Escrow Agent. Said standard form escrow instructions shall be executed by Buyer and Seller and returned to Escrow Agent within three (3) business days from the date same are received from Escrow Agent. To the extent that Escrow Agent's standard-form escrow agreement is inconsistent with the terms hereof, the terms of this Agreement shall control. Should either party fail to return the standard form escrow instructions to Escrow Agent in a timely manner, such failure shall not constitute a material breach of this Agreement.
b. Close of Escrow. Except as provided below, Escrow shall close no later than the date provided for in Section 1, above.
c. Failure to Receive CUP. Should Buyer be denied its application for the CUP or otherwise abandon its CUP application, it shall have the option to terminate this Agreement by written notice to Seller, and the parties shall have no further liability to one another, except for the "Buyer's Indemnity" (as detailed in Section 8 below).

## 5. TITLE MATTERS.

a. Preliminary Title Report/Review of Title. As soon as practicable, but in no event later than five (5) business days after the Date of Agreement, Escrow Agent shall have delivered or shall cause to be delivered to Buyer a Preliminary Title Report issued by Title Company covering the Property (the "Preliminary Title Report"), together with true copies of all documents evidencing matters of record shown as exceptions to title thereon. Buyer shall have the right to object to any exceptions contained in the Preliminary Title Report and thereby disapprove the condition of title by giving written notice to Seller on or before the Title Approval Date as defined in Section 1. Any such disapproval shall specify with particularity the defects Buyer disapproves. Buyer's failure to timely disapprove in writing shall be deemed an approval of all exceptions. If Buyer disapproves of any matter affecting title, Seller shall have the option to elect to (i) cure or remove any one or more of such exceptions by notifying Buyer within five (5) business days from Seller's receipt of Buyer's disapproval, or (ii) terminate this Agreement, in which event Buyer shall receive a refund of its Deposit and all accrued interest, and the parties shall have no
further liability to one another, except for the Buyer's Indemnity. Seller's failure to timely notify Buyer of its election, as provided above, shall conclusively be deemed to be Seller's election to terminate this Agreement. For three (3) business days following Seller's actual or deemed election to terminate this Agreement, Buyer shall have the right to waive, in writing, any one or more of such title defects that Seller has not elected to cure or remove and thereby rescind Seller's election to terminate and close Escrow, taking title to the Property subject to such title exceptions.
b. Permitted Exceptions. The following exceptions shown on the Preliminary Title Report (the "Permitted Exceptions") are approved by Buyer:
(1) Real property taxes not yet due and payable as of the Closing Date, which shall be apportioned as hereinafter provided in Section 15;
(2) Unpaid installments of assessments not due and payable on or before the Closing Date;
(3) Any matters affecting the Property that are created by, or with the written consent of, Buyer;
(4) The pre-printed exclusions and exceptions that appear in the Owner's Title Policy issued by the Title Company; and
(5) Any matter to which Buyer has not delivered a notice of a Title Objection in accordance with the terms of Section 5.a hereof.

Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything else to the contrary, Seller shall be obligated, regardless of whether Buyer objects to any such item or exception, to remove or cause to be removed on or before Closing, any and all mortgages, deeds of trust or similar liens securing the repayment of money affecting title to the Property, mechanic's liens, materialmen's liens, judgment liens, liens for delinquent taxes and/or any other liens or security interests ("Mandatory Cure Items").
c. Title Policy. The Title Policy shall be an ALTA Standard Owners Policy with liability in the amount of the Purchase Price, showing fee title to the Property as vested in Buyer, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions. At Buyer's election, the Title Policy to be delivered to Buyer shall be an ALTA Extended Owners Policy, provided that the issuance of said ALTA Policy does not delay the Close of Escrow. The issuance by Title Company of the standard Title Policy in favor of Buyer, insuring fee title to the Property to Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions, shall be conclusive evidence that Seller has complied with any obligation, express or implied, to convey good and marketable title to the Property to Buyer.
d. Title and Survey Costs. The cost of the standard portion of the premium for the Title Policy shall be paid by the Seller. Buyer shall pay for the survey, if necessary, and the premium for the ALTA portion of the Title Policy and all endorsements requested by Buyer.
6. SELLER'S DELIVERY OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS. Seller has provided to Buyer those necessary documents and materials respecting the Property identified on Exhibit "B", attached hereto and made a part hereof ("Property Information"). The Property Information shall include, inter alia, all disclosures from Seller regarding the Property required by California and federal law.
7. DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer shall have through the last day of the Due Diligence Period, as defined in Section 1, in which to examine, inspect, and investigate the Property Information, the Property and any other relating to the Property or its use and or Compliance with any applicable zoning ordinances, regulations, licensing or permitting affecting its use or Buyer's intention use and, in Buyers sole discretion) and, in Buyer's sole and absolute judgment and discretion, to determine whether the Property is acceptable to Buyer in its present condition and to obtain all necessary internal approvals. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, Buyer may terminate this Agreement by giving notice of termination (a "Due Diligence Termination Notice") to Seller on or before the last day of the Due Diligence Period, in which event Buyer shall receive the immediate return of the Deposit and this Agreement shall terminate, except that Buyer's Indemnities set forth on Section 8, shall survive such termination.

## 8. PHYSICAL INSPECTION; BUYERS INDEMNITIES.

a. Buyer shall have the right, upon reasonable notice and during regular business hours, to physically inspect on a non-intrusive basis, and to the extent Buyer desires, to cause one or more representatives of Buyer to physically inspect on a non-intrusive basis, the Property without interfering with the occupants or operation of the Property Buyer shall make all inspections in good faith and with due diligence. All inspection fees, appraisal fees, engineering fees and other expenses of any kind incurred by Buyer relating to the inspection of the Property will be solely Buyer's expense. Seller shall cooperate with Buyer in all reasonable respects in making such inspections. To the extent that a Phase I environmental assessment acceptable to Seller justifies it, Buyer shall have the right to have an independent environmental consultant conduct an environmental inspection in excess of a Phase I assessment of the Property. Buyer shall notify Seller not less than one (1) business day in advance of making any inspections or interviews. In making any inspection or interviews hereunder, Buyer will treat, and will cause any representative of Buyer to treat, all information obtained by Buyer pursuant to the terms of this Agreement as strictly confidential except for such information which Buyer is required to disclose to its consultants, attorneys, lenders and transferees.
b. Buyer agrees to keep the Property free and clear of all mechanics' and materialmen's liens or other liens arising out of any of its activities or those of its representatives, agents or contractors. Buyer shall indemnify, defend (through legal counsel reasonably acceptable to Seller), and hold Seller, and the Property, harmless from all damage, loss or liability, including without limitation attorneys' fees and costs of court, mechanics' liens or claims, or claims or assertions thereof arising out of or in connection with the entry onto, or occupation of the Property by Buyer, its agents, employees and contractors and subcontractors. This indemnity shall survive the sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or, if such sale is not consummated, the termination of this Agreement. After each such inspection or investigation of the Property,

Buyer agrees to immediately restore the Property or cause the Property to be restored to its condition before each such inspection or investigation look place, at Buyer's sole expense.
9. COVENANTS OF SELLER. During the period from the Date of Agreement until the earlier of termination of the Agreement or the Close of Escrow, Seller agrees to the following:
a. Seller shall not permit or suffer to exist any new encumbrance, charge or lien or allow any easements affecting all or any portion of the Property to be placed or claimed upon the Property unless such encumbrance, charge, lien or easement has been approved in writing by Buyer or unless such monetary encumbrance, charge or lien will be removed by Seller prior to the Close of Escrow.
b. Seller shall not execute or amend, modify, renew, extend or terminate any contract without the prior written consent of Buyer, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If Buyer fails to provide Seller with notice of its consent or refusal to consent, Buyer shall be deemed to have approved such contract or modification, except that no contract entered into by Seller shall be for a period longer than thirty (30) days and shall be terminable by the giving of a thirty (30) day notice.
c. Seller shall notify Buyer of any new matter that it obtains actual knowledge of affecting title in any manner, which was not previously disclosed to Buyer by the Title Report. Buyer shall notify Seller within five (5) business days of receipt of notice of its acceptance or rejection of such new matter. If Buyer rejects such matter, Seller shall notify Buyer within five (5) business days whether it will cure such matter. If Seller does not elect to cure such matter within such period, Buyer may terminate this Agreement or waive its prior disapproval within three (3) business days.

## 10. REPRESENTATIONS OF SELLER.

a. Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that:
(1) The execution and delivery by Seller of, and Seller's performance under, this Agreement are within Seller's powers and have been duly authorized by all requisite action.
(2) This Agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Seller, enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to laws applicable generally to applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws or equitable principles affecting or limiting the right of contracting parties generally.
(3) Performance of this Agreement by Seller will not result in a breach of, or constitute any default under any agreement or instrument to which Seller is a party, which breach or default will adversely affect Seller's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement.
(4) To Seller's knowledge, without duty of inquiry, the Property is not presently the subject of any condemnation or similar proceeding, and to Seller's knowledge, no such condemnation or similar proceeding is currently threatened or pending.
(5) To Seller's knowledge, there are no management, service, supply or maintenance contracts affecting the Property which shall affect the Property on or following the Close of Escrow except as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and made a part hereof.
(6) Seller is not a "foreign person" within the meaning of Section 1445 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (i.e., Seller is not a non-resident alien, foreign corporation, foreign partnership, foreign trust or foreign estate as those terms are defined in the Code and regulations promulgated).
(7) Seller (a) is not in receivership; (b) has not made any assignment related to the Property for the benefit of creditors; (c) has not admitted in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature; (d) has not been adjudicated a bankrupt; (e) has not filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, a petition or answer seeking reorganization, or an arrangement with creditors under the Federal Bankruptcy Law or any other similar law or statute of the United States or any state, and ( $f$ ) does not have any such petition described in Clause (e) hereof filed against Seller.
(8) Seller has not received written notice, nor to the best of its knowledge is it aware, of any actions, suits or proceedings pending or threatened against Seller which affect title to the Property, or which would question the validity or enforceability of this Agreement or of any action taken by Seller under this Agreement, in any court or before any governmental authority, domestic or foreign.
(9) Unless otherwise disclosed herein in Exhibit D, to Seller's knowledge without duty of inquiry, there does not exists any conditions or pending or threatening lawsuits which would materially affect the Property, including but not limited to, underground storage, tanks, soil and ground water.
(10) That Seller has delivered to Buyer all written information, records, and studies in Seller's possession concerning hazardous, toxic, or governmentally regulated materials that are or have been stored, handled, disposed of, or released on the Property.
b. If after the expiration of the Due Diligence Period but prior to the Closing, Buyer or any of Buyer's partners, members, trustees and any officers, directors, employees, agents, representatives and attorneys of Buyer, its partners, members or trustees (the "Buyer's Representatives") obtains knowledge that any of the representations or warranties made herein by Seller are untrue, inaccurate or incorrect in any material respect, Buyer shall give Seller written notice thereof within three (3) business days of obtaining such knowledge (but, in any event, prior to the Closing). If at or prior to the Closing, Seller obtains actual knowledge that any of the representations or warranties made herein by Seller are untrue, inaccurate or incorrect in any material respect, Seller shall give Buyer written notice thereof within three (3) business days of obtaining such knowledge (but, in any event, prior to the Closing). In such cases, Buyer, may elect either (a) to consummate the transaction, or (b) to terminate this Agreement by written notice given
to Seller on the Closing Date, in which event this Agreement shall be terminated, the Property Information returned to the Seller and, thereafter, neither party shall have any further rights or obligations hereunder except as provided in any section hereof that by its terms expressly provides that it survives the termination of this Agreement.
c. The representations of Seller set forth herein shall survive the Close of Escrow for a period of twelve (12) months.
11. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES BY BUYER.
a. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller that:
(9) Buyer is duly organized and legally existing, the execution and delivery by Buyer of, and Buyer's performance under, this Agreement are within Buyer's organizational powers, and Buyer has the authority to execute and deliver this Agreement.
(10) This Agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Buyer enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to laws applicable generally to applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws or equitable principles affecting or limiting the rights of contracting parties generally.
(11) Performance of this Agreement will not result in any breach of, or constitute any default under, any agreement or other instrument to which Buyer is a party, which breach or default will adversely affect Buyer's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement.
(12) Buyer (a) is not in receivership or dissolution, (b) has not made any assignment for the benefit of creditors, (c) has not admitted in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature, (d) has not been adjudicated a bankrupt, (e) has not filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, a petition or answer seeking reorganization, or an arrangement with creditors under the federal bankruptcy law, or any other similar law or statute of the United States or any state, or (f) does not have any such petition described in (e) filed against Buyer.
(5) Buyer hereby warrants and agrees that, prior to Closing, Buyer shall (i) conduct all examinations, inspections and investigations of each and every aspect of the Property, (ii) review all relevant documents and materials concerning the Property, and (iii) ask all questions related to the Property, which are or might be necessary, appropriate or desirable to enable Buyer to acquire full and complete knowledge concerning the condition and fitness of the Property, its suitability for any use and otherwise with respect to the Property.
12. DAMAGE. Risk of loss up to and including the Closing Date shall be borne by Seller. Seller shall immediately notify Buyer in writing of the extent of any damage to the Property. In the event of any material damage to or destruction of the Property or any portion thereof, Buyer
may, at its option, by notice to Seller given within ten (10) days after Buyer is notified of such damage or destruction (and if necessary the Closing Date shall be extended to give Buyer the full ten (10) day period to make such election): (i) terminate this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be immediately returned to Buyer or (ii) proceed under this Agreement, receive any insurance proceeds (including any rent loss insurance applicable to any period on and after the Closing Date) due Seller as a result of such damage or destruction and assume responsibility for such repair, and Buyer shall receive a credit at Closing for any deductible, uninsured or coinsured amount under said insurance policies. If Buyer elects (ii) above, Seller will cooperate with Buyer after the Closing to assist Buyer in obtaining the insurance proceeds from Seller's insurers. If the Property is not materially damaged, then Buyer shall not have the right to terminate this Agreement, but Seller shall at its cost repair the damage before the Closing in a manner reasonably satisfactory to Buyer or if repairs cannot be completed before the Closing, credit Buyer at Closing for the reasonable cost to complete the repair. "Material damage" and "Materially damaged" means damage reasonably exceeding ten percent ( $10 \%$ ) of the Purchase Price to repair or that entitles a tenant to terminate its Lease.
13. CONDEMNATION. Seller shall immediately notify Buyer of any proceedings in eminent domain that are contemplated, threatened or instituted by anybody having the power of eminent domain over Property. Within ten (10) days after Buyer receives written notice from Seller of proceedings in eminent domain that are contemplated, threatened or instituted by anybody having the power of eminent domain, and if necessary the Closing Date shall be extended to give Buyer the full ten (10) day period to make such election, Buyer may: (i) terminate this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be immediately returned to Buyer; or (ii) proceed under this Agreement, in which event Seller shall, at the Closing, assign to Buyer its entire right, title and interest in and to any condemnation award related to the Real Property, and Buyer shall have the sole right during the pendency of this Agreement to negotiate and otherwise deal with the condemning authority in respect of such matter. Buyer shall not have any right or claim to monies relating to Sellers loss of income prior to closing.

## 14. CLOSING

a. Closing Date. The consummation of the transaction contemplated herein ("Closing") shall occur on or before the Closing Date set forth in Section 1. Closing shall occur through Escrow with the Escrow Agent. Unless otherwise stated herein, all funds shall be deposited into and held by Escrow Agent. Upon satisfaction or completion of all closing conditions and deliveries, the parties shall direct the Escrow Agent to immediately record and deliver the closing documents to the appropriate parties and make disbursements according to the closing statement executed by Seller and Buyer. The Escrow Agent shall agree in writing with Buyer that (1) recordation of the Deed constitutes its representation that it is holding the closing documents, closing funds and closing statements and is prepared and irrevocably committed to disburse the closing funds in accordance with the closing statements and (2) release of funds to the Seller shall irrevocably commit it to issue the Title Policy in accordance with this Agreement.
b. Seller's Deliveries in Escrow. On or prior to the Closing Date, Seller shall deliver in escrow to the Escrow Agent the following:
(13) Deed. A Special Warranty Deed mutually satisfactory to the parties, executed and acknowledged by Seller, conveying to Buyer good, indefeasible and marketable fee simple title to the Property, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions (the "Deed").
(14) Assignment of Intangible Property. Such assignments and other documents and certificates as Buyer may reasonably require in order to fully and completely transfer and assign to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest, in and to the Intangibles, all documents and contracts related thereto, Leases, and any other permits, rights applicable to the Property, and any other documents and/or materials applicable to the Property, if any. Such assignment or similar document shall include an indemnity by Buyer to Seller for all matters relating to the assigned rights, and benefits following the Closing Date.
(3) Assignment and Assumption of Contracts. An assignment and assumption of Leases from Seller to Buyer of landlord's interest in the Leases.
(4) FIRPTA. A non-foreign person affidavit that meets the requirements of Section 1445(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
(5) Additional Documents. Any additional documents that may be reasonably required for the consummation of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
c. Buyer's Deliveries in Escrow. On or prior to the Closing Date, Buyer shall deliver in escrow to the Escrow Agent the following:
(1) Purchase Price. The Purchase Price, less the Deposits, plus or minus applicable prorations, deposited by Buyer with the Escrow Agent in immediate funds wired or deposited for credit into the Escrow Agent's escrow account.
(2) Assumption of Intangible Property. A duly executed assumption of the Assignment referred to in Section 14.b(2).
(3) Authority. Evidence of existence, organization, and authority of Buyer and the authority of the person executing documents on behalf of Buyer reasonably required by the Title Company.
(4) Additional Documents. Any additional documents that may be reasonably required for the consummation of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
d. Closing Statements. Seller and Buyer shall each execute and deposit the closing statement, such transfer tax declarations and such other instruments as are reasonably required by the Title Company or otherwise required to close the Escrow and consummate the acquisition of the Property in accordance with the terms hereof. Seller and Buyer hereby designate Escrow Agent as the "Reporting Person" for the transaction pursuant to Section 6045(e) of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder and agree to execute such documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate such designation.
e. Title Policy. The Escrow Agent shall deliver to Buyer the Title Policy required hereby.
f. Possession. Seller shall deliver possession of the Property to Buyer at the Closing subject to the Permitted Exceptions, and shall deliver to Buyer all keys, security codes and other information necessary for Buyer to assume possession.
g. Transfer of Title. The acceptance of transfer of title to the Property by Buyer shall be deemed to be full performance and discharge of any and all obligations on the part of Seller to be performed pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, except where such agreements and obligations are specifically stated to survive the transfer of title.
15. COSTS, EXPENSES AND PRORATIONS.
a. Seller Will Pay. At the Closing, Seller shall be charged the following:
(1) All premiums for an ALTA Standard Coverage Title Policy;
(2) One-half of all escrow fees and costs;
(3) Seller's share of prorations; and
(4) One-half of all transfer taxes.
b. Buyer Will Pay. At the Closing, Buyer shall pay:
(1) All document recording charges;
(2) One-half of all escrow fees and costs;
(3) Additional charge for an ALTA Extended Coverage Title Policy, and the endorsements required by Buyer;
(4) One-half of all transfer taxes; and
(5) Buyer's share of prorations.
c. Prorations.
(1) Taxes. All non-delinquent real estate taxes and assessments on the Property will be prorated as of the Closing Date based on the actual current tax bill. If the Closing Date takes place before the real estate taxes are fixed for the tax year in which the Closing Date occurs, the apportionment of real estate taxes will be made on the basis of the real estate taxes for the immediately preceding tax year applied to the latest assessed valuation. All delinquent taxes and all delinquent assessments, if any, on the Property will be paid at the Closing Date from funds accruing to Seller. All supplemental taxes billed after the Closing Date for periods prior to the

Closing Date will be paid promptly by Seller. Any tax refunds received by Buyer which are allocable to the period prior to Closing will be paid by Buyer to Seller.
(2) Utilities. Gas, water, electricity, heat, fuel, sewer and other utilities and the operating expenses relating to the Property shall be prorated as of the Close of Escrow. If the parties hereto are unable to obtain final meter readings as of the Close of Escrow, then such expenses shall be estimated as of the Close of Escrow based on the prior operating history of the Property.

## 16. CLOSING DELIVERIES.

a. Disbursements And Other Actions by Escrow Agent. At the Closing, Escrow Agent will promptly undertake all of the following:
(1) Funds. Disburse all funds deposited with Escrow Agent by Buyer in payment of the Purchase Price for the Property as follows:
(a) Deliver to Seller the Purchase Price, less the amount of all items, costs and prorations chargeable to the account of Seller; and
(b) Disburse the remaining balance, if any, of the funds deposited by Buyer to Buyer, less amounts chargeable to Buyer.
(2) Recording. Cause the Special Warranty Deed (with documentary transfer tax information to be affixed after recording) to be recorded with the San Diego County Recorder and obtain conformed copies thereof for distribution to Buyer and Seller.
(3) Title Policy. Direct the Title Company to issue the Title Policy to Buyer.
(4) Delivery of Documents to Buyer or Seller. Deliver to Buyer the any documents (or copies thereof) deposited into escrow by Seller. Deliver to Seller any other documents (or copies thereof) deposited into Escrow by Buyer.

## 17. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES :

a. Seller's Default. If Seller fails to comply in any material respect with any of the provisions of this Agreement, subject to a right to cure, or breaches any of its representations or warranties set forth in this Agreement prior to the Closing, then Buyer may:
(1) Terminate this Agreement and neither party shall have any further rights or obligations hereunder, except for the obligations of the parties which are expressly intended to survive such termination; or
(2) Bring an action against Seller to seek specific performance of Seller's obligations hereunder.
b. Buyer's Default - Liquidated Damages. IF BUYER FAILS TO TIMELY COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT DUE TO ITS DEFAULT, SELLER SHALL BE RELEASED FROM ITS OBLIGATION TO SELL THE PROPERTY TO BUYER. BUYER AND SELLER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL AND/OR EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIX OR ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY SELLER AS A RESULT OF SUCH DEFAULT BY BUYER, AND AGREE THAT THE DEPOSITS ARE A REASONABLE APPROXIMATION THEREOF. ACCORDINGLY, IN THE EVENT THAT BUYER FAILS TO COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT DUE TO ITS DEFAULT, THE DEPOSIT SHALL CONSTITUTE AND BE DEEMED TO BE THE AGREED AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF SELLER, AND SHALL BE SELLER'S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. SELLER AGREES TO WAIVE ALL OTHER REMEDIES AGAINST BUYER WHICH SELLER MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE AT LAW OR IN EQUITY BY REASON OF SUCH DEFAULT BY BUYER. THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE A FORFEITURE OR PENALTY, BUT ARE INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES TO SELLER.

## $\overline{\text { Seller's Initials }}$ Buyer's Initials

c. Escrow Cancellation Following a Termination Notice. If either party terminates this Agreement as permitted under any provision of this Agreement by delivering a termination notice to Escrow Agent and the other party, Escrow shall be promptly cancelled and, Escrow Agent shall return all documents and funds to the parties who deposited them, less applicable Escrow cancellation charges and expenses. Promptly upon presentation by Escrow Agent, the parties shall sign such instruction and other instruments as may be necessary to effect the foregoing Escrow cancellation.
d. Other Expenses. If this Agreement is terminated due to the default of a party, then the defaulting party shall pay any fees due to the Escrow Agent for holding the Deposits and any fees due to the Title Company in connection with issuance of the Preliminary Title report and other title matters (together, "Escrow Cancellation Charges"). If Escrow fails to close for any reason, other than a default under this Agreement, Buyer and Seller shall each pay one-half ( $1 / 2$ ) of any Escrow Cancellation Charges.

## 18. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Exhibits and schedules hereto, contains all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements are replaced in total by this Agreement together with the Exhibits and schedules hereto.
b. Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
c. Attomeys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attomeys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
d. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
e. Goveming Law. This Agreement shall be govemed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Califomia.
f. Confidentiality and Retum of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential any and all material obtained about the other or, in the case of Buyer, about the Property or its operations, this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party. Except as may be required by law, Buyer will not divulge any such information to other persons or entities including, without limitation, appraisers, real estate brokers, or competitors of Seller. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall have the right to disclose information with respect to the Property to its officers, directors, employees, attomeys, accountants, environmental auditors, engineers, potential lenders, and permitted assignees under this Agreement and other consultants to the extent necessary for Buyer to evaluate its acquisition of the Property provided that all such persons are told that such information is confidential and agree (in writing for any third party engineers, environmental auditors or other consultants) to keep such information confidential. If Buyer acquires the Property from Seller, either party shall have the right, subsequent to the Closing of such acquisition, to publicize the transaction (other than the parties to or the specific economics of the transaction) in whatever manner it deems appropriate; provided that any press release or other public disclosure regarding this Agreement or the transactions contemplated herein, and the wording of same, must be approved in advance by both parties, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The provisions of this section shall survive the Closing or any termination of this Agreement. In the event the transaction contemplated by this Agreement does not close as provided herein, upon the request of Seller, Buyer shall promptly retum to Seller all Property Information and all other documents, reports and records obtained by Buyer in connection with the investigation of the Property.
g. Interpretation of Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any govemment or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
h. Amendments. This Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
i. Drafts Not an Offer to Enter Into a Legally Binding Contract. The parties hereto agree that the submission of a draft of this Agreement by one party to another is not intended by either party to be an offer to enter into a legally binding contract with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property. The parties shall be legally bound with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Agreement only if and when both Seller and Buyer have fully executed and delivered to each other a counterpart of this Agreement (or a copy by facsimile transmission).
j. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
k. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.
I. Survival. Except as expressly set forth to the contrary herein, no representations, warranties, covenants or agreements of Seller contained herein shall survive the Closing.
m. Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
n. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the addresses set forth in Section 1. Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to 5:00 p.m. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided, however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
o. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included,
unless such last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
p. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
q. Procedure for Indemnity. The following provisions govern actions for indemnity under this Agreement. Promptly after receipt by an indemnitee of notice of any claim, such indemnitee will, if a claim in respect thereof is to be made against the indemnitor, deliver to the indemnitor written notice thereof and the indemnitor shall have the right to participate in, and, if the indemnitor agrees in writing that it will be responsible for any costs, expenses, judgments, damages and losses incurred by the indemnitee with respect to such claim, to assume the defense thereof with counsel mutually satisfactory to the parties; provided, however, that an indemnitee shall have the right to retain its own counsel, with the fees and expenses to be paid by the indemnitor, if the indemnitee reasonably believes that representation of such indemnitee by the counsel retained by the indemnitor would be inappropriate due to actual or potential differing interests between such indemnitee and any other party represented by such counsel in such proceeding. The failure to deliver written notice to the indemnitor within a reasonable time of notice of any such claim shall relieve such indemnitor of any liability to the indemnitee under this indemnity only if and to the extent that such failure is prejudicial to its ability to defend such action, and the omission so to deliver written notice to the indemnitor will not relieve it of any liability that it may have to any indemnitee other than under this indemnity. If an indemnitee settles a claim without the prior written consent of the indemnitor, then the indemnitor shall be released from liability with respect to such claim unless the indemnitor has unreasonably withheld or delayed such consent.
r. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto at Closing, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the Closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
s. Execution in Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
t. Section 1031 Exchange. Either party may consummate the purchase or sale (as applicable) of the Property as part of a so-called like kind exchange (an "Exchange") pursuant to Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), provided that: (a) the Closing shall not be delayed or affected by reason of the Exchange nor shall the consummation or accomplishment of an Exchange be a condition precedent or condition subsequent to the exchanging party's obligations under this Agreement; (b) the exchanging party shall effect its Exchange through an assignment of this Agreement, or its rights under this Agreement, to a qualified intermediary (c) neither party shall be required to take an assignment of the purchase
agreement for relinquished or replacement property or be required to acquire or hold title to any real property for purposes of consummating an Exchange desired by the other party; and (d) the exchanging party shall pay any additional costs that would not otherwise have been incurred by the non-exchanging party had the exchanging party not consummated the transaction through an Exchange. Neither party shall by this Agreement or, acquiescence to an Exchange desired by the other party, have its rights under this Agreement affected or diminished in any manner or be responsible for compliance with or be deemed to have warranted to the exchanging party that its Exchange in fact complies with Section 1031 of the Code.
u. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above and the exhibits attached hereto and referred to herein are incorporated in this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
v. Partial Invalidity. If any provision of this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of the Agreement shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be impaired or invalidated, and the parties agree to substitute for the invalid or unenforceable provision a valid and enforceable provision that most closely approximates the intent and economic effect of the invalid or unenforceable provision.
w. Wajver of Covenants, Conditions or Remedies. The waiver by one party of the performance of any covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any act, under this Agreement shall not invalidate this Agreement nor shall it be considered a waiver by such party of any other covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any other act required, under this Agreement. The exercise of any remedy provided in this Agreement shall not be a waiver of any consistent remedy provided by law, and the provisions of this Agreement for any remedy shall not exclude any other consistent remedies unless they are expressly excluded.
x. Legal Advice. Each party has received independently legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.
y. Memorandum of Agreement. Buyer and Seller shall execute and notarize the Memorandum of Agreement included herewith as Exhibit E, which Buyer may record with the county of San Diego, in its sole discretion.

## SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement effective the day and year first set forth above.

BUYER:
6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST

By:

Printed: $\qquad$
Its: Trustee

## SELLER:

## DARRYL COTTON.

$\qquad$

Escrow Agent has executed this Agreement in order to confirm that the Escrow Agent has received and shall hold the Deposit and the interest earned thereon, in escrow, and shall disburse the Deposit, and the interest earned thereon, pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement.

Date: $\qquad$ 2017

By:

> Escrow Officer

## EXHIBIT "A"

LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY (to be provided by the Title Company)


1
$\vdots$
$\vdots$
$\vdots$
$\vdots$
$\vdots$
$\vdots$
1
$\vdots$
$\vdots$
19

## EXHIBIT "B"

## PROPERTY INFORMATION

;

21

## EXHIBIT "C"

## SERVICE CONTRACTS

## EXHIBIT "D"

## THREATENED OR PENDING LAWSUITS

## EXHIBIT "E"

## MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

697

## Statement

1 message
Larry Geraci [Larry@tfosd.net](mailto:Larry@tfosd.net)

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

## Circular 230 Disclaimer:

IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specifically noted, any federal tax advice in this communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materials) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avolding penaltes; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addresses. This email is considered a confidential communication

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and is intended for the person or firm identifled above. If you have recelved this in error, please contact us at (858)576-1040 and return this to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, copying. distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immediately and arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

17-0227 Side Agreement unsigned.dacx 35 K

## SIDE AGREEMENT

## Dated as of March <br> $\qquad$ 2017

By and Among

## DARRYL COTTON

## and <br> 6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST

This Side Agreement ("Side Agreement") is made as of the $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ 2017, by and between Darryl Cotton ("Seller") and 6176 Federal Blvd Trust ("Buyer"), a California trust. Buyer and Seller are sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties."

## RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Seller and Buyer desire to enter into a Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement"), dated of even date herewith, pursuant to which the Seller shall sell to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from the Seller, the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, California 92114 (the "Property"); and

WHEREAS, the purchase price for the Property is Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000$ ); and

WHEREAS, a condition to the Purchase Agreement is that Buyer and Seller enter into this Side Agreement that addresses the terms under which Seller shall move his existing business located on the Property.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as follows:

## ARTICLE I

## 1. Terms of the Side Agreement

I.I. Buyer shall pay Four Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$400,000) to cover Seller's expenses related to moving and re-establishing his business ("Payment Price").
I.2. The Payment Price is contingent on close of escrow pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.
$\qquad$

## ARTICLE II

## 2. Closing Conditions

2.1. Within ten (10) business days from the close of escrow on the Property, Buyer shall pay the Payment Price by wire transfer to an account provided by the Seller (see section 2.3); and
2.2. A condition precedent to the payment of the Payment Price is receipt by the Buyer of Seller's written representation that Seller has relocated his business and vacated the Property; and
2.3. If escrow does not close on the Property, the Side Agreement shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the Purchase Agreement and no payment is due or owing from Buyer to Seller.

ARTICLE III

## 3. General Provisions

3.1. This Side Agreement, together with the Purchase Agreement and any Exhibits and schedules hereto, contain all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements, in relation to this Side Agreement are replaced in total by this Side Agreement together with the Purchase Agreement, Exhibits and schedules hereto.
3.2. Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
3.3. Wire Instructions. Buyer shall transmit Payment Price via wire transfer to the following account: $\qquad$ , with the routing number or swift code of: $\qquad$ located at the following bank and address: $\qquad$ .
3.4. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Side Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attorneys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
3.5. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
3.6. Goveming Law. This Side Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Califomia.
3.7. Confidentiality and Return of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential any and all material obtained about the other or, in the case of Buyer, about the Property or its operations, this Side Agreernent or the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party. Except as may be required by law, Buyer shall not divulge any such information to other persons or entities including, without limitation, appraisers, real estate brokers, or competitors of Seller. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall have the right to disclose information with respect to the Property to its officers, directors, employees, attomeys, accountants, environmental auditors, engineers, potential lenders, and permitted assignees under this Side Agreement and other consultants to the extent necessary for Buyer to evaluate its acquisition of the Property provided that all such persons are told that such information is confidential and agree (in writing for any third party engineers, environmental auditors or other consultants) to keep such information confidential. If Buyer acquires the Property from Seller, either party shall have the right, subsequent to the Closing of such acquisition, to publicize the transaction (other than the parties to or the specific economics of the transaction) in whatever manner it deems appropriate; provided that any press release or other public disclosure regarding this Side Agreement or the transactions contemplated herein, and the wording of same, must be approved in advance by both parties, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The provisions of this section shall survive the Closing or any termination of this Side Agreement. In the event the transaction contemplated by this Side Agreement does not close as provided herein, upon the request of Seller, Buyer shall promptly return to Seller all Property Information and all other documents, reports and records obtained by Buyer in connection with the investigation of the Property.
3.8. Interpretation of Side Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Side Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
3.9. Amendments. This Side Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
3.10. Drafts Not an Offer to Enter Into a Legally Binding Contract. The parties hereto agree that the submission of a draft of this Side Agreement by one party to another is not intended by either party to be an offer to enter into a legally binding contract with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property. The parties shall be legally bound with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Side Agreement only if and when both Seller and Buyer have fully executed and delivered to each other a counterpart of this Side Agreement (or a copy by facsimile transmission).
3.11. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
3.12. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Side Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.
3.13. Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Side Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Side Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Side Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
3.14. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the following addresses:

## IF TO BUYER:

```
6176 Federal Blvd. Trust
6 1 7 6 \text { Federal Blvd.}
San Diego, California }9211
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
```

with a copy to:

Austin Legal Group, APC<br>3990 Old Town Ave, A-1 12<br>San Diego, CA 92110

## IF TO SELLER:

Darryl Cotton
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to 5:00 p.m. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided,
however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
3.15. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless such last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
3.16. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
3.17. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto at Closing, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the Closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
3.18. Execution in Counterparts. This Side Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Side Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Side Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
3.19. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above and the exhibits attached hereto and referred to herein are incorporated in this Side Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
3.20. Waiver of Covenants, Conditions or Remedies. The waiver by one party of the performance of any covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any act, under this Side Agreement shall not invalidate this Side Agreement nor shall it be considered a waiver by such party of any other covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any other act required, under this Side Agreement. The exercise of any remedy provided in this Side Agreement shall not be a waiver of any consistent remedy provided by law, and the provisions of this Side Agreement for any remedy shall not exclude any other consistent remedies unless they are expressly excluded.
3.21. Legal Advice. Each party has independently received legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Side Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Side Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Side Agreement, in duplicate originals, by their respective officers hereunto duly authorized, the day and year herein written.

BUYER:
6176 FEDERAL BLVD. TRUST

By: $\qquad$
Printed: $\qquad$
Its: Trustee

## SELLER:

DARRYL COTTON:

Re: Statement
Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 8:22 AM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Larry,
I read the Side Agreement in your attachment and I see that no reference is made to the $10 \%$ equity position as per my Inda-Gro GERL Service Agreement (see attached) in the new store. In fact para 3.11 looks to avoid our agreement completely. It looks like counsel did not get a copy of that document. Can you explain?

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 8:51 AM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfosd.net](mailto:Larry@tfosd.net) wrote:

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

# Gmail - Re: Statement 

Circular 230 Disclaimer:
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IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specifically noted, any federal tax advice in thls communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materials) was nol intended or writlen to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addresses. This email is considered a confidential communication and is intended for the person or firm ldentifed above. If you have received this in error, please conlact us at (858) 576-1040 and return this to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohiblted. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immediately and arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimite and all attachments.

IndaGro-GERL Service Contract.doc 691K

## SERVICES AGREEMENT CONTRACT

Date: 09/24/16

| Customer: | GERL Investments |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | 5402 Ruffin Road, Ste. 200 |
|  | San Diego, CA 92103 |

Attn: Mr. Larry Geraci
Ph: 858.956.4040
E-mail: Larry@TFCSD.net

## Mr. Geraci;

Pursuant to our conversations I have developed this document to act as the Contract between us that will serve to define our relationship, services, and fee's for the development of 6176 Federal Boulevard San Diego, CA. 92114 (hereinafter referred to as the property) as a new dispensary to be owned and managed by your company, GERL Investments.

1) The property is currently owned by me, Darryl Cotton (Cotton-Seller) and occupied by my company, Inda-Gro Induction Lighting Company (Inda-Gro-Tenant). Under separate Contract Cotton has agreed to sell the property to GERL Investments (GERL-Buyer) for $\$ 400,000.00$ and a $10 \%$ equity position in the new licensed cannabis dispensary business being developed at the property by GERL.
2) Upon completion and transfer of property ownership Cotton will immediately cease being the landlord to Inda-Gro and Inda-Gro will become the tenant of GERL.
3) GERL plans to tear down the existing structure(s) and build a new structure for a commercial dispensary. Under this Agreement GERL will allow Inda-Gro to remain in the property at no charge until such time that the plan check with the City of San Diego has been approved and permits have been issued. This process is expected to take 6-9 months. At the time GERL notices Inda-Gro that the permits have been issued Inda-Gro will have 30 days to vacate the property. Inda-Gro agrees to cooperate with GERL architects to access the property during the design phase of this work.
4) Inda-Gro is agreeing to vacate the property in consideration for a relocation fee of $\$ 400,000.00$ of which payment would be made in two parts. Upon execution of this Contract GERL agrees to pay Inda-Gro $\$ 200,000$. Upon issuance of the permits and the 30 day notice to vacate the balance, $\$ 200,000.00$ would become payable and due.
5) Inda-Gro currently operates what we refer to as a 151 Farm. This is a teaching and touring farm that demonstrates urban farming technologies which utilize our lighting systems, controls and water savings strategies utilizing Aquaponics systems. Since it is in the interest of all parties; Inda-Gro, Cotton and

GERL to identify ongoing investment opportunities with both cannabis and non-cannabis related ventures Inda-Gro and Cotton agree to use the current property to highlight the benefits of what having a licensed dispensary is to the community and once relocated Inda-Gro/Cotton would agree to continue to promote the new dispensary as an example of seed to sale retail distribution as well as identify other investment opportunities that develop from interested parties having toured our facilities and wishing to establish similar operations.
6) GERL may wish to have interested parties tour the current and new property for Inda-Gro 151 Farms. This too is acceptable and under this Agreement would be a mutual collaboration and strategic alliance in terms of the farming and cultivation aspects provided by Inda-Gro and the Site Acquisition, Design/Build Construction and Retail Cannabis Services provided by GERL for those future contracts.

## TOTAL PRICE: Four Hundred Thousand and 00/100 (\$400,000.00)

I/we accept the Service Agreement Contract as detailed and do hereby agree to the Terms as set forth herein:

Sign: $\qquad$ Print Name: $\qquad$ Date: $\qquad$
Darryl Cotton, President

Sign: $\qquad$ Print Name: $\qquad$ Date: $\qquad$
Larry Geraci

## Contract Review

Hi Daryl,

I have not reviewed this yet but wanted you to look at it and give me your thoughts. Talking to Matt, the 10k a month might be difficult to hit until the sixth month....can we do 5 k , and on the seventh month start 10 k ?

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

# Gmail - Contract Review 

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## 17-0306 Side Agreement unsigned v2.docx 38 K

## SIDE AGREEMENT

This Side Agreement ("Side Agreement") is made as of the $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ 2017, by and between Darryl Cotton ("Seller") and 6176 Federal Blvd Trust, dated $\qquad$ Buyer and Seller are sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties."

## RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Seller and Buyer have entered into a Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement"), dated as of approximate even date herewith, pursuant to which the Seller shall sell to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from the Seller, the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, California 92114 (the "Property");

WHEREAS, The Buyer intends to operate a licensed medical cannabis at the property ("Business"); and

WHEREAS, in conjunction with Buyer's purchase of the Property, Buyer has agreed to pay Seller $\$ 400,000.00$ to reimburse and otherwise compensate Seller for Seller relocating his business located at the Property, and to share in certain profits of Buyer's future Business.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as follows:

## ARTICLE I <br> SIDE AGREEMENT

1.1. Within 10 days from the closing of the purchase of the Property pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, and conditioned upon Seller being fully vacated from the Property prior to such closing, Buyer shall pay to Seller in cash or cash equivalent, the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000.00$ ) to an account to be designated by Seller in writing.
1.2. In addition to the above, conditioned upon the timely closing of the purchase of the Property pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, Buyer hereby agrees to pay to Seller $10 \%$ of the net revenues of Buyer's Business after all expenses and liabilities have been paid. Profits will be paid on the $10^{\text {th }}$ day of each month following the month in which they accrued. Further, Buyer hereby guarantees a profits payment of not less than $\$ 5,000.00$ per month for the first three months the Business is open (i.e. profits would be paid in months $2-4$ for profits accrued in months $1-3$ ) and $\$ 10,000.00$ a month for each month thereafter the Business is operating on the Property.

## ARTICLE II GENERAL TERMS

2. Entire Agreement. This Side Agreement, together with the Purchase Agreement and any Exhibits and schedules hereto or thereto, contain all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements, in relation to this Side Agreement are replaced in total by this Side Agreement together with the Purchase Agreement, Exhibits and schedules hereto.
2.1.Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
2.2.Termination. If escrow does not close on the Property according to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Side Agreement shall terminate and Buyer and Seller shall have no obligations to each other under this Agreement.
2.3. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Side Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attorneys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
2.4. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
2.5. Governing Law. This Side Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
2.6. Confidentiality and Return of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential this Side Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party, except their respective attorneys.
2.7. Interpretation of Side Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Side Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires; the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
2.8. Amendments. This Side Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
2.9. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
2.10. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Side Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.
2.11. Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Side Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
2.12. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the following addresses:

IF TO BUYER:
6176 Federal Blvd. Trust
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
with a copy to:

Austin Legal Group, APC<br>3990 Old Town Ave, A-112<br>San Diego, CA 92110

## 1F TO SELLER:

Darryl Cotton
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to 5:00 p.m. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided, however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
2.13. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless such last day is a Saturday,
$\qquad$

Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
2.14. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
2.15. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
2.16. Execution in Counterparts. This Side Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Side Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Side Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
2.17. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above are incorporated in this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
2.18. Legal Advice. Each party has independently received legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Side Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Side Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Side Agreement, in duplicate originals, by their respective officers hereunto duly authorized, the day and year herein written.

## BUYER: SELLER:

6176 FEDERAL BLVD. TRUST
DARRYL COTTON:

By: $\qquad$
Printed: $\qquad$

## Its: Trustee

Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)

## Re: Contract Review

1 message
Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 8:23 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tficsd.net](mailto:Larry@tficsd.net)
Larry,
My apologies ahead of time as I am going to provide frank comments on the agreement so that we can finalize it and get this closed. And, so that you understand where I am coming from, just want to lay out a few of our milestones.

Throughout October we had discussions regarding the sale of my property. We met on $11 / 2$ and agreed upon an $\$ 800,000$ purchase price, a $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit, a $10 \%$ equity stake with a monthly guaranteed minimum $\$ 10,000$ payment and to definitive agreements that contained a few other conditions (e.g., I stay at the property if the CUP is issued until construction starts). We executed a good faith agreement that day stating the sale of the property was for the $\$ 800,000$ and that as a sign of good faith, you were providing a $\$ 10,000$ deposit towards the required $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit. That same day you scanned and emailed to me the agreement and I replied and noted that the agreement did not contain the $10 \%$ equity stake in the dispensary. I asked you to please respond and confirm via email that a condition of the sale was my $10 \%$ equity stake. You did not respond and confirm the $10 \%$ as I requested.

Almost 4 months later, on $2 / 27$, you forwarded a draft purchase agreement for the property that again did not contain the agreed upon $10 \%$ equity stake, it also does not mention the remaining $\$ 40,000$ towards the non-refundable deposit. I called you about this and we spoke.

On $3 / 2$, you forwarded a draft Side Agreement that again did not contain the $10 \%$ equity stake. I replied the next day on $3 / 3$ raising the $10 \%$ equity issue and attaching the draft services agreement that I drafted that contains some of the terms we had agreed upon.

On $3 / 7$, email below, you forwarded a revised Side Agreement that did contain the $10 \%$ equity stake, but in the body of the email you requested that the $\$ 10,000$ minimum monthly payment be held off until month 7 and that months $1-6$ be reduced to $\$ 5,000$ a month. I know from our conversations that you have spent over $\$ 300,000$ on lobbying and zoning efforts for this property, which has caused you to be strapped for cash. However, I am not in a position to take a $\$ 5,000$ reduction for 6 months.

The long and short of it, we started these negotiations 4 months ago and the drafts and our communications have not reflected what we agreed upon and are still far from reflecting our original agreement. Here is my proposal, please have your attomey Gina revise the Purchase Agreement and Side Agreement to incorporate all the terms we have agreed upon so that we can execute final versions and get this closed.

Please have these terms incorporated into revised drafts:

- The remaining $\$ 40,000$ deposit, which is nonrefundable in the event you choose to not close on the property if the CUP is denied. And which is to be provided upon execution of the final agreements.
- If the CUP is granted, my business can remain at the property until the city has finalized the plans and construction begins at the property.
- A $10 \%$ equity stake with a minimum guaranteed monthly distribution of $\$ 10,000$, whichever is greater.
- A clause that my $10 \%$ equity stake carries with it consent rights for any material decisions. Those items that are to require my consent can be standard minority consent rights, but basically that my consent is required for large decisions like the issuance of employee bonus and for agreements with


## Gmail - Re: Contract Review

suppliers and vendors that are not done on an arm-lengths basis. A friend of mine said that these are standard "Minority Shareholder Protection Rights."

- A provision requiring that upon the creation of the formation and govemance documents of the CUP entity, that there is a requirement that the accounting is to be done by a third-party accounting firm that will also be responsible for calculating my $10 \%$ monthly equity distributions.
- The incorporation of all the terms in the MOU that I created that Gina references in the draft purchase agreement.
- Please have Gina delete the clause in the purchase agreement that says both you and I had our own counsel review the agreement. You told me I could just communicate with Gina and though I tried to engage an attomey, I did not ultimately do so for cost reasons.

The intent of all this is to ensure that the agreement we have agreed upon can be executed and verfied. Having said all this, I really want to finalize this as soon as possible - I found out today that a CUP application for my property was submitted in October, which 1 am assuming is from someone connected to you. Although, I note that you told me that the $\$ 40,000$ deposit balance would be paid once the CUP was submitted and that you were waiting on certain zoning issues to be resolved. Which is not the case.

Ulimately, the main point is that we were supposed to execute our agreements as soon as possible so that I could receive the total $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit and you would take the risk of the non-approval of the CUP. If this keeps dragging on and we do not finalize and execute our agreements, then you may get a denial from the city on the CUP and then simply walk away. At that point, the property having been denied, no other party would be willing to take on that risk. If you are not willing to take on that risk as originally agreed upon, please let me know as there are other parties who would match your terms and be willing to take on that risk.

Please confirm by Monday 12:00 PM whether we are on the same page and you plan to continue with our agreement. Or, if not, so I can return your $\$ 10,000$ of the $\$ 50,000$ required deposit. If, hopefully, we can work through this, please confirm that revised final drafts that incorporate the terms above will be provided by Wednesday at 12:00 PM. I promise to review and provide commerits that same day so we can execute the same or next day.

In anticipation of your reply, I remain,
Darryl Cotton

## Re: Contract Review

1 message
Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 2:15 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tficsd.net](mailto:Larry@tficsd.net)
Larry, I received your text asking to meet in person tomorrow. I would prefer that until we have final agreements, that we converse exclusively via email. My greatest concern is that you will get a denial on the CUP application and not provide the remaining $\$ 40,000$ non-refundable deposit. To be frank, I feel that you are not dealing with me in good faith, you told me repeatedly that you could not submit a CUP application until certain zoning issues had been resolved and that you had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on getting them resolved. You lied to me, I found out yesterday from the City of San Diego that you submitted a CUP application on October 31, 2016 BEFORE we even signed our agreement on the 2nd of November. There is no situation where an oral agreement will convince me that you are dealing with me in good faith and will honor our agreement. We need a final written, legal, binding agreement.

Please confirm, as requested, by 12:00 PM Monday that you are honoring our agreement and will have final drafts (reflecting completely the below) by Wednesday at 12:00 PM.

It is unfortunate that matters have turned out like this, but hearing from the city that the application had been submitted before our deal was signed and that it is already under review, meaning you have been lying to me for months, forces me to take this course of action.

Again, please respond to this email so that there is a clear record of our conversations from this point forward or at least until we have final executed documents.
-Darryl

## RE: Contract Review

1 message
Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Sat, Mar 18, 2017 at 1:43 PM
To: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)

Darryl,

I have an attorney working on the situation now. I will follow up by Wednesday with the response as their timing will play a factor.

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

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## Re: Contract Review

## 1 message

Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Sun, Mar 19, 2017 at 9:02 AM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Larry,
I understand that drafting the agreements will take time, but you don't need to consult with your attomeys to tell me whether or not you are going to honor our agreement.

I need written confirmation that you will honor our agreement so that I know that you are not just playing for time - hoping to get a response from the City before you put down in writing that you owe me the remainder of the $\$ 50,000$ nonrefundable deposit we agreed to.

If I do not have a written confimation from you by 12:00 PM tomorrow, I will contacting the City of San Diego and let them know that our agreement was not completed and that the application pending on my property needs to be denied because the applicant has no right to my property.

## RE: Contract Review

1 message

Darryl,

At this point, you keep changing your mind every time we talk. My attorneys will move forward on the agreement as planned. Any signed written agreement will be followed by the letter of the law. It's not about any deposit, it's about you changing what is not in writing. So there is no confusion, the attorneys will move forward with an agreement.

As to lying about the status, read the comment below from the city on Wednesday $3 / 15 / 2017$. We are addressing this currently with the city. I have been forthright with you this entire process.

To: 'Abhay Schweitzer' [abhay@techne-us.com](mailto:abhay@techne-us.com)
Subject: PTS 520606 - Federal Boulevard MMCC Importance: High

## Good Aftemoon,

I am the Development Project Manager assigned to the above referenced project. The project is iocated in the CO-2-1 (Commercial Office) Zone. Please note that per the San Diego Municipal Code, a Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative is not a permitted use in this Zone and staff will be recommending denial of this application.

Pease advise if you wish to continue the processing of the subject application through the full review process, or staff could schedule a hearing immediately with a recommendation of denial. Please note that ail costs associated with the processing of the application would be charged to the deposit account and not refunded.

Please notify me at your earliest convenience of your preference.
Regards,

## Re: Contract Review

1 message
Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Sun, Mar 19, 2017 at 6:47 PM
To: Lary Geraci [Larry@lfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@lfcsd.net)
Larry,
I have not been changing my mind. The only additional requests have been in regards to putting in place third party accounting and other mechanisms to ensure that my interests are protected. I have only done so because you kept providing draft agreements that continuously failed the terms we agreed to.

It is blatantly clear to me now that you have been stringing me along, even now all your responses are to buy more time. So there is no confusion, you have until tomorrow 12:00 PM to provide confirmation as requested below. If you don't, I am emailing the City of San Diego regarding the fact that no third-party has any interest in my property and the application currently pending needs to be denied.

## Re: Contract Review

1 message
Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 3:18 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Larry, I have been in communications over the last 2 days with Firouzeh, the Development Project Manager for the City of San Diego who is handling CUP applications. She made it $100 \%$ clear that there are no restrictions on my property and that there is no recommendation that a CUP application on my property be denied. In fact she told me the application had just passed the "Deemed Complete' phase and was entering the review process. She also confirmed that the application was paid for in October, before we even signed our agreement.

This is our last communication, you have failed to live up to your agreement and have continuously lied to me and kept pushing off creating final legal agreements because you wanted to push it off to get a response from the City without taking the risk of losing the non-refundable deposit in the event the CUP application is denied.

To be clear, as of now, you have no interest in my property, contingent or otherwise. I will be entering into an agreement with a third-party to sell my property and they will be taking on the potential costs associated with any litigation arising from this falled agreement with you.

Darryl Cotton

## EXHIBIT 2

725

Friday, March 3, 2017
12:16 PM Did you get my email?

(1)
Yes I did I'm having her rewrite it now

-     - 

As soon as I get it I will forward it to you

12:17 PM
Monday, March 6, 2017

(1)
Gina Austin is there she has a red jacket on if you want to have a conversation with her $4: 30 \mathrm{PM}$

Tuesday, March 7, 2017
Just sent the contract over
12:05 PM
12:10 PM III look it over tonight
Thursday, March 16, 2017
(L) How's it going with the contract?

4:47 PM
Friday, March 17, 2017
(L)

Can we meet tomorrow
11:44 AM

0 Enter message

That sounds good. Can we
10:15 AM
speak later?

(1)Not done intel 1030 tonight ... am tomorrow 11:27 AM 12:16 PM

Wednesday, February 15, 2017
Good morning Darrell... We are preparing the documents with the attor
ney and hopefully will have them by the end of this week

Wednesday، February 22. 2017
Contract should be ready in a couple days

Thursday, February 23, 2017
Can you call me when you get a chance thanks

Monday, February 27, 2017
Good morning Darrell I emailed you the contract for the purchase of the property ...the relocation contract will come sometime today 8:50 AM

Hi Larry I'm traveling today I will have a chance to look at that tomorrow and I will forward it to my attorney thank you

Wednesday, January 18, 2017

(L)
The sign off date they said it's going to be the 30th

This resolves the zoning 10:34 AM issue?


10:36 AM

- Monday, January 30, 2017

On phone.. Call you back shortly..

Tuesday, January 31, 2017

## 2:47 PM How goes it?

Were waiting for
confirmation today at about 4
o'clock
2:48 PM

Monday, February 6, 2017

> 12:15 PM Whats new?

Tuesday, February 7, 2017
Based on your last text I thought you'd have some information on the zoning by now. Your lack of response suggests no resolution as of yet.

I'm just walking in with clients they resolved it it's fine were just waiting for final paperwork B:20 AM

8589564040


SMS/MMS
Wednesday, January 4, 2017
Hi Daryl I have the extreme case of the flu and I'm in bed Ill try to call you tomorrow or the next day

12:20 PM
12:20 PM Get better and ttyl
Thursday, January 5, 2017
8.52 AM Any better?

Friday, January 6, 2017
Can you call me. If for any reason you're not moving 8:40 AM forward I need to know.

I'm at the doctor now everything is going fine the meeting went great yesterday
supposed to sign off on the zoning on the 24th of this month Ill try to
call you later today still very
sick

Friday, January 13. 2017
Are you available for a call?
10:46 AM
I'm in a meeting Ill call you when l'm done

General Security Detalls

Property Value
Description
Title
Subject
Tags
Categories
Comments
Origin
Authors Gina Austin
Last saved by ..... AEA
Revision number ..... 4
Version number
Program name Microsoft Office Word
Company ..... HP
Manager
Content created $3 / 6 / 2017348$ PM
Date last saved ..... 3/6/2017505 PM
Last printed
Total editing time 012200
Content
Remove Properties and Personal Information

EXHIBIT 4
731

Case No.:
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE

DARRYL COTTON<br>Defendant and Appellant,

v.'

The Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, Respondent. LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity,

Real Parties in Interest.

Appeal from Orders of the Superior Court, County of San Diego
37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL 37-2017-00037675-CU-WM-CTL

Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge Presiding

## INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT OF DARRYL COTTON; DECLARATION OF DR. MARKUS PLOESSER IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S EMERGENCY PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT, WRIT OF MANDATE, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF

Darryl Cotton 6176 Federal Blvd. San Diego, CA 92114 Telephone: (619) 954-4447 Appellant, Self-Represented

I, Markus Ploesser, MD, LLM, DABPN, FRCP(C), declare:

1. On March 4, 2018, I interviewed Mr. Darryl Cotton for an Independent Psychiatric Assessment. At the beginning of the assessment, I informed Mr. Cotton that the assessment was being prepared to assist the Court and not to act as an advocate on his behalf. Mr. Cotton expressed his understanding, agreement and proceeded with the interview and assessment.

## DUTY TO COURT

2. I certify that I am aware of my duty as an expert to assist the Court and not to be an advocate for any party. I have prepared this report in conformity with that duty. I will provide testimony in conformity with that duty if I am called upon to provide oral or written testimony.
3. I am solely responsible for the opinions provided in this report. I reserve the right to amend or alter my opinions should additional relevant information become available after the report completion.

## QUALIFICATIONS

4. I am a psychiatrist licensed in the State of California, Physician and Surgeon License No. A101564 and the Province of British Columbia, License No. 31564.
5. I am Board certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the area of Psychiatry (Certificate No. 60630) and the subspecialty of Forensic

Psychiatry (Certificate No. 1903).
6. I am a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, with certifications in Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry.
7. I am on the clinical faculty at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in the division of Forensic Psychiatry.
8. My prior work experience has included forensic psychiatric evaluation work for the Forensic Psychiatric Hospital and the Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission in Coquitlam, British Columbia. I have written numerous forensic psychiatric assessment reports and testified as an expert witness before the British Columbia Review Board and the Provincial Courts of British Columbia.
9. I currently work as a psychiatrist for the Department of Corrections for the State of California.
10. In addition to my medical qualifications, $I$ am also a graduate of Columbia University School of Law in the LLM program.
11. In preparation for my assessment of Mr. Cotton, I consulted with Dr. Carolyn Candido regarding her medical diagnosis of Mr. Cotton on December 13, 2017. Additionally, I reviewed the declaration previously provided by Dr. Candido regarding her diagnosis of Mr. Cotton prepared on January 22, 2018. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 1.)
12. Prior to my interview with Mr. Cotton, I also discussed the factual
background regarding Mr. Cotton's need for a psychiatric assessment with his legal consultant, Mr. Jacob Austin. Mr. Austin, I was told, is representing Mr. Cotton on a limited basis due to Mr. Cotton's inability to pay for his full legal representation by Mr. Austin.

## CLIENT INTERVIEW

13. Mr. Cotton related the following: He is 57 years old. He was boin and raised in the Chicago area and has lived in San Diego since 1980. He owns a lighting manufacturing company but reports that over the past approximately 9-12 months he has experienced financial hardship, stress and anxiety originating from a lawsuit against him.
14. Mr . Cotton denies any history of mental health symptoms predating the current lawsuit. He is taking Keppra 500 mg twice daily for a seizure disorder, which he started suffering from around the age of 26 . He usually suffers from approximately 3 Grand Mal seizures per year. He used to take Dilantin, another anticonvulsant medication. He reports having obtained significant medical benefit from the use of medical cannabis, particularly a high CBD strain which he says has helped to reduce the frequency of his seizures.
15. Mr. Cotton represents he owns a property meeting certain requirements by the City of San Diego and the State of California that would allow the creation and operation of a Medical Marijuana Consumer Collective.
16. Mr. Cotton reports that he has and is being subjected to a variety of threats and harassing behaviors that he believes have been directed against him by the plaintiff in the lawsuit.
17. Mr. Cotton believes that an armed robbery on June $10^{\text {th }}, 2017$ on his property may have been directed by the plaintiff. He was present at his property at the time of the armed robbery, slamming the door and thereby escaping the robbers inside a building on his property while he called 911. The armed individuals who committed the robbery threatened Mr . Cotton at gun-point before fleeing from the premises. (Mr. Cotton stated the armed-robbery is still unresolved by the police and it was the subject of local news coverage that is still available online.)
18. Mr. Cotton states he followed the armed individuals in his vehicle as they fled from the scene while he was on the phone with 911 . He was told by 911 to cease his pursuit due to safety reasons as Mr. Cotton was chasing the armed robbers at highspeed. Mr. Cotton believes he recognized the driver of the getaway vehicle as an employee of the plaintiff.
19. Mr. Cotton appeared particularly intense during his narration regarding one of his employees who was duct-taped and laying face down at gun-point on the ground. Mr. Cotton states that this long-time employee, an electrical-engineer who Mr. Cotton relied upon heavily, quit the next day because of this incident.
20. Mr . Cotton describes starting to experience increased symptoms of stress
and anxiety since the robbery, above that which was caused by the litigation. He had been in his usual state of health prior. He reports that he is now unable to sleep at night, experiences "mood swings" and episodes of explosive rage without apparent triggers. He experiences nightmares around themes of feeling powerless. The nightmares occur in slight variations, and at times he "sees the robbers in his dreams."
21. Furthermore, his description of his nightmares include vivid scenes of violence towards the attorneys for plaintiff that he believes are not acting in a professional manner. Mr. Cotton believes that the attorneys representing plaintiff are "in it together" with the plaintiff to use the lawsuit to "defraud" him of his property. This point is one of the main foci of his expressed mental distress.
22. Mr. Cotton's distress due to his perception of a conspiracy against him by attorneys is amplified by what he believes is the Court's disregard for the evidence and arguments he has presented. He states he has never been provided the reasoning for the denial of any relief he sought. Mr. Cotton expressed that at certain points during the course of the litigation he believed the trial court judge was part of the perceived conspiracy against him.
23. Mr. Cotton is also under the belief that his former law firm could have resolved this matter at an early stage in the proceedings but chose not to in order to continue billing legal fees.
24. Mr. Cotton reports no improvement in his mental health symptoms since
the robbery. He describes that since the robbery there have been additional threats made against him by "agents" of the plaintiff. Specifically, he describes that two associates of plaintiff went to his property on February 3, 2017 under the pretense of discussing potential business opportunities, but when they arrived they were there to indirectly threaten him by informing him that it would be "good" for him to "settle with Geraci."
25. Mr. Cotton now feels hopeless, helpless, unable to sleep, with decreased appetite, but either no or only minimal changes in weight.
26. Mr. Cotton states that on December 12, 2017, immediately after a court hearing, he was evaluated in the emergency department of a hospital for a TIA (transitory ischemic attack, a frequent precursor of a stroke).
27. The day after his emergency department discharge, Mr. Cotton states he assaulted a third-party and that is also the day he was diagnosed with Acute Stress Disorder by Dr. Candido.
28. Mr. Cotton expressed having experienced suicidal ideation, most recently on December 13th, 2017. He denied symptoms of psychosis, specifically hallucinations.

## OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

29. It is my professional opinion that Mr. Cotton currently meets criteria of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (F43:10), Intermittent Explosive Disorder (F63.81) and Major Depression (F32.2). He does not present with any objective, observable signs -6-
and symptoms of psychosis.
30. Given the absence of a prior mental health history of psychotic disorder (and the physical symptoms that led to a diagnosis of a TIA and Acute Stress Disorder by separate medical doctors), I have no reason to believe that Mr. Cotton's reports of harassment by the plaintiff would be of delusional quality. It is my professional opinion that Mr. Cotton sincerely believes that the plaintiff and his counsel are in a conspiracy against him and that they represent a threat to his life.
31. It is my medical opinion that Mr. Cotton's symptoms are unlikely to improve as long as current stressors (pending litigation, and what Mr. Cotton believes to be threatening behaviors by plaintiff or his "agents") persist. His symptoms are also likely to be significantly reduced if he believes the Court was not ignoring and disregarding him.
32. It is my medical opinion that Mr. Cotton's mental health condition would likely benefit from a rapid resolution of current legal proceedings. In my professional opinion, the level of emotional and physical distress faced by Mr. Cotton at this time is above and beyond the usual stress on any defendant being exposed to litigation. If causative triggers and threats against Mr. Cotton persist, there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Cotton may suffer irreparable harm with regards to his mental health.
33. Besides a removal of current stressors, his mental health condition would likely benefit from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for PTSD and depression, as well as a trial of antidepressant medication.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED:
$3 / 4 / 2018$ Markus Ploesser, MD, LLM, DABPN, FRCP(C)
M. PLOESSER, M.D. PSYCHIATRIST

Jacob P. Austin, SBN 290303
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JPA@JacobAustinEsq.com
Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton
[Representation Limited to This Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens]

## SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISIONLARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1-10, Inclusive, )

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
LARRY GERACI, and individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, Inclusive,

Cross-Defendants.

CASE NO. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF:

DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS);
AND
DARRYL COTTON'S EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR ORDERS (1)
SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING ON
DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE
NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS
PENDENS), AND (2) COMPELLING
ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF LARRY GERACI

Ex Parte Hrg: April 5, 2018 at 8:30 a.m. Motion Hrg: April 13, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. Dept: C-73
Judge: Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil

Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton requests that this Court take judicial notice of the following documents served and filed submitted herewith in support of his Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens):

| TAB NO. | DOCUMENT TITLE/DESCRIPTION |
| :---: | :--- |
| 1. | Verified Petition for Alternative Writ of Mandate [Code Civ. Proc., § 1085] filed by <br> Plaintiff on October 6, 2017 |
| 2. | Plaintiff’s Complaint for: 1. Breach of Contract; 2. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith <br> and Fair Dealing; 3. Specific Performance; and 4. Declaratory Relief filed March 21, <br> 2017 |
| 3. | City of San Diego, Development Services Department Information Bulletin 170 (October <br> $2017)($ City Information Bulletin describing "the application process for a Marijuana <br> Outlet")). |
| 4. | Ownership Disclosure Statement - Form DS-318 |
| 5. | City of San Diego Development Services Department Parcel Information Report - Report <br> Number 101 dated March 20, 2018 |
| 6. | Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Darryl Cotton's Response <br> to (1) Motion by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Larry Geraci and Cross-Defendant Rebecca <br> Berry to Compel the Deposition of Darryl Cotton and (2) Motion by Real Parties in <br> Interest, Larry Geraci and Rebecca Berry, to Compel the Deposition of Darryl Cotton <br> filed January 22, 201 |

DATED: April 4, 2018
THE LAW OFFICE OF JACOB AUSTIN


Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant DARRYL COTTON

## 743

> DAVIDS. DEMIAN, SBN 220626 E-MAIL: ddemian@ftblaw.com ADAMC.WITT, SBN 271502
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# FINCH, THORNTON \& BAIRD, LLP 

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Attorneys for Petitioner/Plaintiff Darryl Cotton

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CENTRAL DIVISION
DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity; and DOES 1 through 25,

Respondents/Defendants,

REBECCA BERRY, an individual; LARRY GERACI, an individual; and ROES 1 through 25,

Real Parties In Interest.

## INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, petitioner/plaintiff Darryl Cotton ("Cotton") seeks an alternative writ of mandate and a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondents/defendants City of San Diego ("City") and DOES 1 through 25 to: (1) recognize Cotton, the sole record owner of the real property located at 6176 Federal Boulevard, San Diego, California 92105 ("Property"), as the sole applicant with respect to Conditional Use Permit Application - Project No. 520606 ("Cotton Application") for a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") to operate a Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative ("MMCC") at the

Property; and (2) process the Cotton Application with Cotton as the sole applicant. In the alternative, Cotton seeks an order to show cause directed to the City as to why the Court should not issue such a writ.
2. The relief sought in paragraph 1 is proper because Cotton has no other plain, speedy, or adequate legal remedy. The relief is necessary because the City's refusal to recognize Cotton as the sole applicant on the Cotton Application is lacking in evidentiary support and inconsistent with the City's legal duty.

## JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND PARTIES

3. The Court has jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.
4. Venue is proper in this Court because the City is a public entity located in this judicial district and the property at issue is located in this judicial district.
5. Petitioner/plaintiff Cotton is, and at all times mentioned was, an individual living and doing business in California.
6. Respondent/defendant City is, and at all times mentioned was, a public entity organized and existing under the laws of California.
7. Cotton is informed and believes real party in interest Rebecca Berry ("Berry") is, and at all times mentioned was, an individual living and doing business in the County of San Diego.
8. Cotton is informed and believes real party in interest Larry Geraci ("Geraci") is, and at all times mentioned was, an individual living and doing business in the County of San Diego.
9. Cotton does not know the true names and capacities of the respondents/defendants named as DOES 1 through 25 and, therefore, sues them by fictitious names. Cotton is informed and believes DOES 1 through 25 are in some way responsible for the events described in this petition or impacted by them. Cotton will seek leave to amend this petition when the true names and capacities of these parties have been ascertained.

## 2

VERIFIED PETITION FOR ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE [CODE CIV. PROC., § 1085]
10. At all times mentioned each respondent/defendant was an agent, principal, representative, alter ego, and/or employee of the others and each was at all times acting within the course and scope of said agency, representation, and/or employment and with the permission of the others.
11. Cotton does not know the true names and capacities of the real parties in interest named as ROES 1 through 25 and, therefore, names them by fictitious names. Cotton is informed and believes ROES 1 through 25 are in some way responsible for the events described in this petition or impacted by them. Cotton will seek leave to amend this petition when the true names and capacities of these parties have been ascertained.
12. At all times mentioned each real party in interest was an agent, principal, representative, alter ego, and/or employee of the others and each was at all times acting within the course and scope of said agency, representation, and/or employment and with the permission of the others.

## BACKGROUND

13. In or around August 2016, Geraci first contacted Cotton seeking to purchase the Property. Geraci desired to buy the Property from Cotton because it meets certain requirements of the City for obtaining a CUP to operate a MMCC at the Property. The Property is one of a very limited number of properties located in San Diego City Council District 4 that potentially satisfy the CUP requirements for a MMCC.
14. Over the ensuing weeks and months, Geraci and Cotton negotiated extensively regarding the terms of a potential sale of the Property. Cotton, acting in good faith based upon Geraci's representations during the sale negotiations, assisted Geraci with preliminary due diligence in investigating the feasibility of a CUP application at the Property while the parties negotiated the terms of a possible deal. However, despite the parties' work on a CUP application, Geraci represented to Cotton that a CUP application for the Property could not actually be submitted until after a critical zoning issue was resolved or the application would be summarily rejected by the City.
15. On or around October 31, 2016, Geraci asked Cotton to execute an Ownership Disclosure Statement, which is a required component of all CUP applications. Geraci told Cotton that he needed the signed document to show that Geraci had access to the Property in connection with his lobbying efforts to resolve the zoning issue and his eventual preparation of a CUP application. Geraci also requested that Cotton sign the Ownership Disclosure Statement as an indication of good-faith while the parties negotiated on the sale terms. At no time did Geraci indicate to Cotton that a CUP application would be filed prior to the parties entering into a final written agreement for the sale of the Property. In fact, Geraci repeatedly maintained to Cotton that the critical zoning issue needed to be resolved before a CUP application could even be submitted.
16. The Ownership Disclosure Statement that Geraci provided to Cotton to sign in October 2016 incorrectly indicated that Cotton had leased the Property to Berry. However, Cotton has never met Berry personally and never entered into a lease or any other type of agreement with her. At the time, Geraci told Cotton that Berry was a trusted employee who was very familiar with MMCC operations and who was involved with his other MMCC dispensaries. Cotton's understanding was that Geraci was unable to list himself on the application because of Geraci's other legal issues but that Berry was Geraci's agent and was working in concert with him and at his direction. Based upon Geraci's assurances that listing Berry as a tenant on the Ownership Disclosure Statement was necessary and proper, Cotton executed the Ownership Disclosure Statement that Geraci provided to him. A true and correct copy of the CUP application, including the Ownership Disclosure Statement, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
17. On November 2, 2016, Geraci and Cotton met at Geraci's office in an effort to negotiate the final terms of their deal for the sale of the Property. The parties reached an agreement on the material terms for the sale of the Property. The parties further agreed to cooperate in good faith to promptly reduce the complete agreement, including all of the agreed-upon terms, to writing.
18. At the November 2, 2016 meeting, the parties executed a three-sentence document related to their agreement on the purchase price for the Property at Geraci's request, which read as follows:

Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, CA for a sum of $\$ 800,000.00$ to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of $\$ 800,000.00$ and to remain in effect until license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed not to enter into any other contacts on this property.

A true and correct copy of the November 2, 2016 agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. Geraci assured Cotton that the document was intended to merely create a record of Cotton's receipt of the $\$ 10,000$ "good-faith" deposit and provide evidence of the parties' agreement on the purchase price and good-faith agreement to enter into final integrated agreement documents related to the sale of the Property. A true and correct copy of the November 2, 2016 email is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
19. Thereafter, Cotton continued to operate in good faith under the assumption that Geraci's attorney would promptly draft the fully integrated agreement documents as the parties had agreed and the parties would shortly execute the written agreements to document their agreed-upon deal. However, over the following months, Geraci proved generally unresponsive and continuously failed to make substantive progress on his promises, including his promises to promptly deliver the draft final agreement documents, pay the balance of the non-refundable deposit, and keep Cotton apprised of the status of the zoning issue.
20. Over the weeks and months that followed, Cotton repeatedly reached out to Geraci regarding the status of the zoning issue, the payment of the remaining balance of the non-refundable deposit, and the status of the draft documents. For example, between January 18, 2017 and February 7, 2017, the following exchange took place between Geraci and Cotton via text message:

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1/1/1
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Geraci: "The sign off date they said it's going to be the 30th."
Cotton: "This resolves the zoning issue?"
Geraci: "Yes"
Cotton: "Excellent"...
Cotton: "How goes it?"
Geraci: "We're waiting for confirmation today at about 4 o'clock"
Cotton: "Whats new?"
Cotton: "Based on your last text I thought you'd have some information on the zoning by now. Your lack of response suggests no resolution as of yet."
Geraci: "I'm just walking in with clients they resolved it its fine we're just waiting for final paperwork."

The above communications between Geraci and Cotton regarding the zoning issue conveyed to Cotton that the issue had still not yet been fully resolved at that time. Geraci had previously represented to Cotton that the CUP application could not be submitted until the zoning issue was resolved. As it turns out, Geraci's representations were untrue and he knew they were untrue as he had already submitted the CUP application months prior.
21. With respect to the promised final agreement documents, Geraci continuously failed to timely deliver the documents as agreed. On February 27, 2017, nearly three months after the parties reached an agreement on the terms of the sale, Geraci finally emailed Cotton a draft real estate purchase agreement. However, upon review, the draft purchase agreement was missing many of the key deal points agreed upon by the parties at their November 2, 2016 meeting. After Cotton called Geraci for an explanation, Geraci claimed it was simply due to miscommunication with his attorney and promised to have her revise the agreement to accurately reflect their deal points.
22. On March 2, 2017, Geraci first emailed Cotton a draft of the separate side agreement that was to incorporate other terms of the parties' deal. Cotton immediately reviewed the draft side agreement and emailed Geraci the next day regarding certain missing and inaccurate material terms.
/ / / / /
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23. On March 7, 2017, Geraci emailed Cotton a revised draft of the side agreement along with a further request to change material terms of the parties' deal. Cotton, increasingly frustrated with Geraci's failure to abide by the parties' agreement, responded to Geraci on March 16, 2017 in an email which included the following:

We started these negotiations 4 months ago and the drafts and our communications have not reflected what agreed upon and are still far from reflecting our original agreement. Here is my proposal, please have your attorney Gina revise the Purchase Agreement and the Side Agreement to incorporate all the terms we have agreed upon so that we can execute final versions and get this closed... Please confirm by Monday 12:00 PM whether we are on the same page and you plan to continue with our agreement ... If, hopefully, we can work through this, please confirm that revised final drafts that incorporate the terms will be provided by Wednesday at 12:00 PM. I promise to review and provide comments that same day so we can execute the same or next day.
24. On the same day, Cotton contacted the City's Development Project Manager responsible for CUP applications. At that time, Cotton discovered for the first time that Geraci had submitted a CUP application for the Property way back on October 31, 2016, before the parties even agreed upon the final terms of their deal and contrary to Geraci's express representations over the previous five months. Cotton expressed his disappointment and frustration in the same March 16, 2017 email to Geraci:

I found out today that a CUP application for my property was submitted in October, which I am assuming is from someone connected to you. Although, I note that you told me that the $\$ 40,000$ deposit balance would be paid once the CUP was submitted and that you were waiting on certain zoning issues to be resolved. Which is not the case.
25. On March 17, 2017, after Geraci requested an in-person meeting via text message, Cotton replied in an email to Geraci which including the following:

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111.1

I would prefer that until we have final agreements that we converse exclusively via email. My greatest concern is that you get a denial on the CUP application and not provide the remaining $\$ 40,000$ non-refundable deposit. To be frank, I feel that you are not dealing with me in good faith, you told me repeatedly that you could not submit a CUP application until certain zoning issues had been resolved and that you had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on getting them resolved. You lied to me, I found out yesterday from the City of San Diego that you submitted a CUP application on October 312016 BEFORE we even signed our agreement on the 2 nd of November... Please confirm by 12:00 PM Monday that you are honoring our agreement and will have final drafts (reflecting completely the below) by Wednesday at 12:00 PM.

Geraci did not provide the requested confirmation that he would honor their agreement or proffer the requested agreements prior to Cotton's deadlines.
26. On March 21, 2017, Cotton emailed Geraci to confirm their agreement was terminated and that Geraci had no interest in the Property.
27. On March 22, 2017, Geraci's attorney, Michael Weinstein ("Weinstein"), emailed Cotton a copy of a complaint filed by Geraci in which Geraci claims for the very first time that the three-sentence document signed by the parties on November 2, 2016 constituted the parties' complete agreement regarding the Property, contrary to the parties' further agreement the same day, the entire course of dealings between the parties, and Geraci's own statements and actions.
28. On March 28, 2017, Weinstein emailed Cotton and indicated that Geraci intended to continue to pursue the CUP application and would be posting notices on Cotton's property. Cotton responded via email the same day and objected to Geraci or his agents entering the Property and reiterated the fact that Geraci has no rights to the Property.
29. On May 12, 2017, Cotton filed a cross-complaint against Berry and Geraci including causes of action for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and false promise with respect to the purchase agreement and the CUP application.
30. On September 22, 2017, Cotton, through his attorneys, demanded the City remove Berry from the Cotton Application and process it for Cotton. A true and correct copy of the September 22, 2017 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
30. The City responded via email on September 29, 2017, but did not agree to remove Berry from the Cotton Application and process it on behalf of Cotton. A true and correct copy of the September 29, 2017 email is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.

## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Writ of Mandate - Against all respondents/defendants and all real parties in interest)
31. Cotton incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 30 above as though set forth in full at this point.
32. The City is subject to California law. The City is further responsible for administering the CUP process according to the San Diego Municipal Code ("Municipal Code"), and is obligated to perform the ministerial duties of: (1) recognizing Cotton as the sole applicant for the Cotton Application, as required under Municipal Code sections 112.0102 and 113.0103, and (2) processing the Cotton Application with Cotton as the sole applicant and financially responsible party:
33. As the record owner of the Property, Cotton has a clear, present, legal and beneficial right in seeing that the City follows the Municipal Code and California law and recognizes the correct applicant with respect to the Cotton Application.
34. Cotton has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than the writ by this petition. Cotton has exhausted all available administrative remedies, if any, available to him. The only means by which Cotton may compel the City to follow the Municipal Code and California law is this petition for a writ of mandate.

## INDEX OF EXHIBITS

| Exhibit | Description |
| :---: | :--- |
| 1 | CUP application incl. Ownership Disclosure Statement |
| 2 | November 2, 2016 agreement |
| 3 | Email dated November 2, 2016 between Cotton and Geraci |
| 4 | Letter dated September 22, 2017 from Cotton to the City |
| 5 | Email dated September 29, 2017 from City to Cotton |

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$1 / 1 / 1$

## PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Cotton prays as follows:

## ON ALL CAUSES OF ACTION:

1. For a writ of mandate to be issued under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, and under seal of this Court, ordering the City to recognize Cotton as the sole applicant with respect to the Cotton Application and to process the Cotton Application with Cotton as the sole applicant;
2. In the alternative, for an order to show cause directed to the City as to why the Court should not issue such a writ; and
3. For such other or further relief the Court deems just.

DATED: October 6, 2017
Respectfully submitted,


ADAM C. WitT
Attorneys for Petitioner/Plaintiff DARRYL COTTON

## VERIFICATION

I, Darryl Cotton, have read this VERIFIED PETITION FOR ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE [CODE CIV. PROC., § 1085], and I am familiar with its contents. I am informed and believe the matters stated therein are true and on that basis verify that the matters stated therein are true.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on $\qquad$ , 2017 in San Diego, California.


## 11

EXHIBIT 2
755

FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation
Michael R. Weinstein (SBN 106464)
Scott H. Toothacre (SBN 146530)
501 West Broadway, Suite 1450
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
LARRY GERACI

## SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

## COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-EC-CTL

## PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR:

1. BREACH OF CONTRACT;
2. BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING;
3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; and
4. DECLARATORY RELIEF.

Plaintiff, LARRY GERACI, alleges as follows:

1. Plaintiff, LARRY GERACI ("GERACI"), is, and at all times mentioned was, an individual residing within the County of San Diego, State of California.
2. Defendant, DARRYL COTTON ("COTTON"), is, and at all times mentioned was, an individual residing within the County of San Diego, State of California.
3. The real estate purchase and sale agreement entered into between Plaintiff GERACI and Defendant COTTON that is the subject of this action was entered into in San Diego County, California, and concerns real property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., City of San Diego, San Diego County, California (the "PROPERTY").
4. Currently, and at all times since approximately 1998, Defendant COTTON owned the PROPERTY.
5. Plaintiff GERACI does not know the true names or capacities of the defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 20 and therefore sue such defendants by their fictitious names. Plaintiff is
informed and believe and based thereon allege that each of the fictitiously-named defendants is in some way and manner responsible for the wrongful acts and occurrences herein alleged, and that damages as herein alleged were proximately caused by their conduct. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend this complaint to state the true names and/or capacities of such fictitiously-named defendants when the same are ascertained.
6. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that at all times mentioned herein, each and every defendant was the agent, employee, joint venture, partner, principal, predecessor, or successor in interest and/or the alter ego of each of the remaining defendants, and in doing the acts herein alleged, were acting, whether individually or through their duly authorized agents and/or representatives, within the scope and course of said agencies, service, employment, joint ventures, partnerships, corporate structures and/or associations, whether actual or ostensible, with the express and/or implied knowledge, permission, and consent of the remaining defendants, and each of them, and that said defendants ratified and approved the acts of all of the other defendants.

## GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

7. On November 2, 2016, Plaintiff GERACI and Defendant COTTON entered into a written agreement for the purchase and sale of the PROPERTY on the terms and conditions stated therein. A true and correct copy of said written agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
8. On or about November 2, 2016, GERACI paid to COTTON $\$ 10,000.00$ good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of $\$ 800,000.00$ and to remain in effect until the license, known as a Conditional Use Permit or CUP is approved, all in accordance with the terms and conditions of the written agreement.
9. Based upon and in reliance on the written agreement, Plaintiff GERACI has engaged and continues to engage in efforts to obtain a CUP for a medical marijuana dispensary at the PROPERTY, as contemplated by the parties and their written agreement. The CUP process is a long, time-consuming process, which can take many months if not years to navigate. Plaintiff GERACI's efforts include, but have not been limited to, hiring a consultant to coordinate the CUP efforts as well as hiring an architect. Plaintiff GERACI estimates he has incurred expenses to date of more than $\$ 300,000.00$ on the CUP process, all in reliance on the written agreement for the purchase and sale of
the PROPERTY to him by Defendant COTTON.

## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

## (For Breach of Contract against Defendant COTTON and DOES 1-5)

10. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 above.
11. Defendant COTTON has anticipatorily breached the contract by stating that he will not perform the written agreement according to its terms. Among other things, COTTON has stated that, contrary to the written terms, the parties agreed to a down payment or earnest money in the amount of $\$ 50,000.00$ and that he will not perform unless GERACI makes a further down payment. COTTON has also stated that, contrary to the written terms, he is entitled to a $10 \%$ ownership interest in the PROPERTY and that he will not perform unless GERACI transfers to him a $10 \%$ ownership interest. COTTON has also threatened to contact the City of San Diego to sabotage the CUP process by withdrawing his acknowledgment that GERACI has a right to possession or control of the PROPERTY if GERACI will not accede to his additional terms and conditions and, on March 21, 2017, COTTON made good on his threat when he contacted the City of San Diego and attempted to withdraw the CUP application.
12. As result of Defendant COTTON's anticipatory breach, Plaintiff GERACI will suffer damages in an amount according to proof or, alternatively, for return of all sums expended by GERACI in reliance on the agreement, including but not limited to the estimated $\$ 300,000.00$ or more expended to date on the CUP process for the PROPERTY.

## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against Defendant COTTON and DOES 1-5)
13. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 12 above.
14. Each contract has implied in it a covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will undertake actions that, even if not a material breach, will deprive the other of the benefits of the agreement. By having threatened to contact the City of San Diego to sabotage the CUP process by
withdrawing his acknowledgment that Plaintiff GERACI has a right to possession or control of the PROPERTY if GERACI will not accede to his additional terms and conditions, Defendant COTTON has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
15. As result of Defendant COTTON's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff GERACI will suffer damages in an amount according to proof or, alternatively, for return of all sums expended by GERACI in reliance on the agreement, including but not limited to the estimated $\$ 300,000.00$ or more expended to date on the CUP process for the PROPERTY.

## THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Specific Performance against Defendants COTTON and DOES 1-5)
16. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 15 above.
17. The aforementioned written agreement for the sale of the PROPERTY is a valid and binding contract between Plaintiff GERACI and Defendant COTTON.
18. The aforementioned written agreement for the sale of the PROPERTY states the terms and conditions of the agreement with sufficient fullness and clarity so that the agreement is susceptible to specific performance.
19. The aforementioned written agreement for the purchase and sale of the PROPERTY is a writing that satisfies the statute of frauds.
20. The aforementioned written agreement for the purchase and sale of the PROPERTY is fair and equitable and is supported by adequate consideration.
21. Plaintiff GERACI has duly performed all of his obligations for which performance has been required to date under the agreement. GERACI is ready and willing to perform his remaining obligations under the agreement, namely: a) to continue with his good faith efforts to obtain a CUP for a medical marijuana dispensary; and b) if he obtains CUP approval for a medical marijuana dispensary thus satisfying that condition precedent, then to pay the remaining $\$ 790,000.00$ balance of the purchase price.
22. Defendant COTTON is able to specifically perform his obligations under the contract, namely: a) to not enter into any other contracts to sell or otherwise encumber the PROPERTY; and b) if

Plaintiff GERACI obtains CUP approval for a medical marijuana dispensary thus satisfying that condition precedent, then to deliver title to the PROPERTY to GERACI or his assignee in exchange for receipt of payment from GERACI or assignee of the remaining $\$ 790,000.00$ balance of the purchase price.
23. Plaintiff GERACI has demanded that Defendant COTTON refrain from taking actions that interfere with GERACI's attempt to obtain approval of a CUP for a medical marijuana dispensary and to specifically perform the contract upon satisfaction of the condition that such approval is in fact obtained.
24. Defendant COTTON has indicated that he has or will interfere with Plaintiff GERACI's attempt to obtain approval of a CUP for a medical marijuana dispensary and that COTTON does not intend to satisfy his obligations under the written agreement to deliver title to the PROPERTY upon satisfaction of the condition that GERACI obtain approval of a CUP for a medical marijuana dispensary and tender the remaining balance of the purchase price.
25. The aforementioned written agreement for the purchase and sale of the PROPERTY constitutes a contract for the sale of real property and, thus, Plaintiff GERACI's lack of a plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy is presumed.
26. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff GERACI is entitled to an order and judgment thereon specifically enforcing the written agreement for the purchase and sale of the PROPERTY from Defendant COTTON to GERACI or his assignee in accordance with its terms and conditions.

## FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

## (For Declaratory Relief against Defendants COTTON and DOES 1-5)

27. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 14 above.
28. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Defendant COTTON, on the one hand, and Plaintiff GERACI, on the other hand, in that COTTON contends that the written agreement contains terms and condition that conflict with or are in addition to the terms stated in the written agreement. GERACI disputes those conflicting or additional contract terms.
29. Plaintiff GERACI desires a judicial determination of the terms and conditions of the written agreement as well as of the rights, duties, and obligations of Plaintiff GERACI and defendants thereunder in connection with the purchase and sale of the PROPERTY by COTTON to GERACI or his assignee. Such a declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time so that each party may ascertain their rights, duties, and obligations thereunder.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants as follows:

## On the First and Second Causes of Action:

1. For compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $\$ 300,000.00$ according to proof at trial.

## On the Third Cause of Action:

2. For specific performance of the written agreement for the purchase and sale of the PROPERTY according to its terms and conditions; and
3. If specific performance cannot be granted, then damages in an amount in excess of $\$ 300,000.00$ according to proof at trial.

## On the Fourth Cause of Action:

4. For declaratory relief in the form of a judicial determination of the terms and conditions of the written agreement and the duties, rights and obligations of each party under the written agreement.

## On all Causes of Action:

5. For temporary and permanent injunctive relief as follows: that Defendants, and each of them, and each of their respective directors, officers, representatives, agents, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting in concert with or participating with them, directly or indirectly, be enjoined and restrained from taking any action that interferes with Plaintiff GERACI' efforts to obtain approval of a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) for a medical marijuana dispensary at the PROPERTY;
6. For costs of suit incurred herein; and
7. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: March 21, 2017

FERRIS \& BRITTON, A Professional Corporation


Michael R. Weinstein Scott H. Toothacre

Attorneys for Plaintiff
LARRY GERACI

## EXHIBIT A

## 763

Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Darryl Cotton:

Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, CA for a sum of $\$ 800,000.00$ to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of $\$ 800,000.00$ and to remain in effect until license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts on this property.


## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

> A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of California
County of


On November 2,2016 before me,
personally appeared $\qquad$ and Larry Guerra —.
who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the persons) whose names) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signatures) on the instrument the persons), or the entity upon behalf of which the persons) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.


EXHIBIT 3

## 766

# SD) <br> HOW TO APPLY FOR A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT Marijuana Outlet 

City of San Diego
Development Services Department
1222 First Avenue, MS 301, San Diego, CA 92101-4101

This Information Bulletin describes the application process for a Marijuana Outlet (formerly Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative) Conditional Use Permit.

## I. MARIJUANA OUTLETS

All Marijuana Outlets ( MO ) are regulated by SDMC, Section 141.0504 and Chapter 4, Article 2, Division 15 . This information bulletin provides general information, regulations and minimum submittal requirements to apply for a Process 3 Conditional Use Permit (CUP) for a MO. For general information, please see https://www.sandiego.gov/developmentservices.

## II. MARIJUANA OUTLET RESTRICTIONS

A. The total number of MOs is limited to four (4) per City Council District.
B. MOs are not allowed within 1,000 feet of the following: resource and populationbased City parks; churches; child care centers; playgrounds; City libraries; minororiented facilities; other Marijuana Outlets; residential care facilities; or schools (as defined in SDMC Section 141.0504).
C. MOs are not allowed within 100 feet of a residential zone.
D. MOs are allowed only in the following zones: IBT-1-1; IL-3-1; IS-1-1; CC-2-1; CC-22; CC-2-3; CC-2-4; CC-2-5; CR-2-1, CO-2-1; CO-2-2; and within the following Planned Districts (PDO): Barrio Logan (Subdistrict D), Carmel Valley (EC \& SP), Centre City (WM, I, T \& CC), Mission Valley (CO, CV \& CR - without residential), and San Ysidro within the Coastal Overlay Zone (Commercial Zones 1, 2 \& 3 and $\mathrm{I}-1$ Industrial Zones) until such time the PDO is repealed.

## Documents referenced in this Information Bulletin

- San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC) Section 141.0504
- San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC) (Chapter 4, Article 2, Division 15)
- Project Submittal Manual, Section 4
- Information Bulletin 503, Fee/Deposit Schedule For Development \& Policy Approvals/Permits
- Information Bulletin 512, How to Obtain Public Noticing Information
- Information Bulletin 580, Potential Historical Resource Review
- Affidavit for Marijuana Outlet/Marijuana Production Facilities for Conditional Use Permit (CUP), DS-190
- Ownership Disclosure Statement, DS-318
- Storm Water Requirements Applicability Checklist, DS-560
- Climate Action Plan Consistency Checklist
- General Application, DS-3032
- Deposit Account/Financially Responsible Party, DS-3242
- List of Approved MO Sites


## III. OPTIONS FOR SERVICE

MO CUP applications may be submitted by appointment by calling 619-446-5300 or as a Walk-In Service at 1222 1st Avenue, 3rd floor, Check-In Counter.

## IV. SUBMITTAL REQUIREMENTS

MO The Development Services Department will not accept, formally review, nor deem complete any MO CUP applications unless the application package satisfies all of the City's minimum project submittal requirements for Conditional Use Permits (see Project Submittal Manual, Section 4) and this Information Bulletin (Section IV, Step A). The Submittal Matrix and the Minimum Submittal Requirements Checklist identify the forms, documents, and plans that are required. The Submittal Matrix is an easy-touse tool to help you quickly identify the type of items needed for submittal. The Submittal Requirements Checklist provides a

Printed on recycled paper. Visit our web site at www.sandiego.gov/development-services. Upon request, this information is available in alternative formats for persons with disabilities.
description of the requirement and content of each form, document, and plan details needed. The checklist also provides the applicant with information references regarding the required fees and deposits.

All MO CUP applications will go through a three step completeness review process to ensure that all of the required information is provided to review the project.
A. Step One: Initial Screening

One copy of all items noted in the checklist below must be provided during this first initial screening step:

1. General Application (DS-3032).
2. Deposit Account/Financially Responsible Party Form (DS-3032).
3. Ownership Disclosure Statement (DS-318).
4. Proof of Ownership/Legal Lot Status (Grant Deed).
5. Storm Water Requirements Checklist (DS-560).
6. Photographic Survey photo and CD-R.
7. Site plan with development summary.
8. Floor plan.
9. Elevations if proposing exterior modifications.
10. Historic Resources Information (See Information Bulletin 580) if exterior alterations are proposed on a structure 45 years or older.
11. Fees (see Information Bulletin 503 \& Section V of this bulletin).
12. Climate Action Plan (CAP) Consistency Checklist.
13. In addition to the submittal requirements for CUP, the following information is required:
a. 1000-foot Radius Map.
i. Provide a one page Assessor's parcel map outlining a 1000-foot radius around the subject property. Include a spreadsheet identifying the use, address, assessor parcel number, and business name for all properties within the 1,000 foot radius.
ii. The map must also identify residential zones within 100 feet of the property.
b. Affidavit for MO/MPF for Conditional Use Permit (CUP) (DS-190).

Please note that if all required forms above are not completely filled out and/or signed, the application will be rejected. Once staff has determined that the submittal application contains all of the required information listed above, your application will then go to Step Two, known as Submitted Completeness Review.

## B. Step Two: Submitted Completeness Review

If your project application meets the minimum requirements described in Step One above, your project will then go through the Step Two comprehensive review called Submitted Completeness Review. Submitted Completeness Review can take up to 30 (calendar) days to complete. The Public Notice Package will not be required as part of the Submitted Completeness Review, but will be collected at the time of Full Submittal. Upon completion of the Submitted Completeness Review, staff will notify the applicant via email or by postal mail whether the application is ready to be fully submitted or if additional information/clarification is required.
C. Step Three: Full Submittal

When the project is ready for a Full Submittal, staff will provide the applicant with the number of document sets required, including the request for the Public Notice Package. Once staff accepts
the Full Submittal, the project will then be assigned to a project manager and routed to the required reviewers. Once four (4) projects per each council district have obtained final approval from the City's decision-maker, no more applications can be approved.

## V. DEPOSIT/FEES

The deposit and fees must be paid at the time of Step One: Initial Screening (see Information Bulletin 503 "Fee Schedule for Development \& Policy Approvals/Permits").
VI. PUBLIC SAFETY PERMIT

MOs must obtain a MO/MPF Permit (Form DS-191) from the Development Services Department pursuant to Chapter 4, Article 2, Division 15 of the San Diego Municipal Code. Applications for a MO/MPF Permit will be processed after the approval of the Conditional Use Permit. Subsequent annual MO/MPF Permit renewals or any updated fingerprinting and background checks can be processed by the Development Services Department with the submittal of a General Application Form DS-3032 and fee payment for Single Discipline Preliminary Review (see Information Bulletin 513).

EXHIBIT 4

## 770


 Upon request, thes information is available in altomative formats for persons vith disabilities

## EXHIBIT 5

## 772



## Map Layers Included In Report

Description

Roads
Freeways
Parcels
Lots
Base Zones ("Official Zoning Map") Community Plan

Clairemont Mesa Height Limitation Overlay Zone Coastal Height Limitation Overlay Zone
Coastal Overlay Zone (Permit Jurisdictions)
Earthquake Fault Buffers
Elevation Contours (5 foot; 1999)
MSCP Vegetation
Multiple Habitat Planning Area
Non-Coastal Wetlands
Sensitive Coastal Overlay Zone
Sensitive Vegetation
Slopes $25 \%$ or greater (1999)
Vernal Pools
Airport Land Use Compatibility Overlay Zone Airports: ALUCP Noise Contours (CNEL) Airports: Airport Approach Overlay Zone (SDIA) Airports: Airport Influence Areas
Airports: FAA Part 77 Noticing Area
Airports: OId SDIA Airport Influence Areas
Airports: Old SDIA Noise Contours (CNEL)
Airports: Old SDIA Safety Zones (RPZ)
Airports: Safety Zones
Community Plan Implementation Overlay Zone
FEMA Floodways \& Floodplains
Facilities Benefit Assessment
Fire: Brush Management
Fire: Brush Zones with 300 Foot Buffer
Fire: Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones
First Public Roadway
Historic Districts: Existing
Historic Districts: Potential
Historic Resources: Designated (points)
Historic Resources: Potential, Greater North Park

Visible Transparent
$\sqrt{\checkmark}$ NoNoNo

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No No
YesNo No NoNo

Every reasonable effort has been made to assure the accuracy of this map. However, neither the SanGIS participants nor San Diego Data Processing Corporation assume any liability arising from its use.

THIS MAP IS PROVIDED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

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## Map Layers Included In Report

| Description | Visible | Transparent | Has Intersecting Features |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Port District Dedicated Streets | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Port District Granted \& Conveyed Lands | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Prime Industrial Lands | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Promise Zone | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Redevelopment Districts | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Urban Vilage Overlay Zone | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Geologic Hazards | $\square$ | $\square$ | Yes |
| Parking Impact Overlay Zone | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Residential Tandem Parking Overlay Zone | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Transit Area Overlay Zone | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |
| Transit Priority Areas | $\square$ | $\square$ | No |

## Intersecting Features

Parcels

| APN | Recordation | Owner Information |  | Valuation |  | Other |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 543-020-0200 | Record: 102763 Date:2/27/1998Legal:BLK 25 LOT 20 PER MAP 2121 | COTTON DARRYL 6184 FEDERAL BLVD |  | Land: | \$133,274 | Units: 0 |
|  |  |  |  | Imp: | \$60,698 | Taxable: $\sqrt{ }$ |
| Address(es) |  | SAN DIEGO | CA 92114 | Total: | \$193,972 | Own Occ: |

6176 FEDERAL BL

| Base Zones <br> Zonename | (Official Zoning Map") <br> Ordinance Number | Implementation Date |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| CO-2-1 | O-20580 NS | $01 / 14 / 2016$ |


| Community Plan <br> Community Plan Name | Code |
| :--- | :--- |
| ENCANTO NEIGHBORHOODS,SOL | 11 |

Elevation Contours (5 foot; 1999)

| Elevation |
| ---: |
| 275 |


| MSCP Vegetation |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Feature Name |  |
| Urban Developed | Holland 95 Code: $12000 /$ Holland 90 Code: $12000 /$ Category: NON-NATIVE VEGETATION |


| FEMA Floodways Floodplains <br> Feature Name |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Flood Designation: FP500 | Flood Zone: 0.2 PCT ANNUAL CHANCE FLOOD HAZARD <br> Floodway? NO | Special Flood Hazard Area? NO / |

Fire: Brush Zones with 300 Foot Buffer

| Feature Name |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 300 Foot Buffer Zone |  |

Fire: Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones

| Feature Name |  | Feature Detail |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone |  |  |

## Geologic Hazards

Code Hazard

32 Liquifaction; Low Potential - fluctuating groundwater minor drainages

EXHIBIT 6

## 776

Darryl Cotton 6176 Federal Avenue
San Diego, CA 92114
619-266-4004 (phone)
619-229-9387 (fax)
PRO PER COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual, and DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity; and DOES 1 through 25 ,

Respondents/Defendants.

REBECCA BERRY, and individual; LARRY GERACI, an individual, and ROES 1 through 25 ,

Real Parties In Interest.

## I. Legal Introduction

I, Darryl Cotton (Cotton or Petitioner), Defendant and Cross-Complainant in the matter against Larry Geraci (Geraci or Respondent) and Rebecca Berry (Berry) and Petitioner/Plaintiff
-1.
DARRYL COTTON'S VERIFIED OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO COMPEL

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
$\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text { Case Nos.: } \\ 37-2017-00010073-C U-B C-C T L \\ 37-2017-00037675-C U-W M-C T L\end{array}\right.$
) VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF ) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN ) SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S ) RESPONSE TO
(1) MOTION BY PLAINTIFF/CROSSDEFENDANT LARRY GERACI AND CROSS-DEFENDANT REBECCA BERRY TO COMPEL THE
DEPOSITION OF DARRYL COTTON AND (2) MOTION BY REAL PARTIES
) IN INTEREST, LARRY GERACI AND REBECCA BERRY, TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DARRYL COTTON )
)
Date: January 25, 2018
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Judge: Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil Dept.: C-73
in the matter against the City of San Diego (City), submit these points and authorities in opposition to the two motions before this Court seeking to compel my deposition (Motions to Compel). As fully argued below, the technical basis of my opposition is that, as a result of the professional negligence of my then-counsel and the facts of this case, when this Court made a factual finding that I am unlikely to prevail on my cause of action for breach of contract and denied my Application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO Motion) on December 7, 2017, it "abused its discretion."

Consequently, pursuant to CCP $\S \S 904.1(\mathrm{a})(6), 923$ and the Emeryville line of cases, a Writ of Supersedeas and Writ of Mandate is warranted and the Motions to Compel should be denied while my appeals are reviewed by the Court of Appeals (COA). ${ }^{1}$ I respectfully submit that the only issue that this Court needs to fully understand to decide these Motions to Compel is whether this Court would have made a different factual finding regarding my likelihood of success on the merits of my cause of action for breach of contract had my then-counsel not been negligent at the oral hearing and raised with this Court a single 1-page email.

## II. Plain Language Introduction and Respectful Request

The real reason I will be before this Court on January 25, 2018, once summarized in this introduction, will make me sound like I am paranoid, suffer from delusions of being the target of numerous conspiracies and will almost assuredly make me lose all credibility with this Court at the very onset. "From Oswald to Elvis, from Ollie to O.J., allegations of conspiracy have become the stuff of tabloid journalism and have the ring of a slug coin. The history of conspiracy, it has been observed, evidences the 'tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.' [Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The

[^4]DARRYL COTTON'S VERIFIED OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO COMPEL

Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1925)).] ${ }^{12}$
Your Honor, for the first time in my life I understand the concept of cognitive dissonance. I believe myself to be a man of reason and logic. Although I am not an attorney, I can understand the application of laws and principal to facts to analyze a situation and determine whether a cause of action is met. I firmly and completely believe that based on the facts of my case, the law and my reasoning below, that it is very simple and clear that this case brought by Geraci was done in bad-faith in an attempt to acquire my property, the main subject matter of this litigation, through a vexatious lawsuit. Further, that once this Court confirms my allegations of actions taken by counsel during the course of this litigation, that this Court will be absolutely appalled that our judicial system has been used so blatantly and disrespectfully as an instrument of misjustice.

However, despite believing in what I stated in the preceding paragraph $100 \%$, I have been before Judge Sturgeon and this Court on [seven] occasions and not only has there been no outrage, with the exception of one motion, all of my motions have been denied and this Court even made a factual finding that I am unlikely to prevail on the merits of my case. Clearly, I am missing something. I am left to conclude that the reason for this paradox is probably one of two causes.

First, what I believe and hope to be the case, the negligent and/or potentially fraudulent actions by counsel in this action have prevented Judge Sturgeon and this Court from properly focusing on the substantive facts of this case and providing me appropriate lawful relief. Further, due to intense stress and my own lack of ability to properly articulate myself before this Court, I have not been able to communicate clearly and reasonably to this Court when I personally have been before it. I realize that this imposes a burden and makes it more difficult for this Court "to get quickly to the crux of a matter and to craft creative problem-solving orders for [pro se] litigants."3
${ }^{2}$ Governmental Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: A Theory Reconsidered. Michael Finch. Montana Law Review Volume 57. Issue 1 Winter 1996. Page 1.
${ }^{3}$ See Handling Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants. Administrative Office of the Courts. January 2007. Page xi. ("[S]elf-represented litigants often have difficulty preparing complete pleadings, meeting procedural -3-
DARRYL COTTON'S VERIFIED OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO COMPEL

It is for this reason that, although I believe Mr. Weinstein filed the instant Motions to Compel as a vexatious litigation tactic, I am grateful that he did. It gives me a lawful and procedurally appropriate forum to fully explain the substantive issues to this Court and not have Mr . Weinstein be able to have this response stricken or denied on some procedural grounds that elevate form over justice.

As noted above, I am applying for a Writ of Supersedeas: "The issuance of a writ of supersedeas is not based on any statute, code section, or rule of court, but is within the inherent power of the court. Whether or not a writ should issue depends 'upon the special circumstances of each case' (West Coast etc. Co. v. Contractors' etc. Board, 68 Cal.App.2d 1, 6 [155 P.2d 863])." (internal citations omitted.) ${ }^{4}$ Additionally, pursuant to my appeal for a Writ of Mandate, relevantly and as summarized in the Rutter Guide:
"Mandate will issue only if the following requirements are met:
[1] No adequate remedy and irreparable injury...
However, notwithstanding an adequate remedy by appeal, a petition for writ of mandate may be granted in exceptional circumstances-e.g., where the issue presented is of great public importance requiring prompt resolution and/or constitutional rights are implicated. [See, e.g., Anderson v. Super.Ct. (1989) 213 CA3d 1321, 1328, 262 CR 405, 410; Silva v. Super.Ct. (Heerhartz) (1993) 14 CA4th $562,573,17$ CR2d 577, 583; and $\mathbb{I} 15: 6.1 \mathrm{ff}$.]
[2] ... Additionally, the petitioner must demonstrate an abuse of discretion or respondent's failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty to act." ${ }^{5}$

It is the "special/exceptional circumstances" arising from the acts of counsel in this matter, affecting the judiciary, deceiving this Court and the perception of access to justice by the public in our judicial system that makes what was originally a very simple contractual dispute a case "of great public importance requiring prompt resolution..."6

Thus, assuming I am not crazy, I believe that if the irreparable harm that I am facing is
requirements, and articulating their cases clearly to the judicial officer. These difficulties produce obvious challenges.")
${ }^{4}$ Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of Cal. v. Paul (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 368, 374-375 [40 Cal.Rptr. 352]
${ }_{6}^{5}$ B.Common Law Writs, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. App. \& Writs Ch. 15-B (emphasis added.) ${ }^{6}$ Id.
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allowed to pass, then as stated by the Supreme Court of California, public confidence in the judiciary will be eroded and this case "will reinforce an already too common perception that the quality of justice a litigant can expect is proportional to the financial means at the litigant's disposal." Nearyv. Regents of Univ. of California, 3 Cal. 4th 273, 287, 834 P.2d 119, 127-28 (1992).

However, there is the second possibility, which is that I am simply not reasoning well and have had some form of mental or psychological impairment. And I am actually before this Court wasting this Court's precious judicial time and resources. This is, I am forced to conclude, a possibility, because December 12, 2017, when this Court denied my Motion for Reconsideration, was the worst day of my life. As explained below, I was $100 \%$ positive that when I appeared before this Court on that day, I would be able to explain my then-counsel's negligence at the December 7, 2017 TRO Motion hearing, this Court would change its position and issue the TRO. Instead, my Motion for Reconsideration was denied and, given my expectations of having "my day in court," I was in so much shock that I suffered a mini-stroke, a TIA, and had to go to the Emergency Room (see Exhibit 1; medical records from admission to Mercy Scripps Hospital). The next day, when my financial investor told me, as a result of the denial of my Reconsideration Motion, that he was going to cease funding my business and this litigation because he needed to "cut his losses," I went to his location uninvited and physically assaulted him. (See Exhibit 2 - Supporting declaration of Joe Hurtado.) He was going to call the police and have me arrested. I will forever be grateful that he did not and instead called a medical doctor who found me to be a danger to myself and others (See Exhibit 3; Declaration of Dr. Carolyn Candido stating that I was a danger to myself and others and was suffering from Acute Stress Disorder).

In light of the above, I am open to the fact that I am not thinking clearly and would like to respectfully request that this Court, when determining whether to grant or deny the Motions to Compel, that it please provide a written opinion regarding my allegations of facts, law and reasoning below that make up the "special/exceptional circumstances" of my case and which are

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the basis of my appeal. To be completely clear, I fully recognize that, especially if I am simply delusional, this Court has no obligation to me whatsoever to provide any reasoning. ${ }^{7}$ But I ask the Court to please believe me when I say that I am incapable of expressing in written words here the everyday anguish I face thinking that I am losing everything of value in my life, that I am letting down my family, friends and business partners of over 20 years, and that I will soon be destitute due to Geraci's vexatious lawsuit and the negligent actions of counsel who failed to live up to their ethical obligations. I fear if I am not thinking clearly and there are legal, valid, and substantive reasons for the things that have happened, I may not be able to fully understand the legal concepts that justify such actions (however personally I disagree with them). A written opinion that I can slowly review and research the legal language and concepts of, analyzing my arguments below, would truly and sincerely be appreciated. It would, as perverse as it sounds, be a source of great solace to me. Understanding that Geraci's lawsuit against me has some modicum of merit would be a great relief to me and would take away what is the unfounded every day, relentless and intense rage I have against Geraci and counsel in this case and the despair that I feel at being unable to access justice because I cannot, with my limited time and resources, navigate the complexities of what is supposed to also be my judicial system.

## III. Material Factual Background

A. Summary of Sole Underlying and Case Dispositive Issue in this Matter (the "Real Issue")

In November of 2016, Petitioner and Respondent met and came to an oral agreement for the sale of Petitioner's Property to Respondent (the "November Agreement"). Materially, at the

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meeting at which the parties reached the November Agreement, Respondent (i) provided Petitioner with $\$ 10,000$ in cash to be applied towards a total non-refundable deposit of $\$ 50,000$ and had Petitioner execute a document to record his receipt of the $\$ 10,000$ (the "Receipt") and (ii) promised to have his attorney speedily draft and provide final, written purchase agreements for the Property that memorialized all of the terms that made up the November Agreement (the "Final Purchase Agreement").

On the same day the November Agreement was reached, Respondent emailed Petitioner a scanned copy of the Receipt. Petitioner, recognizing the Receipt could be construed as the final purchase agreement for the Property, emailed back asking Respondent to specifically confirm the Receipt was not the final purchase agreement as it failed to incorporate material terms. Respondent replied, acknowledging Petitioner's request for his confirmation and specifically providing said confirmation that the Receipt was not the Final Purchase Agreement (the "Confirmation Email"). (See Exhibit 4 (contains all 14 emails between Geraci and myself. There are no other written documents or communications between myself and Geraci other than text messages.)

Thereafter, Respondent breached the November Agreement by, inter alia, failing to provide (i) the balance of the non-refundable deposit and (ii) the Final Purchase Agreement. Consequently, almost five months later in March of 2017, Petitioner terminated the November Agreement with Respondent for breach. After terminating the November Agreement with Respondent, Petitioner entered into a written real estate purchase agreement with a third-party for the sale of the Property (the "Real Estate Purchase Agreement"). (Exhibit 5; the Third-Party Purchase Agreement.)

After Petitioner terminated the November Agreement, Respondent filed the underlying lawsuit seeking to stymie the Real Estate Purchase Agreement and to acquire the Property through a vexatious lawsuit ("Respondent's Lawsuit"). Respondent's Lawsuit is premised solely and exclusively on the allegation that the Receipt is the Final Purchase Agreement. Thus, putting aside an overwhelming amount of additional and undisputed evidence, Respondent's own written

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admission in the Confirmation Email stating the Receipt is not the Final Purchase Agreement is completely damning and dispositive. (See Exhibit 4.)

Respondent has never, (i) in the almost five months between his sending of the Confirmation Email and the termination of the November Agreement or (ii) in any pleading or oral argument in the two underlying civil matters to date, challenged, disputed, denied or even acknowledged his own written admission in the Confirmation Email that the Receipt is not the Final Purchase Agreement - in complete contradiction of his own complaint. Furthermore, Respondent has neither produced nor even alleged the existence of a single piece of evidence to support his contention that the Receipt is the Final Purchase Agreement.

Respondent's entire and sole superficial litigation strategy has been to rely on the Statute of Frauds ("SOF") and the Parol Evidence Rule ("PER") to prevent the admission of his Confirmation Email. However, the trial court denied Respondent's Demurrer based on the SOF and the PER. Moreover, even if the trial court had held that the SOF and the PER did apply in the first instance, the legal concept of promissory estoppel in California undeniably makes clear that Respondent's reliance is misplaced. The seminal case of Monarco makes clear that Respondent's actions in this case would be an unconscionable act and result in his unjust enrichment. Thus, with no just basis for filing Respondent's Lawsuit, the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that Respondent did so to unjustly acquire Petitioner's Property through a vexatious lawsuit.

## B. Additional Material Background

Petitioner initially, given the simple nature of the Real Issue, believed that he would be able to represent himself pro se against Respondent's Lawsuit. Petitioner prepared and filed an Answer to Respondent's Lawsuit and a Cross-Complaint. Petitioner's Answer and CrossComplaint were denied by the Court for failing to comply with procedural requirements. Petitioner realized, notwithstanding the simplicity of the Real Issue, that he would be unable to efficiently represent himself in a legal proceeding and entered into an agreement with a thirdparty to finance the litigation (the "Investor") against Respondent's Lawsuit in exchange for a

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portion of the proceeds that he would receive from the Real Estate Purchase Agreement.
Investor did research, interviewed and hired a local law firm that had successfully handled a similar matter for a landlord (the "Similar Lawsuit"). The Investor negotiated with Mr. Demian for Mr. Demian to fully represent Petitioner and to provide his services on a financed agreement of $\$ 10,000$ a month. The understanding was that the law firm would fully represent Petitioner to have Respondent's Lawsuit adjudicated as quickly and efficiently as possible. Thus, if in any given month the law firm billed more than $\$ 10,000$, the balance would be carried over and made up for in future months in which there was less than $\$ 10,000$ a month billed or upon conclusion of Petitioner's legal actions. (See Exhibit 6; email with Mr. Demian regarding $\$ 10,000$ payment and retainer agreement with Mr. Demian.)

The reality was, the law firm did not want to actually do more than $\$ 10,000$ of work a month. It heavily resisted doing the work necessary and preparing the Shortening Time and TRO Motions. The end result was that Petitioner's counsel was ill-prepared for the hearings and, most egregiously, completely failed to represent Petitioner's interest at the TRO Motion hearing. Specifically, as fully detailed below, Petitioner's TRO motion argued that Petitioner would more likely than not prevail on his Causes of Action for Breach of Contract and Declaratory Relief. Petitioner's moving papers put forth three arguments in support of his likelihood to prevail on his Breach of Contract claim and, essentially, one argument in support of his Declaratory Relief claim.

Summarily, the three arguments in support of his Breach of Contract claim are that (i) the undisputed communications between the parties, including the Confirmation Email, make clear that the Receipt is not the Final Purchase Agreement as Respondent alleges, (ii) that the trial court had already denied Respondent's attempt to utilize the SOF and the PER to prevent the admission of the Confirmation Email when it denied Respondent's Demurrer and (iii) even if the trial court were to have ruled otherwise or change its view, the concept of promissory estoppel would clearly prevent the use of the SOF and the PER to effectuate an unconscionable fraud or unjust enrichment, which would take place here if the Confirmation Email were prevented from
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being legally taken notice of here as Respondent argues. The argument in support of the Declaratory Relief claim is based on a property owner's constitutional right to determine who may use his property as he sees fit - the exact same legal reasoning used by Petitioner's thencounsel to prevail in the previous Similar Lawsuit.
C. The TRO Motion Hearing

At the TRO Motion hearing, counsel for Respondent referenced the Receipt and said, essentially, "your Honor, we have a valid contract for the property, end of story." At this point, Petitioner's then-counsel should have, at the very least, raised the Confirmation Email and explained to this Court that there was undisputed evidence that completely contradicted Respondent's own argument and that the Receipt was the final purchase agreement for Petitioner's property. He did not. Instead, he argued solely the constitutional grounds for prevailing on the Declaratory Relief cause of action, which, unsurprisingly, did not persuade this Court. Consequently, this Court made factual findings that I was unlikely to prevail on the merits of my cause of action for breach of contract and that I was facing no irreparable harm.

The only relief sought by Petitioner via the TRO was that Respondent be enjoined from withdrawing and/or sabotaging the CUP application pending on the property and that a Receiver be appointed to oversee the CUP application pending resolution of Respondent's Lawsuit. Petitioner, for valid reasons below, simply wanted to have Respondent enjoined from sabotaging the CUP application pending resolution of Respondent's Lawsuit and the court addressing the Real Issue. During the TRO Motion hearing, the trial court judge reviewed the proposed order submitted by Petitioner and asked opposing counsel what was wrong with an agreement by Respondent or an order enjoining such action, to which Respondent's counsel replied that there was nothing specific, just the conceptual notion that his client should not be prevented from being able to do as he wished. The court did not pursue this line of reasoning further.

In other words, the very action that Petitioner sought to prevent was de facto approved of by the trial court. As explained below, withdrawing and/or sabotaging the CUP application is, from Respondent's perspective, the best and only reasonable course of action to take in order to
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mitigate his damages to Petitioner - assuming Petitioner is able to get to a point in the judicial system in which the Real Issue will be reviewed and adjudicated by the court. Thus, having the trial court specifically allow the very course of action that will irreparably harm Petitioner is maddening and a source of every day extreme psychological and emotional distress.

Immediately after the TRO hearing, Investor called and informed Petitioner about his then-counsel's failure to raise the Confirmation Email or any of the other arguments in support of his Breach of Contract claim. After speaking with Investor and his then-counsel, Petitioner fired his then-counsel. Thereafter, Petitioner filed his Reconsideration Motion and the aftermath of what happened after its denial is described above in the introduction.

## D. Ethical Violations by Counsel

After the denial of my Motion for Reconsideration, I made numerous calls to the State Bar of California and calls to its Ethics Hotline regarding the actions of Mr. Demian. Based on my descriptions of what took place at the TRO Motion hearing, I was directed to various ethics opinions and judicial cases (set forth below), that support the position that Mr. Demian was, at the very least, professionally negligent. Of note, it appears, all counsel present violated their ethical duties that day when they failed to raise with your Honor the fact that my counsel had been negligent in raising with this Court the single most material and dispositive piece of evidence that was in the moving papers. As noted in one of the ethics opinions, referencing the following Court of Appeals case:
" [A]n attorney has a duty not only to tell the truth in the first place, but a duty to 'aid the court in avoiding error and in determining the cause in accordance with justice and the established rules of practice.' (51 Cal.App. at p. 271, italics added.) Observance of this duty, we might add, prevents the waste of judicial resources, and the opposing party's time and money. ${ }^{8 "}$
I will, after submission of this pleading to this Court, begin compiling my email records with Mr. Demian, Mr. Weinstein and Ms. Austin and intend to file complaints against each of them with the State Bar of California regarding their actions in this case. As to Mr. Weinstein

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and Ms. Austin, for bringing and maintaining a lawsuit with no probable cause. And, as to Mr. Demian, for his professional negligence and, as argued below, potentially fraudulent behavior.

## D. Emotional and Financial Pressure

Submitted herewith to this Court is the Secured Litigation Financing Agreement, which, because of confidentiality provisions and with this Court's approval, shall not be made public. However, as detailed therein, because of this litigation, I have been continually forced to sell and negotiate for financing for my businesses, personal, professional and litigation needs. To summarize, on March 21, 2017, when I sold my Property to the Third-Party Buyer, provided the CUP was issued, I was going to receive $\$ 2,000,000$; a $20 \%$ equity stake in the business; and a guaranteed $\$ 10,000$ a month payment for 10 years (minus agent and transaction fees). Assuming the CUP was not issued, I would have received $\$ 100,000$ and kept my Property, from which I have run my business and non-profit 151 Farms for over 20 years. As of the day I submit this pleading with this Court, if I fail to prevail in this litigation, given all of the liens against my Property required to finance this litigation, I will be left completely destitute and with no home. ${ }^{9}$

## ARGUMENT

## A. Due to Counsel's Negligence, the Court Incorrectly Denied my TRO Motion

"[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2011))
a. Geraci Breached The Agreement Reached on November 2, 2016

Neither party disputes an agreement was reached on November 2, 2016. However, as described above, Geraci's contention that the November Receipt is the full and final agreement between the parties for the purchase of the Property is completely contradicted by his own admission on the same day the November Receipt was executed. See Exhibit 4.

As noted, Geraci has never contested the Confirmation Email and, thus, Geraci's
${ }^{9}$ See supporting declarations of Darryl Cotton, -12-
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subsequent silence show that he admits the existence of those terms - specifically, that "any final" agreement, would contain my 10\% equity stake. (See, e.g., Keller v. Key System Transit Lines (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 593, 596 ["The basis of the rule on admissions made in response to accusations is the fact that human experience has shown that generally it is natural to deny an accusation if a party considers himself innocent of negligence or wrongdoing."].
b. Geraci and Berry's Reliance on the Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule Is Misplaced

It appears that Geraci's complaint and his entire defense to my cross-complaint is premised on the Statute of Frauds. As discussed above, Geraci's admission that the November Receipt is not the final agreement is damning and dispositive. His attempt to cling to a 3sentence one page document as the be-all end-all for our deal is not credible under any reasonable interpretation of the evidence. The fact is, the 3 -sentence one page document is, on its face, ambiguous and the terms we actually agreed upon are reflected in our emails and texts, which are reliable, credible, and controlling. Indeed, the Court previously ruled as such on November 6, 2017, when it ruled against Geraci's statute-of-frauds-and-parol-evidence-rulebased demurrer. Thus, with the Court's ruling, there is no legal basis at all on which Geraci can prevail in this action.

Moreover, the statute of frauds does not apply and is not permitted to be used for an unconscionable fraud or to unjustly enrich a third party, which would be the result if the Court were now to cancel its previous determination that the Statute of Frauds is no bar to Cotton. The California Supreme Court is clear on this point - the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been "consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances." (Monarco v. Lo Greco (1950) 35 Cal.2d 621, 623.) Per the agreement reached by the parties in November, Geraci was to pay $\$ 800,000$ and ensure I received at least $\$ 10,000$ a month from operations of the MMCC which would last for an estimated 10 -year period at minimum. This is an obligation of approximately $\$ 2,000,000$. Thus, Geraci is estopped from asserting the statute in this case as it is both an unconscionable act

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and it would result in an unjust enrichment to Geraci of $\$ 1,200,000$ - minimum.

## c. Cotton Will Be Irreparably Harmed if the Court Does Not Grant the Injunction

It is clear based on the above that Geraci brought this action with no probable cause attempting to acquire the property through a vexatious lawsuit. However, at some point, any party who brings a lawsuit with no probable cause will realize, as the case progresses, that the trial court will be able to determine what is really going on. At that point, any such party must take what actions they can to mitigate their actions. I realized that, which was the basis of my TRO request. I believed I would ultimately prevail on the merits of my case, but wanted to ensure that Geraci could not withdraw and/or sabotage the CUP application to mitigate his damages to me.

Ahbay Schweitzer is an architect, a building designer and the owner of Techne, a local design firm that was engaged by Larry Geraci to acquire the CUP at the Property. Schweitzer is Geraci's exclusive agent. Per Schweitzer's declaration regarding the issuance of the CUP at the Property, he has:
"Been engaged in the application process for this CUP application for approximately twelve (12) months so far... [and] [t]here is one major issue left to resolve regarding a street dedication. I expect this issue to be resolved within the next six (6) weeks." (See Exhibit 7 - Declaration of Abhay Schweitzer.)

Schweitzer executed his declaration on October 20, 2017. Thus, it is possible that Geraci, now realizing that at this point the truth would come out, may already have taken steps to covertly sabotage the CUP application to prevent it from being issued. This is my biggest fear. Though I am distressed every day because of this entire situation, the denial of the TRO is what is driving me literally insane - the fact that every day that has passed since the TRO motion was denied has made it clear to Geraci that he is going to lose and he has had so much time to take covert actions to sabotage the CUP application in a way that will not be possible to discern and will prevent him from being legally liable. By doing so, if I ultimately prevail in this lawsuit, his damages will have been mitigated by millions.

I note, per Mr. Schweitzer's declaration, the second most important and final item that

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will be required to issue the CUP is a public hearing which he estimates to take place in March. In other words, Geraci still has the ability to sabotage the CUP application before this matter is even scheduled for trial.

The harm I face is all-encompassing, affecting my professional, personal, and every aspect of my life. Those who are close to me have seen me slowly be worn down, but the mental and psychological stress is real. The negative effect to me and everything of import in my life is read. Please see my supporting declaration submitted herewith, as well as those of (i) Don Casey, (ii) Michael Kevin McShane, (iii) Shawna Salazar, (iv) Sean Major, (v) Cindy Jackson, (vi) James Whitfield, (vii) Michael Scott McKim and (viii) Cheryl Morrow (all attached hereto as Exhibit 15)

## B. Writ of Supersedeas

"A writ of supersedeas may be granted only upon a showing that (a) appellant would suffer irreparable harm absent the stay, and (b) the appeal has merit. [See Smith v. Selma

Community Hosp. (2010) 188 CA4th 1, 18, 115 CR3d 416, 432]. ${ }^{10}$
As argued above, (i) I will suffer irreparable harm if Geraci is allowed to withdraw and/or covertly sabotage the CUP application and (ii) my appeal has merit because, but for Mr. Demian's incompetence, this Court would have approved my TRO application. ${ }^{11}$
"CCP § 923 grants the appellate court virtually unlimited discretion to make orders to preserve the status quo in protection of its own jurisdiction, including issuance of a stay order other than supersedeas. [CCP § 923; People ex rel. San Francisco Bay
Conservation \& Develop. Comm'n v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 C2d 533, 538-539, 72 CR 790, 793]
(a) [7:274] "Stay" to preserve status quo following denial of TRO or injunction: Where a temporary restraining order or injunction has been denied and the defendant threatens to perform the act in question, a stay of the trial court order obviously will not "preserve the status quo." Here, the appellate court has authority to issue a "stay" (as

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distinguished from supersedeas) enjoining defendant from doing the action in question pending the appeal. [CCP § 923-court of appeal may "make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo" during pendency of an appeal; People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation \& Develop. Comm'n v. Town of Emeryville, supra, 69 C2d at 536-539, 72 CR at 792-794] ${ }^{י 12}$
At the TRO hearing, your Honor reviewed the proposed TRO order and asked Mr. Weinstein what would be wrong with preventing his client from withdrawing the CUP application on the Property. Mr. Weinstein replied something to the effect that his client should not be prevented from doing as he wishes. (See Exhibit 8 Declarations of Elizabeth Emerson (stating "At the hearing, the judge asked Mr. Weinstein what would be wrong with preventing the withdrawal of the CUP application. Mr. Weinstein replied something about his client having freedom to do what he wanted.") and Mr. Mass (stating "Mr. Demian, counsel for Mr. Cotton, did not raise any email arguments with the Court.")

In other words, given that Geraci brought forth this action to prevail with vexatious tactics and not anticipating I would be able to secure financial backers to hire counsel, he would at some point realize he will lose this case on the merits. In that case, knowing he would be liable for damages, but that those damages are exponentially higher if the CUP is issued, he would be incentivized to withdraw and/or through subterfuge have the CUP sabotaged so as to limit his liability. Thus, this Court unknowingly de facto allowed Geraci to take an action that is in his best interest but is unjust towards me - the destruction of the "fruits" that I would ultimately seek in the Court of Appeals if I lost this action or if he simply delays this action long enough to covertly sabotage the CUP application while he still has exclusive control.

Thus, even assuming I am incorrect about some facts and law above, allowing Geraci to withdraw the CUP as this Court allowed would deprive the COA of its jurisdiction and CCP § 923 is perfectly on point here because it "grants the appellate court virtually unlimited discretion to make orders to preserve the status quo in protection of its own jurisdiction, including issuance of a stay order other than supersedeas."
C. Writ of Mandate
${ }^{12}$ E.Stay by Writ of Supersedeas, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. App. \& Writs Ch. 7-E

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A writ of mandate is appropriate where a beneficially interested petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law, and Respondent has a clear, present and ministerial duty, or has abused its discretion. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1085; see, e.g. Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 C3d 199, 205 ("Robbins.")) For the reasons argued above, this Court should reverse its position on the TRO Motion and direct the City to transfer control of the CUP application to me. Or, at least, as requested below, appoint a receiver to manage the CUP application until the merits of this action are finally adjudicated and prevent Geraci from sabotaging the CUP application.
D. Ethical Considerations

As noted above, the case law language below cited to in the ethical opinions of the State Bar of California, appears to be completely applicable here to the actions of counsel:

1. Per the Supreme Court of California, "Business and Professions Code section 6128 provides in relevant part: 'Every attorney is guilty of a misdemeanor who ... is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive ... any party.'" "That section [6128] and subdivision impose a duty on attorneys to 'employ ... such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law.' ${ }^{13}$
2. The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2013-189 discusses "Deceitful Conduct" and cites to Datig v. Dove Books, Inc., a Court of Appeals case that states the following (all emphasis in original text):

## Defense Counsel Failed to Do His Duty as an Officer of the Court and Acted in Direct Violation of the Trial Court's Local Rules

Business and Professions Code section 6068 provides, in relevant part: "It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: [T] ... [7] (b) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. [T] (c) To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him or her legal or just, except the defense of a
${ }^{13}$ Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 219 [266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365], as modified (Mar. 12, 1990)

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person charged with a public offense. [T] (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." (Italics added.)

Further, the Rules of Professional Conduct require that a member of the State Bar "[s]hall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 5-200(B).) (4) "'Honesty in dealing with the courts is of paramount importance, and misleading a judge is, regardless of motives, a serious offense.' " (Paine v. State Bar (1939) 14 Cal.2d 150, 154 [93 P.2d 103], italics added; see also Di Sabatino v. State Bar (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159, 162-163 [162 Cal.Rptr. 458, 606 P.2d 765]; Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912, 917 [180 Cal.Rptr. 831, 640 P.2d 1106].) "Counsel should not forget that they are officers of the court, and while it is their duty to protect and defend the interests of their clients, the obligation is equally imperative to aid the court in avoiding error and in determining the cause in accordance with justice and the established rules of practice." (Furlong $v$. White (1921) 51 Cal.App. 265, 271 [196 P. 903], italics added.)
[...] We therefore find it is necessary to state, explicitly, that although a misrepresentation to the court may have been made negligently, not intentionally, it is still a misrepresentation, and once the attorney realizes that he or she has misled the court, even innocently, he or she has an affirmative duty to immediately inform the court and to request that it set aside any orders based upon such misrepresentation; also, counsel should not attempt to benefit from such improvidently entered orders. As the court stated in Furlong $v$. White, an attorney has a duty not only to tell the truth in the first place, but a duty to "aid the court in avoiding error and in determining the cause in accordance with justice and the established rules of practice." ( 51 Cal.App. at p. 271, italics added.) Observance of this duty, we might add, prevents the waste of judicial resources, and the opposing party's time and money. ${ }^{14}$
3. The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and

Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2013-189 also states:
Even when no duty of disclosure would otherwise exist, "where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conceal any facts which materially qualify those stated. [Citation.] One who is asked for or volunteers information must be truthful, and the telling of a half-truth calculated to deceive is fraud." Cicone v. URS Corp. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 194, 201. See Goodman, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 346-347 and Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon \& Gladstone (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 54, 72 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 777].

See also Vega, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 294 ("it is established by statute 'that intentional concealment of a material fact is an alternative form of fraud and deceit equivalent to direct

[^8]affirmative misrepresentation' [citations omitted] . . . . In some but not all circumstances, an independent duty to disclose is required; active concealrnent may exist where a party '[w]hile under no duty to speak, nevertheless does so, but does not speak honestly or rnakes misleading statements or suppresses facts which rnaterially qualify those stated." [Fn. ornitted.]); Lovejoy v. AT\&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 85, 97 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 711]; Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 608 [225 Cal.Rptr. 624].

Footnote 14 states:
Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 1996-146 ("A lawyer acts unethically where she assists in the cornrnission of a fraud by irnplying facts and circumstances that are not true in a context likely to be misleading."); cf. Datig, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 980-81 (once attorney realized he had negligently rnisled the court, the attorney had an affirmative duty to immediately notify the court).

## E. Application of Ethical Considerations

Your Honor, this section is the part that rnakes rne sound like a conspiracy nut. Below I describe facts and provide docurnentation that can be independently verified. I respectfully request that, notwithstanding how outlandish my clairns are, you please consider that rnaybe, just rnaybe, they are true and that nurnerous officers of the court have engaged in unethical behavior.

Attorney Gina Austin. First, Austin undisputedly knows that the Receipt is not the final agreernent for my Property as she is the attorney that, after November 2, 2016, was drafting various versions of the purchase agreernent for rny property. She is narned numerous tirnes in ernails and texts between myself and Geraci. (See Exhibit 4.)

On March 6, 2017, Geraci texted rne "Gina Austin is there she has a red jacket on it you want to have a conversation with her." (See Exhibit 9; all of the text rnessages between Geraci and myself including the quoted one above, all of which also rnake clear that Geraci was stringing me along and rnake nurnerous drafts to contracts for the purchase of rny property after Novernber 2016.) Austin was the headnote speaker at a local cannabis event on that day. I was unable to rnake the event, but rny Investor Mr. Hurtado was and he spoke with Austin briefly, letting her know that I would not be attending. (See Exhibit 2; Declaration of Joe Hurtado, Paragraph 4.)

Second, at the TRO Motion hearing, per the Suprerne Court and COA language above, Austin had affirmative duty to inform Your Honor that Mr. Dernian had been negligent in failing

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to bring to your attention the Confirmation Email.
Based on the ethics language above, it appears to me that Gina Austin has violated numerous ethical duties by bringing and maintaining this action against me when she knows it is completely founded on a lie.

Attorney Michael Weinstein. First, I have an email from myself to Mr. Weinstein that I will not attach here because I do not want this pleading stricken from the record because of Litigation Privilege discussed in the ethics opinions cited above. But, I will bring copies with me to Court on January $25^{\text {th }}$. These emails to Mr. Weinstein recount the entire history of the dealings between Geraci and me and provide emails, texts and provide him the evidence he needed to know that his client Geraci had no probable cause to bring this lawsuit.

Second, I will not assume that Geraci told Weinstein about the draft purchase agreements that Austin was working on. Assuming it can be argued that Weinstein was not aware of the concept of promissory estoppel at the onset of this litigation and that he believed the SOF and the PER would prevent the Confirmation email, thus providing probable cause for this suit, no later than when this Court denied Geraci's demurrer, Weinstein knew this case had no probable cause and that maintaining it was simply a vexatious tactic to fraudulently acquire my Property.

Third, at the TRO Motion hearing, for the same reasoning put forth above, Weinstein was obligated to inform this Court about Mr. Demian's negligence and provide the Confirmation Email.

Fourth, after the oral hearing in front of your honor on January 18, 2018, Mr. Weinstein approached me to discuss access to the Property for soil samples to continue the CUP application and to discuss a possible settlement of this action regarding the Property and the CUP application. I am not clear what he means, Mr. Weinstein has had the Third-Party Purchase Agreement for since early in this litigation and it has been discussed. He knows I was forced to unconditionally sell my interest in the Property on April 15, 2017, to pay off debts and continue financing this litigation. See Exhibit 5 ("Seller hereby transfers and sells to Buyer, with all the associated rights and liabilities, his ownership, rights and interests in the property and the
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associated CUP application pending before the City of San Diego for $\$ 500,000$.") As that agreement makes clear, the condition precedent for closing is the successful resolution of this lawsuit. I am assuming that Mr. Weinstein wants me to engage in some kind of legal machinations by which I can void my agreement with the Third-Party Buyer so I can transfer the Property to Geraci. Even if there were some legal mechanism that would allow that (and it does not appear to me that is should be allowed in any circumstance as it would violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract), I would not do so. Even if lawful, it is not ethical and it would make me just as bad as Geraci - the very idea of which is nauseating.

Attorney David Demian. First, Mr. Demian started off his representation on fraudulent grounds. My Investor, Mr. Hurtado negotiated a monthly $\$ 10,000$ a month payment with him for his services. It was expressly discussed and negotiated that we would speedily and quickly resolve my legal matters as quickly as possible and that the $\$ 10,000$ would not be a limitation. However, when he sent me the retainer agreement, it did not contain the $\$ 10,000$ monthly financing concept. Mr. Hurtado spoke with Mr. Adam Witt, Mr. Demian's junior associate, who informed him that Mr. Demian did not want to put such a provision in the agreement because his partners would not like it. However, that he should not worry because so long as $\$ 10,000$ was being paid, that my representation would not be impeded. Mr. Hurtado pushed back hard, being a former attorney, he knew that ultimately what mattered was the language. Mr. Witt spoke with Mr. Demian and called Mr. Hurtado and myself back, they proposed, and I am sure that they never would have anticipated that they would find themselves in this position, that execute the retainer agreement and that I note in the cover email our $\$ 10,000$. I am assuming that they filed the retainer agreement with their firm Mr. Demian did not record the email reflecting our $\$ 10,000$ a month agreement. At that point, the reasoning that they provided made sense, that so long as $\$ 10,000$ was paid, that they would continue their services. I understand that businesses carry balances with vendors and clients. However, what is now apparent, is that Mr. Demian did not intend to fully represent me as he promised. He was intending to only do up to $\$ 10,000$ a month of work. Either that, or he intended to fraud his partners. I do not know the words, but one
way or another, he was defrauding me or his partners. (See Exhibit 6: email to Adam Witt confirming that notwithstanding language in the retainer agreement, only $\$ 10,000$ would be paid to FTB.)

Second, in his opposition to Geraci's demurrer, Mr. Demian did not raise the affirmative defense of promissory estoppel as articulated by the Supreme Court case of Monarco. Rather, it was Mr. Hurtado, who attended the oral arguments for the hearing, that felt that something had to be wrong. Mr. Hurtado did some "Googling" emailed Mr. Demian and approximately 2 weeks after the demurrer hearing emailed Mr. Demian about the concept of promissory estoppel and the Monarco case discussing the application to Mr. Cotton's case (See Exhibit 10). Mr. Demian included the Monarco case/promissory estoppel concept in the TRO motion that he submitted to this Court. In other words, I respectfully submit to this Court that this reflects that Mr. Demian clearly failed to meet his ethical obligations to me by even doing the most basic legal research required to properly represent me before this Court.

Third, Mr. Demian's actions at the TRO Motion hearing. As discussed ad nauseum above, he failed to raise the Confirmation Email. After the hearing, when Mr. Demian and the attorney for the City left the courtroom, the attorney for the City told Mr. Demian something to the effect of "you should have won based on the moving papers, but oral argument got you." Mr. Hurtado was standing no more 3 feet away from them when this was stated as he was enraged that Mr. Demian performed so poorly. Per the declarations of Mr. Mass and Ms. Elizabeth, Mr. Hurtado loudly berated Mr. Demian about his poor performance. Per Mr. Hurtado, he berated Mr. Demian for being unprepared and failing so miserably. Mr. Demian actually had the gall to retort to Mr. Hurtado that investing in litigation was always "risky" and, presumably, Mr. Hurtado should be less upset. Notably, and I believe the most actionable item against Mr. Demian, when I replied to Mr. Demian noting that even the City attorney stated that he should have won, he replied by email stating: "Also, as to the City Attorney, she told me my papers and oral argument were excellent. She did not say we should have won." (See Exhibit 11.) Mr. Demian is blatantly lying here, obviously and, at least it appears to me, foolishly attempting to
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cloud title. Specifically, the statute allows for a judgement on the merits similar to summary adjudication. Given the facts of my case, this motion should have been pursued by any competent attorney who was aware of these facts. Mr. Austin is a criminal defense attorney who has only agreed to help upon the favorable resolution of my appeal. How is it that a criminal defense attorney within two days of hearing the facts of my case can discover a motion that can quickly and speedily allow this Court to get to the merits of the case, avoiding all of the vexatious tactics employed by Geraci, such as these Motions to Compel that are before the Court and which are completely frivolous (there is absolutely no more information that can be provided through discovery that will contradict the Confirmation Email.) In other words, this provides additional support that Mr. Demian was negligent and/or purposefully fraudulent in his actions towards me as he was seeking not seeking to end this litigation quickly, rather, he was hoping to prolong it to increase his legal fees. As of today, Mr. Demian has been paid approximately $\$ 60,000$. I note, at $\$ 10,000$ a month as per our email agreement. And, on January 10, 2018, Mr. Demian emailed me a bill for his services up to the TRO Motion hearing - he is requesting $\$ 91,943.45$ in addition to the approximate $\$ 60,000$ he has already received. (See Exhibit 12; invoices from FTB for \$91,943.45.)

Your honor, this is not just. His negligence and active deceit are worthy of nothing but contempt. I implore you to exercise your powers to the fullest extent to grant me what relief you can against Mr. Demian for his actions described herein.

## The City Attorneys

"The notion that government might be "conspiring" to violate the rights of citizens is more apt to invite derision than concern... [y]et, when conspiracy is understood simply as an agreement to do wrong, the possibility of that government might conspire against citizens is not only plausible but likely. Contemporary government often operates through bureaucratic consensus, which necessarily involves the joint actions of multiple parties. By its nature then governmental decision-making that goes awry is often amenable to characterization as a "conspiracy." Most practitioners recognize that federal law authorizes civil actions against persons who, acting under color of law, directly violate the civil rights of others. These suits are typically brought under the now familiar section 1983 of title 41.
It is well known from a jurisprudence perspective that the City is anti-cannabis. ${ }^{15}$ The
${ }^{15}$ See County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal. App. $4^{\text {th }} 798,81$ in which two California counties (San Diego and San Bernardino challenged the California Compassionate Use Act (Proposition 215) and subsequent
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create a false record of what took place in order to limit his liability. However, I respectfully submit to this Court, now that you have reviewed the Confirmation Email and the Monarco case, it is simply not credible to believe the City attorney told him his oral argument was "excellent." Alternatively, I respectfully request that this Court ask the City attorney on January $25^{\text {th }}$ what she told him after the oral hearing. I believe this to be incredibly important as Mr . Demian without a doubt failed his professional obligations by failing to raise the Confirmation Email. He then failed his ethical obligations by failing to inform the court of his negligence. Lastly, his email stating that Mr. Hurtado is lying and that his oral argument was "excellent" actually crosses the line and goes from negligence to, as noted above, deceit. I implore this Court to get to the bottom of this issue. My retainer agreement with Mr. Demian has an arbitration provision that prevents me from suing him for legal malpractice. "Honesty in dealing with the courts is of paramount importance, and misleading a judge is, regardless of motives, a serious offense.' " (Paine v. State Bar (1939) 14 Cal.2d 150, 154 [93 P.2d 103], italics added; see also Di Sabatino v. State Bar (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159, 162-163 [162 Cal.Rptr. 458, 606 P.2d 765]; Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912, 917 [180 Cal.Rptr. 831, 640 P.2d 1106].) Mr. Demian here is not just seeking to mislead, he is attempting active deceit. This goes beyond serious. Please your honor, as an officer of the court he was beholden to you to do what was right. Instead of making things right, he sent me an email stating he was withdrawing from my case before even speaking with me! He set in motion a set of events that compounded the irreparable harm to me.

Fourth, on December 11, 2017, a day before oral hearing on my Motion for Reconsideration, that I was positive would be approved, I spoke with another local attorney named Jacob Austin as I was looking for new counsel. I had previously been introduced to Mr. Austin, who was tentatively planning to help me with my various legal matters before, unfortunately I ultimately chose to go with Mr. Demian given what appeared to be his superior expertise. Here is what is important to note: Mr. Austin brought to my attention the ability to bring a motion to expunge a lis pendens pursuant to a section in the CCP. The purpose of this motion is to speedily address meritless lawsuits that seek to attach real property and unlawfully
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City Attorney's Prosecutorial office, though while not germane to these Motions to Compel, but described in my supporting declaration, took advantage of a plea agreement $I$ entered into and extorted $\$ 25,000$ from me (the consequences of which are described and detailed in the Secured Litigation Investment Agreement). It also appears to me the City's Development Services violated my Constitutional due process rights by failing to provide notice to me and continuing to process the CUP application after explicitly telling me that they would not until they received a grant deed from me, which I never provided, and working with Geraci on the CUP application. Furthermore, that the City, when it filed its Answer to my application for a Writ of Mandate, after the TRO Motion hearing knowing Demian had been negligent, seeking legal fees and accusing me, among other things, of being guilty of "unclean hands," that is also is violating my rights because the City knew there was no probable cause against me.

Thus, it appears to me, that I could file a case against the City tomorrow in federal court pursuant to Section 1983 alleging a conspiracy against me by the City because of my procannabis political activism. I have no desire to do so. I want to end this endless, soul-crushing litigation. As described below, I respectfully request this Court's help.

## CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of California case of Neary v. Regents of University of California has become my last hope and I have read and re-read this case as it is my only source of strength right now. Ironically, it is for this reason that I have requested from this Court a written opinion regarding what I know are my amateurship attempts at legal formatting, writing and reasoning. If I truly am culpable somehow and Geraci is entitled to my Property, I will similarly carry this Court's decision with me to prevent me from acting out on my anger against Geraci and opposing counsel. (Even if I am crazy, Mr. Demian is worthy of contempt under any scenario.)

The opinion and the dissent in Neary discuss the best way to effectuate justice in our society taking into account the practical realities of the world we all live in. I empathize with George Neary, the plaintiff is the case, as did the Supreme Court of California, it stated:
legislation requiring counties to issue identification cards to qualified patients and primary caregivers, on the ground that these measures were preempted by provisions of the federal Controlled Substances Act.
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His plea is sympathetic: "Neary has spent more than twelve years in an expensive, timeconsuming, emotionally wrenching, and destructively distracting struggle which has included enough twists, turns, setbacks and victories for a novel. He has finally resolved that struggle through negotiation and voluntary agreement." Thwarting the settlement would frustrate the parties' mutual desire for an immediate end to their now 13- year-old dispute. The parties have pummeled each other long enough and have staggered to their respective corners. We choose to give them help, not the prospect of further battering.

This statement holds great power for me. The Supreme Court recognized Mr. Neary's extraordinary circumstances and the unique situation his case represented to substantive justice.

They recognized his plea as being "sympathetic" and I hope this Court can recognize the extraordinary circumstances I am in and do the same for me. Neary also states:

In ordinary civil actions such as the one before us, the parties come to court seeking resolution of a dispute between them. The litigation process they encounter is fraught with complexities, uncertainties, delays, and risks of many kinds. Different judges and juries may respond in different ways to the same evidence and argument. Public judicial proceedings may result in adverse publicity and unwanted disclosure of previously confidential information. Damage awards (or failure to recover) may cause financial hardship or ruin. These observations are not original. "More than a century ago, Abraham Lincoln gave the following advice: 'Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise wherever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time.' This was sage advice then and remains so now." (Lynch, California Negotiation and Settlement Handbook, supra, p. vii (foreword by California Supreme Court Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas).) ${ }^{16}$
[...] The primary purpose of the public judiciary is "to afford a forum for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties." (*282 Vecki v. Sorensen (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [ 340 P.2d 1020].) We do not resolve abstract legal issues, even when requested to do so. We resolve real disputes between real people. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170 [188 Cal.Rptr. 104, 655 P.2d 306].) This function does not undermine our integrity or demean our function. By providing a forum for the peaceful resolution of citizens' disputes, we provide a cornerstone for ordered liberty in a democratic society.

The Court of Appeal's concern for the integrity of trial court judgments is flawed in other respects. First, the notion that such a judgment is a statement of "legal truth" places too much emphasis on the result of litigation rather than its purpose. "In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the judgment produces-the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant. ... The real value of the judicial pronouncement-what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a 'case

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or controversy' rather than an advisory opinion-is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff." (Hewitt v. Helms (1987) 482 U.S. 755, 761 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 654, 661, 107 S.Ct. 2672], original italics. $)^{17}$

Your Honor, I respectfully submit to you the language above and note that Geraci's actions make a mockery of the Supreme Court of California and this Court. Above, the Supreme Court of California discusses the challenges to individuals "[i]n ordinary civil actions" and that the Courts "resolve[s] real disputes between real people," this is not an "ordinary" action in which there is a "real" dispute here. It is a fabricated one. "Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant." This vexatious lawsuit makes a mockery of the very basis of our judicial system - it is a blatant unlawful attempt by Geraci to acquire my Property from the Court and our judicial system. Geraci knew this case had no merit, but he brought it anyway knowing my financial predicament, of his partial making by failing to provide funds he promised and that he knew I was relying on, and filing a lis pendens to prevent me from entering into other agreements. Had I not entered into an agreement with Mr. Martin the same day I had terminated the agreement with Geraci, given that Weinstein served me the next day with the Complaint and lis pendens, I would not have been able to legally enter into that agreement and I would have lost everything by now. But for my desperate need for capital at the time, Geraci stringing me along (as our email communications make clear) and Weinstein's legal practice tactics would have been successful and I would not be before this Court attempting, however inarticulate, to see justice done.

Your Honor it is already after 11:00 am and will already late and running to get this printed to submit this pleading to your Court downtown. Please forgive the failings herein. I would request a continuance, but I cannot, because it although shames me to say this in a permanent public record, I am compelled to do so - there are people depending on me: I have
${ }^{17}$ Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 281-282 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119]

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become estranged from my partner, I am behind on payroll, debts, and I am living at the Property. This case left me destitute. I do the best I can to keep up appearances, but I cannot run a commercial business with no capital and a lis pendens on the Property. I have absolutely no funds. I long ago maxed out any and all financial sources of help. Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 are the water and electrical bills that are due, which are scheduled to be turned off tomorrow. I have already asked for repeated extensions. I do not know whether I will have electricity when I see you on Thursday. If my father were not the first note holder, I would already not even have a place to stay (see Exhibit 14; Declaration of Dale L. Cotton, stating "were this a normal business relationship, I would have foreclosed on this property...")

Please, in the interest of real, substantive justice, investigate my allegations here. I clearly understand how outrageous they seem. Please do not do not elevate form over substance and deny this pleading or the relief you can grant me on procedural, non-substantive grounds. I implore you to use your power to its fullest extent to grant me whatever relief that you can, which I do not even know what it is, so I cannot ask for it. I understand that you must vet my allegations herein as to Gina Austin and Micahel Weinstein. But, as to Mr. Demian, he is clearly culpable for failing to raise the Confirmation Email at the oral hearing, for failing to let you know that he did so in the aftermath, and, blatantly attempting to create a false record to deceive this Court. I ask that you please set in place whatever motion is necessary to sanction him.
"Violation of statewide rules of court and/or local rules is sanctionable by payment of the opposing party's reasonable expenses and counsel fees. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 227.) Furthermore, use of sanctions against both attorneys and clients has been commended by our Supreme Court as an appropriate method for dealing with unjustified litigation. (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert \& Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 873-874 [254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498].) (3c) Based on our review of this record, it appears that defense counsel violated several statewide rules of court and local rules, and that these violations resulted in unnecessary litigation and cost to plaintiff and her attorney in time and money. We therefore remand this matter to the trial court to consider, and, if appropriate, award
sanctions against defendants and/or their attorneys and in favor of plaintiff." ${ }^{\text {P }}$
"[I]t is well established that California's Constitution provides the courts, including the Courts of Appeal, with inherent powers to control judicial proceedings. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1; Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 266-267 [279 Cal.Rptr. 576, 807 P.2d 418]; Keeler v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 596, 600 [297 P.2d 967].) To the same effect, Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) authorizes every court ' $[t] \mathrm{o}$ amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice.' This provision is consistent with and codifies the courts' traditional and inherent judicial power to do whatever is necessary and appropriate, in the absence of controlling legislation, to ensure the prompt, fair, and orderly administration of justice." ${ }^{19}$ (Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 276-277.)

Your Honor, I conclude with a plea, I realize that you are an arbitrator and must remain impartial. However, this Court is meant to give justice and vindicate the rights of the wronged. At the Court hearing this Thursday, unless Austin desires to perjure herself, you can ask her if she drafted the purchase agreements in early 2017, thereby reflecting her knowledge that the November 2016 agreement was not a final purchase agreement as Geraci and Weinstein allege. At the hearing, you can ask Weinstein why, given this Court's ruling denying his demurrer, he has continued to prosecute this case that has no factual or legal basis. I realize that my requests may be excessive, but, I respectfully note the following in the hopes that it supports my requests here. In Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856; 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, the Court of Appeal [explicitly recognized the necessity and approved active judicial behavior in providing affirmative assistance to pro se clients] such as myself: "the judge cannot rely on the pro per

[^10] modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 13, 1999) 19
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litigants to know each of the procedural steps, to raise objections, to ask all the relevant questions of witnesses, and to otherwise protect their due process rights."

Lastly, I sincerely believe that this case also represents something larger than myself and that if the damage and harm caused to me by Geraci and perpetuated and augmented by the acts of counsel as described above, including their manipulations of this Court, are allowed to pass, then it will prove that the concern articulated by Justice Kennard in Neary in 1992 has ceased to be "an already too common perception," but has in fact become reality and "the quality of justice a litigant can expect is proportional to the financial means at the litigant's disposal." Neary $v$. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 287 (emphasis added).

Dated: January 22, 2017

By:


Verification: I, Darryl Cotton, verify that all statements herein made that declare actions or beliefs as to myself are true and correct and I declare under penalty of perjury under the

By:
 State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

I also verify and confirm that all exhibits attached hereto are true and correct copies as stated.

EXHIBITI


EXAIBIT 2

I, Joe Hurtado, declare:

1. I am an individual residing in the County of San Diego and I have personal knowledge of the facts stated below and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify.
2. Between late 2016 and early 2017, the following sequence of events took place: (i) Mr. Darryl Cotton informed me that he sold his property to Mr. Larry Geraci; (ii) Mr. Cotton told me that he expected Mr. Geraci would breach his agreement; (iii) Mr. Cotton asked that I help him locate a new buyer for his property; (iv) I brokered a deal between Mr. Cotton and Mr. Richard Martin for the sale of Mr. Cotton's property to Mr. Martin.
3. The day after the deal with Mr. Cotton and Mr. Martin was reached on March 21, 2017, Mr. Geraci via his counsel, Mr. Michael Weinstein, initiated a lawsuit against Mr. Cotton seeking to enforce a previous agreement between Mr. Cotton and himself (the "Geraci Litigation").
4. Materially, on March 6, 2017, I attended a local cannabis event at which Gina Austin was a speaker. At that event, I introduced myself and, at Mr. Cotton's request, let her know that he would not be attending and speaking with her.
5. Throughout the course of the Geraci Litigation, the following sequence of events took place:
(i) Mr. Cotton attempted to represent himself pro se in the Geraci Litigation; (ii) Mr. Cotton chose to no longer represent himself in the Geraci Litigation and asked that I help him finance and facilitate his legal representation; (iii) I identified Mr. David Demian and facilitated the full legal representation of Mr. Cotton by Mr. Demian ; (iv) Mr. Demian, I believe, failed to live up to his professional obligations by, inter alia, (a) failing to discover and/or argue to the Court in the Geraci Litigation the concept of promissory estoppel in response to Mr. Geraci's demurrer to Mr. Cotton's Cross-Complaint; (b) failing to raise with the Court, at the oral hearing for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") applied for by Mr. Cotton, evidence that is material and necessary for the Court's proper adjudication of the issues before it; (c) when confronted by me, outside the courtroom

DECLARATION OF JOE HURTADO IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DECLARATION OF JOE HURTADO IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL
immediately after the TRO hearing, he acknowledged his failure to raise material arguments and evidence in the moving papers, but denied that the fact that his failure to do so was reflective of any wrongdoing; (d) not informing the Court of his failure to raise said arguments after the TRO hearing; and (e) terminating his representation of Mr. Cotton by email before even speaking with Mr. Cotton immediately after the oral hearing on the TRO.
6. I note that after the TRO hearing, I was approximately 5 feet away from Mr. Demian and the attorney representing the City of San Diego. I expressly heard the attorney for the City of San Diego say something along the lines of: "the moving papers were great" and that Mr. Demian "should have won."
7. Summarily, I originally supported Mr. Cotton to protect my own financial interest and as an investment. However, for various reasons which are being put forth by Mr. Cotton, this litigation has become incredibly more expensive, time consuming and mentally and emotionally challenging than originally envisioned. And which is hard to describe in words.
8. Notably, the day after the Court declined Mr. Cotton's motion for reconsideration of his application for a TRO, thereby confirming that Mr. Cotton was unlikely to prevail in the Geraci Litigation, I informed him that I would be "cutting my losses" and would cease funding him personally and the Geraci Litigation. This took place on December 13, 2017. Thereafter, on the same day, Mr. Cotton came to where I was located uninvited and pleaded with me to continue my support. I refused. Mr. Cotton physically assaulted me. I threatened to call the authorities and Mr. Cotton just sat down and became, for lack of a better expression, neurotic (e.g., speaking to himself, talking to others, being emotional, etc.)
9. Mr. Cotton was speaking and it appeared that he thought he was in the courtroom or at his property on Federal Boulevard. His speech was nonsensical. Understanding his situation, I did not

DECLARATION OF JOE HURTADO IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO
call the police and instead called a medical doctor I had recently been introduced to, Dr. Candido, and explained the situation to her.
10. Dr. Candido came to the location where Mr. Cotton was located and examined Mr. Cotton.
11. After diagnosing him, Dr. Candido recommended that we take Mr. Cotton to the Emergency Room or call the authorities as she believed him to be a danger to himself and others.
12. I spoke with Dr. Candido and she agreed that so long as Mr. Cotton was not allowed to drive and he could stay at the residence with me under my supervision, it would not be necessary to call the authorities.
13. It is against my recommendation that Mr. Cotton is submitting his response to the Court on the date hereof. I skimmed the very large document that appears to be over 1,000 pages that he intends to file with the Court today and strongly recommended that he request additional time from the Court, suggesting that to file such a document may actually be detrimental to him. However, Mr. Cotton has stated his situation is even more dire than before and that he requires this action to be speedily adjudicated, not just because of his dire financial situation, but for the well-being of his mental and emotional state.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXHIBIT 3

I, Dr. Carolyn Candido, declare:

1. I am a licensed physician in the State of California.
2. On December 13, 2017, I was contacted by Mr. Joe Hurtado who requested I examine a friend of his, Mr. Darryl Cotton, who was speaking incoherently. Mr. Hurtado stated he was concerned that Mr. Cotton may require medical attention but that Mr. Cotton did not want to go to the Emergency Room.
3. I traveled to Mr. Hurtado's residence and met with Mr. Hurtado and Mr. Cotton.
4. Mr. Cotton was in a room by himself and mitially did not allow me to examine him. After approximately thirty minutes, Mr. Hurtado spoke with Mr. Cotton who then allowed me to perform a physical examination.
5. Mr. Cotton had an elevated pulse, was speaking incoherently and exhibited signs of anxiety, panic and was expressing suicidal thoughts. His language vacillated from being clear to incoherent. I am unclear as to what he was attempting to express, but from what I could make out, he was in an emotional state due to matters related to some legal matter regarding his property.
6. It is my diagnosis that he was suffering from Acute Stress Disorder and that at that moment in time represented a danger to himself and others. Because of his express statements regarding suicide and other expressions of violence as to unidentified third-parties, I repeatedly requested that Mr. Cotton go to the Emergency Room, which he refused.
7. I communicated with Mr. Hurtado my diagnosis and expressed my concern for Mr. Cotton regarding his statements, to the extent that they were clear, as they reflected an intent to harm himself and others. It was my recommendation that Mr. Cotton not be by himself,
8. After speaking with Mr. Hurtado regarding Mr. Cotton, Mr. Hurtado promised to allow Mr. Cotton to remain at that residence until such time as Mr. Cotton was calm.

DECLARATION OF DR. CAROLYN CANDIDO IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S PETITION FOR EMERGENCY WRIT OF SUPERSEDEAS AND WRIT OFMANDATE
9. Since that evening I have not met or spoken with Mr. Cotton.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

January 22, 2018


Dr. Carolyn Candido

EXHIBT 4

## Exhibit A

## Compilation of all email correspondence between Darryl Cotton and Larry Geraci

## Table of Contents

Format: Sender; Receiver; Date; Time

1. Geraci. Cotton. 10-20-16. 11:42 AM. ..... A-1
2. Geraci. Cotton. 10-24-16. 12:38 PM. ..... A-2
2.1 Attachment ..... A-2.1
3. Geraci. Cotton. 11-2-16. 3:11 PM. ..... A-3
3.1 Attachment ..... A-3.1
4. Geraci. Cotton. 11-2-16. 9:13 PM. ..... A-4
5. Geraci. Cotton. 11-14-16. 10:26 AM. ..... A-5
5.1 Attachment ..... A-5.1
6. Geraci. Cotton. 2-27-17. 8:49 AM. ..... A-6
6.1 Attachment ..... A-6.1
7. Geraci. Cotton. 2-2-17. 8:51 AM. ..... A-7
7.1 Attachment ..... A-7.1
8. Cotton. Geraci. 3-3-17. 8:22 AM. ..... A-8
8.1 Attachment ..... A-8.1
9. Geraci. Cotton. 3-7-17. 12:05 PM. ..... A-6
9.1 Attachment ..... A-9.1
10. Cotton. Geraci. 3-16-17. 8:23 PM. ..... A-10
11. Cotton. Geraci. 3-17-17. 2:15 PM. ..... A-11
12. Geraci. Cotton. 3-18-17. 1:43 PM. ..... A-12
13. Cotton. Geraci. 3-19-17. 9:02 AM. ..... A-13
14. Geraci. Cotton. 3-19-17. 3:11 PM. ..... A-14

# 15. Cotton. Geraci. 3-19-17. 6:47 PM. A-15 <br> 16. Cotton. Geraci. 3-21-17. 3:18 PM. A-16 

Subject: Automatic reply: test mail
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: darryl@dalbercia.us
Date: Thursday, October 20, 2016 10:42:49 AM GMT-08:00

Thank you for your emall...
I will be out of the office until Wednesday, October 26th, 2016. If you should need Immediate assistance, please contact Becky at: becky@tfcsd.net. You may also contact the office as well.
Thank you.
$1 / 1$

Subject: Drawing
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
Date: Monday, October 24, 2016 11:38:28 AM GMT-08:00

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123
Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

## Circular 230 Disclaimer:

IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specifically noted, any federal tax advice in this communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materiais) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addresses. This emaii is considered a confidentiai communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have received this in error, please contact us at (858)576-1040 and retum this to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of thls confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disciosure; copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please nolify the sender of this facsimile immediately and arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

From: darryl@dalbercia.us [mailto:darryl@dalbercia.us] On Behalf Of Darryl Cotton
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 12:37 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Subject: Test Send

Darryl Cotton, President

darryl@inda-gro.com
www.inda-aro.com
Ph: 877.452.2244
Cell: 619.954.4447
Skype: dc.dalbercia
6176 Federal Blvd.
San Diego, CA. 92114 --.
USA

[^11]826


827


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Exhibit 1 to Darryl Cotton's Request for Judicial Notice Page 52 of 334

Subject: Agreement
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
Date: Wednesday, November 2, 2016 2:11:51 PM GMT-08:00

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

## Tax \& Financial Center, Inc

5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123
Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

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Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Daryl Cotton:

Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, CA for a sum of $\$ 800,000.00$ to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of $\$ 800,000.00$ and to remain in effect until license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts on this property.


## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

> A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of California
County of

$\qquad$
On November $2, \partial 01 l(2$ before me,

personally appeared $\qquad$
cotton and Larry Geraai who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the persons) whose names) islare subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the sarne in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signatures) on the instrument the persons), or the entity upon behalf of which the persons) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

(Seal)

Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Darryl Cotton:

Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, CA for a sum of $\$ 800,000,00$ to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary)

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of Califomia
County of $\qquad$ 10 $\qquad$
on Nope mber 2 , $\partial 0 l l a$ before me,

personally appeared $\square$ and Lardy Gear $i^{\prime}$ who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the persons) whose name (s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signatures) on the instrument the persons), or the entity upon behalf of which the persons) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

(Seal)

Subject: Re: Agreement
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
Date: Wednesday, November 2, 2016 8:13:54 PM GMT-08:00
No no problem at all
Sent from my iPhone
On Nov 2, 2016, at 6:55 PM, Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com) wrote:

## Hi Larry,

Thank you for meeting today. Since we executed the Purchase Agreement in your office for the sale price of the property I just noticed the $10 \%$ equity position in the dispensary was not language added into that document. I just want to make sure that we're not missing that language in any final agreement as it is a factored element in my decision to sell the property. I'll be fine if you would simply acknowledge that here in a reply.

Regards.

Darryl Cotton, President

darryl@inda-gro.com
www.inda-gro.com
Ph: 877.452.2244
Cell: 619.954.4447
Skype: dc.dalbercia
6176 Federal Blvd.
San Diego, CA. 92114
USA
NOTICE: The information contained in the above message is confidential information solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the reader of this message is not the Intended recipient, the reader is notified that any use, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify inda-Gro immediately by telephone at 619.266.4004.

On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 3:11 PM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net) wrote:

Best Regards,
$1 / 2$

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc

## 5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200

San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576 .1040
Fax: 858.630 .3900

Circular 230 Disclaimer:
iRS regulations require us to advise you that, uniess otherwise specifically noted, any federal tax advice in this communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materiais) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addresses. This email is considered a confidential communication and is Intended for the person or firm identfied above. if you have received this in error, please contact us at (858)576-1040 and retum this to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immediately and arrange for the retum or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

Subject: Federal Blvd need sig ASAP
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
Date: Monday, November 14, 2016 10:26:09 AM GMT-08:00

## Hi Darryl,

## Can you sign and email back to me asap?

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc<br>5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200<br>San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

## Circular 230 Disciaimer:

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# Authorization to view and copy Building Records from the County of San Diego Tax Assessor 

I, Darryl Cotton, owner of the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, San Diego, CA (APN 543-020-02-00) authorize Abhay Schweitzer, Benjamin Peterson, and/or Carlos Gonzalez of TECHNE to view and make copies of the County of San Diego Tax Assessor Building Records.

Signature
$\qquad$
Date

# Authorization to view and copy Building Records from the County of San Diego Tax Assessor 

I, Darryl Cotton, owner of the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, San Diego, CA (APN 543-020-02-00) authorize Abhay Schweitzer, Benjamin Peterson, and/or Carlos Gonzalez of TECHNE to view and make copies of the County of San Diego Tax Assessor Building Records.

Signature


Date

Subject: Federal Blvd Property
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
Date: Monday, February 27, 2017 8:49:16 AM GMT-08:00
Hi Daryl,
Attached is the draft purchase of the property for 400k. The additional contract for the 400k should be in today and I will forward it to you as well.

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123
Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

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## AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

THIS AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY ("Agreement") is made and entered into this ___ day of , 2017, by and between DARRYL COTTON, an individual resident of San Diego, CA ("Seller"), and 6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST dated $\qquad$ , 2017, or its assignee ("Buyer").

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is mutually covenanted and agreed by Seller and Buyer as follows:

1. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Agreement the following terms will be defined as follows:
a. "Real Property": That certain real property commonly known as 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, Califomia, as legally described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof.
b. "Date of Agreement": The latest date of execution of the Seller or the Buyer, as indicated on the signature page.
c. "Purchase Price": The Purchase Price for the Property (defined below) is Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000.00$ ).
d. "Due Diligence Period": The period that expires at 5:00 p.m., California time, on the date the CUP (defined below) is issued to Buyer or its designated assign.
e. "Escrow Agent": The Escrow Agent is: [NAME]
f. "Title Company": The Title Company is: [NAME]
g. "Title Approval Date": The Title Approval Date shall be twenty (20) days following Buyer's receipt of a Preliminary Title Report and all underlying documents.
h. "Closing", "Closing Date" and "Close of Escrow": These terms are used interchangeably in this Agreement. The closing shall occur on or at 5:00 p.m., California time, on the date fifteen (15) days from the date Buyer or its designated assign is approved by the city of San Diego for a conditional use permit to distribute medical marijuana from the Real Property ("CUP"). Notwithstanding the foregoing, in no event shall Closing occur later than March 1, 2018, unless mutually agreed by the parties.
i. "Notices" will be sent as follows to:

Buyer: $\quad 6176$ Federal Blvd. Trust 6176 Federal Blvd.

1

6176 Federal Blvd. Purchase Agreement
$2 / 27$

|  | San Diego, Califomia 92114 <br> Attn: <br> Fax No.: <br> Phone No.: |
| :--- | :--- |
| with a copy to: | Austin Legal Group, APC <br>  <br>  <br>  <br> 3990 Old Town Ave, A-112 <br> San Diego, CA 92110, |
| Seller: |  |
|  | Darryl Cotton |
|  | Address: |
|  | City, State, Zip |
|  | Attn: |
|  | Fax No.: |
|  | Phone No.: |
| Escrow Agent: |  |
|  | [NAME] |
|  | [ADDRESS] |

2. PURCHASE AND SALE. Subject to all of the terms and conditions of this Agreement and for the consideration set forth, upon Closing Seller shall convey to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from Seller, all of the following:
a. The Real Property and all of Seller's interest in all buildings, improvements, facilities, fixtures and paving thereon or associated therewith (collectively, the "Improvements"), together with all easements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions in accordance with Section 5.b;
b. All other right, title and interest of Seller constituting part and parcel of the Property (hereinafter defined), including, but not limited to, all lease rights, agreements, easements, licenses, permits, tract maps, subdivision/condominium filings and approvals, air rights, sewer agreements, water line agreements, utility agreements, water rights, oil, gas and mineral rights, all licenses and permits related to the Property, and all plans, drawings, engineering studies located within, used in connection with, or related to the Property, if any in Seller's possession (collectively, the "Intangibles"). (Reference herein to the "Property" shall include the Real Property, Improvements, and Intangibles).
3. PURCHASE PRICE AND PAYMENT; DEPOSIT. The Purchase Price will be paid as follows:
a. Deposit. There shall be no Deposit required. It is acknowledged and agreed that Buyer has provided Seller alternative consideration in lieu of the Deposit.
b. Cash Balance. Buyer shall deposit into Escrow the cash balance of the Purchase Price, plus or minus prorations and costs pursuant to Section 15, in the form of cash, bank

## 2

6176 Federal Blvd. Purchase Agreement
cashier's check or confirmed wire transfer of funds not less than one (1) business day prior to the Close of Escrow.

## 4. ESCROW.

a. Execution of Form Escrow Instructions. Seller shall deposit this Agreement with Escrow Agent upon full execution of same by Buyer and Seller, at which time escrow (the "Escrow") shall be deemed to be opened. Escrow Agent shall thereafter promptly execute the original of this Agreement, provide copies thereof to Buyer and Seller. Immediately upon receipt of such duly executed copy of this Agreement, Escrow Agent shall also notify Seller and Buyer of the opening of Escrow. This Agreement shall act as escrow instructions to Escrow Agent, and Escrow Agent shall hereby be authorized and instructed to deliver the documents and monies to be deposited into the Escrow pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Escrow Agent shall prepare the Escrow Agent's standard-form escrow agreement (if such a form is required by Escrow Agent), which shall, to the extent that the same is consistent with the terms hereof and approved by Seller and Buyer and not exculpate Escrow Agent from acts of negligence and/or willful misconduct, inure to the benefit of Escrow Agent. Said standard form escrow instructions shall be executed by Buyer and Seller and returned to Escrow Agent within three (3) business days from the date same are received from Escrow Agent. To the extent that Escrow Agent's standard-form escrow agreement is inconsistent with the terms hereof, the terms of this Agreement shall control. Should either party fail to return the standard form escrow instructions to Escrow Agent in a timely manner, such failure shall not constitute a material breach of this Agreement.
b. Close of Escrow. Except as provided below, Escrow shall close no later than the date provided for in Section 1, above.
c. Failure to Receive CUP. Should Buyer be denied its application for the CUP or otherwise abandon its CUP application, it shall have the option to terminate this Agreement by written notice to Seller, and the parties shall have no further liability to one another, except for the "Buyer's Indemnity" (as detailed in Section 8 below).

## 5. TITLE MATTERS.

a. Preliminary Title Report/Review of Title. As soon as practicable, but in no event later than five (5) business days after the Date of Agreement, Escrow Agent shall have delivered or shall cause to be delivered to Buyer a Preliminary Title Report issued by Title Company covering the Property (the "Preliminary Title Report"), together with true copies of all documents evidencing matters of record shown as exceptions to title thereon. Buyer shall have the right to object to any exceptions contained in the Preliminary Title Report and thereby disapprove the condition of title by giving written notice to Seller on or before the Title Approval Date as defined in Section 1. Any such disapproval shall specify with particularity the defects Buyer disapproves. Buyer's failure to timely disapprove in writing shall be deemed an approval of all exceptions. If Buyer disapproves of any matter affecting title, Seller shall have the option to elect to (i) cure or remove any one or more of such exceptions by notifying Buyer within five (5) business days from Seller's receipt of Buyer's disapproval, or (ii) terminate this Agreement, in which event Buyer shall receive a refund of its Deposit and all accrued interest, and the parties shall have no
further liability to one another, except for the Buyer's Indemnity. Seller's failure to timely notify Buyer of its election, as provided above, shall conclusively be deemed to be Seller's election to terminate this Agreement. For three (3) business days following Seller's actual or deemed election to terminate this Agreement, Buyer shall have the right to waive, in writing, any one or more of such title defects that Seller has not elected to cure or remove and thereby rescind Seller's election to terminate and close Escrow, taking title to the Property subject to such title exceptions.
b. Permitted Exceptions. The following exceptions shown on the Preliminary Title Report (the "Permitted Exceptions") are approved by Buyer:
(1) Real property taxes not yet due and payable as of the Closing Date, which shall be apportioned as hereinafter provided in Section 15;
(2) Unpaid installments of assessments not due and payable on or before the Closing Date;
(3) Any matters affecting the Property that are created by, or with the written consent of, Buyer,
(4) The pre-printed exclusions and exceptions that appear in the Owner's Title Policy issued by the Title Company; and
(5) Any matter to which Buyer has not delivered a notice of a Title Objection in accordance with the terms of Section 5. a hereof.

Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything else to the contrary, Seller shall be obligated, regardless of whether Buyer objects to any such item or exception, to remove or cause to be removed on or before Closing, any and all mortgages, deeds of trust or similar liens securing the repayment of money affecting title to the Property, mechanic's liens, materialmen's liens, judgment liens, liens for delinquent taxes and/or any other liens or security interests ("Mandatory Cure Items").
c. Title Policy. The Title Policy shall be an ALTA Standard Owners Policy with liability in the amount of the Purchase Price, showing fee title to the Property as vested in Buyer, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions. At Buyer's election, the Title Policy to be delivered to Buyer shall be an ALTA Extended Owners Policy, provided that the issuance of said ALTA Policy does not delay the Close of Escrow. The issuance by Title Company of the standard Title Policy in favor of Buyer, insuring fee title to the Property to Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions, shall be conclusive evidence that Seller has complied with any obligation, express or implied, to convey good and marketable title to the Property to Buyer.
d. Title and Survey Costs. The cost of the standard portion of the premium for the Title Policy shall be paid by the Seller. Buyer shall pay for the survey, if necessary, and the premium for the ALTA portion of the Title Policy and all endorsements requested by Buyer.
6. SELLER'S DELIVERY OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS. Seller has provided to Buyer those necessary documents and materials respecting the Property identified on Exhibit " B ", attached hereto and made a part hereof ("Property Information"). The Property Information shall include, inter alia, all disclosures from Seller regarding the Property required by Califomia and federal law.
7. DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer shall have through the last day of the Due Diligence Period, as defined in Section 1, in which to examine, inspect, and investigate the Property Information, the Property and any other relating to the Property or its use and or Compliance with any applicable zoning ordinances, regulations, licensing or permitting affecting its use or Buyer's intention use and, in Buyers sole discretion) and, in Buyer's sole and absolute judgment and discretion, to determine whether the Property is acceptable to Buyer in its present condition and to obtain all necessary intemal approvals. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, Buyer may terminate this Agreement by giving notice of termination (a "Due Diligence Termination Notice") to Seller on or before the last day of the Due Diligence Period, in which event Buyer shall receive the immediate retum of the Deposit and this Agreement shall terminate, except that Buyer's Indemnities set forth on Section 8, shall survive such termination.

## 8. PHYSICAL INSPECTION; BUYERS INDEMNITIES.

a. Buyer shall have the right, upon reasonable notice and during regular business hours, to physically inspect on a non-intrusive basis, and to the extent Buyer desires, to cause one or more representatives of Buyer to physically inspect on a non-intrusive basis, the Property without interfering with the occupants or operation of the Property Buyer shall make all inspections in good faith and with due diligence. All inspection fees, appraisal fees, engineering fees and other expenses of any kind incurred by Buyer relating to the inspection of the Property will be solely Buyer's expense. Seller shall cooperate with Buyer in all reasonable respects in making such inspections. To the extent that a Phase I environmental assessment acceptable to Seller justifies it, Buyer shall have the right to have an independent environmental consultant conduct an environmental inspection in excess of a Phase I assessment of the Property. Buyer shall notify Seller not less than one (1) business day in advance of making any inspections or interviews. In making any inspection or interviews hereunder, Buyer will treat, and will cause any representative of Buyer to treat, all information obtained by Buyer pursuant to the terms of this Agreement as strictly confidential except for such information which Buyer is required to disclose to its consultants, attomeys, lenders and transferees.
b. Buyer agrees to keep the Property free and clear of all mechanics' and materialmen's liens or other liens arising out of any of its activities or those of its representatives, agents or contractors. Buyer shall indemnify, defend (through legal counsel reasonably acceptable to Seller), and hold Seller, and the Property, harmless from all damage, loss or liability, including without limitation attomeys' fees and costs of court, mechanics' liens or claims, or claims or assertions thereof arising out of or in connection with the entry onto, or occupation of the Property by Buyer, its agents, employees and contractors and subcontractors. This indemnity shall survive the sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or, if such sale is not consummated, the termination of this Agreement. After each such inspection or investigation of the Property,

Buyer agrees to immediately restore the Property or cause the Property to be restored to its condition before each such inspection or investigation look place, at Buyer's sole expense.
9. COVENANTS OF SELLER. During the period from the Date of Agreement until the earlier of termination of the Agreement or the Close of Escrow, Seller agrees to the following:
a. Seller shall not permit or suffer to exist any new encumbrance, charge or lien or allow any easements affecting all or any portion of the Property to be placed or claimed upon the Property unless such encumbrance, charge, lien or easement has been approved in writing by Buyer or unless such monetary encumbrance, charge or lien will be removed by Seller prior to the Close of Escrow.
b. Seller shall not execute or amend, modify, renew, extend or terminate any contract without the prior written consent of Buyer, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If Buyer fails to provide Seller with notice of its consent or refusal to consent, Buyer shall be deemed to have approved such contract or modification, except that no contract entered into by Seller shall be for a period longer than thirty (30) days and shall be terminable by the giving of a thirty (30) day notice.
c. Seller shall notify Buyer of any new matter that it obtains actual knowledge of affecting title in any manner, which was not previously disclosed to Buyer by the Title Report. Buyer shall notify Seller within five (5) business days of receipt of notice of its acceptance or rejection of such new matter. If Buyer rejects such matter, Seller shall notify Buyer within five (5) business days whether it will cure such matter. If Seller does not elect to cure such matter within such period, Buyer may terminate this Agreement or waive its prior disapproval within three (3) business days.

## 10. REPRESENTATIONS OF SELLER.

a. Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that:
(1) The execution and delivery by Seller of, and Seller's performance under, this Agreement are within Seller's powers and have been duly authorized by all requisite action.
(2) This Agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Seller, enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to laws applicable generally to applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws or equitable principles affecting or limiting the right of contracting parties generally.
(3) Performance of this Agreement by Seller will not result in a breach of, or constitute any default under any agreement or instrument to which Seller is a party, which breach or default will adversely affect Seller's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement.
(4) To Seller's knowledge, without duty of inquiry, the Property is not presently the subject of any condemnation or similar proceeding, and to Seller's knowledge, no such condemnation or similar proceeding is currently threatened or pending.
(5) To Seller's knowledge, there are no management, service, supply or maintenance contracts affecting the Property which shall affect the Property on or following the Close of Escrow except as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and made a part hereof.
(6) Seller is not a "foreign person" within the meaning of Section 1445 of the Intemal Revenue Code of 1986 (i.e., Seller is not a non-resident alien, foreign corporation, foreign partnership, foreign trust or foreign estate as those terms are defined in the Code and regulations promulgated ).
(7) Seller (a) is not in receivership; (b) has not made any assignment related to the Property for the benefit of creditors; (c) has not admitted in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature; (d) has not been adjudicated a bankrupt; (e) has not filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, a petition or answer seeking reorganization, or an arrangement with creditors under the Federal Bankruptcy Law or any other similar law or statute of the United States or any state, and (f) does not have any such petition described in Clause (e) hereof filed against Seller.
(8) Seller has not received written notice, nor to the best of its knowledge is it aware, of any actions, suits or proceedings pending or threatened against Seller which affect title to the Property, or which would question the validity or enforceability of this Agreement or of any action taken by Seller under this Agreement, in any court or before any governmental authority, domestic or foreign.
(9) Unless otherwise disclosed herein in Exhibit D, to Seller's knowledge without duty of inquiry, there does not exists any conditions or pending or threatening lawsuits which would materially affect the Property, including but not limited to, underground storage, tanks, soil and ground water.
(10) That Seller has delivered to Buyer all written information, records, and studies in Seller's possession concerning hazardous, toxic, or governmentally regulated materials that are or have been stored, handled, disposed of, or released on the Property.
b. If after the expiration of the Due Diligence Period but prior to the Closing, Buyer or any of Buyer's partners, members, trustees and any officers, directors, employees, agents, representatives and attorneys of Buyer, its partners, members or trustees (the "Buyer's Representatives") obtains knowledge that any of the representations or warranties made herein by Seller are untrue, inaccurate or incorrect in any material respect, Buyer shall give Seller written notice thereof within three (3) business days of obtaining such knowledge (but, in any event, prior to the Closing). If at or prior to the Closing, Seller obtains actual knowledge that any of the representations or warranties made herein by Seller are untrue, inaccurate or incorrect in any material respect, Seller shall give Buyer written notice thereof within three (3) business days of obtaining such knowledge (but, in any event, prior to the Closing). In such cases, Buyer, may elect either (a) to consummate the transaction, or (b) to terminate this Agreement by written notice given
to Seller on the Closing Date, in which event this Agreement shall be terminated, the Property Information returned to the Seller and, thereafter, neither party shall have any further rights or obligations hereunder except as provided in any section hereof that by its terms expressly provides that it survives the termination of this Agreement.
c. The representations of Seller set forth herein shall survive the Close of Escrow for a period of twelve (12) months.

## 11. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES BY BUYER.

a. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller that:
(9) Buyer is duly organized and legally existing, the execution and delivery by Buyer of, and Buyer's performance under, this Agreement are within Buyer's organizational powers, and Buyer has the authority to execute and deliver this Agreement.
(10) This Agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Buyer enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to laws applicable generally to applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws or equitable principles affecting or limiting the rights of contracting parties generally.
(11) Performance of this Agreement will not result in any breach of, or constitute any default under, any agreement or other instrument to which Buyer is a party, which breach or default will adversely affect Buyer's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement.
(12) Buyer (a) is not in receivership or dissolution, (b) has not made any assignment for the benefit of creditors, (c) has not admitted in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature, (d) has not been adjudicated a bankrupt, (e) has not filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, a petition or answer seeking reorganization, or an arrangement with creditors under the federal bankruptcy law, or any other similar law or statute of the United States or any state, or (f) does not have any such petition described in (e) filed against Buyer.
(5) Buyer hereby warrants and agrees that, prior to Closing, Buyer shall (i) conduct all examinations, inspections and investigations of each and every aspect of the Property, (ii) review all relevant documents and materials concerning the Property, and (iii) ask all questions related to the Property, which are or might be necessary, appropriate or desirable to enable Buyer to acquire full and complete knowledge concerning the condition and fitness of the Property, its suitability for any use and otherwise with respect to the Property.
12. DAMAGE. Risk of loss up to and including the Closing Date shall be borne by Seller. Seller shall immediately notify Buyer in writing of the extent of any damage to the Property. In the event of any material damage to or destruction of the Property or any portion thereof, Buyer
may, at its option, by notice to Seller given within ten (10) days after Buyer is notified of such damage or destruction (and if necessary the Closing Date shall be extended to give Buyer the full ten (10) day period to make such election): (i) terminate this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be irnmediately returned to Buyer or (ii) proceed under this Agreernent, receive any insurance proceeds (including any rent loss insurance applicable to any period on and after the Closing Date) due Seller as a result of such darnage or destruction and assurne responsibility for such repair, and Buyer shall receive a credit at Closing for any deductible, uninsured or coinsured amount under said insurance policies. If Buyer elects (ii) above, Seller will cooperate with Buyer after the Closing to assist Buyer in obtaining the insurance proceeds from Seller's insurers. If the Property is not materially darnaged, then Buyer shall not have the right to terminate this Agreement, but Seller shall at its cost repair the darnage before the Closing in a rnanner reasonably satisfactory to Buyer or if repairs cannot be completed before the Closing, credit Buyer at Closing for the reasonable cost to complete the repair. "Material damage" and "Materially damaged" means damage reasonably exceeding ten percent ( $10 \%$ ) of the Purchase Price to repair or that entitles a tenant to terminate its Lease.
13. CONDEMNATION. Seller shall immediately notify Buyer of any proceedings in eminent domain that are contemplated, threatened or instituted by anybody having the power of eminent dornain over Property. Within ten (10) days after Buyer receives written notice frorn Seller of proceedings in eminent dornain that are contemplated, threatened or instituted by anybody having the power of eminent dornain, and if necessary the Closing Date shall be extended to give Buyer the full ten (10) day period to make such election, Buyer may: (i) terminate this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be immediately returned to Buyer, or (ii) proceed under this Agreement, in which event Seller shall, at the Closing, assign to Buyer its entire right, title and interest in and to any condemnation award related to the Real Property, and Buyer shall have the sole right during the pendency of this Agreement to negotiate and otherwise deal with the condemning authority in respect of such matter. Buyer shall not have any right or claim to monies relating to Sellers loss of income prior to closing.

## 14. CLOSING

a. Closing Date. The consummation of the transaction contemplated herein ("Closing") shall occur on or before the Closing Date set forth in Section 1. Closing shall occur through Escrow with the Escrow Agent. Unless otherwise stated herein, all funds shall be deposited into and held by Escrow Agent. Upon satisfaction or completion of all closing conditions and deliveries, the parties shall direct the Escrow Agent to immediately record and deliver the closing documents to the appropriate parties and make disbursements according to the closing statement executed by Seller and Buyer. The Escrow Agent shall agree in writing with Buyer that (1) recordation of the Deed constitutes its representation that it is holding the closing documents, closing funds and closing statements and is prepared and irrevocably committed to disburse the closing funds in accordance with the closing statements and (2) release of funds to the Seller shall irrevocably commit it to issue the Title Policy in accordance with this Agreement.
b. Seller's Deliveries in Escrow. On or prior to the Closing Date, Seller shall deliver in escrow to the Escrow Agent the following:
(13) Deed. A Special Warranty Deed mutually satisfactory to the parties, executed and acknowledged by Seller, conveying to Buyer good, indefeasible and marketable fee simple title to the Property, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions (the "Deed").
(14) Assignment of Intangible Property. Such assignments and other documents and certificates as Buyer may reasonably require in order to fully and completely transfer and assign to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest, in and to the Intangibles, all documents and contracts related thereto, Leases, and any other permits, rights applicable to the Property, and any other documents and/or materials applicable to the Property, if any. Such assignment or similar document shall include an indemnity by Buyer to Seller for all matters relating to the assigned rights, and benefits following the Closing Date.
(3) Assignment and Assumption of Contracts. An assignment and assumption of Leases from Seller to Buyer of landlord's interest in the Leases.
(4) FIRPTA. A non-foreign person affidavit that meets the requirements of Section 1445(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
(5) Additional Documents. Any additional documents that may be reasonably required for the consummation of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
c. Buyer's Deliveries in Escrow. On or prior to the Closing Date, Buyer shall deliver in escrow to the Escrow Agent the following:
(1) Purchase Price. The Purchase Price, less the Deposits, plus or minus applicable prorations, deposited by Buyer with the Escrow Agent in immediate funds wired or deposited for credit into the Escrow Agent's escrow account.
(2) Assumption of Intangible Property. A duly executed assumption of the Assignment referred to in Section 14.b(2).
(3) Authority. Evidence of existence, organization, and authority of Buyer and the authority of the person executing documents on behalf of Buyer reasonably required by the Title Company.
(4) Additional Documents. Any additional documents that may be reasonably required for the consummation of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
d. Closing Statements. Seller and Buyer shall each execute and deposit the closing statement, such transfer tax declarations and such other instruments as are reasonably required by the Title Company or otherwise required to close the Escrow and consummate the acquisition of the Property in accordance with the terms hereof. Seller and Buyer hereby designate Escrow Agent as the "Reporting Person" for the transaction pursuant to Section 6045(e) of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder and agree to execute such documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate such designation.
e. Title Policy. The Escrow Agent shall deliver to Buyer the Title Policy required hereby.
f. Possession. Seller shall deliver possession of the Property to Buyer at the Closing subject to the Permitted Exceptions, and shall deliver to Buyer all keys, security codes and other information necessary for Buyer to assume possession.
g. Transfer of Title. The acceptance of transfer of title to the Property by Buyer shall be deemed to be full performance and discharge of any and all obligations on the part of Seller to be performed pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, except where such agreements and obligations are specifically stated to survive the transfer of title.

## 15. COSTS, EXPENSES AND PRORATIONS.

a. Seller Will Pay. At the Closing, Seller shall be charged the following:
(1) All premiums for an ALTA Standard Coverage Title Policy;
(2) One-half of all escrow fees and costs;
(3) Seller's share of prorations; and
(4) One-half of all transfer taxes.
b. Buyer Will Pay. At the Closing, Buyer shall pay:
(1) All document recording charges;
(2) One-half of all escrow fees and costs;
(3) Additional charge for an ALTA Extended Coverage Title Policy, and the endorsements required by Buyer;
(4) One-half of all transfer taxes; and
(5) Buyer's share of prorations.
c. Prorations.
(1) Taxes. All non-delinquent real estate taxes and assessments on the Property will be prorated as of the Closing Date based on the actual current tax bill. If the Closing Date takes place before the real estate taxes are fixed for the tax year in which the Closing Date occurs, the apportionment of real estate taxes will be made on the basis of the real estate taxes for the immediately preceding tax year applied to the latest assessed valuation. All delinquent taxes and all delinquent assessments, if any, on the Property will be paid at the Closing Date from funds accruing to Seller. All supplemental taxes billed after the Closing Date for periods prior to the 11
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Closing Date will be paid promptly by Seller. Any tax refunds received by Buyer which are allocable to the period prior to Closing will be paid by Buyer to Seller.
(2) Utilities. Gas, water, electricity, heat, fuel, sewer and other utilities and the operating expenses relating to the Property shall be prorated as of the Close of Escrow. If the parties hereto are unable to obtain final meter readings as of the Close of Escrow, then such expenses shall be estimated as of the Close of Escrow based on the prior operating history of the Property.

## 16. CLOSING DELIVERIES.

a. Disbursements And Other Actions by Escrow Agent. At the Closing, Escrow Agent will promptly undertake all of the following:
(1) Funds. Disburse all funds deposited with Escrow Agent by Buyer in payment of the Purchase Price for the Property as follows:
(a) Deliver to Seller the Purchase Price, less the amount of all items, costs and prorations chargeable to the account of Seller; and
(b) Disburse the remaining balance, if any, of the funds deposited by Buyer to Buyer, less amounts chargeable to Buyer.
(2) Recording. Cause the Special Warranty Deed (with documentary transfer tax information to be affixed after recording) to be recorded with the San Diego County Recorder and obtain conformed copies thereof for distribution to Buyer and Seller.
(3) Title Policy. Direct the Title Company to issue the Title Policy to Buyer.
(4) Delivery of Documents to Buyer or Seller. Deliver to Buyer the any documents (or copies thereof) deposited into escrow by Seller. Deliver to Seller any other documents (or copies thereof) deposited into Escrow by Buyer.

## 17. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES

a. Seller's Default. If Seller fails to comply in any material respect with any of the provisions of this Agreement, subject to a right to cure, or breaches any of its representations or warranties set forth in this Agreement prior to the Closing, then Buyer may:
(1) Terminate this Agreement and neither party shall have any further rights or obligations hereunder, except for the obligations of the parties which are expressly intended to survive such termination; or
(2) Bring an action against Seller to seek specific performance of Seller's obligations hereunder.
b. Buyer's Default - Liquidated Damages. IF BUYER FAILS TO TIMELY COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT DUE TO ITS DEFAULT, SELLER SHALL BE RELEASED FROM ITS OBLIGATION TO SELL THE PROPERTY TO BUYER. BUYER AND SELLER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL AND/OR EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIX OR ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY SELLER AS A RESULT OF SUCH DEFAULT BY BUYER, AND AGREE THAT THE DEPOSITS ARE A REASONABLE APPROXIMATION THEREOF. ACCORDINGLY, IN THE EVENT THAT BUYER FAILS TO COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT DUE TO ITS DEFAULT, THE DEPOSIT SHALL CONSTITUTE AND BE DEEMED TO BE THE AGREED AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF SELLER, AND SHALL BE SELLER'S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. SELLER AGREES TO WAIVE ALL OTHER REMEDIES AGAINST BUYER WHICH SELLER MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE AT LAW OR IN EQUITY BY REASON OF SUCH DEFAULT BY BUYER. THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE A FORFEITURE OR PENALTY, BUT ARE INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES TO SELLER.

## Seller's Initials Buyer's Initials

c. Escrow Cancellation Following a Termination Notice. If either party terminates this Agreement as permitted under any provision of this Agreement by delivering a termination notice to Escrow Agent and the other party, Escrow shall be promptly cancelled and, Escrow Agent shall return all documents and funds to the parties who deposited them, less applicable Escrow cancellation charges and expenses. Promptly upon presentation by Escrow Agent, the parties shall sign such instruction and other instruments as may be necessary to effect the foregoing Escrow cancellation.
d. Other Expenses. If this Agreement is terminated due to the default of a party, then the defaulting party shall pay any fees due to the Escrow Agent for holding the Deposits and any fees due to the Title Company in connection with issuance of the Preliminary Title report and other title matters (together, "Escrow Cancellation Charges"). If Escrow fails to close for any reason, other than a default under this Agreement, Buyer and Seller shall each pay one-half ( $1 / 2$ ) of any Escrow Cancellation Charges.

## I8. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Exhibits and schedules hereto, contains all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements are replaced in total by this Agreement together with the Exhibits and schedules hereto.
b. Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.

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c. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attorneys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
d. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
e. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
f. Confidentiality and Return of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential any and all material obtained about the other or, in the case of Buyer, about the Property or its operations, this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party. Except as may be required by law, Buyer will not divulge any such information to other persons or entities including, without limitation, appraisers, real estate brokers, or competitors of Seller. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall have the right to disclose information with respect to the Property to its officers, directors, employees, attorneys, accountants, environmental auditors, engineers, potential lenders, and permitted assignees under this Agreement and other consultants to the extent necessary for Buyer to evaluate its acquisition of the Property provided that all such persons are told that such information is confidential and agree (in writing for any third party engineers, environmental auditors or other consultants) to keep such information confidential. If Buyer acquires the Property from Seller, either party shall have the right, subsequent to the Closing of such acquisition, to publicize the transaction (other than the parties to or the specific economics of the transaction) in whatever manner it deems appropriate; provided that any press release or other public disclosure regarding this Agreement or the transactions contemplated herein, and the wording of same, must be approved in advance by both parties, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The provisions of this section shall survive the Closing or any termination of this Agreement. In the event the transaction contemplated by this Agreement does not close as provided herein, upon the request of Seller, Buyer shall promptly return to Seller all Property Information and all other documents, reports and records obtained by Buyer in connection with the investigation of the Property.
g. Interpretation of Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
h. Amendments. This Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
i. Drafts Not an Offer to Enter Into a Legally Binding Contract. The parties hereto agree that the submission of a draft of this Agreement by one party to another is not intended by either party to be an offer to enter into a legally binding contract with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property. The parties shall be legally bound with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Agreement only if and when both Seller and Buyer have fully executed and delivered to each other a counterpart of this Agreement (or a copy by facsimile transmission).
j. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
k. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.

1. Survival. Except as expressly set forth to the contrary herein, no representations, warranties, covenants or agreements of Seller contained herein shall survive the Closing.
m . Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
n. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the addresses set forth in Section 1. Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by ovemight delivery using a nationally recognized ovemight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to 5:00 p.m. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided, however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
o. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included,
unless such last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
p. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
q. Procedure for Indemnity. The following provisions govern actions for indemnity under this Agreement. Promptly after receipt by an indemnitee of notice of any claim, such indemnitee will, if a claim in respect thereof is to be made against the indemnitor, deliver to the indemnitor written notice thereof and the indemnitor shall have the right to participate in, and, if the indemnitor agrees in writing that it will be responsible for any costs, expenses, judgments, damages and losses incurred by the indemnitee with respect to such claim, to assume the defense thereof with counsel mutually satisfactory to the parties; provided, however, that an indemnitee shall have the right to retain its own counsel, with the fees and expenses to be paid by the indemnitor, if the indemnitee reasonably believes that representation of such indemnitee by the counsel retained by the indemnitor would be inappropriate due to actual or potential differing interests between such indemnitee and any other party represented by such counsel in such proceeding. The failure to deliver written notice to the indemnitor within a reasonable time of notice of any such claim shall relieve such indemnitor of any liability to the indemnitee under this indemnity only if and to the extent that such failure is prejudicial to its ability to defend such action, and the omission so to deliver written notice to the indemnitor will not relieve it of any liability that it may have to any indemnitee other than under this indemnity. If an indemnitee settles a claim without the prior written consent of the indemnitor, then the indemnitor shall be released from liability with respect to such claim unless the indemnitor has unreasonably withheld or delayed such consent.
r. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto at Closing, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the Closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
s. Execution in Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
t. Section 1031 Exchange. Either party may consummate the purchase or sale (as applicable) of the Property as part of a so-called like kind exchange (an "Exchange") pursuant to Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), provided that: (a) the Closing shall not be delayed or affected by reason of the Exchange nor shall the consummation or accomplishment of an Exchange be a condition precedent or condition subsequent to the exchanging party's obligations under this Agreement; (b) the exchanging party shall effect its Exchange through an assignment of this Agreement, or its rights under this Agreement, to a qualified intermediary (c) neither party shall be required to take an assignment of the purchase
agreement for relinquished or replacement property or be required to acquire or hold title to any real property for purposes of consummating an Exchange desired by the other party; and (d) the exchanging party shall pay any additional costs that would not otherwise have been incurred by the non-exchanging party had the exchanging party not consummated the transaction through an Exchange. Neither party shall by this Agreement or, acquiescence to an Exchange desired by the other party, have its rights under this Agreement affected or diminished in any manner or be responsible for compliance with or be deemed to have warranted to the exchanging party that its Exchange in fact complies with Section 1031 of the Code.
u. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above and the exhibits attached hereto and referred to herein are incorporated in this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
v. Partial Invalidity. If any provision of this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of the Agreement shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be impaired or invalidated, and the parties agree to substitute for the invalid or unenforceable provision a valid and enforceable provision that most closely approximates the intent and economic effect of the invalid or unenforceable provision.
w. Waiver of Covenants, Conditions or Remedies. The waiver by one party of the performance of any covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any act, under this Agreement shall not invalidate this Agreement nor shall it be considered a waiver by such party of any other covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any other act required, under this Agreement. The exercise of any remedy provided in this Agreement shall not be a waiver of any consistent remedy provided by law, and the provisions of this Agreement for any remedy shall not exclude any other consistent remedies unless they are expressly excluded.
x. Legal Advice. Each party has received independently legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.
y. Memorandum of Agreement. Buyer and Seller shall execute and notarize the Memorandum of Agreement included herewith as Exhibit E, which Buyer may record with the county of San Diego, in its sole discretion.

## SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS

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6176 Federal Blvd. Purchase Agreement

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement effective the day and year first set forth above.

## BUYER:

6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST

SELLER:
DARRYL COTTON.

By:

Printed: $\qquad$
Its: Trustee

Escrow Agent has executed this Agreement in order to confirm that the Escrow Agent has received and shall hold the Deposit and the interest earned thereon, in escrow, and shall disburse the Deposit, and the interest earned thereon, pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement.

Date: $\qquad$ , 2017

By:
Escrow Officer

## EXHIBIT "A"

## LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY

 (to be provided by the Title Company)$21 / 27$

## EXHIBIT "B"

## PROPERTY INFORMATION

## EXHIBIT "C"

## SERVICE CONTRACTS

## EXHIBIT "D"

THREATENED OR PENDING LAWSUITS

## EXHIBIT "E"

## MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

## AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

THIS AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY ("Agreement") is made and entered into this ___ day of , 2017, by and between DARRYL COTTON, an individual resident of San Diego, CA ("Seller"), and 6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST dated $\qquad$ , 2017, or its assignee ("Buyer").

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, it is mutually covenanted and agreed by Seller and Buyer as follows:

1. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Agreement the following terms will be defined as follows:
a. "Real Property": That certain real property commonly known as 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, California, as legally described in Exhibit " $\mathbf{A}$ " attached hereto and made a part hereof.
b. "Date of Agreement": The latest date of execution of the Seller or the Buyer, as indicated on the signature page.
c. "Purchase Price": The Purchase Price for the Property (defined below) is Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000.00$ ).
d. "Due Diligence Period": The period that expires at 5:00 p.m., California time, on the date the CUP (defined below) is issued to Buyer or its designated assign.
e. "Escrow Agent": The Escrow Agent is: [NAME]
f. "Title Company": The Title Company is: [NAME]
g. "Title Approval Date": The Title Approval Date shall be twenty (20) days following Buyer's receipt of a Preliminary Title Report and all underlying documents.
h. "Closing", "Closing Date" and "Close of Escrow": These terms are used interchangeably in this Agreement. The closing shall occur on or at 5:00 p.m., Califomia time, on the date fifteen (15) days from the date Buyer or its designated assign is approved by the city of San Diego for a conditional use permit to distribute medical marijuana from the Real Property ("CUP"). Notwithstanding the foregoing, in no event shall Closing occur later than March 1, 2018, unless mutually agreed by the parties.
i. "Notices" will be sent as follows to:

Buyer: $\quad 6176$ Federal Blvd. Trust 6176 Federal Blvd.
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6176 Federal Bivd. Purchase Agreement
$2 / 27$

## San Diego, California 92114

Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
with a copy to: Austin Legal Group, APC
3990 Old Town Ave, A-112
San Diego, CA 92110 ,
Seller: Darryl Cotton
Address:
City, State, Zip
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
Escrow Agent: [NAME]
[ADDRESS]
2. PURCHASE AND SALE. Subject to all of the terms and conditions of this Agreement and for the consideration set forth, upon Closing Seller shall convey to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from Seller, all of the following:
a. The Real Property and all of Seller's interest in all buildings, improvements, facilities, fixtures and paving thereon or associated therewith (collectively, the "Improvements"), together with all easements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions in accordance with Section 5.b;
b. All other right, title and interest of Seller constituting part and parcel of the Property (hereinafter defined), including, but not limited to, all lease rights, agreements, easements, licenses, permits, tract maps, subdivision/condominium filings and approvals, air rights, sewer agreements, water line agreements, utility agreements, water rights, oil, gas and mineral rights, all licenses and permits related to the Property, and all plans, drawings, engineering studies located within, used in connection with, or related to the Property, if any in Seller's possession (collectively, the "Intangibles"). (Reference herein to the "Property" shall include the Real Property, Improvements, and Intangibles).
3. PURCHASE PRICE AND PAYMENT; DEPOSIT. The Purchase Price will be paid as follows:
a. Deposit. There shall be no Deposit required. It is acknowledged and agreed that Buyer has provided Seller alternative consideration in lieu of the Deposit.
b. Cash Balance. Buyer shall deposit into Escrow the cash balance of the Purchase Price, plus or minus prorations and costs pursuant to Section 15, in the form of cash, bank
cashier's check or confirmed wire transfer of funds not less than one (1) business day prior to the Close of Escrow.

## 4. ESCROW.

a. Execution of Form Escrow Instructions. Seller shall deposit this Agreement with Escrow Agent upon full execution of same by Buyer and Seller, at which time escrow (the "Escrow") shall be deemed to be opened. Escrow Agent shall thereafter promptly execute the original of this Agreement, provide copies thereof to Buyer and Seller. Immediately upon receipt of such duly executed copy of this Agreement, Escrow Agent shall also notify Seller and Buyer of the opening of Escrow. This Agreement shall act as escrow instructions to Escrow Agent, and Escrow Agent shall hereby be authorized and instructed to deliver the documents and monies to be deposited into the Escrow pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Escrow Agent shall prepare the Escrow Agent's standard-form escrow agreement (if such a form is required by Escrow Agent), which shall, to the extent that the same is consistent with the terms hereof and approved by Seller and Buyer and not exculpate Escrow Agent from acts of negligence and/or willful misconduct, inure to the benefit of Escrow Agent. Said standard form escrow instructions shall be executed by Buyer and Seller and retumed to Escrow Agent within three (3) business days from the date same are received from Escrow Agent. To the extent that Escrow Agent's standard-form escrow agreement is inconsistent with the terms hereof, the terms of this Agreement shall control. Should either party fail to return the standard form escrow instructions to Escrow Agent in a timely manner, such failure shall not constitute a material breach of this Agreement.
b. Close of Escrow. Except as provided below, Escrow shall close no later than the date provided for in Section 1, above.
c. Failure to Receive CUP. Should Buyer be denied its application for the CUP or otherwise abandon its CUP application, it shall have the option to terminate this Agreement by written notice to Seller, and the parties shall have no further liability to one another, except for the "Buyer's Indemnity" (as detailed in Section 8 below).

## 5. TITLE MATTERS.

a. Preliminary Title Report/Review of Title. As soon as practicable, but in no event later than five (5) business days after the Date of Agreement, Escrow Agent shall have delivered or shall cause to be delivered to Buyer a Preliminary Title Report issued by Title Company covering the Property (the "Preliminary Title Report"), together with true copies of all documents evidencing matters of record shown as exceptions to title thereon. Buyer shall have the right to object to any exceptions contained in the Preliminary Title Report and thereby disapprove the condition of title by giving written notice to Seller on or before the Title Approval Date as defined in Section 1. Any such disapproval shall specify with particularity the defects Buyer disapproves. Buyer's failure to timely disapprove in writing shall be deemed an approval of all exceptions. If Buyer disapproves of any matter affecting title, Seller shall have the option to elect to (i) cure or remove any one or more of such exceptions by notifying Buyer within five (5) business days from Seller's receipt of Buyer's disapproval, or (ii) terminate this Agreement, in which event Buyer shall receive a refund of its Deposit and all accrued interest, and the parties shall have no
further liability to one another, except for the Buyer's Indemnity. Seller's failure to timely notify Buyer of its election, as provided above, shall conclusively be deemed to be Seller's election to terminate this Agreement. For three (3) business days following Seller's actual or deemed election to terminate this Agreement, Buyer shall have the right to waive, in writing, any one or more of such title defects that Seller has not elected to cure or remove and thereby rescind Seller's election to terminate and close Escrow, taking title to the Property subject to such title exceptions.
b. Permitted Exceptions. The following exceptions shown on the Preliminary Title Report (the "Permitted Exceptions") are approved by Buyer:
(1) Real property taxes not yet due and payable as of the Closing Date, which shall be apportioned as hereinafter provided in Section 15;
(2) Unpaid installments of assessments not due and payable on or before the Closing Date;
(3) Any matters affecting the Property that are created by, or with the written consent of, Buyer;
(4) The pre-printed exclusions and exceptions that appear in the Owner's Title Policy issued by the Title Company; and
(5) Any matter to which Buyer has not delivered a notice of a Title Objection in accordance with the terms of Section 5.a hereof.

Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything else to the contrary, Seller shall be obligated, regardless of whether Buyer objects to any such item or exception, to remove or cause to be removed on or before Closing, any and all mortgages, deeds of trust or similar liens securing the repayment of money affecting title to the Property, mechanic's liens, materialmen's liens, judgment liens, liens for delinquent taxes and/or any other liens or security interests ("Mandatory Cure Items").
c. Title Policy. The Title Policy shall be an ALTA Standard Owners Policy with liability in the amount of the Purchase Price, showing fee title to the Property as vested in Buyer, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions. At Buyer's election, the Title Policy to be delivered to Buyer shall be an ALTA Extended Owners Policy, provided that the issuance of said ALTA Policy does not delay the Close of Escrow. The issuance by Title Company of the standard Title Policy in favor of Buyer, insuring fee title to the Property to Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions, shall be conclusive evidence that Seller has complied with any obligation, express or implied, to convey good and marketable title to the Property to Buyer.
d. Title and Survey Costs. The cost of the standard portion of the premium for the Title Policy shall be paid by the Seller. Buyer shall pay for the survey, if necessary, and the premium for the ALTA portion of the Title Policy and all endorsements requested by Buyer.

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6176 Federai Bivd. Purchase Agreement
6. SELLER'S DELIVERY OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS. Seller has provided to Buyer those necessary documents and materials respecting the Property identified on Exhibit " B ", attached hereto and made a part hereof ("Property Information"). The Property Information shall include, inter alia, all disclosures from Seller regarding the Property required by California and federal law.
7. DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer shall have through the last day of the Due Diligence Period, as defined in Section 1, in which to examine, inspect, and investigate the Property Information, the Property and any other relating to the Property or its use and or Compliance with any applicable zoning ordinances, regulations, licensing or permitting affecting its use or Buyer's intention use and, in Buyers sole discretion) and, in Buyer's sole and absolute judgment and discretion, to determine whether the Property is acceptable to Buyer in its present condition and to obtain all necessary internal approvals. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, Buyer may terminate this Agreement by giving notice of termination (a "Due Diligence Termination Notice") to Seller on or before the last day of the Due Diligence Period, in which event Buyer shall receive the immediate return of the Deposit and this Agreement shall terminate, except that Buyer's Indemnities set forth on Section 8, shall survive such termination.

## 8. PHYSICAL INSPECTION; BUYERS INDEMNITIES.

a. Buyer shall have the right, upon reasonable notice and during regular business hours, to physically inspect on a non-intrusive basis, and to the extent Buyer desires, to cause one or more representatives of Buyer to physically inspect on a non-intrusive basis, the Property without interfering with the occupants or operation of the Property Buyer shall make all inspections in good faith and with due diligence. All inspection fees, appraisal fees, engineering fees and other expenses of any kind incurred by Buyer relating to the inspection of the Property will be solely Buyer's expense. Seller shall cooperate with Buyer in all reasonable respects in making such inspections. To the extent that a Phase I environmental assessment acceptable to Seller justifies it, Buyer shall have the right to have an independent environmental consultant conduct an environmental inspection in excess of a Phase I assessment of the Property. Buyer shall notify Seller not less than one (1) business day in advance of making any inspections or interviews. In making any inspection or interviews hereunder, Buyer will treat, and will cause any representative of Buyer to treat, all information obtained by Buyer pursuant to the terms of this Agreement as strictly confidential except for such information which Buyer is required to disclose to its consultants, attorneys, lenders and transferees.
b. Buyer agrees to keep the Property free and clear of all mechanics' and materialmen's liens or other liens arising out of any of its activities or those of its representatives, agents or contractors. Buyer shall indemnify, defend (through legal counsel reasonably acceptable to Seller), and hold Seller, and the Property, harmless from all damage, loss or liability, including without limitation attorneys' fees and costs of court, mechanics' liens or claims, or claims or assertions thereof arising out of or in connection with the entry onto, or occupation of the Property by Buyer, its agents, employees and contractors and subcontractors. This indemnity shall survive the sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or, if such sale is not consummated, the termination of this Agreement. After each such inspection or investigation of the Property,

Buyer agrees to immediately restore the Property or cause the Property to be restored to its condition before each such inspection or investigation look place, at Buyer's sole expense.
9. COVENANTS OF SELLER. During the period from the Date of Agreement until the earlier of termination of the Agreement or the Close of Escrow, Seller agrees to the following:
a. Seller shall not permit or suffer to exist any new encumbrance, charge or lien or allow any easements affecting all or any portion of the Property to be placed or claimed upon the Property unless such encumbrance, charge, lien or easement has been approved in writing by Buyer or unless such monetary encumbrance, charge or lien will be removed by Seller prior to the Close of Escrow.
b. Seller shall not execute or amend, modify, renew, extend or terminate any contract without the prior written consent of Buyer, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If Buyer fails to provide Seller with notice of its consent or refusal to consent, Buyer shall be deemed to have approved such contract or modification, except that no contract entered into by Seller shall be for a period longer than thirty (30) days and shall be terminable by the giving of a thirty (30) day notice.
c. Seller shall notify Buyer of any new matter that it obtains actual knowledge of affecting title in any manner, which was not previously disclosed to Buyer by the Title Report. Buyer shall notify Seller within five (5) business days of receipt of notice of its acceptance or rejection of such new matter. If Buyer rejects such matter, Seller shall notify Buyer within five (5) business days whether it will cure such matter. If Seller does not elect to cure such matter within such period, Buyer may terminate this Agreement or waive its prior disapproval within three (3) business days.

## 10. REPRESENTATIONS OF SELLER.

a. Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that:
(1) The execution and delivery by Seller of, and Seller's performance under, this Agreement are within Seller's powers and have been duly authorized by all requisite action.
(2) This Agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Seller, enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to laws applicable generally to applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws or equitable principles affecting or limiting the right of contracting parties generally.
(3) Performance of this Agreement by Seller will not result in a breach of, or constitute any default under any agreement or instrument to which Seller is a party, which breach or default will adversely affect Seller's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement.

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6176 Federal Blvd. Purrhase Agreement
(4) To Seller's knowledge, without duty of inquiry, the Property is not presently the subject of any condemnation or similar proceeding, and to Seller's knowledge, no such condemnation or similar proceeding is currently threatened or pending.
(5) To Seller's knowledge, there are no management, service, supply or maintenance contracts affecting the Property which shall affect the Property on or following the Close of Escrow except as set forth in Exhibit " $C$ " attached hereto and made a part hereof.
(6) Seller is not a "foreign person" within the meaning of Section 1445 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (i.e., Seller is not a non-resident alien, foreign corporation, foreign partnership, foreign trust or foreign estate as those terms are defined in the Code and regulations promulgated ).
(7) Seller (a) is not in receivership; (b) has not made any assignment related to the Property for the benefit of creditors; (c) has not admitted in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature; (d) has not been adjudicated a bankrupt; (e) has not filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, a petition or answer seeking reorganization, or an arrangement with creditors under the Federal Bankruptcy Law or any other similar law or statute of the United States or any state, and (f) does not have any such petition described in Clause (e) hereof filed against Seller.
(8) Seller has not received written notice, nor to the best of its knowledge is it aware, of any actions, suits or proceedings pending or threatened against Seller which affect title to the Property, or which would question the validity or enforceability of this Agreement or of any action taken by Seller under this Agreement, in any court or before any governmental authority, domestic or foreign.
(9) Unless otherwise disclosed herein in Exhibit D, to Seller's knowledge without duty of inquiry, there does not exists any conditions or pending or threatening lawsuits which would materially affect the Property, including but not limited to, underground storage, tanks, soil and ground water.
(10) That Seller has delivered to Buyer all written information, records, and studies in Seller's possession concerning hazardous, toxic, or governmentally regulated materials that are or have been stored, handled, disposed of, or released on the Property.
b. If after the expiration of the Due Diligence Period but prior to the Closing, Buyer or any of Buyer's partners, members, trustees and any officers, directors, employees, agents, representatives and attorneys of Buyer, its partners, nembers or trustees (the "Buyer's Representatives") obtains knowledge that any of the representations or warranties made herein by Seller are untrue, inaccurate or incorrect in any material respect, Buyer shall give Seller written notice thereof within three (3) business days of obtaining such knowledge (but, in any event, prior to the Closing). If at or prior to the Closing, Seller obtains actual knowledge that any of the representations or warranties made herein by Seller are untrue, inaccurate or incorrect in any material respect, Seller shall give Buyer written notice thereof within three (3) business days of obtaining such knowledge (but, in any event, prior to the Closing). In such cases, Buyer, may elect either (a) to consummate the transaction, or (b) to terminate this Agreement by written notice given
to Seller on the Closing Date, in which event this Agreement shall be terminated, the Property Information returned to the Seller and, thereafter, neither party shall have any further rights or obligations hereunder except as provided in any section hereof that by its terms expressly provides that it survives the termination of this Agreement.
c. The representations of Seller set forth herein shall survive the Close of Escrow for a period of twelve (12) months.

## 11. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES BY BUYER.

a. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller that:
(9) Buyer is duly organized and legally existing, the execution and delivery by Buyer of, and Buyer's performance under, this Agreement are within Buyer's organizational powers, and Buyer has the authority to execute and deliver this Agreement.
(10) This Agreement constitutes the legal, valid and binding obligation of Buyer enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to laws applicable generally to applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or similar laws or equitable principles affecting or limiting the rights of contracting parties generally.
(11) Performance of this Agreement will not result in any breach of, or constitute any default under, any agreement or other instrument to which Buyer is a party, which breach or default will adversely affect Buyer's ability to perform its obligations under this Agreement.
(12) Buyer (a) is not in receivership or dissolution, (b) has not made any assignment for the benefit of creditors, (c) has not admitted in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature, (d) has not been adjudicated a bankrupt, (e) has not filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, a petition or answer seeking reorganization, or an arrangement with creditors under the federal bankruptcy law, or any other similar law or statute of the United States or any state, or (f) does not have any such petition described in (e) filed against Buyer.
(5) Buyer hereby warrants and agrees that, prior to Closing, Buyer shall (i) conduct all examinations, inspections and investigations of each and every aspect of the Property, (ii) review all relevant documents and materials concerning the Property, and (iii) ask all questions related to the Property, which are or might be necessary, appropriate or desirable to enable Buyer to acquire full and complete knowledge concerning the condition and fitness of the Property, its suitability for any use and otherwise with respect to the Property.
12. DAMAGE. Risk of loss up to and including the Closing Date shall be borne by Seller. Seller shall immediately notify Buyer in writing of the extent of any damage to the Property. In the event of any material damage to or destruction of the Property or any portion thereof, Buyer
may, at its option, by notice to Seller given within ten (10) days after Buyer is notified of such damage or destruction (and if necessary the Closing Date shall be extended to give Buyer the full ten (10) day period to make such election): (i) terminate this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be immediately returned to Buyer or (ii) proceed under this Agreement, receive any insurance proceeds (including any rent loss insurance applicable to any period on and after the Closing Date) due Seller as a result of such damage or destruction and assume responsibility for such repair, and Buyer shall receive a credit at Closing for any deductible, uninsured or coinsured amount under said insurance policies. If Buyer elects (ii) above, Seller will cooperate with Buyer after the Closing to assist Buyer in obtaining the insurance proceeds from Seller's insurers. If the Property is not materially damaged, then Buyer shall not have the right to terminate this Agreement, but Seller shall at its cost repair the damage before the Closing in a manner reasonably satisfactory to Buyer or if repairs cannot be completed before the Closing, credit Buyer at Closing for the reasonable cost to complete the repair. "Material damage" and "Materially damaged" means damage reasonably exceeding ten percent ( $10 \%$ ) of the Purchase Price to repair or that entitles a tenant to terminate its Lease.
13. CONDEMNATION. Seller shall immediately notify Buyer of any proceedings in eminent domain that are contemplated, threatened or instituted by anybody having the power of eminent domain over Property. Within ten (10) days after Buyer receives written notice from Seller of proceedings in eminent domain that are contemplated, threatened or instituted by anybody having the power of eminent domain, and if necessary the Closing Date shall be extended to give Buyer the full ten (10) day period to make such election, Buyer may: (i) terminate this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be immediately returned to Buyer; or (ii) proceed under this Agreement, in which event Seller shall, at the Closing, assign to Buyer its entire right, title and interest in and to any condemnation award related to the Real Property, and Buyer shall have the sole right during the pendency of this Agreement to negotiate and otherwise deal with the condemning authority in respect of such matter. Buyer shall not have any right or claim to monies relating to Sellers loss of income prior to closing.

## 14. CLOSING

a. Closing Date. The consurnmation of the transaction contemplated herein ("Closing") shall occur on or before the Closing Date set forth in Section 1. Closing shall occur through Escrow with the Escrow Agent. Unless otherwise stated herein, all funds shall be deposited into and held by Escrow Agent. Upon satisfaction or completion of all closing conditions and deliveries, the parties shall direct the Escrow Agent to immediately record and deliver the closing docurnents to the appropriate parties and make disbursements according to the closing statement executed by Seller and Buyer. The Escrow Agent shall agree in writing with Buyer that (1) recordation of the Deed constitutes its representation that it is holding the closing documents, closing funds and closing statements and is prepared and irrevocably committed to disburse the closing funds in accordance with the closing statements and (2) release of funds to the Seller shall irrevocably commit it to issue the Title Policy in accordance with this Agreement.
b. Seller's Deliveries in Escrow. On or prior to the Closing Date, Seller shall deliver in escrow to the Escrow Agent the following:
(13) Deed. A Special Warranty Deed mutually satisfactory to the parties, executed and acknowledged by Seller, conveying to Buyer good, indefeasible and marketable fee simple title to the Property, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions (the "Deed").
(14) Assignment of Intangible Property. Such assignments and other documents and certificates as Buyer may reasonably require in order to fully and completely transfer and assign to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest, in and to the Intangibles, all documents and contracts related thereto, Leases, and any other permits, rights applicable to the Property, and any other documents and/or materials applicable to the Property, if any. Such assignment or similar document shall include an indemnity by Buyer to Seller for all matters relating to the assigned rights, and benefits following the Closing Date.
(3) Assignment and Assumption of Contracts. An assignment and assumption of Leases from Seller to Buyer of landlord's interest in the Leases.
(4) FIRPTA. A non-foreign person affidavit that meets the requirements of Section 1445 (b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
(5) Additional Documents. Any additional documents that may be reasonably required for the consummation of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
c. Buyer's Deliveries in Escrow. On or prior to the Closing Date, Buyer shall deliver in escrow to the Escrow Agent the following:
(1) Purchase Price. The Purchase Price, less the Deposits, plus or minus applicable prorations, deposited by Buyer with the Escrow Agent in immediate funds wired or deposited for credit into the Escrow Agent's escrow account.
(2) Assumption of Intangible Property. A duly executed assumption of the Assignment referred to in Section 14.b(2).
(3) Authority. Evidence of existence, organization, and authority of Buyer and the authority of the person executing documents on behalf of Buyer reasonably required by the Title Company.
(4) Additional Documents. Any additional documents that may be reasonably required for the consummation of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement.
d. Closing Statements. Seller and Buyer shall each execute and deposit the closing statement, such transfer tax declarations and such other instruments as are reasonably required by the Title Company or otherwise required to close the Escrow and consummate the acquisition of the Property in accordance with the terms hereof. Seller and Buyer hereby designate Escrow Agent as the "Reporting Person" for the transaction pursuant to Section 6045(e) of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder and agree to execute such documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate such designation.

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6176 Federal Blvd. Purchase Agreement
e. Title Policy. The Escrow Agent shall deliver to Buyer the Title Policy required hereby.
f. Possession. Seller shall deliver possession of the Property to Buyer at the Closing subject to the Permitted Exceptions, and shall deliver to Buyer all keys, security codes and other information necessary for Buyer to assume possession.
g. Transfer of Title. The acceptance of transfer of title to the Property by Buyer shall be deemed to be full performance and discharge of any and all obligations on the part of Seller to be performed pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, except where such agreements and obligations are specifically stated to survive the transfer of title.
15. COSTS, EXPENSES AND PRORATIONS.
a. Seller Will Pay. At the Closing, Seller shall be charged the following:
(1) All premiums for an ALTA Standard Coverage Title Policy;
(2) One-half of all escrow fees and costs;
(3) Seller's share of prorations; and
(4) One-half of all transfer taxes.
b. Buyer Will Pay. At the Closing, Buyer shall pay:
(1) All document recording charges;
(2) One-half of all escrow fees and costs;
(3) Additional charge for an ALTA Extended Coverage Title Policy, and the endorsements required by Buyer;
(4) One-half of all transfer taxes; and
(5) Buyer's share of prorations.
c. Prorations.
(1) Taxes, All non-delinquent real estate taxes and assessments on the Property will be prorated as of the Closing Date based on the actual current tax bill. If the Closing Date takes place before the real estate taxes are fixed for the tax year in which the Closing Date occurs, the apportionment of real estate taxes will be made on the basis of the real estate taxes for the immediately preceding tax year applied to the latest assessed valuation. All delinquent taxes and all delinquent assessments, if any, on the Property will be paid at the Closing Date from funds accruing to Seller. All supplemental taxes billed after the Closing Date for periods prior to the

Closing Date will be paid promptly by Seller. Any tax refunds received by Buyer which are allocable to the period prior to Closing will be paid by Buyer to Seller.
(2) Utilities. Gas, water, electricity, heat, fuel, sewer and other utilities and the operating expenses relating to the Property shall be prorated as of the Close of Escrow. If the parties hereto are unable to obtain final meter readings as of the Close of Escrow, then such expenses shall be estimated as of the Close of Escrow based on the prior operating history of the Property.
16. CLOSING DELIVERIES.
a. Disbursements And Other Actions by Escrow Agent. At the Closing, Escrow Agent will promptly undertake all of the following:
(1) Funds. Disburse all funds deposited with Escrow Agent by Buyer in payment of the Purchase Price for the Property as follows:
(a) Deliver to Seller the Purchase Price, less the amount of all items, costs and prorations chargeable to the account of Seller; and
(b) Disburse the remaining balance, if any, of the funds deposited by Buyer to Buyer, less amounts chargeable to Buyer.
(2) Recording. Cause the Special Warranty Deed (with documentary transfer tax information to be affixed after recording) to be recorded with the San Diego County Recorder and obtain conformed copies thereof for distribution to Buyer and Seller.
(3) Title Policy. Direct the Title Company to issue the Title Policy to Buyer.
(4) Delivery of Documents to Buyer or Seller. Deliver to Buyer the any documents (or copies thereof) deposited into escrow by Seller. Deliver to Seller any other documents (or copies thereof) deposited into Escrow by Buyer.

## 17. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES

a. Seller's Default. If Seller fails to comply in any material respect with any of the provisions of this Agreement, subject to a right to cure, or breaches any of its representations or warranties set forth in this Agreement prior to the Closing, then Buyer may:
(1) Terminate this Agreement and neither party shall have any further rights or obligations hereunder, except for the obligations of the parties which are expressly intended to survive such termination; or
(2) Bring an action against Seller to seek specific performance of Seller's obligations hereunder.

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b. Buyer's Defauilt - Liquidated Damages. IF BUYER FAILS TO TIMELY COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT DUE TO ITS DEFAULT, SELLER SHALL BE RELEASED FROM ITS OBLIGATION TO SELL THE PROPERTY TO BUYER. BUYER AND SELLER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL AND/OR EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIX OR ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY SELLER AS A RESULT OF SUCH DEFAULT BY BUYER, AND AGREE THAT THE DEPOSITS ARE A REASONABLE APPROXIMATION THEREOF. ACCORDINGLY, IN THE EVENT THAT BUYER FAILS TO COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY AS PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT DUE TO ITS DEFAULT, THE DEPOSIT SHALL CONSTITUTE AND BE DEEMED TO BE THE AGREED AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF SELLER, AND SHALL BE SELLER'S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. SELLER AGREES TO WAIVE ALL OTHER REMEDIES AGAINST BUYER WHICH SELLER MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE AT LAW OR IN EQUITY BY REASON OF SUCH DEFAULT BY BUYER. THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE A FORFEITURE OR PENALTY, BUT ARE INTENDED TO CONSTITUTE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES TO SELLER.

## Seller's Initials Buyer's Initials

c. Escrow Cancellation Following a Termination Notice. If either party terminates this Agreement as permitted under any provision of this Agreement by delivering a termination notice to Escrow Agent and the other party, Escrow shall be promptly cancelled and, Escrow Agent shall return all documents and funds to the parties who deposited them, less applicable Escrow cancellation charges and expenses. Promptly upon presentation by Escrow Agent, the parties shall sign such instruction and other instruments as may be necessary to effect the foregoing Escrow cancellation.
d. Other Expenses. If this Agreement is terminated due to the default of a party, then the defaulting party shall pay any fees due to the Escrow Agent for holding the Deposits and any fees due to the Title Company in connection with issuance of the Preliminary Title report and other title matters (together, "Escrow Cancellation Charges"). If Escrow fails to close for any reason, other than a default under this Agreement, Buyer and Seller shall each pay one-half ( $1 / 2$ ) of any Escrow Cancellation Charges.

## 18. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the Exhibits and schedules hereto, contains all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements are replaced in total by this Agreement together with the Exhibits and schedules hereto.
b. Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
c. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attorneys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
d. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
e. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
f. Confidentiality and Return of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential any and all material obtained about the other or, in the case of Buyer, about the Property or its operations, this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party. Except as may be required by law, Buyer will not divulge any such information to other persons or entities including, without limitation, appraisers, real estate brokers, or competitors of Seller. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall have the right to disclose information with respect to the Property to its officers, directors, employees, attorneys, accountants, environmental auditors, engineers, potential lenders, and permitted assignees under this Agreement and other consultants to the extent necessary for Buyer to evaluate its acquisition of the Property provided that all such persons are told that such information is confidential and agree (in writing for any third party engineers, environmental auditors or other consultants) to keep such information confidential. If Buyer acquires the Property from Seller, either party shall have the right, subsequent to the Closing of such acquisition, to publicize the transaction (other than the parties to or the specific economics of the transaction) in whatever manner it deems appropriate; provided that any press release or other public disclosure regarding this Agreement or the transactions contemplated herein, and the wording of same, must be approved in advance by both parties, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The provisions of this section shall survive the Closing or any termination of this Agreement. In the event the transaction contemplated by this Agreement does not close as provided herein, upon the request of Seller, Buyer shall promptly return to Seller all Property Information and all other documents, reports and records obtained by Buyer in connection with the investigation of the Property.
g. Interpretation of Agreernent. The article, section and other headings of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
h. Amendments. This Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
i. Drafts Not an Offer to Enter Into a Legally Binding Contract. The parties hereto agree that the submission of a draft of this Agreement by one party to another is not intended by either party to be an offer to enter into a legally binding contract with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property. The parties shall be legally bound with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Agreement only if and when both Seller and Buyer have fully executed and delivered to each other a counterpart of this Agreement (or a copy by facsimile transmission).
j. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
k. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.

1. Survival. Except as expressly set forth to the contrary herein, no representations, warranties, covenants or agreements of Seller contained herein shall survive the Closing.
m . Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
n. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the addresses set forth in Section 1. Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to 5:00 p.m. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided, however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
o. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included,
unless such last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
p. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
q. Procedure for Indemnity. The following provisions govern actions for indemnity under this Agreement. Promptly after receipt by an indemnitee of notice of any claim, such indemnitee will, if a claim in respect thereof is to be made against the indemnitor, deliver to the indemnitor written notice thereof and the indemnitor shall have the right to participate in, and, if the indemnitor agrees in writing that it will be responsible for any costs, expenses, judgments, damages and losses incurred by the indemnitee with respect to such claim, to assume the defense thereof with counsel mutually satisfactory to the parties; provided, however, that an indemnitee shall have the right to retain its own counsel, with the fees and expenses to be paid by the indemnitor, if the indemnitee reasonably believes that representation of such indemnitee by the counsel retained by the indemnitor would be inappropriate due to actual or potential differing interests between such indemnitee and any other party represented by such counsel in such proceeding. The failure to deliver written notice to the indemnitor within a reasonable time of notice of any such claim shall relieve such indemnitor of any liability to the indemnitee under this indemnity only if and to the extent that such failure is prejudicial to its ability to defend such action, and the omission so to deliver written notice to the indemnitor will not relieve it of any liability that it may have to any indemnitee other than under this indemnity. If an indemnitee settles a claim without the prior written consent of the indemnitor, then the indemnitor shall be released from liability with respect to such claim unless the indemnitor has unreasonably withheld or delayed such consent.
r. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto at Closing, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the Closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
s. Execution in Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
t. Section 1031 Exchange. Either party may consummate the purchase or sale (as applicable) of the Property as part of a so-called like kind exchange (an "Exchange") pursuant to Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), provided that: (a) the Closing shall not be delayed or affected by reason of the Exchange nor shall the consummation or accomplishment of an Exchange be a condition precedent or condition subsequent to the exchanging party's obligations under this Agreement; (b) the exchanging party shall effect its Exchange through an assignment of this Agreement, or its rights under this Agreement, to a qualified intermediary (c) neither party shall be required to take an assignment of the purchase
agreement for relinquished or replacement property or be required to acquire or hold title to any real property for purposes of consummating an Exchange desired by the other party; and (d) the exchanging party shall pay any additional costs that would not otherwise have been incurred by the non-exchanging party had the exchanging party not consummated the transaction through an Exchange. Neither party shall by this Agreement or, acquiescence to an Exchange desired by the other party, have its rights under this Agreement affected or diminished in any manner or be responsible for compliance with or be deemed to have warranted to the exchanging party that its Exchange in fact complies with Section 1031 of the Code.
u. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above and the exhibits attached hereto and referred to herein are incorporated in this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
v. Partial Invalidity. If any provision of this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of the Agreement shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be impaired or invalidated, and the parties agree to substitute for the invalid or unenforceable provision a valid and enforceable provision that most closely approximates the intent and economic effect of the invalid or unenforceable provision.
w. Waiver of Covenants, Conditions or Remedies. The waiver by one party of the performance of any covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any act, under this Agreement shall not invalidate this Agreement nor shall it be considered a waiver by such party of any other covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any other act required, under this Agreement. The exercise of any remedy provided in this Agreement shall not be a waiver of any consistent remedy provided by law, and the provisions of this Agreement for any remedy shall not exclude any other consistent remedies unless they are expressly excluded.
x. Legal Advice. Each party has received independently legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.
y. Memorandum of Agreement. Buyer and Seller shall execute and notarize the Memorandum of Agreement included herewith as Exhibit E, which Buyer may record with the county of San Diego, in its sole discretion.

## SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement effective the day and year first set forth above.

## BUYER:

## 6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST

By:

Printed: $\qquad$
Its: Trustee

Escrow Agent has executed this Agreement in order to confirm that the Escrow Agent has received and shall hold the Deposit and the interest earned thereon, in escrow, and shall disburse the Deposit, and the interest earned thereon, pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement.

Date: $\qquad$ , 2017

By:
Escrow Officer

## EXHIBIT "A"

## LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY

 (to be provided by the Title Company)
## EXHIBIT "B"

## PROPERTY INFORMATION

## EXHIBIT "C"

## SERVICE CONTRACTS

## EXHIBIT "D"

## THREATENED OR PENDING LAWSUITS

## EXHIBIT "E"

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

## Subject: Statement

From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
Date: Thursday, March 2, 2017 8:51:11 AM GMT-08:00

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123
Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

## Circuiar 230 Disclaimer:

IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specificaily noted, any federal tax advice in this communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other occompanying materials) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communicalion was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addresses. This email is considered a confidentlal communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have received this In error, please contact us at (858)576-1040 and return thls to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of this confidential information. and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure; copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohiblted. Piease notify the sender of this facsimile lnimediately arid arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

## SIDE AGREEMENT

## Dated as of March 2017

By and Among
DARRYL COTTON
and

## 6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST

This Side Agreement ("Side Agreement") is made as of the $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ 2017, by and between Darry1 Cotton ("Seller") and 6176 Federal Blvd Trust ("Buyer"), a California trust. Buyer and Seller are sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties."

## RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Seller and Buyer desire to enter into a Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement'), dated of even date herewith, pursuant to which the Seller shall sell to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from the Seller, the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, California 92114 (the "Property"); and

WHEREAS, the purchase price for the Property is Four Hundred Thousand Dollars $(\$ 400,000)$; and

WHEREAS, a condition to the Purchase Agreement is that Buyer and Seller enter into this Side Agreement that addresses the terms under which Seller shall move his existing business located on the Property.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as follows:


#### Abstract

\section*{ARTICLE I}

\section*{1. Terms of the Side Agreement} 1.1. Buyer shall pay Four Hundred Thousand Dollars $(\$ 400,000)$ to cover Seller's expenses related to moving and re-establishing his business ("Payment Price"). 1.2. The Payment Price is contingent on close of escrow pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.


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I 6176 Federal Blvd. Side Agreement
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## ARTICLE II

## 2. Closing Conditions

2.1. Within ten (10) business days from the close of escrow on the Property, Buyer shall pay the Payment Price by wire transfer to an account provided by the Seller (see section 2.3); and
2.2. A condition precedent to the payment of the Payment Price is receipt by the Buyer of Seller's written representation that Seller has relocated his business and vacated the Property; and
2.3. If escrow does not close on the Property, the Side Agreement shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the Purchase Agreement and no payment is due or owing from Buyer to Seller.

## ARTICLE III

## 3. General Provisions

3.1.This Side Agreement, together with the Purchase Agreement and any Exhibits and schedules hereto, contain all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements, in relation to this Side Agreement are replaced in total by this Side Agreement together with the Purchase Agreement, Exhibits and schedules hereto.
3.2. Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
3.3. Wire Instructions. Buyer shall transmit Payment Price via wire transfer to the following account: $\qquad$ , with the routing number or swift code of: $\qquad$ located at the following bank and address: $\qquad$ .
3.4. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Side Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attorneys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
3.5. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
3.6. Governing_Law. This Side Agreement shall be govemed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Califomia.
3.7. Confidentiality and Retum of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential any and all material obtained about the other or, in the case of Buyer, about the Property or its operations, this Side Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party. Except as may be required by law, Buyer shall not divulge any such information to other persons or entities including, without limitation, appraisers, real estate brokers, or competitors of Seller. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall have the right to disclose information with respect to the Property to its officers, directors, employees, attomeys, accountants, environmental auditors, engineers, potential lenders, and permitted assignees under this Side Agreement and other consultants to the extent necessary for Buyer to evaluate its acquisition of the Property provided that all such persons are told that such information is confidential and agree (in writing for any third party engineers, environmental auditors or other consultants) to keep such information confidential. If Buyer acquires the Property from Seller, either party shall have the right, subsequent to the Closing of such acquisition, to publicize the transaction (other than the parties to or the specific economics of the transaction) in whatever manner it deems appropriate; provided that any press release or other public disclosure regarding this Side Agreement or the transactions contemplated herein, and the wording of same, must be approved in advance by both parties, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The provisions of this section shall survive the Closing or any termination of this Side Agreement. In the event the transaction contemplated by this Side Agreement does not close as provided herein, upon the request of Seller, Buyer shall promptly return to Seller all Property Information and all other documents, reports and records obtained by Buyer in connection with the investigation of the Property.
3.8. Interpretation of Side Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Side Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
3.9. Amendments. This Side Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
3.10. Drafts Not an Offer to Enter Into a Legally Binding_Contract. The parties hereto agree that the submission of a draft of this Side Agreement by one party to another is not intended by either party to be an offer to enter into a legally binding contract with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property. The parties shall be legally bound with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Side Agreement only if and when both Seller and Buyer have fully executed and delivered to each other a counterpart of this Side Agreement (or a copy by facsimile transmission).
3.11. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
3.12. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Side Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.
3.13. Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Side Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Side Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Side Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
3.14. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the following addresses:

IF TO BUYER:
6176 Federal Blvd. Trust
6176 Federal Blvd.
San Diego, California 92114
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
with a copy to:
Austin Legal Group, APC
3990 Old Town Ave, A-112
San Diego, CA 92110
IF TO SELLER:
Darryl Cotton
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to $5: 00 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided,
however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
3.15. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless such last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
3.16. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
3.17. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto at Closing, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the Closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
3.18. Execution in Counterparts. This Side Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Side Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Side Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
3.19. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above and the exhibits attached hereto and referred to herein are incorporated in this Side Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
3.20. Waiver of Covenants, Conditions or Remedies. The waiver by one party of the performance of any covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any act, under this Side Agreement shall not invalidate this Side Agreement nor shall it be considered a waiver by such party of any other covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any other act required, under this Side Agreement. The exercise of any remedy provided in this Side Agreement shall not be a waiver of any consistent remedy provided by law, and the provisions of this Side Agreement for any remedy shall not exclude any other consistent remedies unless they are expressly excluded.
3.21. Legal Advice. Each party has independently received legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Side Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Side Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Side Agreement, in duplicate originals, by their respective officers hereunto duly authorized, the day and year herein written.

## BUYER:

6176 FEDERAL BLVD. TRUST

By:
Printed: $\qquad$
Its: Trustee
$\qquad$

## SELLER:

DARRYL COTTON:
$\qquad$

## SIDE AGREEMENT

## Dated as of March <br> $\qquad$ 2017

By and Among
DARRYL COTTON
and

## 6176 FEDERAL BLVD TRUST

This Side Agreement ("Side Agreement") is made as of the ___ day of 2017, by and between Darryl Cotton ("Seller") and 6176 Federal Blvd Trust ("Buyer"), a California trust. Buyer and Seller are sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties."

## RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Seller and Buyer desire to enter into a Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement"), dated of even date herewith, pursuant to which the Seller shall sell to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from the Seller, the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, California 92114 (the "Property"); and

WHEREAS, the purchase price for the Property is Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000$ ); and

WHEREAS, a condition to the Purchase Agreement is that Buyer and Seller enter into this Side Agreement that addresses the terms under which Seller shall move his existing business located on the Property.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as follows:

## ARTICLE I

## 1. Terms of the Side Agreement

1.1. Buyer shall pay Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000$ ) to cover Seller's expenses related to moving and re-establishing his business ("Payment Price").
1.2. The Payment Price is contingent on close of escrow pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.

## ARTICLE II

## 2. Closing Conditions

2.1. Within ten (10) business days from the close of escrow on the Property, Buyer shall pay the Payment Price by wire transfer to an account provided by the Seller (see section 2.3); and
2.2. A condition precedent to the payment of the Payment Price is receipt by the Buyer of Seller's written representation that Seller has relocated his business and vacated the Property; and
2.3. If escrow does not close on the Property, the Side Agreement shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the Purchase Agreement and no payment is due or owing from Buyer to Seller.

## ARTICLE III

## 3. General Provisions

3.1.This Side Agreement, together with the Purchase Agreement and any Exhibits and schedules hereto, contain all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements, in relation to this Side Agreement are replaced in total by this Side Agreement together with the Purchase Agreement, Exhibits and schedules hereto.
3.2. Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
3.3. Wire Instructions. Buyer shall transmit Payment Price via wire transfer to the following account: $\qquad$ with the routing number or swift code of: $\qquad$ located at the following bank and address: $\qquad$ ,
3.4. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Side Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attorneys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
3.5. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.

2
3.6. Governing_Law. This Side Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
3.7. Confidentiality and Return of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential any and all material obtained about the other or, in the case of Buyer, about the Property or its operations, this Side Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party. Except as may be required by law, Buyer shall not divulge any such information to other persons or entities including, without limitation, appraisers, real estate brokers, or competitors of Seller. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer shall have the right to disclose information with respect to the Property to its officers, directors, employees, attorneys, accountants, environmental auditors, engineers, potential lenders, and permitted assignees under this Side Agreement and other consultants to the extent necessary for Buyer to evaluate its acquisition of the Property provided that all such persons are told that such information is confidential and agree (in writing for any third party engineers, environmental auditors or other consultants) to keep such information confidential. If Buyer acquires the Property from Seller, either party shall have the right, subsequent to the Closing of such acquisition, to publicize the transaction (other than the parties to or the specific economics of the transaction) in whatever manner it deems appropriate; provided that any press release or other public disclosure regarding this Side Agreement or the transactions contemplated herein, and the wording of same, must be approved in advance by both parties, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. The provisions of this section shall survive the Closing or any termination of this Side Agreement. In the event the transaction contemplated by this Side Agreement does not close as provided herein, upon the request of Seller, Buyer shall promptly return to Seller all Property Information and all other documents, reports and records obtained by Buyer in connection with the investigation of the Property.
3.8. Interpretation of Side Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Side Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
3.9. Amendments. This Side Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
3.10. Drafts Not an Offer to Enter Into a Legally Binding_Contract. The parties hereto agree that the submission of a draft of this Side Agreement by one party to another is not intended by either party to be an offer to enter into a legally binding contract with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property. The parties shall be legally bound with respect to the purchase and sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Side Agreement only if and when both Seller and Buyer have fully executed and delivered to each other a counterpart of this Side Agreement (or a copy by facsimile transmission).
3.11. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
3.12. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Side Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.
3.13. Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Side Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Side Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Side Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
3.14. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the following addresses:

## IF TO BUYER:

6176 Federal Blvd. Trust
6176 Federal Blvd.
San Diego, California 92114
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
with a copy to:
Austin Legal Group, APC
3990 Old Town Ave, A-112
San Diego, CA 92110
IF TO SELLER:
Darryl Cotton
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to $5: 00 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided,
however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
3.15. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless such last day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
3.16. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
3.17. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto at Closing, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the Closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
3.18. Execution in Counterparts. This Side Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Side Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Side Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
3.19. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above and the exhibits attached hereto and referred to herein are incorporated in this Side Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
3.20. Waiver of Covenants, Conditions or Remedies. The waiver by one party of the performance of any covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any act, under this Side Agreement shall not invalidate this Side Agreement nor shall it be considered a waiver by such party of any other covenant, condition or promise, or of the time for performing any other act required, under this Side Agreement. The exercise of any remedy provided in this Side Agreement shall not be a waiver of any consistent remedy provided by law, and the provisions of this Side Agreement for any remedy shall not exclude any other consistent remedies unless they are expressly excluded.
3.21. Legal Advice. Each party has independently received legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Side Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Side Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Side Agreement, in duplicate originals, by their respective officers hereunto duly authorized, the day and year herein written.

## BUYER:

6176 FEDERAL BLVD. TRUST

By:
Printed: $\qquad$
Its: Trustee

## SELLER:

DARRYL COTTON:

Subject: Re: Statement
From: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Date: Friday, March 3, 2017 8:22:09 AM GMT-08:00

Larry,
I read the Side Agreement in your attachment and I see that no reference is made to the $10 \%$ equity position as per my Inda-Gro GERL Service Agreement (see attached) in the new store. In fact para 3.11 looks to avoid our agreement completely. It looks like counsel did not get a copy of that document. Can you explain?

On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 8:51 AM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net) wrote:

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: $\mathbf{8 5 8 . 5 7 6 . 1 0 4 0}$
Fax: 858.630.3900

Circular 230 Disclaimer:


#### Abstract

andion of the contents hereof is strictly probibited Please notify the sender of this facsimie nourled and arrange for the return or


 destruction of this facsimite and all attachments.
# SERVICES AGREEMENT CONTRACT 

Date: 09/24/16

Customer: GERL Investments 5402 Ruffin Road, Ste. 200 San Diego, CA 92103<br>Attn: Mr. Larry Geraci<br>Ph: 858.956.4040<br>E-mail: Larry@TFCSD.net<br>Mr. Geraci;

Pursuant to our conversations I have developed this document to act as the Contract between us that will serve to define our relationship, services, and fee's for the development of 6176 Federal Boulevard San Diego, CA. 92114 (hereinafter referred to as the property) as a new dispensary to be owned and managed by your company, GERL Investments.

1) The property is currently owned by me, Darryl Cotton (Cotton-Seller) and occupied by my company, Inda-Gro Induction Lighting Company (Inda-Gro-Tenant). Under separate Contract Cotton has agreed to sell the property to GERL Investments (GERL-Buyer) for $\$ 400,000.00$ and a $10 \%$ equity position in the new licensed cannabis dispensary business being developed at the property by GERL.
2) Upon completion and transfer of property ownership Cotton will immediately cease being the landlord to Inda-Gro and Inda-Gro will become the tenant of GERL.
3) GERL plans to tear down the existing structure(s) and build a new structure for a commercial dispensary. Under this Agreement GERL will allow Inda-Gro to remain in the property at no charge until such time that the plan check with the City of San Diego has been approved and permits have been issued. This process is expected to take 6-9 months. At the time GERL notices Inda-Gro that the permits have been issued Inda-Gro will have 30 days to vacate the property. Inda-Gro agrees to cooperate with GERL architects to access the property during the design phase of this work.
4) Inda-Gro is agreeing to vacate the property in consideration for a relocation fee of $\$ 400,000.00$ of which payment would be made in two parts. Upon execution of this Contract GERL agrees to pay Inda-Gro $\$ 200,000$. Upon issuance of the permits and the 30 day notice to vacate the balance, $\$ 200,000.00$ would become payable and due.
5) Inda-Gro currently operates what we refer to as a 151 Farm. This is a teaching and touring farm that demonstrates urban farming technologies which utilize our lighting systems, controls and water savings strategies utilizing Aquaponics systems. Since it is in the interest of all parties; Inda-Gro, Cotton and

Inda-Gro
6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, CA 92114-1401
Toll Free: 877.452 .2244 Local: 619.266 .4004
www.inda-gro.com

GERL to identify ongoing investment opportunities with both cannabis and non-cannabis related ventures Inda-Gro and Cotton agree to use the current property to highlight the benefits of what having a licensed dispensary is to the community and once relocated Inda-Gro/Cotton would agree to continue to promote the new dispensary as an example of seed to sale retail distribution as well as identify other investment opportunities that develop from interested parties having toured our facilities and wishing to establish similar operations.
6). GERL may wish to have interested parties tour the current and new property for Inda-Gro 151 Farms. This too is acceptable and under this Agreement would be a mutual collaboration and strategic alliance in terms of the farming and cultivation aspects provided by Inda-Gro and the Site Acquisition, Design/Build Construction and Retail Cannabis Services provided by GERL for those future contracts.

TOTAL PRICE: Four Hundred Thousand and $00 / 100$ ( $\$ 400,000,00$ )

I/we accept the Service Agreement Contract as detailed and do hereby agree to the Terms as set forth herein:

Sign: $\qquad$ Print Name: $\qquad$ Date: $\qquad$
Darryl Cotton, President

Sign: $\qquad$ Print Name: $\qquad$ Date: $\qquad$ Larry Geraci

## SERVICES AGREEMENT CONTRACT

Date: 09/24/16

Customer: GERL Investments 5402 Ruffin Road, Ste. 200 San Diego, CA 92103<br>Attn: Mr. Larry Geraci<br>Ph: 858.956.4040<br>E-mail: Larry@TFCSD.net<br>Mr. Geraci;

Pursuant to our conversations I have developed this document to act as the Contract between us that will serve to define our relationship, services, and fee's for the development of 6176 Federal Boulevard San Diego, CA. 92114 (hereinafter referred to as the property) as a new dispensary to be owned and managed by your company, GERL Investments.

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3) GERL plans to tear down the existing structure(s) and build a new structure for a commercial dispensary. Under this Agreement GERL will allow Inda-Gro to remain in the property at no charge until such time that the plan check with the City of San Diego has been approved and permits have been issued. This process is expected to take 6-9 months. At the time GERL notices Inda-Gro that the permits have been issued Inda-Gro will have 30 days to vacate the property. Inda-Gro agrees to cooperate with GERL architects to access the property during the design phase of this work.
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Inda-Gro
6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, CA 92114-1401
Toll Free: 877.452.2244 ${ }^{3 / 4}$ Local: 619.266 .4004
www.inda-gro.com


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## TOTAL PRICE: Four Hundred Thousand and 00/100 (\$400,000.00)

I/we accept the Service Agreement Contract as detailed and do hereby agree to the Terms as set forth herein:

Sign: $\qquad$ Print Name: $\qquad$ Date: $\qquad$
Darryl Cotton, President

Sign: $\qquad$ Print Name: $\qquad$ Date: $\qquad$
Larry Geraci

## Inda-Gro

6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, CA 92114-1401
Toll Free: 877.452.2244 4/4 Local: 619.266.4004
www.inda-gro.com

Subject: Contract Review
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [darryl@inda-gro.com](mailto:darryl@inda-gro.com)
Date: Tuesday, March 7, 2017 12:05:43 PM GMT-08:00

Hi Daryl,
I have not reviewed this yet but wanted you to look at it and give me your thoughts. Talking to Matt, the 10k a month might be difficult to hit until the sixth month....can we do $5 k$, and on the seventh month start 10k?

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123
Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

Circular 230 Disciaimer,
IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specifically noted, any federal tax advice in this communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materials) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addresses. This email is considered a confidential communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have received this in error, please contact us at (858)576-1040 and retum this to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intanded recipient, you are hereby notified that any unaulhorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immediataiy and arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

## SIDE AGREEMENT

This Side Agreement ("Side Agreement") is made as of the $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ 2017, by and between Darryl Cotton ("Seller") and 6176 Federal Blvd Trust, dated $\qquad$ , 2017 ("Buyer"). Buyer and Seller are sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties."

## RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Seller and Buyer have entered into a Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement"), dated as of approximate even date herewith, pursuant to which the Seller shall sell to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from the Seller, the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, California 92114 (the "Property");

WHEREAS, The Buyer intends to operate a licensed medical cannabis at the property ("Business"); and

WHEREAS, in conjunction with Buyer's purchase of the Property, Buyer has agreed to pay Seller $\$ 400,000.00$ to reimburse and otherwise compensate Seller for Seller relocating his business located at the Property, and to share in certain profits of Buyer's future Business.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as follows:

## ARTICLE I <br> SIDE AGREEMENT

1.1. Within 10 days from the closing of the purchase of the Property pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, and conditioned upon Seller being fully vacated from the Property prior to such closing, Buyer shall pay to Seller in cash or cash equivalent, the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 400,000.00$ ) to an account to be designated by Seller in writing.
1.2. In addition to the above, conditioned upon the timely closing of the purchase of the Property pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, Buyer hereby agrees to pay to Seller $10 \%$ of the net revenues of Buyer's Business after all expenses and liabilities have been paid. Profits will be paid on the $10^{\text {th }}$ day of each month following the month in which they accrued. Further, Buyer hereby guarantees a profits payment of not less than $\$ 5,000.00$ per month for the first three months the Business is open (i.e. profits would be paid in months $2-4$ for profits accrued in months $1-3$ ) and $\$ 10,000.00$ a month for each month thereafter the Business is operating on the Property.

## ARTICLE II GENERAL TERMS

2. Entire Agreement. This Side Agreement, together with the Purchase Agreement and any Exhibits and schedules hereto or thereto, contain all representations, warranties and covenants made by Buyer and Seller and constitutes the entire understanding between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. Any prior correspondence, memoranda or agreements, in relation to this Side Agreement are replaced in total by this Side Agreement together with the Purchase Agreement, Exhibits and schedules hereto.
2.1. Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
2.2. Termination. If escrow does not close on the Property according to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Side Agreement shall terminate and Buyer and Seller shall have no obligations to each other under this Agreement.
2.3. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Side Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attomeys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
2.4. Assigment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
2.5. $\quad$ Governing_Law. This Side Agreement shall be govemed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Califomia.
2.6. Confidentiality and Retum of Documents. Buyer and Seller shall each maintain as confidential this Side Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby, and shall not disclose such information to any third party, except their respective attorneys.
2.7. Interpretation of Side Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Side Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
2.8. Amendments. This Side Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
2.9. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
2.10. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Side Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.
2.11. Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Side Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
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## IF TO BUYER:

6176 Federal Blvd. Trust
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
with a copy to:
Austin Legal Group, APC
3990 Old Town Ave, A-112
San Diego, CA 92110

## IF TO SELLER:

Darryl Cotton
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
Any such notices shall be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to 5:00 p.m. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided, however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
2.13. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless such last day is a Saturday,

Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
2.14. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
2.15. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Side Agreement, in duplicate originals, by their respective officers hereunto duly authorized, the day and year herein written.

## BUYER: SELLER:

6176 FEDERAL BLVD. TRUST

By: $\qquad$
Printed: $\qquad$
Its: Trustee

## DARRYL COTTON:

$\qquad$
$\square$

## SIDE AGREEMENT

This Side Agreement ("Side Agreement") is made as of the $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ 2017, by and between Darryl Cotton ("Seller") and 6176 Federal Blvd Trust, dated $\qquad$ 2017 ("Buyer"). Buyer and Seller are sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties."

## RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Seller and Buyer have entered into a Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement'), dated as of approximate even date herewith, pursuant to which the Seller shall sell to Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase from the Seller, the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., San Diego, California 92114 (the "Property");

WHEREAS, The Buyer intends to operate a licensed medical cannabis at the property ("Business"); and

WHEREAS, in conjunction with Buyer's purchase of the Property, Buyer has agreed to pay Seller $\$ 400,000.00$ to reimburse and otherwise compensate Seller for Seller relocating his business located at the Property, and to share in certain profits of Buyer's future Business.

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as follows:

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1.2. In addition to the above, conditioned upon the timely closing of the purchase of the Property pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, Buyer hereby agrees to pay to Seller $10 \%$ of the net revenues of Buyer's Business after all expenses and liabilities have been paid. Profits will be paid on the $10^{\text {th }}$ day of each month following the month in which they accrued. Further, Buyer hereby guarantees a profits payment of not less than $\$ 5,000.00$ per month for the first three months the Business is open (i.e. profits would be paid in months $2-4$ for profits accrued in months $1-3$ ) and $\$ 10,000.00$ a month for each month thereafter the Business is operating on the Property.

## ARTICLE II GENERAL TERMS

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2.1.Time. Time is of the essence in the performance of each of the parties' respective obligations contained herein.
2.2. Termination. If escrow does not close on the Property according to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Side Agreement shall terminate and Buyer and Seller shall have no obligations to each other under this Agreement.
2.3. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any action or proceeding brought by either party against the other under this Side Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses including its attorneys' fees in such action or proceeding in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. The prevailing party shall be determined by the court based upon an assessment of which party's major arguments made or positions taken in the proceedings could fairly be said to have prevailed over the other party's major arguments or positions on major disputed issues in the court's decision. If the party which shall have commenced or instituted the action, suit or proceeding shall dismiss or discontinue it without the concurrence of the other party, such other party shall be deemed the prevailing party.
2.4. Assignment. Buyer's rights and obligations hereunder shall be assignable without the prior consent of Seller.
2.5. $\quad$ Governing Law. This Side Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California.
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2.7. Interpretation of Side Agreement. The article, section and other headings of this Side Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall not be construed to affect the meaning of any provision contained herein. Where the context so requires, the use of the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and the use of the masculine shall include the feminine and the neuter. The term "person" shall include any individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust, unincorporated association, any other entity and any government or any department or agency thereof, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.
2.8. Amendments. This Side Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by Buyer and Seller.
2.9. No Partnership. The relationship of the parties hereto is solely that of Seller and Buyer with respect to the Property and no joint venture or other partnership exists between the parties hereto. Neither party has any fiduciary relationship hereunder to the other.
2.10. No Third Party Beneficiary. The provisions of this Side Agreement are not intended to benefit any third parties.
2.11. Invalidity and Waiver. If any portion of this Agreement is held invalid or inoperative, then so far as is reasonable and possible the remainder of this Side Agreement shall be deemed valid and operative, and effect shall be given to the intent manifested by the portion held invalid or inoperative. The failure by either party to enforce against the other any term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed not to be a waiver of such party's right to enforce against the other party the same or any other such term or provision, unless made in writing.
2.12. Notices. All notices required or permitted hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served on the parties at the following addresses:

## IF TO BUYER:

6176 Federal Blvd. Trust
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
with a copy to:
Austin Legal Group, APC
3990 Old Town Ave, A-112
San Diego, CA 92110
IF TO SELLER:

Darryl Cotton
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Attn:
Fax No.:
Phone No.:
Any such notices shail be either (a) sent by overnight delivery using a nationally recognized overnight courier, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered one business day after deposit with such courier, (b) sent by telefax or electronic mail, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon confirmation of delivery if sent prior to 5:00 p.m. on a business day (otherwise, the next business day), or (c) sent by personal delivery, in which case notice shall be deemed delivered upon receipt. A party's address may be changed by written notice to the other party; provided, however, that no notice of a change of address shall be effective until actual receipt of such notice. Copies of notices are for informational purposes only, and a failure to give or receive copies of any notice shall not be deemed a failure to give notice. Notices given by counsel to the Buyer shall be deemed given by Buyer and notices given by counsel to the Seller shall be deemed given by Seller.
2.13. Calculation of Time Periods. Unless otherwise specified, in computing any period of time described herein, the day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included and the last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless such last day is a Saturday,

Sunday or legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The last day of any period of time described herein shall be deemed to end at 5:00 p.m. California time.
2.14. Brokers. The parties represent and warrant to each other that no broker or finder was instrumental in arranging or bringing about this transaction.
2.15. Further Assurances. In addition to the acts and deeds recited herein and contemplated to be performed, executed and/or delivered by the parties hereto, Buyer and Seller each agree to perform, execute and deliver, but without any obligation to incur any additional liability or expense, on or after the closing any further deliveries and assurances as may be reasonably necessary to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
2.16. Execution in Counterparts. This Side Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and all of such counterparts shall constitute one Side Agreement. To facilitate execution of this Side Agreement, the parties may execute and exchange by telephone facsimile counterparts of the signature pages.
2.17. Incorporation of Recitals/Exhibits. All recitals set forth herein above are incorporated in this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
2.18. Legal Advice. Each party has independently received legal advice from its attorneys with respect to the advisability of executing this Side Agreement and the meaning of the provisions hereof. The provisions of this Side Agreement shall be construed as to the fair meaning and not for or against any party based upon any attribution of such party as the sole source of the language in question.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Side Agreement, in duplicate originals, by their respective officers hereunto duly authorized, the day and year herein written.

## BUYER: SELLER:

6176 FEDERAL BLVD. TRUST
DARRYL COTTON:

By: $\qquad$
Printed: $\qquad$

## Its: Trustee

Subject: Re: Contract Review
From: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Date: Thursday, March 16, 2017 8:23:52 PM GMT-07:00

Larry,
My apologies ahead of time as I am going to provide frank comments on the agreement so that we can finalize it and get this closed. And, so that you understand where I am coming from, just want to lay out a few of our milestones.

Throughout October we had discussions regarding the sale of my property. We met on $11 / 2$ and agreed upon an $\$ 800,000$ purchase price, a $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit, a $10 \%$ equity stake with a monthly guaranteed minimum $\$ 10,000$ payment and to definitive agreements that contained a few other conditions (e.g., I stay at the property if the CUP is issued until construction starts). We executed a good faith agreement that day stating the sale of the property was for the $\$ 800,000$ and that as a sign of good faith, you were providing a $\$ 10,000$ deposit towards the required $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit. That same day you scanned and emailed to me the agreement and I replied and noted that the agreement did not contain the $10 \%$ equity stake in the dispensary. I asked you to please respond and confirm via email that a condition of the sale was my $10 \%$ equity stake. You did not respond and confirm the $10 \%$ as I requested.

Almost 4 months later, on $2 / 27$, you forwarded a draft purchase agreement for the property that again did not contain the agreed upon $10 \%$ equity stake, it also does not mention the remaining $\$ 40,000$ towards the non-refundable deposit. I called you about this and we spoke.

On $3 / 2$, you forwarded a draft Side Agreement that again did not contain the $10 \%$ equity stake. I replied the next day on $3 / 3$ raising the $10 \%$ equity issue and attaching the draft services agreement that I drafted that contains some of the terms we had agreed upon.

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The long and short of it, we started these negotiations 4 months ago and the drafts and our communications have not reflected what we agreed upon and are still far from reflecting our original agreement. Here is my proposal, please have your attorney Gina revise the Purchase Agreement and Side Agreement to incorporate all the terms we have agreed upon so that we can execute final versions and get this closed.

Please have these terms incorporated into revised drafts:

- The remaining $\$ 40,000$ deposit, which is nonrefundable in the event you choose to not close on the property if the CUP is denied. And which is to be provided upon execution of the final agreements.
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basically that my consent is required for large decisions like the issuance of employee bonus and for agreements with suppliers and vendors that are not done on an arm-lengths basis. A friend of mine said that these are standard "Minority Shareholder Protection Rights."
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Please confirm by Monday 12:00 PM whether we are on the same page and you plan to continue with our agreement. Or, if not, so I can return your $\$ 10,000$ of the $\$ 50,000$ required deposit. If, hopefully, we can work through this, please confirm that revised final drafts that incorporate the terms above will be provided by Wednesday at 12:00 PM. I promise to review and provide comments that same day so we can execute the same or next day.

In anticipation of your reply, I remain,
Darryl Cotton

On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net) wrote:

## Hi Daryl,

I have not reviewed this yet but wanted you to look at it and give me your thoughts. Talking to Matt, the 10 k a month might be difficult to hit until the sixth month....can we do 5 k , and on the seventh month start 10 k ?

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com

## Bus: 858.576 .1040

Fax: 858.630 .3900

Circular 230 Disclaimer:

IRS regulations require us to advise you that, uniess otherwise specificaily noted, any federal tax advice in this communication fincluding any attachments, enciosures, or other accompanying materlais) was not lntended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters It addresses. This email is considered a confidentiai communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have received this in error, piease contact us at (858)576-1040 and return this to us or destroy it immediately. if you are in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immedialely and arrange for the return or copying, distribution or dissemination of the co
destruction of this facsimile and ell athachments.

Subject: Re: Contract Review
From: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Date: Friday, March 17, 2017 2:15:50 PM GMT-07:00
Larry, I received your text asking to meet in person tomorrow. I would prefer that until we have final agreements, that we converse exclusively via email. My greatest concern is that you will get a denial on the CUP application and not provide the remaining $\$ 40,000$ non-refundable deposit. To be frank, I feel that you are not dealing with me in good faith, you told me repeatedly that you could not submit a CUP application until certain zoning issues had been resolved and that you had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on getting them resolved. You lied to me, I found out yesterday from the City of San Diego that you submitted a CUP application on October 31, 2016 BEFORE we even signed our agreement on the 2nd of November. There is no situation where an oral agreement will convince me that you are dealing with me in good faith and will honor our agreement. We need a final written, legal, binding agreement.

Please confirm, as requested, by 12:00 PM Monday that you are honoring our agreement and will have final drafts (reflecting completely the below) by Wednesday at 12:00 PM.

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Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576 .1040
Fax: 858.630 .3900

Circular 230 Disclalmer:

IRS regulations require us to advise you that, unless otherwise specifically noted, any federal tax advice in this communication (including any attachments, enclosures, or other accompanying materials) was not intended or written to be used, and it cannol be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties; furthermore, this communication was not intended or written to support the promotion or marketing of any of the transactions or matters it addressas. This email is considered a confidential communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have received this in error, please contact us at ( 858 ) $576-1040$ and return this to us or destroy it immediately. If you ere in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any to us or destroy it immediately. If you ere in possession of this confidential information, and you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immediately and unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the con
arrange for the return or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

Subject: RE: Contract Review
From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Date: Saturday, March 18, 2017 1:43:23 PM GMT-07:00

Darryl,
I have an attorney working on the situation now. I will follow up by Wednesday with the response as their timing will play a factor.

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
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San Diego, Ca 92123
Web: Larrygeraci.com
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From: Darryl Cotton [mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2017 2:16 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Subject: Re: Contract Review

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confidential communication and is intended for the person or firm identified above. If you have received this in error, please contact us at (858)576-1040 and retum this to us or destroy it immediately. If you are in possession of this confidential information, and you are nol the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or dissemination of the contents hereof is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender of this facsimile immediately and arrange for the retum or destruction of this facsimile and all attachments.

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From: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Date: Sunday, March 19, 2017 9:02:18 AM GMT-07:00
Larry,
I understand that drafting the agreements will take time, but you don't need to consult with your attorneys to tell me whether or not you are going to honor our agreement.

I need written confirmation that you will honor our agreement so that I know that you are not just playing for time - hoping to get a response from the City before you put down in writing that you owe me the remainder of the $\$ 50,000$ nonrefundable deposit we agreed to.

If I do not have a written confirmation from you by 12:00 PM tomorrow, I will contacting the City of San Diego and let them know that our agreement was not completed and that the application pending on my property needs to be denied because the applicant has no right to my property.

On Sat, Mar 18, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net) wrote:
Darryl,

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Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
$1 / 5$

Bus: 858.576.1040
Fax: 858.630.3900

Circular 230 Disclaimer:

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From: Darryl Cotton [mailto:indaarodarryl@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2017 2:16 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Subject: Re: Contract Review

Larry, I received your text asking to meet in person tomorrow. I would prefer that until we have final agreements, that we converse exclusively via email. My greatest concern is that you will get a denial on the CUP application and not provide the remaining $\$ 40,000$ non-refundable deposit. To be frank, I feel that you are not dealing with me in good faith, you told me repeatedly that you could not submit a CUP application until certain zoning issues had been resolved and that you had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on getting them resolved. You lied to me, I found out yesterday from the City of San Diego that you submitted a CUP application on October 31, 2016 BEFORE we even signed our agreement on the 2nd of November. There is no situation where an oral agreement will convince me that you are dealing with me in good faith and will honor our agreement. We need a final written, legal, binding agreement.

Please confirm, as requested, by 12:00 PM Monday that you are honoring our agreement and will have final drafts (reflecting completely the below) by Wednesday at 12:00 PM.

It is unfortunate that matters have turned out like this, but hearing from the city that the application had been submitted before our deal was signed and that it is already under review, meaning you have been lying to me for months, forces me to take this course of action.

Again, please respond to this email so that there is a clear record of our conversations from this point forward or at least until we have final executed documents.
-Darryl

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 8:23 PM, Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com) wrote:
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Throughout October we had discussions regarding the sale of my property. We met on 11/2 and agreed upon an $\$ 800,000$ purchase price, a $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit, a $10 \%$ equity stake with a monthly guaranteed minimum $\$ 10,000$ payment and to definitive agreements that contained a few other conditions (e.g., I stay at the property if the CUP is issued until construction starts). We executed a good faith agreement that day stating the sale of the property was for the $\$ 800,000$ and that as a sign of good faith, you were providing a $\$ 10,000$ deposit towards the required $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit. That same day you scanned and emailed to me the agreement and I replied and noted that the agreement did not contain the $10 \%$ equity stake in the dispensary. I asked you to please respond and confirm via email that a condition of the sale was my $10 \%$ equity stake. You did not respond and confirm the $10 \%$ as I requested.

Almost 4 months later, on $2 / 27$, you forwarded a draft purchase agreement for the property that again did not contain the agreed upon 10\% equity stake, it also does not mention the remaining $\$ 40,000$ towards the non-refundable deposit. I called you about this and we spoke.

On 3/2, you forwarded a draft Side Agreement that again did not contain the 10\% equity stake. I replied the next day on $3 / 3$ raising the $10 \%$ equity issue and attaching the draft services agreement that I drafted that contains some of the terms we had agreed upon.

On 3/7, email below, you forwarded a revised Side Agreement that did contain the 10\% equity stake, but in the body of the email you requested that the $\$ 10,000$ minimum monthly payment be held off until month 7 and that months $1-6$ be reduced to $\$ 5,000$ a month. I know from our conversations that you have spent over $\$ 300,000$ on lobbying and zoning efforts for this property, which has caused you to be strapped for cash. However, I am not in a position to take a $\$ 5,000$ reduction for 6 months.

The long and short of it, we started these negotiations 4 months ago and the drafts and our communications have not reflected what we agreed upon and are still far from reflecting our original agreement. Here is my proposal, please have your attorney Gina revise the Purchase Agreement and Side Agreement to incorporate all the terms we have agreed upon so that we can execute final versions and get this closed.

Please have these terms incorporated into revised drafts:

- The remaining $\$ 40,000$ deposit, which is nonrefundable in the event you choose to not close on the property if the CUP is denied. And which is to be provided upon execution of the final agreements.
- If the CUP is granted, my business can remain at the property until the city has finalized the plans and construction begins at the property.
- A $10 \%$ equity stake with a minimum guaranteed monthly distribution of $\$ 10,000$, whichever is greater.
- A clause that my $10 \%$ equity stake carries with it consent rights for any material decisions. Those items that are to require my consent can be standard minority consent rights, but basically that my consent is required for large decisions like the issuance of employee bonus and for agreements with suppliers and vendors that are not done on an arm-lengths basis. A friend of mine said that these are standard "Minority Shareholder Protection Rights."
- A provision requiring that upon the creation of the formation and governance documents of the CUP entity, that there is a requirement that the accounting is to be done by a third-party accounting firm that will also be responsible for calculating my $10 \%$ monthly equity distributions.
- The incorporation of all the terms in the MOU that I created that Gina references in the draft purchase agreement.
- Please have Gina delete the clause in the purchase agreement that says both you and I
had our own counsel review the agreement. You told me I could just communicate with Gina and though I tried to engage an attorney, I did not ultimately do so for cost reasons.

The intent of all this is to ensure that the agreement we have agreed upon can be executed and verified. Having said all this, I really want to finalize this as soon as possible - I found out today that a CUP application for my property was submitted in October, which I am assuming is from someone connected to you. Although, I note that you told me that the $\$ 40,000$ deposit balance would be paid once the CUP was submitted and that you were waiting on certain zoning issues to be resolved. Which is not the case.

Ultimately, the main point is that we were supposed to execute our agreements as soon as possible so that I could receive the total $\$ 50,000$ non-refundable deposit and you would take the risk of the non-approval of the CUP. If this keeps dragging on and we do not finalize and execute our agreements, then you may get a denial from the city on the CUP and then simply walk away. At that point, the property having been denied, no other party would be willing to take on that risk. If you are not willing to take on that risk as originally agreed upon, please let me know as there are other parties who would match your terms and be willing to take on that risk.

Please confirm by Monday 12:00 PM whether we are on the same page and you plan to continue with our agreement. Or, if not, so I can return your $\$ 10,000$ of the $\$ 50,000$ required deposit. If, hopefully, we can work through this, please confirm that revised final drafts that incorporate the terms above will be provided by Wednesday at 12:00 PM. I promise to review and provide comments that same day so we can execute the same or next day.

In anticipation of your reply, I remain,
Darryl Cotton

On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net) wrote:
Hi Daryl,

I have not reviewed this yet but wanted you to look at it and give me your thoughts. Talking to Matt, the 10 k a month might be difficult to hit until the sixth month....can we do 5 k , and on the seventh month start 10 k ?

Best Regards,

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From: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
To: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
Date: Sunday, March 19, 2017 3:11:22 PM GMT-07:00

Darryl,
At this point, you keep changing your mind every time we talk. My attorneys will move forward on the agreement as planned. Any signed written agreement will be followed by the letter of the law. It's not about any deposit, it's about you changing what is not in writing. So there is no confusion, the attorneys will move forward with an agreement.

As to lying about the status, read the comment below from the city on Wednesday 3/15/2017. We are addressing this currently with the city. I have been forthright with you this entire process.

To: 'Abhay Schweitzer' [abhay@techne-us.com](mailto:abhay@techne-us.com)
Subject: PTS 520606 - Federal Boulevard MMCC
Importance: High
Good Afternoon,
I am the Development Project Manager assigned to the above referenced project. The project is located in the CO-2-1 (Commercial Office) Zone. Please note that per the San Diego Municipal Code, a Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative is not a permitted use in this Zone and staff will be recommending denial of this application. Pease advise if you wish to continue the processing of the subject application through the full review process, or staff could schedule a hearing immediately with a recommendation of denial. Please note that all costs associated with the processing of the application would be charged to the deposit account and not refunded.
Please notify me at your earliest convenience of your preference.
Regards,

Best Regards,

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#### Abstract

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I need written confirmation that you will honor our agreement so that I know that you are not just playing for time - hoping to get a response from the City before you put down in writing that you owe me the remainder of the $\$ 50,000$ nonrefundable deposit we agreed to.

If I do not have a written confirmation from you by $12: 00 \mathrm{PM}$ tomorrow, I will contacting the City of San Diego and let them know that our agreement was not completed and that the application pending on my property needs to be denied because the applicant has no right to my property.

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To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Date: Sunday, March 19, 2017 6:47:43 PM GMT-07:00

## Larry,

I have not been changing my mind. The only additional requests have been in regards to putting in place third party accounting and other mechanisms to ensure that my interests are protected. I have only done so because you kept providing draft agreements that continuously failed the terms we agreed to.

It is blatantly clear to me now that you have been stringing me along, even now all your responses are to buy more time. So there is no confusion, you have until tomorrow 12:00 PM to provide confirmation as requested below. If you don't, I am emailing the City of San Diego regarding the fact that no third-party has any interest in my property and the application currently pending needs to be denied.

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To: 'Abhay Schweitzer' [abhay@techne-us.com](mailto:abhay@techne-us.com)
Subject: PTS 520606 - Federal Boulevard MMCC
Importance: High

Good Afternoon,
I am the Development Project Manager assigned to the above referenced project. The project is located in the CO-2-1 (Commercial Office) Zone. Please note that per the San Diego Municipal Code, a Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative is not a permitted use in this Zone and staff will be recommending denial of this application.

Pease advise if you wish to continue the processing of the subject application through the full review process, or staff could schedule a hearing immediately with a recommendation of denial. Please note that all costs associated with the processing of the application would be charged to the deposit account and not refunded.

Please notify me at your earliest convenience of your preference.
Regards,

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

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Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
San Diego, Ca 92123

Web: Larrygeraci.com
Bus: 858.576 .1040
Fax: 858.630 .3900

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Subject: Re: Contract Review
From: Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com)
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Date: Tuesday, March 21, 2017 3:18:36 PM GMT-07:00
Larry, I have been in communications over the last 2 days with Firouzeh, the Development Project Manager for the City of San Diego who is handling CUP applications. She made it $100 \%$ clear that there are no restrictions on my property and that there is no recommendation that a CUP application on my property be denied. In fact she told me the application had just passed the "Deemed Complete' phase and was entering the review process. She also confirmed that the application was paid for in October, before we even signed our agreement.

This is our last communication, you have failed to live up to your agreement and have continuously lied to me and kept pushing off creating final legal agreements because you wanted to push it off to get a response from the City without taking the risk of losing the non-refundable deposit in the event the CUP application is denied.

To be clear, as of now, you have no interest in my property, contingent or otherwise. I will be entering into an agreement with a third-party to sell my property and they will be taking on the potential costs associated with any litigation arising from this failed agreement with you.

Darryl Cotton

On Sun, Mar 19, 2017 at 6:47 PM, Darryl Cotton [indagrodarryl@gmail.com](mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com) wrote:
Larry,
I have not been changing my mind. The only additional requests have been in regards to putting in place third party accounting and other mechanisms to ensure that my interests are protected. I have only done so because you kept providing draft agreements that continuously failed the terms we agreed to.

It is blatantly clear to me now that you have been stringing me along, even now all your responses are to buy more time. So there is no confusion, you have until tomorrow 12:00 PM to provide confirmation as requested below. If you don't, I am emailing the City of San Diego regarding the fact that no third-party has any interest in my property and the application currently pending needs to be denied.

On Sun, Mar 19, 2017 at 3:11 PM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net) wrote:
Darryl,

At this point, you keep changing your mind every time we talk. My attorneys will move forward on the agreement as planned. Any signed written agreement will be followed by the letter of the law. It's not about any deposit, it's about you changing what is not in writing. So there is no confusion, the attorneys will move forward with an agreement.

As to lying about the status, read the comment below from the city on Wednesday $\mathbf{3 / 1 5 / 2 0 1 7}$. We are addressing this currently with the city. I have been forthright with you this entire
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process.
To: 'Abhay Schweitzer' <abhav@techne-us.com>
Subject: PTS 520606 - Federal Boulevard MMCC
Importance: High
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Good Afternoon,
I am the Development Project Manager assigned to the above referenced project. The project is located in the C0-2-1 (Commercial Office) Zone. Please note that per the San Diego Municipal Code, a Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative is not a permitted use in this Zone and staff will be recommending denial of this application.

Pease advise if you wish to continue the processing of the subject application through the full review process, or staff could schedule a hearing immediately with a recommendation of denial. Please note that all costs associated with the processing of the application would be charged to the deposit account and not refunded.

Please notify me at your earliest convenience of your preference.
Regards,

Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

Tax \& Financial Center, Inc
5402 Ruffin Rd, Ste 200
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From: Darryl Cotton [mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2017 9:02 AM

To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Subject: Re: Contract Review

Larry,
I understand that drafting the agreements will take time, but you don't need to consult with your attorneys to tell me whether or not you are going to honor our agreement.

I need written confirmation that you will honor our agreement so that I know that you are not just playing for time - hoping to get a response from the City before you put down in writing that you owe me the remainder of the $\$ 50,000$ nonrefundable deposit we agreed to.

If I do not have a written confirmation from you by 12:00 PM tomorrow, I will contacting the City of San Diego and let them know that our agreement was not completed and that the application pending on my property needs to be denied because the applicant has no right to my property.

On Sat, Mar 18, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net) wrote:
Darryl,

I have an attorney working on the situation now. I will follow up by Wednesday with the response as their timing will play a factor.

## Best Regards,

Larry E. Geraci, EA

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From: Darryl Cotton [mailto:indagrodarryl@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2017 2:16 PM
To: Larry Geraci [Larry@tfcsd.net](mailto:Larry@tfcsd.net)
Subject: Re: Contract Review

Larry, I received your text asking to meet in person tomorrow. I would prefer that until we have final agreements, that we converse exclusively via email. My greatest concern is that you will get a denial on the CUP application and not provide the remaining $\$ 40,000$ nonrefundable deposit. To be frank, I feel that you are not dealing with me in good faith, you told me repeatedly that you could not submit a CUP application until certain zoning issues had been resolved and that you had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on getting them resolved. You lied to me, I found out yesterday from the City of San Diego that you submitted a CUP application on October 31, 2016 BEFORE we even signed our agreement on the 2nd of November. There is no situation where an oral agreement will convince me that you are dealing with me in good faith and will honor our agreement. We need a final
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written, legal, binding agreement.
Please confirm, as requested, by 12:00 PM Monday that you are honoring our agreement and will have final drafts (reflecting completely the below) by Wednesday at 12:00 PM.

It is unfortunate that matters have turned out like this, but hearing from the city that the application had been submitted before our deal was signed and that it is already under review, meaning you have been lying to me for months, forces me to take this course of action.

Again, please respond to this email so that there is a clear record of our conversations from this point forward or at least until we have final executed documents.
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EXHIBTT 5

CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION
of ReAlTORS*

# COMMERCIAL PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND JOINT ESCROW INSTRUCTONS (fon'resióentlal) <br> (C.A.R.Form CPA, Rovised 12/:5) 

Date Prepared: 03/21R017

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A. THIS IS AN OFFER FROM

Richard John Bartin H
(Buyar)

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CPA REVISED 12i15 (PAGE I OF Is)
COMMERCLAL PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT (CPA PAGE 1 OF 11)

Property Avopess' 6176 Federal Blyd. San Diogo. CA 92114 -1s01
Dato: March 21, 2097
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J. LOAN TERMS








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6. OTHER TERMS: smo attochicd Addyndum S is incorporatod as part of contract.

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7. ALLOCATION OF COSTS
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CPA REVISED 1215\% (PAGE 2 OF 11)

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B. ITEMS INCLUDED IN SALE:









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## D. OTHERTEMS:

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9. CLOSING AND POSSESSION:


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C. Tenant Occupled Unltw: Possossian and occucancy subticet to the mpris ct tenan:s uneter oxising leases. shas be ditiveren :o Bujer on Close Of Escrus.




Preperiz Adstess; 6176 Fodoral alvd, San Diego CA 92114-1409
Dais: March 21, 2017






11. SELLER DISCLOSURES:

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(1) RENTAL SERVICE AGREEMENTS: (i) All coment casos, tonial agrooments, serv:o contacts, and ecter ageomoris

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(4) SURVEYS, PLANS AND ENGINEERING DOCULIENTS: Ceples of suricys, plans, spocitications ant Engineorita dauments, if any, in Sellers possession a contrel.

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(B) STRUCTURAL MOOIFICATHONS: Any kncwn structral acditons $\alpha$ atmations to, of the insthatien, ateraten, :apat or replacemont ot. signific ant compononts of the stristuref(s) waon the Froperis.








O. NOTICE REGARDING GAS ANO HAZARDOUS LQUIO TRANSMSSION PIPELINES: Tnis twice is boing providec slmply to
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 disclosed in reports orderad and pald for by Buyer．
14．CHANGES OURING ESCROW：














C．Buyer is strongly advisod to canduct invesupotions of the entire Property in order to tetormine fis prosem contition． Soller may not bo aware of all dofocis aftecting the Proporty or other facto：s that Buyer considers imporant．Property improvamonts may not be buln according to code；in compliance with current Law，or hove had permils issued．
16．BUYER＇S RNESTIGATION OF PROPERTY AND MATTERS AFFECTING PROPERTY：



















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17．TITLE AND VESTING：





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19. REPAIRS: Repatrs shat be completed prior io linal ventization of conditon untoss ohemisu agrenitin witing, Rupais to be pertormed ut Saller's expense mey be parformed by Seltar of twewign whers, provided trat the wark comples win appllable Law,





20. FINAL VERIFICATION OF CONDITON: Euvoishat have the right to make a final verificalton of tho Pioport; witin 5 (or _I Days Prior it Close Of Escrew, NOT AS A CONTINGENOY OF THE SALE, bul sokefy tc confirm (i) two Pioputy is mantniren oursuant
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21. PRORATIONS OF PROPERTY TAXES AND OTHER TTEMS: Unless otherwien ngread in sting. ne fohowing tems shall bo PAN
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## 22. BROKERS:

A. COMPENSATION: Selle: or Euyer, of bosh. 05 appherble, agress to poy cormensotien to Eroke: os specified in a ecrarate
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24. JOINT ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS TO ESCROW HOLOER:
A. The following pongraphs, or applicabio porions thercof, of this Agrement constitute the jolnt escrow instructions of Bury














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COMMERCLAL PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT (CPA PAGE त OF 11)

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18. TIME PERIODS: REMOVAL OF CONTNGENCIES: CANCELLATION RIGHTS: The following time periods may only be uxiended. ahterod, modifled or changed by mitual writen agreement Any removal of contingensies of cancollallon under Ahis paragraph by oither Buyer or Sellier must be exercised in good fallh and In writing (C.A.R. Form CR or CC)











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(4) Conthuation of Contingency: Even ather tei und et tha time spectad :n paragrazi i6e(1) and velere Soitat cancels, it a

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C. SELLER RLGHT TO CANCEL


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 thaticuations. A Party may be subject to a civil peralty of up to 51.000 for relusal to sign cancolistion instruetions it no good rakh dispute exists as to who is entitiod to thia deposited funds (Civil Code 51057.3).

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urestrises ix \(7 /\) ii
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Piopory Adcress; 6176 Foderal Elyd San Olego, CA 921 14-140:
Dje: March 21. 2017
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C. Broxers are a party to the usciow for the sete purposo of comecneation pursuant to paragrach 2ca une paragraptio of tre
 paragraph 22A, atid irrovocably Insiruct Eserow Hotepr to disburse those funds to beofers at Clovo Of Estrow or fursinn: io

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 delivered to Eserow Hotdee within 3 Enys atter mutual oxocution of the amondiment,
25. REMEDIES FOR BUYER'S BREACH OF CONTRACT:
A. Any cisuse addad by the Partias spocitying a remedy (such as release or forfaiture of deposil or making a deposil nonrafundable) far fillure of Euyer to complata the purctiaxo in viohation of this Agreement shalt be dagmed invalid unless the clauso independenity satisfies the statutory liquldotod damagos requirements \(30 t\) forth in the Civil Code.
B. LQUDATED DAPMAGES: It Euyef fizils to eomplete this purthaso because of Buyers defauth Seltor shall totain, as liquidated damages, the daposit actuathy paid. Buyer and Sellor agrea thas this anoum is a rossonabio sum given that it ha inpratieat or extemety difficuls to extiblish the aniount of tamages that woufd actually be suffored by Sclifer in the event Buyer were to breach thiar Agreement Relaase of funds will requiro mutual, Signed rolaase instructions from both Buyor and Sothor, judelay doclstori or arbitration award. AT TWME OF ANY INCREASED DEPOSTT BUYER ANO SELLER SHALL SIGN A SEPARATE LIGUTOATED DAMAGES PROVISION WCORPORATING THE WCREASED DEPOST AS LICUIDATED DAMAGES (CARETORM RMD).
26. DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

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 Broker(s), who, in writing, agrea to such mediation prior to, or within a reasorisbte time ater, the disputc or clairn is prosentad to



 TMF ~RRGTRATION PROMSION IS INTHULED Exchusions from this mediaton agmement are specifiod in paragraph 20C.
B. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES: The Parties agreo that any disputo or claim in Law or oquity arlsing beiweon them out of this Agreement of any resulting transaction, which is not setuled through mediation, shail be decidad by noutral, binding arbitration. The Partios aiso agreo to arbitrate any dispules of clairns with Broker(s), who, in writing. agree to such arbitiation pritor to, or within a reasonable time after, the dispute or claim is presented to the Broker. The arbitrator shall be a retired judgo or Justlce, or an attornoy with at least 5 years of transactional real estate Law experience, unless the partios mutually agree to. a difforent arbitrator. The Partios shall have tha right to discovory in accordance with Code of Civil Procodure 51283.05. In all other respocis. the astitration shall bo conducted in accordance with Tilie 9 of Part 3 of the Codo of Civil procodure. Judgment upon the award of the arbitrator(s) may be entered into any court having Jurisdiction. Enforcement of this agrecment to arbitrate shall be governed by tho Fedaral Arbitration Act. Exciusions from this arbitration agreement are specifisd in paragraph 26C.
"NOTICE: BY INITLALRIG IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE AARBITRATIDN OF DISPUTES' PROVISION DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AS PROVIDED BY CALFORNIA LAW AND YOU ARE GINNG UP ANY RIGHTS YOU MIGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE LITIGATED IN A COURT OR JURY TRLAL. BY INITLALING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE GNING UP YOUR JUDICIAL RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL, UNLESS THOSE RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE ARBITRATKON OF DISPUTES' PROVISION. IF YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AFTER AGREEING TD THIS PROVISION, YOU MAY BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE CALIFORNLA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. YOUR AGREEMENT TO THIS AREITRATION PROVISION IS VOLUNTARY."
-WE HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING AND AGREE TO SUBMIT DISPYTVS ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARGITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION 1 IO NEUTR


Picperty Adffess: 6976 Foderal Blvd. Sin Dicio, CA 9219 1. 1801
c. ADDTIONAL MEDIATIOB AND ARETRATION TERMS:
(1) EXCLUSKNS: The following mattars are excluded from modiation and artitratlon: (i) a judielal of non judieial foreclosure of other aetion or procecding to enforce a dead of trust, mortgago or installiment land sale coniract as definod In Civil Code s2995: (ii) an untawful detainer acllon: and (ili) any matier that is within the jurisdtction o! a probate, smill cialma or bankrupicy court.
(2) PRESERVATION OF ACTIONS: The following shali not constitute 2 waiver nor viotation of the mediation and arbitiation provisions: (i) the filing of court setion to preserve is statuto of limitations; (i) the riling of a court aetion to enable the recording of a noljec of pending action, for ordar af arachmont, rceelvarship. Injunclion, or othor provistonal remodios: or (iti) tho tling of a mechanic's fien.
(3) BROKERS: Brokers shalf nat bo obligated nar compolied to mediate or arbitrate unisss thay agree to do ao in writing, Any Brokar(s) partelpating in mediation or arbitration shall nof be decmed a party to the Agrecment.

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36. GOVERNiNG LAW: This Agieemen: shall be govemed by die caws of tive stite of Cationta
37. TERMS AND CONDITIÖNS OF OFFER; Tis is in offer to pachuse the frepery on the aisou0 tems and condifons. The liqubated damages paragraph or the artitration of dispules paragraph is incoperated in thls Agtament at initiated by all focries or

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38. TIME OF ESSENCE; ENTIRE CONTRACT; CHANGES: Tine is of the ossence. All underotirdings tethem: the Pirtics ore

 oral agreoment. It any provision el this Anreement is theld to te beffective or imvabd, the semainine wrorisions with rovetheless tie
 aceordance with the Latis of the Swie of Cobfortud. Neither this Agreement nor any provision in it may be axtonded. amended, modiliad, altarad or changed, oxcept in writing Signed by Buyor and Soller.
39. DEFINTIONS: As uset in this Agiecment:




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Property Aderess: 6175 Facioral Blve, San Diago, CA 92114.1401
Deto March 214017
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41. EXPIRATION OF OFFER: This effer shan bu deemed revoled anc the deposit it any, shall te resurfed tu luyer uninss the offer : Sighed ty Settur and a Cany of the Signed ofler ta fersanally roecerot by tuyet, or by \(\qquad\) Nondondum
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\section*{TiAdCitional Signatura Actendurn atached (C,A,R. Form ASA).}


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 ) (Do not Inillal if moking a counter offer.) CONFiRMATION OF ACCEPTANCE: A COFy ol Sigered Acesplancu wus porsonilly tecalved by Buyer or Biryer's autherzed agont on (dolo)
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 the data that Confirmation of Aecoptance has occurrod.
CPA REVISED 1315 (PACE 10 OF 11)
COMMERCLIAL PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT (CPA PAGE 10 OF 11)

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\section*{REAL ESTATE BROKERS:}
A. Real Estate Brokers are not parides to the Agreement between Buyer and Seller.
B. Rgoncy relotionships are confinmed as stated in paragraph 2.
C. If specifies in paragraph 3A(2): Agent who sitmitey bie sher fer Bryer Jcknowhedgas recepp of deposit.
D. COOPERATING BROKER COMPENSAMON: Lbting Eraker agrees to pJy Csoperating Eraker (Selling Fimm) erie Cooperaing


 spechied in a separate writen sgreement (CAAR. Fom C3C). Dectaration of Lisense and Tus (C.A.R. Form. DLIT may be wedt to document that tox fexuting will be required or that an exemption exists.

Roar Estzic Ercket (Eetling Firm) N/A


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Re: Esta:a Broker (Listimy Fimm) N/A

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COMMERCLAL. PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT (CPA PAGE 11 OF 11)




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ADM REVISED 1215 (PAGE 9 OF 9)
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 AODENDUM (ADM PAGE TOF 11

\section*{ADDENDUM}
(C.A.R. Form ADM, Rovised 12:15)

No. 2

OFREALTORS*

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11 This AHmorandum of Undorstonding and Agroomont /"MOUA= amends tho ugreement reached by Buyer and Seller on Msreh \(21,2017\).
2) Nobwithstanding jny language In this purchase agroement to tho contrary the provisfons within this MOUĂ shall be given offoct and supersede any conillcting or amblquous langüzge wilthin fhis purchase ogrecinemt
 in tho property and the assoclatod CuP gpolicatlon pending bofore tho Cly of San Dlogo for 5500,000 1) Beryer shat immedlalely providn sellor whin 350,000 non-refundable deposil
5) Tho closing of this sala, includlact the peyment of tho balance of the purchpse prico ond ail tho requirements statcd herein shall be completad upon the favarable resotution of tho Larry Geraci lawsuit anoinst Sciler for the property.
 Sciler's previous egreement for an oguty stoke th the businass is voldod and Sulter has no interest fn the property or the CUP.
7 CONFIDENTALITY CLAUSE, SELLER WLL NOT DISCLOSE BUYER SIOENTITY OR THIS AGREEMENT IN ANY FORM, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTL, UNTLL HE HAS RESOLVED THE LEGAL ACTION WITH GERACI. FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, THIS HEANS THAT SELLER WHLL NOT WVOLVE OR HENTION BUYER INARY FORM IOANY YHIRD.PARIDES IN ANY LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS ORIN ANY MATTERS REGAROING ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMIINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTIONS. SHOULO SELLER BREACH THIS PROVISION SELLERHEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREES TO PAY IO BUYER 5200000 FOR BREACH OF THIS PROVSION.


Dato Aoll 15, 2017
Buyoiftonanix Richard Jofin Mortin II
Buyerficnan:









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ADM REVISED 1245 (PAGE 1 OF 4)

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Date May 12,2017

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\section*{ADM REVISEO 1215 (PAGE 1 OF 1 )}

\author{
Pre-Approval Letter
}

Friday, April 14, 2017

TO: Whom it may concern
RE: Richard John (R.J.) Martin II
We are pleased to inform you that the above referenced loan application has been pre-approved with the following terms and conditions:

\author{
Purchase Price: \(\$ 2,500,000\) \\ Loan Program: Jumbo 30 YEAR FIX \\ Loan amount: \(\$ 2,000,000\)
}

The following conditions must be satisfied for final loan approval:
1) Appraiser's certification of value along with a final inspection.
2) Acceptable Preliminary Title.
3) Following standard investor requirements: Evidence of Hazard Insurance, Flood Certification
4) Copy of Fully Executed Purchase Contract and Escrow Instructions

This approval is based on review of the borrower's credit report in conjunction with documentation provided by the borrower regarding employment, income, assets as applicable to the above loan. These items are sufficient to obtain final loan approval provided there are no changes in the borrower's financial situation as required by the loan program.

Please keep in mind the following:
- Upgrades and modifications that increase the purchase price beyond what is indicated above may invalidate this approval and result in disqualification or re-qualification on an altemative loan program offering.
- This approval does not include any contingencies unless specifically noted above. If the loan approval is contingent on sale of another property but that sale does not occur prior to closing on this property, requalification on an altemative loan program may be required to complete the purchase.
- At times market conditions require that loan program guidelines and parameters change, which may affect this approval unless your loan has been locked and will close within that lock period. If this occurs, we will review the borrower's file and notify you of any changes that apply.

Sincerely,


\author{
Alexis Roper \\ Sr. Mortgage Loan Officer \\ 619-436-8873 \\ aroper@amerifirst.us \\ NMLS \#583371
}

AmeriFirst Financial, Inc., 1550 E. McKellips Road, Suite 117, Mesa, AZ 85203 (NMLS \# 145368). 1-877-276-1974. Copyright 2014. All Rights Reserved. This is not an offer to enter into an agreement. Not all customers will qualify. Information, rates, and programs are subject to change without prior notice. All products are subject to credit and property approval. Not all products are available in all states or for all loan amounts. Other restrictions and limitations apply. License Information: CA: Licensed by The Department of Business Oversight under the Califomia Residential Mortgage Lending Act

\section*{EXHIBIT6}


Slaceroly.
Daryi Cotton
(2) Servite Contract 6-13-47.pdt

\title{
FINCH \(\circ\) THORNTON•BAIRD* \\ ATTORNEYS AT LAW
}

June 13, 2017

\section*{VIA U.S. AND ELECTRONIC MAIL}

Mr. Darryl Cotton
6176 Federal Boulevard
San Diego, California 92114
indagrodarryl@gmail.com
Re: Services Agreement For Representation Of Darryl Cotton
Dear Mr. Cotton:
We appreciate your decision to retain Finch, Thornton \& Baird, LLP. Please forgive the formality of this letter but the California Business and Professions Code requires that we have a written agreement. This letter sets forth the terms of our representation.
1. Description Of Representation And Services. You retain Finch, Thornton \& Baird, LLP to represent you in connection with obtaining a conditional use permit ("CUP") for 6176 Federal Boulevard and also to represent you in related civil and forfeiture actions related to the property. We will provide other services as requested and provided we agree to perform such services. All services shall be subject to this agreement.
2. Fees To Be Charged. Our fees will be billed on the basis of time expended at the hourly billing rates of the attorneys, law clerks and legal assistants involved. At the present time, our hourly rates vary from \(\$ 210.00\) to \(\$ 420.00\) for attomeys, \(\$ 195.00\) to \(\$ 210.00\) for law clerks and \(\$ 75.00\) to \(\$ 125.00\) for paralegal and legal assistants. My current hourly rate is \(\$ 400.00\). Adam Witt's current hourly rate is \(\$ 300.00\). These hourly rates are subject to change in the future and typically increase in September of each year. The rate(s) charged will be reflected on the invoices for services rendered. We bill in onetenth of an hour increments. In order to deliver cost-effective services, when practical, work will be assigned to other qualified attorneys, law clerks or legal assistants with either billing rates lower than mine or some specialized knowledge beneficial to you.
3. Costs And Expenses. We also charge for expenses and costs necessarily incurred to perform our services. Examples of these are Secretary of State fees, California Department of Corporations fees, court filing fees, service of process fees, deposition court reporter and transcript costs, etc. It is our policy to not charge for minor everyday expenses such as photocopies, postage, facsimiles, mileage, phone expenses, etc., unless these expenses become beyond the ordinary. For example, extra large reproductions or photocopying large quantities of documents for discovery, depositions or trial exhibits, etc., are usually costly and we will bill for reimbursement of such expenses or have you pay the vendor directly.

Mr. Darryl Cotton
June 13, 2017
Page 2 of 6
4. Services Of Experts/Consultants. It may become necessary to employ experts or consultants to assist in resolving a matter. We will obtain your approval for the retention of any such consultants or experts, and you may instruct us in writing at any time to terminate their services. The fees of experts and consultants will be in addition to the fees and costs charged for our services. In most circumstances, we will have the experts or consultants bill you directly.
5. Payment Of Legal Fees. For your convenience, we understand that we will be receiving payment for costs, expenses and fees relating to our legal services pursuant to this agreement from Joe Hurtado. Rather than billing you separately, one invoice will be forwarded to Joe.

Rule 3-310(F) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California requires that we not accept compensation for representing a client from a person other than the client unless: (1) there is no interference with our independent professional judgment or with the attorney-client relationship; (2) information relating to representation of you is protected as required by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e); and (3) we obtain your informed written consent to such an arrangement. With regard to Rule \(3-310(\mathrm{~F})\), we do not believe there will be any interference with our independence of professional judgment or with the attorney-client relationship between our firm and you as a result of the payment of invoices by Joe because your interests are aligned. Note, you remain liable for all fees and costs if Joe fails to pay. We inform you of these matters and request your written consent to this arrangement. Execution of this agreement constitutes such written consent.
6. Client Responsibilities. We have two primary requests of our clients: (1) that we are kept informed of all information you obtain or discover regarding a matter for which we are retained; and (2) that we receive timely payment for our services and advances. In this regard, we invoice monthly and expect payment within 30 days. Any objection to an invoice must be made in writing within 30 days of the date of your receipt of the invoice or the objection is waived. At our option, late payments will accrue interest at the annual rate of seven percent. As security for the payment of our invoices, you grant us a lien upon any sums recovered (or which you are entitled to recover) as a result of our efforts, including any funds in our client trust account. This lien is in addition to our equitable lien rights.

With regard to our lien rights, Rule 3-300 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California states:
"[We] shall not enter into a business relationship with a client; or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client, unless each of the following requirements has been satisfied:
(A) The transaction or acquisition and its terms are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should reasonably have been understood by the client; and
(B) The client is advised in writing that the client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and

Mr. Darryl Cotton
June 13, 2017
Page 3 of 6
(C) The client thereafter consents in writing to the terms of the transaction or the terms of acquisition."

You granting us a lien is an adverse and/or business relationship and pursuant to the above Rule we recommend you seek advice from an independent lawyer of your choice before granting us the lien and entering into this agreement.
7. Potential Conflicts Of Interest. Representation by us in a particular matter is contingent upon clearance of all conflicts of interest checks. With regard to this matter, Rules 3-310(C) through 3\(310(\mathrm{E})\) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California state:

Rule 3-310(C):
"[We] shall not, without the informed written consent of each client:
(1) Accept representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or
(2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or
(3) Represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate matter accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in the first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter."

Rule 3-310(E):
"[We] shall not accept employment adverse to a client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, [we have] obtained confidential information material to the employment except with the informed written consent of the client or former client."

With regard to Rule 3-310(C), it is our duty not to represent clients whose interests potentially or actually conflict, unless each client provides us with informed written consent to such representation. Our current understanding of the available facts and applicable law leads us to believe the prospect for an actual or potential conflict is low. Accordingly, we believe we can represent you in a manner consistent with the professional standards by which we must abide. If this understanding changes in any material way, we will make appropriate disclosures to each of you so a proper course of action may then be pursued.

Although we believe there is only a limited potential for any conflict of interest, we inform you of potential conflicts that could theoretically arise. We do not foresee such a conflict will arise, but advise of the potential. As discussed, we represent the Green Road, LLC, and its principals and agents (collectively "Green Road") in connection with all aspects of the potential operation of a marijuana dispensary within District 6 of the City of San Diego. Our ability to continue to represent Green Road in all matters that

Mr. Darryl Cotton
June 13, 2017
Page 4 of 6
may arise in the future is critical to our firm, including in connection with potential disputes in which you are adverse to Green Road. Our understanding is that you have an interest in operating a marijuana dispensary in District 6 either directly or indirectly, and that our representation here is focused on obtaining a District 4 dispensary. Accordingly, we do not perceive a conflict here. However, in order to preserve our ability to represent Green Road should a conflict arise in the future, by signing this agreement you agree we may terminate our representation of you at any time of a potential or actual conflict arises between you and Green Road.

In addition, in the even of such a conflict, we may ask your consent to represent you and Green Road concurrently. You each acknowledge that if any party refuses to sign such a waiver our firm reserves the right to terminate our representation of you. Similarly, if we do undertake representation adverse to you, you agree not to seek the disqualification of our firm unless you present court-admissible evidence that our firm (a) has material confidential information from you in the matter in which a conflict is claimed, (b) obtained such material confidential information by virtue of our representation of you, and (c) such information could be used against you in the case in which a conflict is claimed. Note that our withdrawal from representation of you could be expensive (bringing new counsel up to speed), disadvantageous (sending the wrong message to an adversary), or come at an inopportune time.

By execution of this agreement, you acknowledge our warnings of potential conflicts of interest with respect to this matter, and waive any and all conflicts of interest which presently exist, or may hereafter arise, by virtue of our representation. Before consenting to our representation on these terms, we recommend you carefully consider the ramifications of our representation on these terms and consult with counsel of your choice.
8. Disclaimer Of Guarantees. It is impossible for us to make any guarantees regarding the successful termination of a matter and all expressions relative to the merits of your positions are only matters of our opinion and do not constitute a guarantee of a particular result.
9. Client Contact. It is our practice to fumish our clients with copies of all important pleadings and/or correspondence and to give verbal or written status reports from time to time concerning the progress of our representation. We encourage you to contact us if you have any questions concerning the status of our representation.
10. Termination Or Withdrawal. You have the right to terminate our services at any time. We may withdraw from representation upon reasonable written notice to enable you to secure other counsel due to: (1) the dissolution of our firm; (2) the discovery of evidence that your claim, suit or position lacks merit; (3) your non-cooperation or material breach of this agreement; and/or (4) the discovery of an irreconcilable conflict of interest. In the event of termination or withdrawal, we may make and retain a duplicate file, and you agree to pay for all costs of duplicating and transferring the files. Similarly, if at any time, during or after our representation, you request your client files, you agree we may make and retain a duplicate file, and you agree to pay for all costs of duplicating and transferring said files.

Mr. Darryl Cotton
June 13, 2017
Page 5 of 6
11. Retainer. We request a retainer of \(\$ 10,000.00\) as an initial payment for our invoices. The retainer will be placed in the Finch, Thornton \& Baird, LLP Client Trust Account, and we are authorized to make disbursements into our firm account to cover amounts we invoice you. Our monthly invoices will show the amount charged against the retainer and the retainer balance. We may request this retainer be replenished monthly or from time to time. The retainer amount is not a representation of the estimated total fees, costs and expenses likely to be incurred in the course of our representation. If we allow the retainer to be depleted, you agree to comply with the billing and payment provisions set forth above. You may pay this retainer by check, payable to Finch, Thornton \& Baird, LLP Client Trust Account or by going on our website http://www.ftblaw.com/bill-pay/. Click on the RETAINER PAYMENT button and pay via credit card. Once the retainer is depleted and you receive invoices for a balance due, you may use this same site to make credit card payments, by clicking the INVOICE PAYMENT button.
12. Arbitration. Any dispute relating to fees and costs due pursuant to this agreement shall, at your discretion and upon timely demand, be submitted to binding arbitration before the San Diego County Bar Association pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 6200, et seq., or should that organization decline to arbitrate the dispute, before the State Bar of California pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 6200, et seq.

Subject to the foregoing requirements of California Business and Professions Code section 6200, et seq., any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be resolved by binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association by a single arbitrator in San Diego, California, in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association prevailing at the time of the arbitration and judgment on the award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. The right to appeal from the arbitrator's award, any judgment entered, or any order made is expressly waived.
13. Conclusion. To confirm this letter accurately reflects our complete and mutual understanding as to the terms of our agreement, please date, sign and return an original agreement along with a check for \(\$ 10,000.00\) in the enclosed addressed and stamped envelope. A duplicate original is enclosed for you. Thank you for the opportunity to be of service.


Enclosures
DSD:hkr/3BD2583
cc: Mr. Joe Hurtado (via email only) (w/o encls.)

Mr. Darryl Cotton
June 13, 2017
Page 6 of 6

\section*{AUTHORIZATION, CONSENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT:}

I have read and understand this services agreement. I acknowledge receiving full disclosure of the terms of the conflicts of entering the transaction described above. I understand I may seek independent counsel before signing this agreement. I consent on behalf of the entity listed below to the representation by Finch, Thornton \& Baird, LLP, as described above.


Finch, Thornton \& Baird, LLP is authorized to accept direction as to the representation of you from the following individuals:


Client ivo. \(\qquad\)

\section*{BILLING INFORMATION}
(1) Please provide the name of the person to whom our invoices should be addressed.
(Name)
(Title)
(Address)
\(\qquad\)
(Work Phone)

\section*{(Fax)}

\section*{(E-mail)}
(2) Please provide the name of your accounts payable contact.
(Name)
(Title)

\section*{(Address)}
\(\qquad\)
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline (Work Phone) & (Direct Phone) \\
(Eax) & \\
\hline (Mobile Phone)
\end{tabular}
(E-mail)
(3) How would you like to receive your invoices? (Sclect Onc) E-mail: \(\square\) Mail:
(4) Would you like to receive wiring instructions? (Select One) Ycs: \(\square \quad\) No:

FINCH•THORNTON•BAIRD*
attorneys at law

\footnotetext{
4747 Executive Drive \(\%\) Suite 700 \% San Diego, California 92121-3107 Telephone: (858) 737-3100 \(\div\) Facsimile: (858) 737-3101 * www.ftblaw.com
}

EXHIBIT 7

FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation
Michael R. Weinstein (SBN 106464)
Scott H. Toothacre (SBN 146530)
501 West Broadway, Suite 1450
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 233-3131
Fax: (619) 232-9316
mweinstein@ferrisbritton.com
stoothacre@ferrisbritton.com
AUSTIN LEGAL GROUP, APC
3990 Old Town Ave., Ste. All2
San Diego, CA 92110
Telephone: (619) 924-9600
Fax: (619) 881-0045
gaustin@austinlegalgroup.com
Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest LARRY GERACI and REBECCA BERRY

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIfIORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity; and DOES 1 through 25 ,

Respondents/Defendants.

REBECCA BERRY, an individual; LARRY GERACE, an individual, and ROES 1 through 25,

Real Parties In Interest.

Case No. 37-2017-00037675-CU-WM-CTL
Judge: Hon. Eddie Sturgeon
DECLARATION OF ABHAY SCHWEITZER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE OR FOR AN ORDER SETTING AN EXPEDTTED HEARING AND BRIEITING SCHCDULE
[IMAGED FILE]
DATE:
TIME:
October 31, 2017
DEPT:
C-67
Petition Filed: Trial Date:

October 6, 2017
None

1

DECLARATION OF ABHAY SCHWEITZWER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PETTION FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE OR FOR AN ORDER SETTING EXPEDITED HEARING AND BREEFING SCHEDULE

I, Abhay Schweitzer, declare:
1. I am over the age of 18 and am not a party to this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration. If called as a witness, I would testify competently thereto. I provide this declaration in support of Real Parties in Interest Rebecca Berry and Larry Geraci's ("RealParties") opposition to Petitioner/Plaintiff's request for the ex parte issuance of a writ of mandate or for an order setting an expedited hearing and briefing schedule.
2. I am a building designer in the state of California and a Principal with Techne, a design firm I founded in approximately December 2010. Techne provides design services to clients throughout California. Our offices are located at \(395630^{\text {th }}\) Street, San Diego, CA 92104. Our firm has worked on approximately 30 medical marijuana projects over the past 5 years, including a number of Conditional Use Permits for Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperatives (MMCC) in the City of San Diego.("City"). One of these projects was and is an application for a MMCC to be located at 6176 Federal Ave., San Diego, CA 92105 (the "Property").
3. On or about October 4, 2016, Rebecca Berry hired my firm to provide design services in connection with the application for a MMCC to be developed and built at the Property (the "Project"). Those services included, but are not limited to, services in connection with the design of the Project and application for a Conditional Use Permit (the "CUP").]
4. The first step in obtaining a CUP is to submit an application to the City of San Diego. My firm along with other consultants (a Surveyor, a Landscape Architect, and a consultant responsible for preparing the noticing package and radius maps) prepared the CUP application for the client as well as prepared the supporting plans and documentation. My firm coordinated their work and incorporated it into the submittal.
5. On or after October 31, 2016, I submitted the application to the City for a CUP for a medical marijuana consumer cooperative to be located on the Property. The CUP application for the Project was submitted under the name of applicant, Rebecca Berry, whom I was informed and believe was and is an employee and agent of Larry Geraci. The submittal of the CUP application required the submission of several forms to the City, including Form DS-318, that I am informed and belicve was
signed by the property owner, Darryl Cotton, authorizing/consenting to the application. A true and correct copy of Form DS-318 that I submitted to the City is attached as Exhibit 3 to Real Parties in Interest Notice of Lodgment in Support of Opposition to Ex Parte Application for Issuance of Alternative Writ of Mandate or for an Order Setting an Expedited Hearing and Briefing Schedule (hereafter "RPI NOL"). Mr. Cotton's signed consent can be found on Form DS-318.
6. On the Ownership Disclosure Statement, I am informed and believe Cotton signed the form as "Owner" and Berry signed the form as "Tenant/Lessee." The form only has three boxes from which to choose when checking - "Owner", "Tenant/Lessee" and "Redevelopment Agency". The purpose of that signed section, Part 1, is to identify all persons with an interest in the property and must be signed by all persons with an interest in the property.
7. The CUP application process generally involves several rounds of comments from the City in which the applicant is required to respond in order to "clear" the comment. This processing involved substantial communication back and forth with the City, with the City asking for additional information, or asking for changes, and our responding to those requests for additional information and making any necessary changes to the plans. I have been the principal person involved in dealings with the City of San Diego in connection with the application for a CUP. My primary contact at the City during the process is and has been Firouzdeh Tirandazi, Development Project Manager, City of San Diego Development Services Department, tele (619) 446-5325, the person whom the City assigned to be the project manager for our CUP application.
8. We have been engaged in the application process for this CUP application for approximately twelve (12) months so far.
9. At the outset of the review process a difficulty was encountered that delayed the processing of the application. The Project was located in an area zoned "CO" which supposedly included medical marijuana dispensary as a permitted use, but the City's zoning ordinance did not specifically statc that was a permitted use. I am informed and believe that on February 22, 2017, the City passed a new regulation that amended the zoning ordinance to clarify that operating a medical marijuana dispensary was a permitted use in areas zoned "CO." I am informed and believe this

DECLARATION OF ABHAY SCHWEITZWER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PETTION FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE OR FOR AN ORDER SETTING EXPEDITED HEARING AND BRDEFING SCHEDULE
regulation took effect on April 12, 2017, so by that date the zoning ordinance issue was cleared up and the City resumed its processing of the CUP application.
10. The CUP application for this Project has completed the initial phase of the process. This initial phase was completed when the City deemed the CUP application complete (although not yet approved) and determined the Project was located in an area with proper zoning. When this occurred, as required, notice of the proposed project was given to the public as follows: First, on March 27, 2017, the City posted a Notice of Application (or "NOA") for the Project on its websitc for 30 days and provided the NOA to me, on behalf of the applicant, for posting at the property; Second, the City mailed the Notice of Application to all properties within 300 feet of the subject property. Third, as applicant we posted the Notice of Application at the property line as was required.
11. Since the completion of the initial phase of the process we have been engaged in successive submissions and reviews and are presently engaged still in that submission and review process. The most recent comments from the City were received on October 20, 2017. There is one major issue left to resolve regarding a street dedication. I expect this issue to be resolved within the next six (6) weeks.
12. Once the City has cleared all the outstanding issues it will issue an environmental determination and the City Clerk will issue a Notice of Right to Appeal Environmental Determination ("NORA"). I expect the NORA to be issued sometime in late December 2017 or January 2018.
13. The NORA must be published for 10 business days. If no interested party appeals the NORA, City staff will present the CUP for a determination on the merits by a Hearing Officer. The hearing is usually set on at least 30 days' notice so the City's Staff has time to prepare a report with its recommendations regarding the issues on which the hearing officer must make findings. If there is no appeal of the NORA, I expect the hearing before the hearing officer to be held in late January or February 2018.
14. If the NORA is appealed it will be set for hearing before the City Council. It is my opinion that the earliest an appeal of the NORA could be heard before the City Council would be midJanuary 2018. In all but one instance, the City Council has denied a NORA appeal related to a medical

\section*{4}

DECLARATION OF ABKAY SCHWETTZWER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PETTION FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE OR FOR AN ORDER SETTING EXPEDITED HEARING AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE
marijuana CUP application. The one NORA appeal that was upheid is a project located in a flood zone.
15. If there is a NORA appeal and such appeal is denied by the City Council, then the earliest I would expect the CUP application to be heard by a hearing officer would be March 2018.
16. If there is a NORA appeal and it is upheld by the City Council, the City Council would retain jurisdiction and the CUP application would be heard by the City Council for a final determination at some point after the NORA appeal. In that case the earliest I would expect this to occur would also be March 2018.
17. To date we have not yet reached the stage of a City Council hearing and there has been no final determination to approve the CUP.
18. I have been notified by the City of San Diego that as of October 30, 2017, there has been no other CUP Application submitted concerning on the property.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 30th day of October, 2017.

Dated: \(\qquad\)


DECLARATION OF ABHAY SCHWEITZWER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PETTION FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE OR FOR AN ORDER SRTTING RXPEDITED HEARING AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE


I, Elizabeth Emerson, hereby declare:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
2. I am 41 years old and an Air Force veteran. I served my country honorably in military intelligence and held a Top Secret clearance for all seven years of my service.
3. I later served as a police dispatcher in Texas for two years and left on good terms to move to San Diego, where I am now a resident.
4. I worked in Accounts Payable for the law firm of McCarthy \& Holthus which I left after two and a half years to start my own bookkeeping, accounting and administrative assistant enterprise. Because of this I now handle the accounting for GreenerLiving, a landscape and lawn maintenance company, which is co-owned by Mr. Tom Maas and Mr. Joe Hurtado.
5. I accompanied Mr. Maas and Mr. Hurtado to the hearing for Mr. Cotton on December 7, 2017 as it was strongly anticipated that this hearing would produce positive results for Mr . Cotton and, thus, for Mr. Hurtado.
6. At the hearing, I was expecting Mr. Demian to mention what Mr. Hurtado repeatedly called the "smoking gun" email in which Mr. Larry Geraci contradicts himself regarding some contract. Mr. Demian did not raise any emails in his oral arguments to the Court.
7. During the hearing, the judge asked Mr. Weinstein what would be wrong with preventing the withdrawal of the CUP application. Mr. Weinstein replied with something about his client having the freedom to do what he wanted.
8. After the hearing concluded, Mr. Hurtado started yelling at Mr. Demian right outside the Courtroom about how it was possible that Mr. Demian could not raise with the Court "the fucking email!" Mr. Hurtado was incredibly agitated and loud and everyone in the hallway was staring at Mr. Hurtado and Mr. Demian.
- 1 -

Supporting Declaration



993

\section*{DECLARATION OF TOM MAAS}

I, Tom Maas, hereby declare:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
2. I have been the proprietor of several businesses in Minneapolis, MN.
3. I am a co-owner of GreenerLiving, a landscaping company with Mr. Joe Hurtado. We originally started GreenerLiving in Minneapolis, but we relocated to San Diego, where I am now a resident.
5. I accompanied Mr. Hurtado to the hearing for Mr. Cotton on December 7, 2017 to provide support for both Mr. Cotton and Mr. Hurtado. I anticipated, based on the descriptions provided by Mr. Cotton and Mr. Hurtado, that the attorney for Mr. Cotton would prevail that day based primarily on an email sent by Larry Geraci that was called the "smoking gun" by Mr. Hurtado.
6. Mr. Demian, counsel for Mr. Cotton, did not raise any email arguments with the Court.
6. After the hearing, Mr. Hurtado yelled at Mr. Demian for failing to raise the email with the Court in the hallway outside the Courtroom.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED: \(1 / 22 / 2018\)

Is/Tom Maas Tom Maas

EXHIBIT 9


\(\qquad\)





\(:\)

EXHIBTT 10
Joe Hurtade <jhurtadoldgralicom>

c.: Daryl Cetton <incagrodamiegmall, emm
HiDavid/Adam,



    Lssue. The controll ng question bs whether plaintrin ie estopped from ralying upon tha atatute el frauds to daroat the enforcement of the cral agreament:"

        . wats induced to materially change his position.

            to such an ortent that 1 Is adequate of procect against the evils which the Statite seughtit io prevent:-
    Anatusls.

        Unconsclonabla injury. Because of Garad, Cottan has:

            able to Lphold ris end af the contracts and he would be aetling himsalf up for sovera damages);
            able to uphold ris end af the contracts and he would be aelling himssif up for severa damagas);

            represens operpatua,
payment of \(\$ 10,000\).


Thank you, Joo
Zิ \({ }_{4640 \mathrm{~K}}^{362856 . O P P O S T T I D N ~ T O ~ E X ~ P A R T E ~ A P P U C A ~(1) . P D F ~}\)

EXHIBIT II
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{RE: Withdrawal} \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Per your requast, attactied aro wibstituion of atromey lorns which must ba filed with the Coutt in af three pending mattors. Pleass sion and email back fous for firing as soon as possible.} \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{} \\
\hline Wa are preparing final huokes and your fies & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
```

From: Daryt Colton [maito:IndagrodarMM EPgmal.com]
Sont:Thurscay, Decermber 07.201712:33PM
<:500 Hurlado <i.hurado1 10gmail.com>
Sut]oct: Re: Withorewal

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Davd,
 arguments. Further, that tha attamey bo the Cily explicily told you right atter you walked out af ths hearing that we should have wan based en the moving papera!

Daryl

On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 al 1133 AM, David 5 . Derranan <ddemian@fthisw.com> wrote:


Pigase coll at any lime with questions.
David

Datid S.Demban Partiear

Fheh, Themion a Baid. LLP Anomeyz At Lat
4747 Exacutive Driva, Sulia 700 San Diego. CA 92121
T858.737.31to © 858.737 .31 tB M 058.245 .2451 F858.737.3191
nblaw.com Eto Unkedtn


\section*{atrachmenta}

\section*{用 Sub of Att - Forfolurre Mattar.pdr}

tit Sub of Att - Geracl Matterpdf

EXHIBTI 12
\(\qquad\) 1011

\section*{FINCH•THORNTON•BAIRD \({ }^{\text {º }}\)}

\author{
Mr. Darryl Cotton 6176 Federal Boulevard San Diego, CA 92114 \\ \section*{For Legal Services Rendered through December 31, 2017}
}

January 10, 2018
Account No: 2403-003 Statement No: 150904

4

\section*{Total Balance Due}
\$9,913.95

Re: Forfeiture Action
\(\begin{array}{lllrrr}12 / 04 / 17 & \text { ACW } & \text { Rate } & \text { Hours } & \\ & \begin{array}{lll}\text { Correspondence with Joe and Darryl regarding upcoming } \\ \text { deadline to make payment to City. }\end{array} & 330.00 & 0.20 & 66.00\end{array}\)
Recapitulation
\begin{tabular}{lrrr} 
& Rate & Hours & \\
ACW Adam C. Witt - Associate & 330.00 & 0.20 & 66.00 \\
For Current Services Rendered & & 0.20 & \(\$ 66.00\)
\end{tabular}

\section*{Expenses/Advances}

Date Description
12/11/17 Ameunt
One Legal's fee for e-filing substitution of attorney. Inv. No. 11145398 -
One Legal LLC
9.95

Total Expenses/Advances
\(\$ 9.95\)
Total Current Work
\(\$ 75.95\)
Previous Balance
9,838.00
Payments/Adjustments Since Last Bill
\(-0.00\)
Balance Due
\(\$ 9,913.95\)

Payments received after January 10, 2018 are not included in this statement.
Please make checks payable to: FINCH, THORNTON \& BAIRD, LLP
Payment is due within 30 days of the invoice date.
Please contact us within 10 days of the invoice date with any questions. Thank you.
To pay online visit: http://www.ftblaw.com/bill-pay/

Mr. Darryl Cotton
6176 Federal Boulevard
San Diego, CA 92114
For Legal Services Rendered through December 31, 2017

\section*{Total Balance Due}

Re: \(\quad 6176\) Federal Boulevard Conditional Use Permit
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & & & Rate & Hours & \\
\hline 12/01/17 & SLH & Analyze status and developments of CUP application (1.0); analyze opposition to ex parte application with respect to same (0.5); prepare public records act request for documents and correspondence with respect to City, Geraci, and related parties (0.5). & 300.00 & 2.00 & 600.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Prepare electronic stipulation to accept pleadings and other documents through email. & 225.00 & 0.20 & 45.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & ACW & Work on developing strategy for writ and ex parte relief regarding CUP application. & 330.00 & 1.10 & 363,00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & DSD & Further work on ex parte motions and strategy. & 415.00 & 2.40 & 996.00 \\
\hline 12/03/17 & DSD & Discussion with Joe on options for saving permit by concurrent actions. & 415.00 & 1.00 & 415.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & DSD & Analyze case of Monarco in connection with effort acquire CUP; work on application for peremptory writ. & 415.00 & 1.40 & 581.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & RSB & Revise ex parte application to incorporate Joe Hurtado's analysis. & 225.00 & 1.70 & 382.50 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & SLH & Conference to analyze San Diego Municipal Code provisions for application resubmittal. & 300.00 & 0,20 & 60.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & DSD & Final correspondence to Weinstein regarding stipulation. & 415.00 & 0.40 & 166.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & DSD & Correspondence to Weinstein as to e-service. & 415.00 & 0.20 & 83.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & DSD & Analyze mandatory injunction options; work on proposed order. & 415.00 & 0.50 & 207.50 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & DSD & Begin work on proposed order. & 415.00 & 0.60 & 249.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & RSB & Revise ex parte application (0.5) and Cotton's and Demian's declarations to reflect Hurtado's latest insights (0.3). & 225.00 & 0.80 & 180.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & DSD & Further work on writ application. & 415.00 & 1.20 & 498.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & ACW & Work on proposal to attorney Weinstein regarding stipulation on CUP application. & 330.00 & 0.80 & 264.00 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & DSD & Further work on writ request. & 415.00 & 0.60 & 249.00 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & CRS & Review and work on edits to memorandum in support of ex parte for an order shortening time for writ hearing. & 355.00 & 1.70 & 603.50 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{1014}

Account Number: 2403-002
Statement No: 150903
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\(12 / 05 / 17\) & RSB & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Finalize writ/ex parte application and all supporting \\
documentation.
\end{tabular} \\
\(12 / 05 / 17\) & DSD & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Discussion with Joe on arguments as to damages and \\
injury.
\end{tabular} \\
\(12 / 05 / 17\) & DSD & Analyze and work on arguments as to injury. \\
\(12 / 05 / 17\) & DSD & Final motion for peremptory writ. \\
\(12 / 05 / 17\) & DSD & Final declaration of Cotton; discussion with Darryl. \\
\(12 / 05 / 17\) & DSD & Correspondence to counsels with notice of ex parte. \\
\(12 / 06 / 17\) & DSD & Discussion with Joe finalizing motion on writ. \\
\(12 / 06 / 17\) & DSD & Finalize motion on writ. \\
\(12 / 06 / 17\) & DSD & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Revise declaration of Darryl per his comments. \\
\(12 / 06 / 17\) \\
DSD
\end{tabular} \\
& Further work on P\&A to focus on arguments and reduce \\
\(12 / 07 / 17\) & DSD & \begin{tabular}{l} 
length.
\end{tabular} \\
& &
\end{tabular}

January 10, 2018
Page 2
\begin{tabular}{rrr} 
Rate & Hours & \\
225.00 & 0.60 & 135.00 \\
& & \\
415.00 & 0.50 & 207.50 \\
& & \\
415.00 & 1.80 & 747.00 \\
415.00 & 1.50 & 622.50 \\
415.00 & 0.20 & 83.00 \\
415.00 & 0.20 & 83.00 \\
415.00 & 0.40 & 166.00 \\
415.00 & 0.40 & 166.00 \\
415.00 & 0.50 & 207.50 \\
415.00 & 0.70 & 290.50 \\
& & \\
415.00 & 0.80 & 332.00
\end{tabular}

\section*{Recapitulation}
\begin{tabular}{llrrr} 
& & Rate & Hours \\
DSD & David Demian - Partner & 415.00 & 15.30 & \(6,349.50\) \\
RSB & Rishi S. Bhatt - Associate & 225.00 & 3.30 & 742.50 \\
SLH & Steven L. Hwang - Associate & 300.00 & 2.20 & 660.00 \\
CRS & Christopher Sillari - Partner & & 355.00 & 1.70 \\
ACW & Adam C. Witt - Associate & & 330.00 & 1.90 \\
For Current Services Rendered & - & & \(\mathbf{2 4 . 4 0}\) & \(\mathbf{\$ 8 , 9 8 2 . 5 0}\)
\end{tabular}

\section*{Expenses/Advances}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline Date & Description & Amount \\
\hline 12/07/17 & Vendor fee of ex parte application, memorandum and de David Demian. Inv. No. 4235732 - Knox Attorney Servic & 203.95 \\
\hline 12/11/17 & One Legal's fee for e-filing of substitution of attorney. Inv 11145392 - One Legal LLC & 9.95 \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{Total Expenses/Advances}} & - \$213.90 \\
\hline & & \\
\hline & Total Current Work & \$9,196.40 \\
\hline & Previous Balance & 32,824.08 \\
\hline & Payments/Adjustments Since Last Bill & -0.00 \\
\hline & Balance Due & \$42,020.48 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Payments received after January 10, 2018 are not included in this statement.
Please make checks payable to: FINCH, THORNTON \& BAIRD, LLP
Payment is due within 30 days of the invoice date.
Please contact us within 10 days of the invoice date with any questions. Thank you.
To pay online visit: http://www.ftblaw.com/bill-pay/

FINCH•THORNTON•BAIRD"
attorneys at law

Mr. Darryl Cotton
6176 Federal Boulevard
San Diego, CA 92114
For Legal Services Rendered through December 31, 2017

4747 Executive Drive, Suite 700 San Diego, CA 92121 r 858.737.3100 F858.737.3101 ftblaw.com

\section*{Total Balance Due}
\(\$ 40,009.02\)

Re: adv. Larry Geraci
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & & & Rate & Hours & \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Conference about lodging objections to Geraci's notice of deposition and accompanying production request. & 225.00 & 0.20 & 45.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Perform final analysis on the probability that Cotton will be able to obtain a TRO or a Preliminary Injunction as a way to force Geraci to quickly settle the case. & 225.00 & 0.30 & 67.50 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Analyze timing of when Cotton's objections to Notice of Deposition are due. & 225.00 & 0.40 & 90.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Further revise discovery responses. & 225.00 & 0.20 & 45.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & CRS & Review draft discovery responses and work on edits to same. & 355.00 & 1.80 & 639.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & CRS & Conference regarding objections to deposition notice and requests for documents, and work on strategy for same. & 355.00 & 0.40 & 142.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & CRS & Conference regarding materials and outline to prepare for depositions. & 355.00 & 0.20 & 71.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Analyze California law regarding the one-year statute of limitations. & 225.00 & 1.20 & 270.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & CRS & Conference regarding primary contract theory of case and strategy for defense of their alleged contract. & 355.00 & 0.50 & 177.50 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Conference about dedication of property to the City of San Diego. & 225.00 & 0.20 & 45.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & CRS & Work on framework for stipulation on CUP and in the alternative, a narrow order for ex parte relief. & 355.00 & 0.80 & 284.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & RSB & Continue analyzing how to frame the theory of the case for purposes of Cotton's upcoming discovery responses and deposition. & 225.00 & 1.20 & 270.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & ACW & Work on document production requests in connection with deposition notices to Geraci and Berry. & 330.00 & 1.40 & 462.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & DSD & Work on case arguments for ex parte and detailed correspondence to Joe and Darryl with strategy for motions. & 415.00 & 3.20 & 1,328.00 \\
\hline 12/01/17 & DSD & Conference as to attorney-client privilege issues in case and analyze same. & 415.00 & 0.50 & 207.50 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Account Number: 2403-004
Statement No: 150905

January 10, 2018
Page 2
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & & & Rate & Hours & \\
\hline 12/02/17 & RSB & Continue analyzing how attorney-client privilege may apply to Joe Hurtado. & 225.00 & 0.90 & 202.50 \\
\hline 12/03/17 & RSB & Draft points and authorities for Cotton's TRO against the City of San Diego. & 225.00 & 3.50 & 787.50 \\
\hline 12/03/17 & CRS & Conference regarding application of attorney-client privilege for communications between Darryl and Hurtado. & 355.00 & 0.30 & 106.50 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & RSB & Review proposed email to Geraci's attorney, Michae! Weinstein, regarding a proposed stipulation pertaining to the CUP application (0.1); provide feedback (0.2) & 225.00 & 0.30 & 67.50 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & CRS & Work on strategy for seeking TRO in addition to ex parte relief on the Writ. & 355.00 & 0.80 & 284.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & RSB & Begin drafting the injunctive order for the Court to sign. & 225.00 & 1.00 & 225.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & RSB & Review"Hurtado's memo regarding the issuance of a TRO. & 225.00 & 0.20 & 45.00 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & RSB & Continue drafting injunction. & 225.00 & 1.10 & 247.50 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & CRS & Work on revisions to proposed order for ex parte hearing on TRO. & 355.00 & 0.30 & 106.50 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & CRS & Work on framework and strategies for memorandum in support of ex parte for TRO. & 355.00 & 1.50 & 532.50 \\
\hline 12/04/17 & ACW & Conference to work on strategy for ex parte application for injunctive relief. & 330.00 & 0.30 & 99.00 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & RSB & Revise ex parte application. & 225.00 & 1.40 & 315.00 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & RSB & Review Hurtado's email regarding lis pendens and attorney fees (0.2); analyze cases cited therein (0.4). & 225.00 & 0.60 & 135.00 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & RSB & Revise Cotton declaration to contain the terms of the parties' contract and to contain the Geraci-Cotton email exchange reflecting the same. & 225.00 & 2.50 & 562.50 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & RSB & Continue to revise TRO for tomorrow's ex parte hearing. & 225.00 & 3.00 & 675.00 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & RSB & Further revise ex parte application materials for tomorrow. & 225.00 & 2.50 & 562.50 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & CRS & Work on memorandum in support of TRO and strategize for order in support of same. & 355.00 & 2.00 & 710.00 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & RSB & Further work on ex parte application and TRO for tomorrow. & 225.00 & 1.50 & 337.50 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & DSD & Work on motion for TRO, arguments on breach of contract. & 415.00 & 2.10 & 871.50 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & DSD & Work on motion for TRO, revise declaration of Cotton. & 415.00 & 1.50 & 622.50 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & DSD & Work on Declaration of Demian in support of TRO. & 415.00 & 0.50 & 207.50 \\
\hline 12/05/17 & DSD & Correspondence to counsels with notice of ex parte. & 415.00 & 0.20 & 83.00 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & RSB & Perform last minute revisions to the TRO and ex parte that is going out today. & 225.00 & 1.10 & 247.50 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & DSD & Discussion with Joe no ex parte for TRO/Pl. & 415.00 & 0.30 & 124.50 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & DSD & Further work on motion arguments for writ as to Schweitzer section on CUP timing; work on declaration as to same. & 415.00 & 0.30 & 124.50 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & DSD & Review declaration exhibits of Darryl and revise numbering. & 415.00 & 0.50 & 207.50 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & CRS & Conference regarding last changes to memorandum in support of TRO. & 355.00 & 0.30
0.30 & 106.50 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & CRS & Conference regarding objections to deposition notices. & 355.00 & 0.30 & 106.50 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & DSD & Prepare responses to document demands by Geraci as part of Darryl deposition; review prior responses and document production; discussion with Darryl as to same. & 415.00 & 0.70
150 & 290.50
622.50 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & DSD & Final motion for TRO for filing. & 415.00
415.00 & 1.50
1.00 & 415.00 \\
\hline 12/06/17 & DSD & Appear at ex parte on TR/preliminary injunction (1.0). & 415.00 & 1.00 & 415.00 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Account Number: 2403-004
Statement No: 150905

12/06/17 DSD Appear at ex parte on verified writ.
12/07/17 DSD Appear at ex parte hearing on TRO.
Recapitulation
\begin{tabular}{llrrr} 
& & Rate & Hours \\
DSD & David Demian - Partner & 415.00 & 14.10 & \(5,851.50\) \\
RSB & Rishi S. Bhatt - Associate & 225.00 & 23.30 & \(5,242.50\) \\
CRS & Christopher Sillari - Partner & 355.00 & 9.20 & \(3,266.00\) \\
ACW & Adam C. Witt - Associate & 330.00 & 1.70 & 561.00 \\
For Current Services Rendered & & 48.30 & \(\$ 14,921.00\)
\end{tabular}

Date Description Amount
11/30/17 Delivery of notice of deposition to Michael Weinstein at Ferris \& Britton 16.59 on November 30, 2017. Inv. No. 3497179 - Golden State Overnight
12/07/17 Vendor fee for filing ex parte application, memorandum and declaration 148.55 of David Demian. Inv. No. 4235733 - Knox Attorney Service
12/11/17 One Legal's fee for e-filing of substitution of attorney. Inv. No. 9:95 11145359 - One Legal LLC
Total Expenses/Advances
\(\$ 175.09\)

Total Current Work
\$15,096.09
Previous Balance
24,912.93
Payments/Adjustments Since Last Bill
\(-0.00\)
Balance Due
\$40,009.02

Payments received after January 10, 2018 are not included in this statement.
Please make checks payable to: FINCH, THORNTON \& BAIRD, LLP
Payment is due within 30 days of the invoice date.
Please contact us within 10 days of the invoice date with any questions. Thank you.
To pay online visit: http://www.ftblaw.com/bill-pay/

EXHIBrT 13

\section*{URGENT NOTICE! \\ PAYMENT REQUEST}
;

We are requesting a \(\$ 4,267.00\) Security Deposit. Your Security Deposit request, which was previously waived, is now being re-instated as your bills have not been paid on time.

A payment is requested in the amount of \(\$ 4,267.00\) and must be received before the expiration date of 02/01/18 to avoid the disconnection of service.
There will be a charge if collection action is required. Please refer to the back of this notice for additional information.

The bottom portion of this notice must accompany your payment. If you intend to mail your payment, you should do so at least three business days prior to the expiration date of this notice.

You can also make your payment online at no charge. Go to sdge.com/myaccount. We also offer electronic payment services, such as SDG\&E Pay-By-Phone and Automatic Pay. For your convenience, you can also pay by using most ATM cards, debit cards, MasterCard \(ß\) and Visa \(ß\) credit cards and electronic checks by calling BillMatrix at 1-800-386-0067.

Si necesita ayuda para intepretar este aviso llamenos a 1-800-311-7343.
4726.1.2.108 1 oz.
|יוין
DARRYL COTTON
6184 FEDERAL BLVD
SAN DIEGO CA 92114-1401
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        SOGE
    A Sempra Energy utlity'

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\section*{NOTICE OF PAST DUE ACCOUNT AND IMPENDING DISCONNECTION \\ IF YOU HAVE ANY QUES IIONS, PLLASE CALL \\ 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) M-F77AM - 8PM, SAT 7AM - 6PM}

Pay Before Date/Disconnection Pollicy
Your SDG\&E bill is due and payable upon presentation and is past due if not paid within 19 days of the date mailed for residential customers or 15 days for non-residential customers. If your payment has not been received by the "Due Date" shown on your bill, your SDG\&E service is subject to disconnection, after proper notice has been provided. If your service is disconnected for non-payment, there may be additional service charges and you will be required to pay all past due SDG\&E amounts before service is restored. Your SDG\&E service could also be disconnected if the information provided on your application for service is false, incomplete or inaccurate. SDG\&E will disconnect your services only for non-payment of those charges owed SDG\&E.

Residential customers who are unable to pay their SDG\&E bill in full due to a temporary finnncial hardship or due to a serious illness in the household, oeed to call SDG\&E before the expiration of this notice. Employees, including multilingual staff, are available to assist with payment arrangements.
If SDG\&E fails to offer you payment arrangements, you may write to " the Consumer Affairs Branctio of the Califomia Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), State Office Building, 505 Van Ness Avenue, Room 2003, San Francisco, CA 94102 , email: consumer-affair@cpuc.ca.gov, prior to disconnection of your SDG\&E service. The Consürner Affairs Branch will review the complaint and issue its proposed resolution to you and SDG\&E. If you are not satisfied, you may appeal the proposed resolution by filing a formal complaint. A more detailed explanation of disconnection policies, including your rights as an SDG\&E customer, may be obtained by calling 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) Monday-Friday \(7 \mathrm{am}-8 \mathrm{pm}\), Saturday \(7 \mathrm{am}-6 \mathrm{pm}\); or e-mail: info@sdge.com.

Re-Establishment of Credit/Depasit
If you pay your SDG\&E bill after the expiration date of a past due notice, or for noo-residential customers, if your SDG\&E bill becomes past due and a written notice for disconnection is mailed, you may be required to re-establish your credit by paying a deposit.

\section*{Rates And Rules}

SDG\&E's rate schedules and rules, on file and approved by the CPUC, are available on the Internet at www.sdge.com. Copies of applicable tanffs may also be obtained by calling 1-800-41 1-SDGE (7343) or visiting any company bill payment office.

Disputed Bills
If you dispute the SDG\&E charges on your bill; winich may include electric energy charges that reflect electricity provided by the State of * Califormia Department of Water Resources (DWR), please request an explauation from SDG\&E within five days. If you still believe you have been billed incorrectly, the full amount of the SDG\&E charges and DWR clarges on the bill should be deposited with the Califormia . *. Public Ctilities Commission, State Office Building, 505 Van Ness Aveuue, Room 2003, San Francisco, CA 94 I02, email: consumer-affairs @cpuc.ca.gov, within 15 days of the mailing date of this past ilue notice to avoid disconnection of your SDG\&E service. Make the remittance payable to the CPUC, notSDG\&E.

Residential customers may, in lieu of depositing the full amount of disputed bills with the CPUC, agree to an installment plan with SDG\&F. A complaint may still be filed with the CPUC by stating your claim ill writing and by providing supporting documentation.
\(\boldsymbol{r}_{8}\). The CPLC will not accept deposits when the dispute appears to be over matters that do not directly relate to the accuracy of the bill. Such matters include the quality of the utility's service, general level of rates, pending rate applications, and sources of fuel power that are used to generate prwer.

Failure to make the deposit to the CPUC or payment arrangements with SDCidE by the expiration date of a past due notice, may result in the discomnection of your SDG\&E service.

PLEASE NOTE: This deposit less the amount of any unpaid bills will be refunded together with any interest due at the rate determined in accordance with the utility's Rule 7, Deposits, upon discontinuance of service or after the deposit has been held for 12 consecutive months during which time continuous gas and/or electric service has been received, and all bills for such service have been paid within the allowed number of days from the date mailed, in accordance with the Rules as approved by the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California.

No interest will be paid if service was temporarily or permanently disconnected for non-payment of bills within the past 12 months, or the account was past due more than once during the past six months or more than twice during the past 12 months.

Refund will be made by application to the account or by check, in which case endorsement of the check will constitute acknowledgement of receipt of refund and release the utility from any further claims against the deposit covered by this notice.

610000247582
ACCOUNT NUMBER

6184 FEDERAL BLVD SERVICEADDRESS

14261 AV 0.373 DARRYL G COTTON 5-1 6176 FEDERAL BLVD 01426 SAN DIEGO CA 92114-1401

Dec 212017

RETURN \({ }_{\text {this portion }}\)
MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO CITY TREASURER

\title{
The City of San Diego • Public Utilities Department \\ Federal Tax ID\# 95-6000776
}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline Payments Information & Contact Information \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
Make Checks Payable to City Treasurer \\
Online \\
www.sandiego.gov/customercare \\
By Mail \\
Public Utilities Department \\
Customer Care Center \\
PO Box 129020 \\
San Diego, CA 92112-9020 \\
In Person (please bring both portions of bill)
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
www.sandiego.gov/publicutilities/customerservices \\
Customer Care \\
(619) 515-3500 \\
(858) 755-7211 \\
(760) 489-8673 \\
Emergency Service \& Repairs (24 Hours) \\
(619) 515-3525 \\
(858) 755-0365 \\
(760) 489-0140
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
City Treasurer - Cashier \\
Cash, Check, Debit Card, MasterCard/Visa/Discover Card \\
Civic Center Plaza \\
1200 3rd Ave - Lobby \\
Public Utilities Department \\
Cash, Check, Debit Card, MasterCard/Visa/Discover Card 525 B Street - Ground Floor \\
Authorized Payment Agencies www.sandiego.gov/publicutilities/customerservices
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
Public Utilities Department Customer Support Division \\
Customer Care Walk-In Payment Center 525 B Street - Ground Floor San Diego, CA 92101 \\
Hours: Monday - Friday 8 a.m. - 5 p.m.
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
Payment is due on or before the Payment Due Date, If not paid within this time, service may be discontinued. \\
Disputed Payment Amounts should be paid to avoid iriterruption of service. Investigations are made upon request. Adjustments, when warranted, are made only after completion of an investigation. \\
In The Event Service is Discontinued for service to be restored payment must be made and reported to Customer Care (619) 515-3500. Service will be restored before the end of the following business day. \\
A Payment Return Fee will be assessed for any payment returned by the bank.
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
Assistance for speech and hearing impaired customers is available via California relay services at 1-800-735-2929 \\
(TT/TDD). Alternate formats available upon request of qualified individuals with disabilities.
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{WASTEWATER SERVICES \({ }^{\text {naicicimums }}\)}

610000012730
ACCOUNT NUMBER

6176 FEDERAL BLVD
SERVICE ADDRESS

ISSUE D.ATE: Jan 2, 2018 a reminder...

Dec 212017
PAYMENT DUE DATE

潼
14251 AV 0.373
FLEET ELECTRICAL CO 5-1
C/O DARRYL G COTTON 01425
6176 FEDERAL BLVD
SAN DIEGO CA 92114-1401
RETURN this portion
MAKE CHECK PAYABLE TO CITY TREASURER

a reminder...

JUST A FRIENDLY REMINDER...TO LET YOU KNOW WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED YOUR PAYMENT. IF PAYMENT HAS BEEN MADE, PLEASE ACCEPT OUR THANKS. IF NOT, YOUR REMITTANCE TODAY WILL BE APPRECIATED.

FOR RECORDED LISTING OF AUTHORIZED PAYMENT AGENCIES OR TO REPORT A PAYMENT, PLEASE CALL 515-3500.

\title{
The City of San Diego • Public Utilities Department Federal Tax ID\# 95-6000776
}
\begin{tabular}{l|l}
\hline \multicolumn{1}{c|}{ Payments Information } & \multicolumn{1}{c}{ Contact Information } \\
\multicolumn{1}{c|}{ Make Checks Payable to City Treasurer } & www.sandiego.gov/publicutilities/customerservices \\
Online & Customer Care \\
www.sandiego.gov/customercare & (619) 515-3500 \\
By Mail & \((858) 755-7211\) \\
Public Utilities Department & (760) 489-8673 \\
Customer Care Center & Emergency Service \& Repairs (24 Hours) \\
PO Box 129020 & (619) 515-3525 \\
San Diego, CA 92112-9020 & (858) 755-0365 \\
In Person (please bring both portions of bill) & (760) 489-0140 \\
City Treasurer - Cashier
\end{tabular}

Cash, Check, Debit Card, MasterCard/Visa/Discover Card
Civic Center Plaza
1200 3rd Ave - Lobby
Public Utiiities Department
Cash, Check, Debit Card, MasterCard/Visa/Discover Card
525 B Street - Ground Floor

\section*{Authorized Payment Agencies}
www.sandiego.gov/publicutilities/customerservices

\section*{Payment is due on or before the Payment Due Date.} If not paid within this time, service may be discontinued.

Disputed Payment Amounts should be paid to avoid interruption of service. Investigations are made upon request. Adjustments, when warranted, are made only after completion of an investigation.

In The Event Service is Discontinued for service to be restored payment must be made and reported to Customer Care (619) 515-3500. Service will be restored before the end of the following business day.

A Payment Return Fee will be assessed for any payment returned by the bank.

Public Utilities Department Customer Support Division

Customer Care Walk-In Payment Center
525 B Street - Ground Floor
San Diego, CA 92101
Hours: Monday - Friday 8 a.m. - 5 p.m.
Assistance for speech and hearing impaired customers is available via California relay services at 1-800-735-2929 (TT/TDD). Alternate formats available upon request of qualified individuals with disabilities.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \({ }_{A}{ }^{3}\) Sempra Energy utiluy' & \begin{tabular}{l}
ACCOUNT NUMBER 13105360324 \\
SERVICE FOR \\
DARRYL COTTON \\
6176 FEDERAL BLVD \\
SAN DIEGO, CA 92114
\end{tabular} & \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{Account Summary} \\
\hline Previous Balance Payment Received & & \[
\begin{array}{r}
\$ 2,120.28 \\
-.00 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline Past Due Balance & & \$2,120.28 \\
\hline Current Charges & & + 1,098.80 \\
\hline Total Amount Due & & \$3,219.08 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

PLEASE KEEP THIS PORTION FOR YOUR RECORDS (FAVOR DE GUARDAR ESTA PARTE PARA SUS REGISTROS)
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT. (FAVOR DE DEVOLVER ESTA PARTE CON SU PAGO)
\begin{tabular}{cl}
\begin{tabular}{c} 
Save Papor \& \\
Postage
\end{tabular} & ACCOUNT NUMBER \\
\begin{tabular}{c} 
PAY ONLINE \\
www.sdge.com
\end{tabular} & 13105360324
\end{tabular}

DATE MAILED Jan 12, 2018
Page 1 of 6 www.sdge.com
1-800-336-SDGE (7343) English
1-800-311-SDGE (7343) Español
1-877-889-SDGE (7343) TTY
M-F, 7am-8pm, Sat, 7am-6pm
24 Hour Emergency Service

Please disregard past due balance if already paid. Please pay current charges by Jan 27 , 2018
7\% Delayed Payment Charge Due If Paid After Feb 6, 2018

\section*{Summary of Current Charges}
(See page 2 for details)
\begin{tabular}{lccr} 
& Billing Period & Usage & Amount(\$) \\
\hline Electric & Dec 10, 2017 - Jan 10, 2018 & \(4,561 \mathrm{kWh}\) & \(1,083.96\) \\
Delayed Payment Charge (.7\% on balance of \(\$ 2,120.28)\) & 14.84 \\
\hline Total Charges this Month & \(\mathbf{\$ 1 , 0 9 8 . 8 0}\)
\end{tabular}

\section*{Regulatory Notices}
- All customers are required to pay a Competition Transition Charge as part of the charges above including those who choose an electric service provider other than SDG\&E

\section*{mary}
\begin{tabular}{lllr} 
& Billing Period & Usage & Amount(\$) \\
\hline Electric & Dec 10, 2017 - Jan 10, 2018 & \(4,561 \mathrm{kWh}\) & \(1,083.96\) \\
Delayed Payment Charge (.7\% on balance of \(\mathbf{\$ 2 , 1 2 0 . 2 8 )}\) & 14.84 \\
\hline Total Charges this Month & \(\$ 1,098.80\)
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|ll|}
\hline DATE DUE & ON RECEIPT \\
\hline Amount due & \(\$ 3,219.08\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{Electric Usage History (Total kWh used)}

\begin{tabular}{lrr|r|r|} 
& Jan 17 & Dec 17 & Jan 18 \\
\hline Total kWh Used & 5.209 & 5,531 & 4.561 \\
Daily average kWh & 168.0 & 1728 & 147.1 \\
Days in billing cycle & 31 & 32 & 31 \\
\hline Change in daily average from last month & & \(14.9 \%\) \\
\hline Change in daily average from last year & & \(.12 .4 \%\) \\
\hline Max monthly demand & 16.3 & 17.1 & 16.0 \\
Max annual demand & & & 22.4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

See Time of Use - Electricity information on page 3.
\begin{tabular}{|ll|}
\hline DATE DUE & ON RECEIPT \\
\hline AMOUNT DUE & \(\$ 3,219.08\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Please enter amount enclosed.


Wrile account number on check and make payable to San Dlego Gas \& Electric

SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC
PO BOX 25111
SANTA ANA CA 92799-5111
account number 13105360324
date due
ON RECEIPT

DATE MAILED Jan 12, 2018
Page 2 of 6
1-800-336-SDGE (7343) English
1-800-311-SDGE (7343) Español
1-877-889-SDGE (7343) TTY
www.sdge.com

\section*{Detail of Current Charges}

\section*{Electric Service}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{Rate: Time of Use - TOU-A-Commercial Climate Zone:} & \\
\hline Billing Period: & 12/10/17-1/10/18 & Total Days: 31 & \\
\hline Moter Number: & 06509045 & (Next scheduled read date Feb 9, 2018) & Cycle 8 \\
\hline Meter Constant: & 1.000 & Billing Voltage Level: Secondary & \\
\hline Circuit: 0165 & \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{Your circuit is currently not subject to rotating outage. However, this is subject to change without notice.} \\
\hline Total Usage: 4 & \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{4.561 (Usage based on interval data)} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{4}{|l|}{ELECTRIC CHARGES} & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Amount(\$) } \\
30.00
\end{gathered}
\]} \\
\hline \multicolumn{4}{|l|}{Customer Charge} & & \\
\hline Electricity & very (Details below) & 3,172 kWh & & & \\
\hline WNTER USAGE & On-Peak & & Off.Poak & & \\
\hline kWh used & 427 & & 2,745 & & \\
\hline RateflWh & \$.13007 & & \$. 13007 & & \\
\hline 21 Day Charge & \$55,54 & \(+\) & \$357.04 & & 412.58 \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Electricity Delivery (Details below)} & \(1,389 \mathrm{kWh}\) & & & \\
\hline winter usage & On.Peak & & Off.Peak & & \\
\hline kWh used & 201 & & 1,188 & & \\
\hline RatolkWh & \$. 13736 & & \$.13736 & & \\
\hline 10 Day Charge & \$27.61 & + & \$163.18 & & 19079 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Rate Change This Billing Period:
There was a rate change on day 22 of your Billing Period. Therefore, your charges tor the Arst 21 days were at Rate 1, and the remaining 10 days were at Rate 2

DWR Bond Charge
\(4.561 \mathrm{kWh} \times \$ .00549\)
(Continued on next page)

Other Important Phone Numbers

\section*{0}

For emergencies and to report
outages, please call 24 hours a day. 7 days a week

1-800-611-7343
To locate underground cables \& gas
pipes, please call DigAlert,
Monday-Friday, Gam-7pm ....... 8-1-1

\section*{Payment Options \(\mathbf{\$}\)}

Online: It's fast, easy and free. Just register or sign into My Account at https:/myaccount. sdge. com
Home banking: If you pay bills online through your bank, check with them to see if you can receive your bill online.
Automatic Pay: Have your payment automatically deducted from your account, For more information, call 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) or visit wow sdge com
Pay by Phone: Visit www sdge.com to enroll Once enrolled for pay by phone option, you may authorize a payment from your checking account any day up to and including the bill due date.
By Mail: Mail your check or money order, along with the payment stub at the bottom of your bill, in the enclosed envelope to SDG\&E, PO Sox 25111 , Santa Ana, CA 92799-5111
ATM/Debit/Credit Card or Electronic Check: You can use most major ATMDebit cards. MasterCard and Visa credit cards, or the Electronic Check thru BillMatrix. A convenience fee is charged Contact BillMatrix at 1-800-386-0067 or visit www sdge com/epay.
In Person: To find the nearest location and hours of operation, call 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) or visit uwwisdge com.
Need help paying your bill? Call us for programs and services at 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) or visit wwu sdge com.

ACCOUNT NUMBER 91855206004 SERVICE FOR
DARRYL COTTON
6184 FEDERAL BLVD
SAN DIEGO, CA 92114
DATE MAILED Jan 12, 2018
Page 1 of 7

\section*{www.sdge.com}

1-800-336-SDGE (7343) English
1-800-311-SDGE (7343) Español
1-877-889-SDGE (7343) TTY
M-F, 7am-8pm, Sat, 7am-6pm
24 Hour Emergency Service

Savings Alert: California is fighting climate change and so can youl Your bill includes a Climate Credit from a state program to cut carbon pollution while also reducing your energy costs. Find out how at EnergyUpgradeCA. org/credit.

\section*{Account Summary}
\begin{tabular}{lr} 
Previous Balance & \(\$ 837.04\) \\
Payment Received & -.00 \\
\hline Past Due Balance & \(\$ 837.04\) \\
Current Charges & +728.63 \\
\hline Total Amount Due & \(\$ 1,565.67\)
\end{tabular}

Please disregard past due balance if already paid. Please pay current charges by Jan 27, 2018.
.7\% Delayed Payment Charge Due If Paid After Feb 6, 2018

\section*{Summary of Current Charges}
(See page 2 for details)
\begin{tabular}{lllr} 
& Billing Period & Usage & Amount(\$) \\
\hline Gas & Dec 10, 2017-Jan 10, 2018 & 18 Therms & 24.59 \\
Electric & Dec 10, 2017-Jan 10, 2018 & \(1,485 \mathrm{kWh}\) & 357.58 \\
Other Charges and Credits & & 346.46 \\
\hline Total Charges this Month & & \(\mathbf{\$ 7 2 8 . 6 3}\)
\end{tabular}

\section*{Regulatory Notices}
- All customers are required to pay a Competition Transition Charge as part of the charges above, including those who choose an electric service provider other than SDG\&E

PLEASE KEEP THIS PORTION FOR YOUR RECORDS (FAVOR DE GUARDAR ESTA PARTE PARA SUS REGISTROS) PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT. (FAVOR DE DEVOLVER ESTA PARTE CON SU PRGOI
\begin{tabular}{cc}
\begin{tabular}{c} 
Save Paper \& \\
Postage
\end{tabular} & ACCOUNT NUMBER \\
\begin{tabular}{c} 
PAY ONLINE \\
Unw.sdge com
\end{tabular} & 91855206004
\end{tabular}

SERVICE ADDRESS: 6184 FEDERAL BLVD SD 92114
\begin{tabular}{|ll|}
\hline DATE DUE & ON RECEIPT \\
\hline AMOUNT DUE & \(\$ 1,565.67\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Gas Usage History (Total Therms used)

\begin{tabular}{lrr|r|} 
& Jan 17 & Dec.17 & Jan 18 \\
\hline Total Therms used & 10 & 18 & 18 \\
Daily average Therms & 3 & 6 & 6 \\
Days in biling cycle & 30 & 32 & 31 \\
\hline Change in daly average from last month & & \(+0.0 \%\) \\
\hline Change in daly average from last year & & \(+100.0 \%\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Electric Usage History (Total kWh used)

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & Jan 17 & Dec 17 & Jan 18 \\
\hline Total kWh used & 3.266 & 1.517 & 1,485 \\
\hline Daily average kWh & 105.4 & 47.4 & 47.9 \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{\multirow[t]{2}{*}{Days in biling cycie
Change in dally average from last month}} & 31 \\
\hline & & & + 1.1\% \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{Change in dally average fiom last year} & - \(54.6 \%\) \\
\hline Max monthly demand & 11.0 & 6.8 & 3.8 \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{Max annual demand} & 15.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

See Time of Use - Electricity information on page 3.
\begin{tabular}{|ll|}
\hline DATE DUE & ON RECEIPT \\
\hline AMOUNT DUE & \(\$ 1,565.67\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Please enter amount enclosed


Write acoount number on sheck and make payable to San Dlego Gas \& Electric

SAN DIEGO GAS \& ELECTRIC
PO BOX 25111
SANTA ANA CA 92799-5111

A Sempra Energy utility*

ACCOUNT NUMBER 91855206004
dATE DUE
ON RECEIPT

DATE MAILED Jan 12, 2018
Page 2 of 7
1-800-336-SDGE (7343) English
1-800-311-SDGE (7343) Español
1-877-889-SDGE (7343) TTY
www.sdge.com
H

\section*{Detail of Current Charges}

\section*{Gas Service}

Rate: GN3-Commercial
Meter Number: 01187950 (Next scheduled read date Feb 9, 2018) Cycle: 8
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Billing Period & Days & \begin{tabular}{l}
Curfent \\
Reading
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
Previous \\
Reading
\end{tabular} & \(=\) & Difference & \(\times\) & Meter Constant & 8 & Theim Muitiplier & Total Therms \\
\hline 12/10/17-01/10/18 & 31 & 435 & 418 & & 17 & & 1.000 & & 1.047 & 18 \\
\hline GAS CHARGES & & & & & & & & & & Amount(\$) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Gas Service Rate Change This Billing Period:
There was a rate change on day 22 of your Billing Period. Therefore, your charges for the first 21 days were at Rate 1, and the remaining 10 days were at Rate 2.
Customer Charge


\section*{Gas Energy Rate Change This Billing Period:}

There was a rafe change on day 22 of your Billing Peniod. Therefore, your charges for the first 21 days were at Rate 1 , and the remaining 10 days were at Rate 2.

\section*{Other Important Phone Numbers}

For emargencies and to report
outages. please call 24 hours a day.
7 days a week ... 1-800-611-7343
To locate underground cables \& gas
pipes, please call DigAlert,
Monday-Friday, Gam-7pm ...... 8-1-1

\section*{Payment Options \$}

Online: It's fast, easy and free. Just register or sign into My Account at https://myaccount.sdge com
Home banking: If you pay bills online through your bank, check with them to see if you can receive your bill online
Automatic Pay: Have your payment automatically
deducted from your account. For more information, call 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) or visit whw sdge com
Pay by Phone: Visit www.sdge.com to enroll, Once enrolled for pay by phone option, you may authorize a payment from your checking account any day up to and including the bill due date.
By Mail: Mail your check or money order, along with the payment stub at the bottom of your bill, in the enclosed envelope to SDG\&E, PO Box 25111, Santa Ana, CA 92799-5111
ATM/Debit/Credit Card or Electronic Check: You can use most major ATMDebit cards. MasterCard and Visa use most major ATMDebit cards, MasterCard and Vis credit cards, or the Electronic Check thru BillMatrix.
convenience fee is charged. Contact BillMatrix at nonvenience fee is charged. Contact BillMatrix at
\(1-800-386-0067\) or visit wwov.sdge.com/epay.
1-800-386-0067 or visit www. sdge.com/epay.
In Person: To find the nearest location and hours of operation, call 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) or visit operation, call
www.sdge com.
Need help paying your bill? Call us for programs and services at 1-800-411-SDGE (7343) or visit nuw.sdge.com

EXHIBT 14
\(\qquad\) 1033

I, Dale Lloyd Cotton, have personal knuwlerge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in thls declaration.
1. 1 am a self-employed businessman and the First Trust Deed Holder of 6176 Federal Boulevard San Diego, CA 92114; to which the title to that property is held by iny son, Darryl Gorard Cotton.
2. Darryl bas been under extreme financial pressure from the litigation he is involved in and he has not been making the mortgage payments to me. He has been responsthle in keeping me updated Hrough regular conmmication as to the status of that litigation.
3. That communication has made me very aware of the enormous stresses Darryl is undergoing both emotionally and financially.
4. To be clear: were this a nonnal busimess relationship, I would have foreclosed on this property a year ago.
5. But this is not a normal business relationship and I do want to help him and any of my childran out to the fullest extent that I can. However, I am not a wealthy man, and this cannot continue.
6. I respectfully request this court to consider what the effects of this needless, protracted litigation has caused to not only Darryl, but to me as well, and plense use whatever discretionary authority you have to see that justice will cventually be served in this matter.


1034

EXHIBIT 15
\(\qquad\) 1036

I, Darryl Gerard Cotton, hereby declare:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
2. This declaration is being prepared for this lawsuit, litigation matter and should lay out in detail all the pertinent facts and history of me, my business and the chronological events leading to and through the legal proceedings to date.
3. It is the intent of this declaration to prove 6 things: 1 ) I have had a lifelong passion and interest in electricity and electrical designs; 2) I am a businessman, I have had numerous companies related to electricity; 3) I also have a lifelong interest in plants and crops; 4) I am involved in and proud of my political activism; 5) Larry Geraci is attempting to defraud me of my property and; 6) My former counsel FTB is also likely guilty of fraud.
4. It is important to me that this reflect these issues, therefore I go to great lengths to describe them.
5. I was born in 1960 in Peoria, Ill. My father, Dale Lloyd Cotton, was a Mechanical Engineer who worked for the Electromotive Company (EMD) as a Process Engineer, just outside of Chicago, Ill. My mother, Therese Marie Cotton, was a chemist who worked at various universities. I had one brother, Gregory, and a sister, Christine, from their marriage.
6. Some of my earliest and fondest memories growing up were of having my parents take us to their respective workplaces. At Christmas, EMD would open their entire facility up for tours where everyone could see the factory and all the locomotives in various stages of construction. My father would walk us around and point out where he worked and explain his job of engineering the manufacturing processes that would produce those enormous locomotives that were sold all over the world. Touring that factory, I saw what seemed like
an important part of what society needed in its everyday life of moving goods from one point to another. I was very proud of my dad and the work he did for EMD.
7. Since my father grew up in the farming area of Southern Illinois, at 13 years old I was given a chance to work one summer detasseling corn. It was very hard work, but I stuck with it and learned to appreciate what it takes to get these crops to harvest. Visiting my grandparents, and that summer working in the farms in Mendota, Illinois, sparked my early interest in plants and crop science.
8. When my mother took me to her job, I got a chance to see the work she was doing toward her thesis in Raman Spectroscopy. This is the science that involves determining the molecular identity of an object using light. As light bombards the object, the return or reflection of that light creates a signature in frequency and wavelength that can be characterized in a nondestructive fashion by the object's unique molecular identity. I would often accompany my mother to her labs at Argonne National Labs and Northwestern University to see her equipment and experiments underway. I got to sit in with her and her colleagues when they would discuss advanced physics and particle science. Of course, these topics were well over my head, but I always made sure they at least attempted to explain what they were talking about, in terms I might be able to grasp. In deference to my mother, and because they probably enjoyed the challenge, her colleagues would usually take the time to do so and show me what the equipment was doing in their experiments. I was thrilled to understand, at least in a broad sense, what it was their work entailed.
9. There is no doubt that my interest in electricity and light, came from exposure to the work my mother had been doing, and the efforts she and her colleagues made to explain to their work to me. Later in life, I would, on occasion, accompany her as she gave lectures around the world to other academics on her work, and it became increasingly evident to me, that she was respected as an innovator in her field. I could only hope that I would have an

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opportunity to contribute to the world in as meaningful a way as she had. Sadly, my mother died in 1999 but her memory and work will live on forever. It is a goal of mine to emulate her personality, and the way she affected those around her, in the same positive ways she did.
10. At a very young age, I found that I was really interested in politics and what was going on in the world. I even have a vague recollection of being 3 years old and sensing something was horribly wrong when the world seemed to stop with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We all just stood there, staring at the TV, and the busy street that normally had cars flying down it, was quiet. There was no traffic. Time stood still. After that, having lived through the Vietnam war, Watergate, Nixon, Martin Luther King, and other such events, I can't recall ever not having an interest in politics and the law and their effects on the world we lived in. I found it exciting and fascinating.
11. My parents went through a horrible divorce when I was 13 years old. There was bitter fighting over who would get what and it led to a serious and permanent fracturing of our family. I'll never forget the tug of war and the lawyers coaching us as to what to say so we would be able to support whatever was expected to be said when we stood in front of the judge. Having to pick sides between your parents is not something that you would ever want a child to do but that is essentially what we had to do. What happened is that the boys went to my father and my sister went to my mother. Life as we knew it would never be the same.
12. From the time I was 13 to 15 years old, my brother and I were basically on our own. My dad worked full time, and during his off time, he sought out new relations that would rebuild our household. My brother and I resisted these new women coming into our lives, trying to assume the position that had been our mother's, so we rebelled. We did not make it easy on these women and they would leave. This, coupled with the fact we were acting like normal SUPPORTING DECLARATION
teenagers, caused a lot of friction with my dad. Eventually my father farmed out my brother Gregory, who was just 12 years old at the time, to a family down the street from us who agreed to take him in. I lived with my dad until I was 15 years old, when he agreed to my moving out.
13. In 1972 I became aware of a considerable buzz being created by then President Nixon having appointed a commission, known as the Shafer Commission, to study, compile information on, and report back to him what effects cannabis was having on our youth. It was clear to us from Nixon's statements that he did not want to see cannabis become acceptable at any level. He needed federal drug policy to make cannabis use a criminal act. Nixon saw cannabis being used by a bunch of war protesters who would sit around smoking weed and creating havoc, over him and his policies, so he needed it stamped out. He needed a way to give the federal government the tools to do that. To that end, he created the Shafer Commission, whose sole purpose he believed was to come back with findings that supported his beliefs. Nixon needed findings that would claim cannabis was evil, dangerous, and a threat to society. Unfortunately for Nixon, after an exhaustive, comprehensive, and nonpartisan analysis of the effects of cannabis, they came back with just the opposite opinion.
14. When the Shafer Commission came back with their report, they relied on research that had been done by UC San Francisco chemistry students who were interested in finding out why the same strain of cannabis could make one person laugh and another contemplative. They appreciated that there was the potential to use cannabis as medicine and they recommended that further research be done to see what biochemistry was at work. What they discovered was the beginning of why the science of this plant needs to be better understood. Relying on that research, and other studies from around the world, created a situation where Nixon could not accept the findings and would not release the report in the form that he had SUPPORTING DECLARATION
received it. Nixon ignored the Commission's recommendations and went on to create the Controlled Substances Act. He eventually resigned and was then pardoned by his replacement, Jerry Ford. One of the first things Ford did was give the Shafer Commission report to Big Pharma so that they could "continue" the research that had been done by others, while it was kept from the public for over 40 years.
15. In 1975 I moved into my own room at a boarding house known as The Stone House. The Stone House was run by a little old lady who went by Marty. Marty was an exceptionally sweet person who had an incredible affection for birds. She had hundreds of finches in the basement and would spend hours with them. What Marty was not always very good at was noticing what her tenants were up to, and by that, I mean, more than a few of her tenants were heroin addicts, who lived there because it was cheap, and Marty loved them unconditionally, as if they were her own.
16. When Marty first met me, she was not ready to rent a room to a 15 -year-old boy but since I was personable, had a job working part time for Horton Electric, a local electrical and lighting company, and was going to high school 1 block away from the Stone House, Marty decided to take a chance and let me move into my own room. This was important, not only because I got to understand self-responsibility at a very young age, but also because it gave me the opportunity to see how those other boarders made their living and survived as adults.
17. The Stone House was a large 3 story house and the attic floor was the most desirable of all the floors. This is where, in the evenings, the rooms would open up and there would be free flowing music, conversation, drinking, drugs (only cannabis and psilocybin for me), and discussions on everything imaginable including politics, the Vietnam war, President Nixon, relationships, and girls. People came from all over to attend these evening soirees. They were lively and fun, but they had purpose too. We were in the midst of revolt and SUPPORTING DECLARATION
revolution. There was Kent State. There was Watergate. There was George McGovern. There was talk of impeachment. There was the Shafer Commission. There were body bags of soldiers fighting in a war that had no meaning. There were refugees. There was Jimmy Carter. There was Lieutenant Calley. There were lines of people waiting to buy gasoline. There was upheaval. I was taking it all in. Living at the Stone House taught me to think for myself, to question those who would manipulate the system on behalf of their own special interests, to help educate others, as I had been, and finally to cherish the Constitution as it is a living, breathing document that must be the center of our universe and not be taken for granted or the freedom we cherish will be lost forever. The tree of liberty will not be taken down with a single swing of the axe, but in a slow and steady process whereby one day you look up and the tree is gone. As citizens of this great country, we have a responsibility to protect ourselves and those around us from letting that happen. That is the message I took from the Stone House.
18. While Stone House helped form some of my early political ideologies, it also got me to question drugs, both legal and illegal, and the influence they had on people's lives. When the parties died down, it was always just me and the other boarders who had all taken me under their wings and mentored me. I got to see them as they really were. Even though some of them got into things that I would never try, such as heroin, I respected that they were clear to me why they did these drugs and why they would never want to see me doing them. I watched them go through the process of attaining the drugs and the rituals that went with getting the drugs into their systems. While they were certainly consumed by their addictions, they also seemed to care about the young man living in their Stone House and did not want to see me make the same mistakes they had. I respected them and their intellects. However, I saw firsthand how heroin would ravish them and ultimately, they would overdose, and some would even die. It was tough knowing that these drugs took
control of young people who could have been assets to our world. I knew then and there that I would never subject myself to a drug, legal or not, that took over my life. Instead I would always maintain an interest in how drugs could be used to provide relief, repair or prevention of disease without the addictive elements that consumed those who took them. 19. After a couple of years of living in the Stone House, I had saved and was making enough money at Horton Electric to move into my own house. In 1977, at the age of 17, I kissed Marty goodbye, thanked her for everything she had done for me, and moved into my own house.
20. At the time I rented my own house, I had been working part time for Horton Electric for almost 3 years. I initially started out working in the warehouse stocking inventory but, since I was always interested in what those electrical parts did, I'd ask a lot of questions of those who worked there. That got me to understand the business to the point that, at just 16 years old, I got to move up to the electrical sales desk. In that capacity, I got to meet with customers, helped fill orders and realized that building and wiring things was incredibly rewarding.
21. While I appreciated the opportunity to work in electrical sales, I lobbied hard to get transferred to the electrical construction side of the company. I had already been dreaming of someday becoming an electrical contractor. The contracting side of Horton Electric was run by a surly old Irishman by the name of Chris who wanted nothing to do with having a young kid working around him and his electricians, but I didn't give up and I eventually got on his good side. Once I did, it was the best thing that could have happened to me. I got direction. I got focus. This shop was well established and serviced all the surrounding area. Chris was very well respected, and by me representing him, by way of delivering materials and getting to know the union electricians, I had an opportunity to see how the electrical construction side of the business operated. I'm a quick study but there was no way

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that, without formal training, I was going to learn the electrical contracting trade unless I got a break. That break came when one of the union electricians I was working with decided that I was worthy of baptism by fire. As much as Chris got to know and rely on me, he knew that my heart was in becoming an electrician and one day running my own business, so he got me onto a union job that needed more electricians than the hall had available at the time. I was given an opportunity to become a walk-on electrician for a huge condominium project being built outside Chicago. While I had some experience in bending conduit and running wire, I was not up to the skill levels that were required to maintain that job. I was not going to lose that job, so I would actually stay after hours to practice bending conduit to improve my production levels. When the project foreman found out I was doing that, he was not happy about it, and told me in no uncertain terms that, if I ever did anything off the clock, I would be terminated. However, he liked that I wanted to succeed and paired me with another walk-on electrician who was so good he was out-producing the union electricians by nearly twice the production per day. John was good. Very good. He had methods and techniques that allowed him alone to finish a one-bedroom condominium, completely piped in conduit and ready for drywall, in one day. I worked with John and learned every technique he had. Within a month, I was knocking out the same production levels he was. John went on to become a union electrician and stayed in Chicago. I could have gone that route too, but I wanted to eventually have my own business as I had seen Chris do at Horton Electric and, since the winters were brutal in Chicago and I had nothing keeping me in the Midwest, I decided to take my skill sets and move to a warmer year round climate. It was in 1980 that I made the decision to pack all my belongings up in a van and move to San Diego.
22. When I arrived in San Diego, I immediately got a job for the U.S. Navy working as an electrician in the Public Works Center (PWC). While this was considered a temporary

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position, my electrical skills and acumen put me in demand among the career, civil service electricians and allowed me to travel to many of the Southern CA naval bases while working on, and often being given a supervisory role in, some of the most sensitive and high-profile projects going at the time.
23. I had been working for PWC for 2 years when, in 1982, I was given an opportunity to make better money as the Electrical Superintendent for Dave Baker of Westland Electric. In this capacity, I would be responsible for running multiple large commercial projects. Dave hired me for this position because he knew, from people he knew at PWC, that I was knowledgeable, organized, liaisoned well with our customers, and delegated authority, which resulted in my projects being completed on time and on budget.
24. In 1983, I met Debra Holly and we started dating. We never married but stayed together for 14 years, during which time we had 2 beautiful daughters, Kimberly and Kristina. It was during those early years that Debra encouraged me to follow my dreams of owning and operating my own electrical contracting firm.
25. In late 1985, I started suffering from occasional nocturnal epileptic seizures. While it is unknown as to what exactly is responsible for these seizures, it is believed that lack of sleep and stress are significant contributing factors. I was originally prescribed Dilantin which worked but was known to cause problems within the liver and, since I also have the Hepatitis C virus, I was very concerned about the effects a prescription drug would have on my liver.
26. In 1987 I made the decision to start my own electrical contracting business and Fleet Electric, CA License Number 514234, began business out of my home in North Park. I managed to run and grow that business so that I needed to move into a larger space. In 1992 I moved our business out of my home and into a commercial rental property at 6184 Federal Blvd, which I currently maintain for my business.
27. In 1996 I first became aware of Dennis Peron as he was getting attention as one of the original co-authors of Prop 215, which, with its passage, had made cannabis legal in CA for treating certain medical conditions. While at the time I was uncertain as to how effective cannabis might be in the treatment of my seizures, I did appreciate that it was now being recognized as a possible alternative option to the prescription drugs I was taking. I resolved to follow the research that developed relative to the genetics and dosing levels that could be relied on to help combat these seizures.
28. In 1997, the owner of the property at 6176 Federal Blvd contacted me and asked if I would be interested in acquiring his property, which is adjacent to mine, at 6184 Federal Blvd, if the terms were favorable. This was a deal that worked for both of us and I purchased the 6176 Federal Blvd property in my name.
29. In 2000 I expanded my license to include a General Contracting classification and was issued CA Contractors license number 757758. Since the new license allowed us to do work beyond just electrical, I renamed the company Fleet Services and proceeded to operate under that license until \(11 / 30 / 2012\) when I decided I would cease contracting and devote my full attention to my efforts in energy efficient horticultural lighting and controls.
30. In 2002 I started Fleet Systems as a compliment to my Fleet Services contracting business. Fleet Systems provided emergency and backup power generation for both permanent and rental power applications. Fleet Systems became dealers and authorized service centers for many major brands including Kohler, Baldor, and Cummins. Within 4 years of our startup; our Fleet Systems Maintenance Contracts Division had acquired a majority of the major key accounts such as hospitals, casinos, office buildings, and hotels in San Diego whereby the annual generator service contracts were an integral part of our portfolio. Recognizing this, the local Kohler Distributor, Bay City Electric Works, made an offer to purchase Fleet Systems and I accepted their offer. It was agreed that we would - 10 -

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retain the Fleet Systems name so that we could continue to provide mobile power systems service on news vans, semi-trucks and RV systems, services that we still provide.
31. In 2005 I expanded our generator equipment business into Mexico with the opening of Fleet Systems de Mexico. This was good timing for us because at the time we opened our facility in Ensenada, MX there were sizeable rentals and sales contracts available. In addition, many of our US manufacturers whose power systems we were already servicing had maquiladora operations in this region which made it relatively easy to support them with equipment and personnel from our San Diego facility. With the sale of Fleet Systems in 2007 we ceased operations in Mexico.
32. In 2010 I started Inda-Gro as an induction plant lighting manufacturer. Inda-Gro was one of the very first companies to identify induction lighting as a viable, energy-efficient plant lighting technology that could compete with the existing HID lighting technology that dominated the plant lighting market.
33. It is through the ongoing research I have done at Inda-Gro that we have seen significant developments in plant photobiology with self-published and other researchers' papers.
34. From 2010 onward I worked primarily on the manufacturing and distribution side of IndaGro lights. Since our products relied on a well-established Tesla Coil technology which was being applied in a new way to provide lighting for plants, it required that growers be convinced that our products could deliver the crop quality and yields to which they had become accustomed under HID lighting systems. The only way that was going to happen with a new technology was if we had "partner growers" who would provide meaningful data as to their comparative results or if we had our own farm running continuously that would allow for people to see the plants and lighting systems in operation. Couple those visits with time/date stamped images posted on Facebook of previous grows and crop results and the
consumer now has the ability to make an informed decision as to what Inda-Gro brings to the market.
35. My experiences with having "partner growers" providing me with any reliable, meaningful data was a challenge. More often than not. they would take one of my lights with the promise that they would tell me how it performed. The majority of the time I would get little to nothing back in return. Clearly this did not work for me and my plans to improve our products by tracking real time plant performance values.
36. In 2011 I decided to no longer rely on "partner growers" as the design developments required more reliable feedback in a timely fashion and I began to focus entirely on our inhouse T\&D garden operations for indoor and greenhouse lighting applications. It was at this time I started both Youtube and Facebook channels to publish our work with time/date stamped images and videos.
37. In 2012, in addition to the lighting and controls research and development underway, I was given the opportunity to procure several different genetics of cannabis that I wanted to grow for the treatment of my seizures. It was during this time that I became very interested in combining the engineering work we were doing with our Inda-Gro products with the plant sciences to generate organically grown cannabis products that would not only be healthier but, by combining certain genetics, prove to be better at combating my seizure disorder.
38. Aquaponics is not widely used in cannabis cultivation. However, I was attracted to this method of cultivation because of the organic nature under which the plants had to be grown. Nothing could be placed on the plants that could harm the fish. This appealed to me since, if I were to continue to use cannabis in combination with prescription drugs to treat my seizures, I wanted to be sure that the cannabis I consumed was free of any potentially toxic elements. A balanced aquaponic system relies on healthy fish and their waste being
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the primary nutrients for the plants. This is a presentation I developed that goes into detail as to how this method of cultivation may be employed for cannabis crop cultivation.
39. I experimented with several methods that would allow aquaponics to be used in cannabis cultivation and found a reliable technique that gave the cannabis plants their main nutrient requirements from the flood and drain fish water but which also allowed us to top feed the trace minerals that cannabis and other flowering plants need in a top water feed that does not water to the point that water combines with the fish water. This practice is referred to as decoupled or dual root zone feeding for the plants.
40. As a result of my posting this work on Facebook media I eventually came to the attention of Pentair Aquaponic Eco-Systems. PentairAES is the Iargest manufacturer of aquaculture products in the world. It was Dr. Huy Tran, PhD , the Director of Research for Pentair at the time, who reached out to me to learn more about us and our products and to explore if induction grow lights would be a good fit for the industry and their product line. After discussing the science involved in our products and learning more about us, Dr. Tran decided to recommend our induction lights be used in the Pentair product line under their own label. His recommendations were accepted by management and I began filling induction grow light orders for PentairAES.
41. After entering into that agreement with PentairAES, I expanded sales of our induction grow lights but I also benefited from the incredible insight and knowledge that Dr. Tran and other advanced academics within Pentair, such as Dr. Jason Danaher, have been able to provide me with in regard to how aquaponics can grow a wide range of crops in a wide range of environments while using \(5-10 \%\) of the water that a traditional soil crop would consume. I also was pleased to discover from the research we were doing into plant lighting and aquaculture that the benefits we found in organically grown food crops quality extended to cannabis crop quality.
42. Cannabis that I had been acquiring through local retail cannabis dispensaries would not always be guaranteed to be free of contaminant pesticides, fungicides, aerocides or even nutrients. When I would procure concentrates of the same genetics for my condition, the percentage of residual solvent elements would be increased by \(10-20 \mathrm{X}\) what it would have been in flower form. While I want the benefits of medical grade cannabis to combat my seizure disorder, I refuse to take in chemicals that I know to be unhealthy and even life threatening.
43. In March 2015 I found a commercial property available for rent in the Barrio Logan section of San Diego. The landlord understood that I was to rent this property for the purposes of developing what I began referring to as a 151 Farm. The concept, which originally began with our R\&D work on Federal Blvd, was that urban farms would grow 1 pound of cannabis to 5 pounds of food for 1 community. I went forward with the Barrio Logan project because it afforded us a larger footprint than I had available at the Federal Blvd property. The size of this property allowed us to have indoor, greenhouse and outdoor plants that were grown in a soilless aquaponic system of recirculating water. In our trials of systems and procedures I grew lettuce, hops, peppers and medical cannabis. I maintained our progress on social media with time/date stamped photos and welcomed those who had an interest in our work to visit us for tours.
44. While I initially sought out others in the hydroponics industry to co-develop the 151 Barrio Logan project, it became apparent that, even though they may have endorsed the efforts, they were never willing to contribute any time or money to see that the project was maintained. While I consider Barrio Logan a success, ultimately the work and money involved to maintain it became too much to bear and I had to shut it down and return those operations to the 6176 Federal Blvd location where it continues to operate to this day.
45. Over the years I became increasingly aware of all the research being done in other countries on the medical benefits of cannabis. I watched with great interest as medical doctors and scientists from every realm of the sciences collaborated in finding out more about this plant and how it interacts with our endocannabinoid systems. What this ongoing research has shown is that at the botanical level there are mysteries about this plant and its broad phenotype expressions that exist amongst the wide-ranging genetics that will combine to promote homeostasis or a balancing of the mind/body relationship.
46. Other elements of the plant have been clinically proven to reduce blood flow to cancer cells. Today there exists greater empirical evidence than ever before as to how this plant can benefit us and why its cultivation and access need to be sensibly managed. Based on my personal experiences, that of those I've seen benefit from this plant and the research that supports its medical use, I will remain committed to lending my voice to see that laws and policies are in place at the federal level which would include the re/declassification of cannabis and that at the local and state levels those who need access to this plant for their medical conditions are able to do so.
47. In late 2015 I was contacted by researchers at the National Algae Association who had seen my work whereby I had taken one of our induction grow lamps and designed a waterproof housing that allowed the lamp to be put underwater without any type of housing over it. This put the lamp's energy, intensity and spectrums at depths in the tank where it is difficult for light to travel at distance to meet with the macroalgae being grown.
48. The particular algae we were interested in cultivating with our lamps was the Haematococcus Pluvialis algae or "HP" for short. HP is known to be very high in the super antioxidant astaxanthin. Research indicated that by installing the lamps in the tank we would be able to increase the concentration levels of astaxanthin and decrease times to
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harvest. From my perspective, anything I could do to help improve any crop production value which, when extracted, would benefit the patient, was worthy of pursuit.
49. Because of my work on the AquaPAR submersible induction lamps to decrease times to harvest and increase HP concentration levels, I was invited to give a presentation at The National Algae Convention.
50. One of my greatest personal motivations in starting my own 151 Farms Urban Aquaponics Gardens was that I could gain personal knowledge by creating these gardens and learn what would and would not work when growing a wide variety of food and plant-based medicines in this fashion as well as develop our lighting and control products.
51. The reason this work at this particular time was especially appealing to me is that botanical plant substances can help alleviate certain medical conditions in patients when combined with the ability to optimize crop production values in a given area using controlled environmental conditions whereby the plants can develop in the lowest times to harvest across all plant species.
52. When optimizing plant production values, what matters most is that the research supports whatever the benefits to the patients may be based on control factors such as the plant genetics, the type of cultivation systems and procedures being used that allows for organically grown plant-based products to be grown in a repeatable fashion. It is for this reason I began to introduce a wider variety of crops, known for treating medical conditions, into our 151 Farms so they could be available to those who would seek them out in their fresh unadulterated form from their local garden. Other factors that contributed to my support for and development of 151 Farms included; The ability to co-cultivate fish and plants in a soilless urban garden setting.
53. There is an opiate epidemic in the United States which has now reached epic proportions. The need for fresh, organically grown, unprocessed foods and plant-based medicine has never been greater.
54. A whole host of medical conditions, such as high blood pressure, diabetes, Alzheimer's, obesity, and cancer, can be directly attributed to the consumption of processed foods.
55. The availability of fresh unprocessed foods is severely restricted in urban settings. This leads more people to purchase food products that have longer shelf lives from the stores in their neighborhoods. Consequently, the percentage of diet-related diseases is disproportionately higher in regions where access to unprocessed food is limited.
56. Why is having locally-sourced, organically grown medical cannabis plant genetics so important to patients? Research has shown improved efficacy from the EXTRACTION of essential oils from cannabis plants when that extraction is done from a just harvested plant. This extraction process is referred to as a live resin extraction. A cultivation process whereby the just harvested plant can be converted into that essential oil is critical to the finished product quality. What is equally important is that the plants are grown in a controlled environment whereby the full phenotype expression can occur. This is a function of broad spectrum lighting. It's also important that the plant genetics are known and stable to realize these benefits in a repeatable process. Finally, it is important that the plants have not been subject to pesticides, aerocides, fungicides or residual nutrients that may contain heavy metals or plant growth regulators which in an extracted process could be \(10-20 \mathrm{X}\) what those levels would be in a flower form. Cannabis grown and processed in this way allows the patient to take lower doses that, when coupled with diet and some form of exercise incorporated into a daily regimen, help to, at a minimum, improve their quality of life and reduce or even eliminate the medical conditions that existed prior to their introduction to naturopathic treatments. The benefits of a 151 Farm are that the source plant material for
medical grade cannabis can be made available to those within the community nearest to where it has been grown.
57. If you're familiar with the term Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), a 151 Farm utilizes Cannabis Supported Community Agriculture (CSCA) as a way to pay it forward within our communities by providing housing and jobs for all skill levels and donating a portion of the food being grown to local food banks.
58. The negative impact that our drug laws and policies have had in non-white communities has been disproportionately larger than for those who live in predominantly white communities. These drug policies have led to higher percentages of incarceration, lost jobs, crime and other negative effects for those individuals and their communities.
59. With the increased opportunities coming from the mainstream and legalization of cannabis within these communities, it is morally imperative that under these new laws, cannabis related business opportunities be given to those who have been most affected by those previous drug policies and laws. 151 Farms provides a distinct and transparent pathway for those opportunities.
60. It is necessary to meet with government officials and interact with them on a regular basis to see that organic urban farming and medical cannabis patient's needs are being considered. Letting your voice be heard, not being passive, leading by example, and being part of the dialogue to be part of the solution are all parts of what being a 151 Farmer means when it comes to exacting change in an ever-changing industry.
61. For me personally, knowing that I am able to grow my own medical grade cannabis with particular genetics that help to prevent my seizures is comforting, but I would also like to know that I can purchase medical grade cannabis which is free of toxic elements, should I become unable to grow in the future. This got me looking into how the State of CA regulates pesticides and toxicity limits on medical cannabis products that are cultivated and
produced under the authority of Prop 215 . What \(I\) found is that as far as the State of CA is concerned, since 1996, when Prop 215 was passed, there have never been any limits on pesticides and toxicity because the California Department of Pesticide Regulations (CDPR) got their limits from those established by the FDA and EPA. The problem CDPR had with setting state levels was that it relied on a federal agency to provide data and NO federal agencies will perform the pesticide and toxicity studies on a product that is listed as a Schedule One drug. Under the Controlled Substance Act cannabis is seen as having NO medicinal value whatsoever, it is subject to severe safety measures and it is listed as having a higher potential for abuse than heroin, which is listed as a less dangerous, schedule two drug.
62. With one side blaming the other and me as the medical cannabis patient caught in the middle, I began researching why the federal government still considered cannabis as having NO medicinal value. What I found that seriously contradicted that position was that in 2003 the Department of Health and Human Services was granted patent number US 6,630,507 B1 which cites the antioxidant and neuroprotective benefits of cannabinoids which are to be derived from cannabis.
63. If, after reviewing this patent, there is still any doubt in your mind as to what research supports it and the benefits of cannabis, I would encourage you to look at the 'other publications' as listed in the upper right-hand portion of the patent. Here you will see the studies from accredited scientists and institutions that from 1965 to 1981 have done their own research to support this singular patent issued in 2003 and the benefits that this plant represents to the medical patient. Yet today, 15 years later, cannabis remains a Schedule One drug. The federal government's scheduling hypocrisy regarding cannabis as having NO medicinal value is astounding!
64. As a medical cannabis patient myself and having lived for 2 years in the Stone House where I saw firsthand the ravages of heroin, I simply cannot understand the hypocrisy between these two positions. It is one of the reasons I have been so vocal about trying to enact common sense laws and regulations as to how cannabis is grown and how it can be accessed by those who require it medically.
65. Another area of great concern to me is why any state government would not have established pesticide and toxicity levels of substances that may come in contact with cannabis before they allow the sale of cannabis products within that state. For food and drugs other than cannabis, these levels are typically established by the federal government but since cannabis is listed as a federal schedule one substance, the California Department of Pesticide Regulation, which would normally set these limits, has had a hands-off policy for setting these limits, citing lack of federal direction.
66. With the passing of Prop 215 in 1996, California has had 20 years to set pesticide and toxicity limits on cannabis grown in state and never provided those limits to the cultivators or to the medical cannabis patients. It was left up to the consumer to decide if they were comfortable with the amount of heavy metals and other potentially toxic substances that could be found in the plant materials and if they were willing to consume that product. Even though it is necessary that there be established limits that require that the testing of that product and the information regarding what was in that product be made available to the consumer, more often than not those test results were not available, and the medical cannabis patient was left to chance what was in the plant material they were ingesting. With recent tests showing that over \(84 \%\) of the cannabis being tested has tested positive for what are considered harmful levels of pesticides, the fact that the State of CA has left this responsibility to the medical cannabis patient consumer for the last 20 years is unconscionable.
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67. With the passing of Proposition 64, "The Control, Regulate and Tax the Adult Use of Marijuana Act" (AUMA) the state has now accepted their responsibility to set these limits. However, the limits have not yet been set and are expected to be released at some point in the near future.
68. With the passing of AUMA nothing has changed in the federal scheduling of cannabis. It's still Schedule One. Why has the state agreed to establish these guidelines now when they were unwilling or unable to set them in protection of the medical cannabis patient before the passage of AUMA? It's simple. The state never took their responsibilities to the medical cannabis patient seriously under Prop 215 since it did not increase revenue for them.
69. I felt strongly then and still feel today that, while Prop 215 was certainly not perfect, it could have been improved upon if the legislature had seen fit to do so. The legislature failed the medical cannabis patient and now they are in charge of a regulatory system that is supposed to be responsible and equitable to the medical and so called "recreational" cannabis communities. To say I have my doubts as to how they will manage this on behalf of the medical cannabis patient would be, to put it mildly, a massive understatement.
70. I have always had a hard time accepting, and have staunchly opposed, any laws or regulations that purport that cannabis can be structured for "recreational" use. It is my belief that has been proven to be the case in Washington, Oregon and Colorado that when "recreational" laws are introduced the medical cannabis patient's rights are infringed upon as the non-profit medical cannabis industry virtually disappears while everyone chases the for-profit "recreational" market.
71. When these so called "recreational" laws are passed they attempt to equate cannabis to other "recreational" drugs such as alcohol or tobacco. Because of that, I stand opposed to a recreational classification for cannabis since both alcohol and tobacco have proven to be cancer causing, lead to addiction and cause death. Cannabis, in any of its forms, has none of - 21 -
these deleterious effects. As cited in the DEA 2017 Drugs of Abuse (page 75) there has never been a reported case where someone has died or suffered permanent harm from the effects of cannabis. The same cannot be said of alcohol or tobacco.
72. In or around March of 2016 I became aware that an initiative, Proposition 64, The Control, Regulate and Tax the Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA) had made the California 2016 ballot. With the passage of AUMA, cannabis would be made available in CA in a "recreational" form to anyone over the age of 21 who wishes to purchase it without the need of a physician's recomnıendation.
73. Over the course of the next couple of months I read this initiative and considered what it's passing would mean for the cannabis market in general and the medical cannabis patient in particular. I regularly watched and participated in online debates on the merits of AUMA and found my position to oppose the passing of AUMA only being reinforced as I learned more about how the general public saw AUMA in a positive light without having an in depth understanding of what its passage would mean to those who would be most impacted by it: medical cannabis patients.
74. Since AUMA was a long and complex initiative, one that the average reader found to be confusing and difficult to read through in its entirety, I took the initiative to create a condensed version that included a Table of Contents, a link to the Proposition in its original form and comments that invited discussion as to the purposes that were specifically included in the Proposition. I then posted that AUMA analysis on the 151 Farmers website, which was created to explain our ideologies and act as an archive for the papers and research that help propel forward the need for urban gardens and how cannabis and those laws that affect cannabis are an important element in those farms' success.
75. From that AUMA analysis I began a campaign that included interviews and numerous social media posts on behalf of myself and others and conducted seminars as to what the passing of - 22 .

AUMA would mean to the medical cannabis patient. Within these presentations and posts I would always reference the AUMA analysis and a certain section of the initiative that was to be voted on.
76. I used social media and the AUMA analysis to create not only discussions about the specific elements within AUMA but also what organizations endorsed it and why they chose to do so. One organization that supported the passing of AUMA was the California Medical Association (CMA). With its 41,000 physician members, the CMA has never supported cannabis for any medical purposes, but they were endorsing AUMA for "recreational" purposes. I found that position to be hypocritical by pointing out the following: 1) The CMA never endorsed cannabis for its possible benefits as a drug to be used for certain medical conditions; 2) The CMA has never been on record supporting research on how cannabis could be used to treat certain medical conditions; 3) Has the CMA endorsed laws that make other recreational drugs legally available to those over 21 years of age? Of course not. I believe that the CMA and other likeminded organizations will endorse any cannabis law that minimizes the benefits of cannabis for medical use and which allows the states to construct laws that tax and regulate cannabis in a recreational form so that it does not compete with pharmaceutical drugs.
77. Once I had a better understanding of AUMA I felt compelled to reach as wide an audience as possible to express my concerns. While I was already reaching a fairly large audience with my posts, seminars and press conferences, it was somewhat limited to a core group who already followed me. If I wanted to reach a much larger audience I needed to get the support of those who had a much larger following. 1 did that with a campaign that included radio, tv, press conferences, seminars and an outreach to cannabis activists who had their own followings.
78. In September 2016 I reached out to Dennis Peron to introduce myself. Over the course of various phone and text messages we shared our concerns over what the passage of AUMA may mean to the medical cannabis patients' rights which were granted to them under Prop 215.
79. Dennis and I both agreed that should AUMA pass, those medical cannabis patients' rights that had previously been made available to them under Prop 215 were likely to be eroded and infringed upon as we have seen happen in other states where recreational cannabis was added to what had previously been strictly medical cannabis. Dennis and I agreed to collaborate to the extent we would try to educate the voters as to what the details within AUMA would mean to the medical cannabis patient should it pass.
80. In October 2016, Dennis Peron, with the help of friends, was able to travel from his home in San Francisco and visit our 151 Farm here in San Diego. While Dennis was here we invited other activists to visit our farm and meet him to discuss how we all might help in his efforts to protect the patients' rights that had been granted under Prop 215.
81. During that visit, Dennis gave me access to his personal Facebook page where I began presenting elements of AUMA on his behalf, daily or every other day, that came directly from the Prop 64 language. Those posts ended up creating a lot of debate and discussion among those who followed Dennis's page. At the time we could only hope they would seriously consider what they would be getting if AUMA passed.
82. Also during that visit, Dennis and I were invited to be interviewed for a radio show on our mutually declared positions as to the threats that the passing of AUMA would represent to the medical cannabis patients' rights granted under Prop 215 . We agreed and those interviews were done in Irvine, CA and sponsored by WeedMaps for SpeakEasy radio.
83. In addition to my work on social media, I also kept up the 151 Farms website which is where I created a paper, in collaboration with Dennis Peron and other likeminded activists, - 24 -

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that addressed how, with the passing of AUMA, the medical cannabis patients' rights which had been granted under Prop 215, would most likely be lost. With the posting of this paper just prior to the November 8,2016 elections, we stated why cannabis could never be considered "recreational" and it was subsequently released to a wide audience through numerous social media platforms.
84. In November 2016 California voters approved Proposition 64, the Adult Use of Marijuana Act, as a way to make cannabis available to anyone over the age of 21 for recreational purposes. Under AUMA, the state will incorporate the medical cannabis patients' rights and access to medical grade cannabis within a regulatory structure that will "streamline" (their words) recreational and medical cannabis licensing beginning January 1, 2018.
85. Under AUMA the state has been given the right to modify the original voter approved proposition with a \(2 / 3\) majority vote of the house. This is the first time that a voter approved initiative has given the state the right to change it without another initiative to replace it. I find this to be a slippery-slope whereby, for example, the \(2 / 3\) majority might someday just vote that a simple majority can carry a change in the law. I seriously doubt the constitutionality of any initiative that undermines this most basic tenet of voter approved Initiatives.
86. With the passing of AUMA we shall see what its effect will be on the medical cannabis patient. I stand prepared to exercise any and all of my constitutional rights in seeking protection for those medical cannabis patients, cultivators and processors who have been harmed should AUMA not take into account their unique needs and circumstances. From a medical cannabis patient's perspective these are the questions I feel need to be asked: 1) Will the passing of AUMA have a negative impact on patients' rights to cannabis?; 2) Will it affect the availability of medical grade cannabis?; 3) Will the price of cannabis go up to where it is now unaffordable for the medical cannabis patient?; 4)Will the opportunities to - 25 -
continue research and development of cannabis genetics for specific medical conditions be limited to only those who would qualify under a for-profit regulatory framework controlled by a state government that has historically taken a laissez-faire attitude toward cannabis and its use for medical purposes?
87. Under AUMA, has the state given voice to a medical cannabis association that can speak on behalf of those who are representative of that group of cannabis buyers that is distinctly different from those that would purchase for recreational reasons? If so, who are they?
88. Since 2015, the 151 Farms at 6176 Federal Blvd has had many people from very diverse backgrounds come tour our operations. I have always treated these visitors as Friends of the Farm and hope to inspire them once they have seen what we represent.
89. If a Friend of the Farm is interested in visiting us on more than one occasion, they become a 151 Ambassador. That is, they can lead their own tour groups and help spread the word about what we do here. These relationships have spawned some remarkable personal connections that have continued to bring attention to our cause.
90. The list of 151 Ambassadors has grown. Over the years we have welcomed a large and diverse range of people to our farm who have come from all over the world. Our motto is: We Need More Gardens Not Less. Come Visit Us! Leave your Bias at the Gate and I Promise You Will Learn Something!
91. With that message we have seen politicians, members of the media, medical doctors, researchers, judges, lawyers, entrepreneurs, veterans, law enforcement, activists, teachers, students, policy makers, community leaders and more. It seems that people identify with community and appreciate a place where they can come together and feel like they can contribute and make a difference. If they have something tangible to wrap their heads around that includes a roadmap that allows them to recreate what they've seen, the possibilities are endless. At 151 Farms that has been my goal and it all starts with a plant.
92. We have had such a huge diversity of talented and motivated people come visit our farm and go on to become 151 Ambassadors that there are simply too many to list. Here are 3 noteworthy 151 Ambassadors that, due to their dedication and commitment, I would like to present as representatives of our cause:
a. Coach Don Casey, former NBA Coach and currently serving as the National Trustee Board Member for the ALS Foundation. Coach Casey has been instrumental in seeing that ALS patients who seek medical cannabis understand that many doctors support the use of cannabis as a way to improve their quality of life. I developed The Casey Cut in honor of Coach Casey as a tribute to his many years of work on behalf of ALS patients.
b. Ms. Linda Davis, Americans for Safe Access, in her tireless efforts to bring medical cannabis patients the 151 Farms message of how important it is to have organically grown, pesticide free cannabis to treat their medical conditions.
c. Sgt. Sean Major, former Marine Corps servicemember, who came to 151 Farms as the only active duty military member in the entire Department of Defense who has ever been given the authorization to treat combat related brain injuries by cultivating cannabis. Having grown cannabis prior to enlisting in the Marine Corps, Sean believed that the psychological issues he was having as a result of his tours in Afghanistan could be managed if he were allowed to cultivate cannabis while gaining accreditation from a school that taught cannabis cultivation as a post military career opportunity. Sean has continued to work tirelessly on behalf of veterans who suffer from combat related injuries so that they might have access to medical grade cannabis to treat their conditions.
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93. In July 2015, Mr. Ramiz Audish came to our offices at Inda-Gro and asked if he could take a tour of our farm. Ramiz, who preferred to be called Ray, was a well-spoken, clean cut young man who had heard about what we were doing and wanted to see the operations for himself. Ray was quite complimentary of everything we were doing with both Inda-Gro and 151 Farms and suggested some ideas to improve our operations. I was interested in hearing what he had to say.
94. Ray first asked under what authority I was growing the cannabis on our site. I pointed him to the Physician's Recommendations I had posted for those personal medical cannabis needs as established under Proposition 215 and SB 420 guidelines.
95. I told Ray that in addition to the posted Physician's Recommendations, we had recently completed a cannabis cultivation application with the Outliers Collective, a duly licensed collective located in El Cajon, CA. In that process the owners of Outliers and two Sheriff's Deputies who specialize in cannabis compliance came out to our farm. I gave them a tour of our operations and, while they complimented the quality and organic nature of our cannabis, they told us they could not certify us as an approved vendor for Outliers since the City of San Diego would not grant a license for cannabis plant counts that would allow us to grow commercially at our location. With that, we were denied approved vendor status with Outliers Collective. Both Outliers and I were very disappointed, but I did feel better when, after having toured our facility, the Sheriff's Deputies told me that I was operating within Prop 215 and SB 420 guidelines.
96. Confident that I was meeting the letter of the law as a cannabis cultivator, Ray said that he felt the only other thing I lacked was a medical marijuana consumer collective (MMCC) or retail dispensary at this location. Ray told me that he had experience in owning and running these MMCC businesses. I did not have an understanding of the retail MMCC laws in San Diego, but Ray told me he was well versed in these laws. Ray explained to me that our
location was appealing to him because it was unique in that City of San Diego zoning allowed for an MMCC type of business at this location. I told him that my interests in the property were not in running an MMCC business but were in lighting and the development and expansion of our 151 Farms.
97. Ray was undeterred by my resistance and insisted that he would be entirely responsible for the MMCC business and would acquire the licensing and permits necessary to maintain compliance for it. His pitch was that the dispensary would bring more attention to what I was doing at 151 Fanms and that by working together we would present to the community a sustainable, organically grown "Seed to Sale" model of what our 151 Farm represented. That concept appealed to me and with that I considered his offer under the following conditions:
a. I would first visit one of his other MMCC businesses to see for myself how it was being run. The business he took me to was in Mira Mesa and I was impressed with how well it was built out and how well it appeared to be run.
b. Ray's and my businesses would be clearly divided with separate entrances and addresses.
c. I would have nothing to do with his business because, unlike Ray, who had operated retail cannabis dispensaries, I knew nothing of what it took to be licensed and compliant for this type of business.
d. Ray assured me that his intentions were to become a long-term tenant and that he would prove his value by not interfering with my current business operations and by signing a short term, 6-month lease while he went about acquiring the necessary licensing and permits to operate his business.
e. Ray agreed to these terms and the Lease Agreement was executed on July 20, 2015 and was set to expire on December 20, 2015.
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98. With our Agreement in place, Ray began operating his MMCC business, which he called Pure Meds. The following statements reference my observations and opinions of Ray and the business from July 2015 until February 2016:
a. Ray was a good tenant who paid his rent on time and never presented any problems for me as a landlord.
b. Ray was at the property daily and ran what appeared to me to be a transparent, successful and well managed business.
c. Ray had licensed and armed security with controlled access and paid attention to the details that I initially feared would detract from my Inda-Gro and 151 Farms business. The concerns I had were that the retail business would attract people who would hang around outside the business or attract criminal elements. That never happened. In fact, just the opposite occurred. Pure Meds attracted repeatable local customers who appreciated that they could acquire their medical grade cannabis products without traveling great distances or having to deal with an underground resource.
d. The operation of Pure Meds did in fact increase the interest in 151 Farms and our Inda-Gro lighting products.
e. Prior to witnessing how Pure Meds operated, I had no firsthand knowledge of how a retail MMCC would or should operate. During the course of his 6 month lease I had a chance to form some opinions that were, for the most part, positive. While the retail side of the business still did not inspire me to get involved, I was satisfied that those who had the experience and resources necessary to manage the day to day operations of the business would be an asset to me and my goals with 151 Farms.
f. When the end of the lease came up, I asked Ray if he planned on staying and what the status was on his licensing with the City. He told me that it was in process and - 30 -
that he would have the license within the next 90 days. I had no reason not to believe Ray as he had been a man of his word in everything he had promised me before. In addition, I, as a landlord, did not see myself as some sort of traffic cop who was expected to make sure Ray paid all his taxes and operated in accordance with all the laws and regulations that his type of business required. If Ray did not secure the necessary operating permits I knew that the City would not allow him to operate and would shut down his business. With that, I agreed to let him stay on the property on a month to month basis for 90 days, at which time, if he had the license to operate, I would give him a 1-year lease. That was satisfactory to Ray and we continued with our relationship.
99. In February 2016 I was served with a lawsuit by the City of San Diego that charged me with running an illegal cannabis dispensary. I was very surprised to receive this lawsuit because it listed me as the owner/manager of Pure Meds and that was never the case. Had the City noticed me by letter that my tenant, Pure Meds, was not in compliance with the MMCC licensing requirements and that my property was not in an area that could ever be zoned for an MMCC Conditional Use Permit, I would have taken action and would have served Ray with an Unlawful Detainer. At the time I was served this lawsuit, Ray was no longer renting under a lease and he was certainly not in compliance with our Agreement that he operate in accordance with city rules and regulations for his business.
100. Ray was not named in that lawsuit because the City was unable to identify who the actual tenant/operator of Pure Meds was. When I showed the lawsuit to Ray, he offered to pay for my legal defense until the case was adjudicated as long as he was able to continue operations. He told me that this was not the first time he had seen this happen and that he was certain that his lawyer could get the case dismissed or obtain a negotiated settlement. He told me he would start a petition that his patients would sign asking the City -31-
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to allow Pure Meds to remain open. I accepted that offer and was prepared to see where this would go once the lawyers for both sides got together and worked out the details. In less than 30 days Ray provided me with 19 pages and some 200 signatures of patients that wanted Pure Meds to remain open. At the time I thought there might be a pretty good chance of negotiating something with the City that allowed him to stay open but of course I didn't know what would come of it since a rezoning had taken place.
101. The only way I discovered that my property had been rezoned was by my having been named in that lawsuit. Within the lawsuit it states that my property had been in an MMCC compliant zone prior to January 13, 2016 at which time the City of San Diego rezoned the property, for unknown reasons, so that it would no longer be eligible to operate as an MMCC. Prior to the rezoning neither I nor any of my neighbors that I spoke with had been noticed that this rezoning was to occur. When I requested the public information as to what notification had been given to the property owners that this rezoning was to be considered, the information I received from the city proved that there had been virtually no notice given to any of the property owners and the notices that were given talked obliquely of a general development plan that included a shopping center approximately 2 miles from our properties.
102. The City next sought a Temporary Restraining Order on me to keep me off the property. These TRO motions are usually summarily granted to the City but in my case, when I showed up to court to argue that I was NOT the owner of Pure Meds and was instead the owner of the PROPERTY and that I had just found out from the details given in that lawsuit about the rezoning issue on my PROPERTY, the Judge asked the City Attorney if that was in fact the case and the City Attorney admitted that it was. With that, the Judge asked me directly if I would be willing to cooperate with the City Attorney in identifying who the owner of Pure Meds was, to which I responded that I had no problem doing so. The - 32 -

Judge then denied the TRO. I would have thought my agreeing to cooperate with the City Attorney in this matter would have satisfied the City Attorney but she and her boss were quite upset with the denial of the TRO and argued after the decision had been made that I was a threat and that the Judge should reconsider. The Judge would not alter his decision and I was able to continue operating my business while I decided what to do next with Ray and Pure Meds.
103. With the TRO having been denied, the City asked for and received a warrant to come onto the property and seize anything related to what they determined was illegal drug activity.
104. On April 6, 2016, approximately 30 armed police officers rushed onto my property and placed me and my 3 employees who were on site in handcuffs.
105. I never resisted and offered to open every door or cabinet that I had access to as they requested. I told them that had they requested a tour of the property, I would have given them one. I regularly conduct these tours and believed that I was operating in compliance with the laws as defined by Prop 215 and SB 64. Everything that the officers wanted to see within my areas of operational control was made available to them. I never denied that there was cannabis being grown and processed on my property but I had the Physician's Recommendations posted for the plants and materials on hand and believed I was operating legally within the limits set forth under these laws. With that, the officers counted and inventoried all of the items, which included company computers, that they felt they might be able to use to prosecute me should they choose to.
106. When it came to the officers gaining access into Pure Meds, I told them that I did not have a key to that area as it was sublet. When they asked me who the owner of Pure Meds was, I told them his name was Ray and I did not know his real name as I had forgotten it. The officers asked me if I could get them his real name and I told them that I could but it - 33 -
would require me finding the lease I had with him which was on the computer they had just confiscated as evidence. The officer noted that the information was available on my computer and a locksmith was called to gain access into Pure Meds.
107. During the approximately 3 hours the officers were on site conducting their investigation, I pleaded with them not to kill the mother plants that had been hybridized and genetically adapted to grow in an aquaponic system. These were high CBD (to be differentiated from the more hallucinogenic THC) strains that we were developing that were showing promise in a high nitrogen system without the need for trace mineral supplements. It had taken us nearly 3 years to accomplish that task.
108. Some of the officers appeared sympathetic to what I was telling them. They admitted they had never seen an aquaponics cultivation system like ours in the past. I took the time to explain to them what our purpose was and, although they still had a job to do, I could tell they were interested in what we were doing. For example, I was asked by one of the officers how these products might work for dogs that might have seizures. Another officer told me his mother had fibromyalgia and asked if an organically grown CBD product would offer her some relief. I don't fault the officers for what happened that day. I saw them on the phone trying to see if they could get permission to avoid killing the mother plants. Whoever they were talking to, though, denied that permission and the plants were all, every single one, killed and taken in for evidence. I was heartbroken. We lost some very solid genetics that day.
109. The officers eventually removed the handcuffs and left without arresting me or anyone from my company. I was told that a Pure Meds guard was briefly detained on a weapons and cocaine charge but when they found that the gun was properly registered and it was not cocaine after all, the guard was released from custody.
110. After the officers left we were all pretty shaken up but I got everyone together and told them that we had done nothing wrong and we were going to return to our normal activities as soon as possible. With that, I invited local TV stations onto the property who were congregating outside our yard watching the police action occur. I got them to set their cameras up outside of our fish tanks and I conducted interviews so I could tell listeners our side of the story. I wanted people to know what we stood for as a 151 Farm and not see us as just another one of the illegal pot shops that were springing up everywhere and getting all the media attention.
111. The next day I got a phone call from Ray who told me he was sorry this had happened and that he wanted to resume operations as quickly as possible. He told me these raids were common practice and the normal way things were conducted until the case went to trial. He told me that these types of businesses would typically continue to run for up to another 6 months before they were permanently shut down or a settlement was reached that allowed them to continue to operate.
112. I asked him if he had, in fact, ever made an attempt to apply for an MMCC CUP and he told me that, while he had originally intended to, he never did. I told Ray that had he done what he had originally promised by applying for the CUP, he would have had a very good chance at being awarded the CUP since the zoning allowed for it at the time he began renting from me. It was the lawsuit that was filed which first informed me that my property had been eligible for a CUP and then, for whatever reason, the property was rezoned to make it ineligible for a CUP shortly before the case against me was filed. Naturally I was very upset with what Ray had put me through and was even MORE upset that his actions had reduced the value of my property if the city having rezoned my property right after Pure Meds began business made it permanently ineligible for any future MMCC business to operate.
113. Since Ray had never attempted to apply for the CUP after he told me that he would, I told him that he could no longer continue to operate his business on my property. Ray was given one week to remove his remaining possessions from the property before I disposed of them. He was not happy that I wasn't going to let him reopen. He offered me considerably more money to which I said "no" and that my decision was final. He begrudgingly accepted that and the next day he had people come and remove his remaining items. Ray never set foot on my property again.
114. After the raid, I never heard from anyone with the City who wanted any additional information from me regarding Ray. I believed that whatever information they needed they had found on my computer and they didn't need my assistance.
115. After a couple of months the City decided to charge me personally with exceeding the allowable plant counts by adding in the clones that I had not included in our counts because they were not rooted. I was arrested and booked into jail at which point I bailed out and got prepared for my arraignment.
116. A few days prior to my arraignment, I called the City Attorney assigned to my case and told him that I was going to plead Not Guilty based on the fact that the clones they had added into the plant counts were not viable since they had not yet rooted. He considered this and decided to drop the charges at least for the time being but he did reserve the right to recharge me in the future if additional information was presented.
117. I got a letter from the District Attorney stating that after a review of the evidence they had decided not to prosecute me but that the City of San Diego still held the option of doing so.
118. On March 15, 2017 I received notice that the City of San Diego would be charging me with 4 misdemeanor counts relative to my operations, 1 day before the statute of limitations would have ran. I retained the legal services of Mr. Robert Bryson and went to - 36 -

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the arraignment on April 5, 2016 where the plan was for me to plead Not Guilty and take it to trial if necessary.
119. Prior to the day of arraignment and entering my plea, I had not seen the report or any evidence that had been used to bring these 4 misdemeanor charges against me. The City Attorney met with Mr. Bryson and me in the hallway and presented us with the case file for our review. This was the first time that I became aware that Ray had been arrested and was awaiting trial on charges of his own. From the evidence I could see that Ray's other locations had been shut down and that he had made agreements with the City that, to avoid charges, he would agree to not operate an unlicensed MMCC business within the City of San Diego in the future. Clearly with his Pure Meds operations on my property he had violated those agreements.
120. After Mr. Bryson and I had spent about 30 minutes reviewing the documents, we asked to speak to Deputy City Attorney Mark Skeels, who was handling the matter. What Mr. Skeels told us was, that since Pure Meds did not reopen after the raid, which was what usually happened, the City was willing to offer me a deal in order to settle the matter without it going to trial.
121. Mr. Skeels told me that if I would agree to forfeit the \(\$ 30,000\) in cash that had been seized from Pure Meds during the raid and plead guilty to one misdemeanor charge of a Health and Safety Code section HS 11366.5 (a) violation, the other 3 charges would be dropped. As Mr. Skeels explained to me, pleading guilty to this single charge was my accepting that there had been a code violation on the property and I would be on probation for 3 years to assure that I would not violate this Code again. Mr. Skeels agreed that Mr. Bryson could take some time to consider this offer.
122. After discussing with Mr. Bryson that this offer seemed reasonable providing there was language added into the plea agreement that for the 3 years I would be on probation and -37.
because I agreed to waive my 4th amendment rights, I would maintain my Prop 215 medical cannabis cultivation rights and not be subject to what was still unknown medical cannabis cultivation limits as would be defined in Prop 64.
123. Mr. Skeels asked why I wanted that language in the Plea Agreement and I told him that I had no problem proving over the 3 year course of my probation that as a medical cannabis patient, who cultivated cannabis at my property and planned on continuing to do so, I was in compliance with Prop 215 but that, based on what I knew of the Pro p 64 law which was due to take effect on January 1,2018 , I wanted whoever was inspecting me and my property to hold me to a recreational standard that may, as the guidelines under Prop 64 were not yet finalized, conflict with a medical standard. The language in the Plea Agreement would be as much for my benefit as for that of any inspecting authority who would visit me over the course of the 3 years' probation.
124. Mr. Skeels considered this and agreed that as far as he and the City were concerned, adding language to the Plea Agreement to that effect was not a problem and that it would indeed provide for clarification of enforcement standards for those authorities who would be tasked with inspecting me and the property for Prop 215 compliance during the course of my 3 years' probation.
125. Having agreed to that, I suggested that Mr. Skeels also add language to the Plea Agreement that would include a limit of up to 4 Physician's Recommendations for those patients for whom I was growing cannabis. Mr. Skeels told us that adding language to that effect was not necessary because the Prop 215 statute didn't set a limit on Physician's Recommendations. He also told us that we simply needed to have those Physician's Recommendations available for inspection and that they had to be current. Mr. Skeels told us that all the Plea Agreement needed to state was that I would be retaining my rights under

Prop 215. With that, we agreed to the terms of the Plea Agreement and Mr. Skeels left us to await his return with the finalized Plea Agreement.
126. When he returned a short time later, Mr. Bryson and I reviewed the Plea Agreement and saw that the language we had discussed about my retaining my rights under Prop 215 had been added. With that, Mr. Skeels then reviewed every element of the Plea Agreement with us and had me initial each box that was required. Once this was completed, we went before the Honorable Judge Rachel Cano.
127. While reviewing the Plea Agreement from the bench, Hon. Judge Cano spoke to me directly and asked why the Prop 215 language had been added into the Plea Agreement. I explained that with the obvious conflicts for me between Prop 215 and Prop 64, that I , as a medical cannabis patient who cultivated cannabis at this property, needed the standard I would operate under to be defined in this agreement or it would be subject to interpretation by any inspecting authority who would visit me during the course of my 3 years' probation. Judge Cano considered this and agreed that it was a simple and straightforward solution to what she and even the City saw as a way of bringing clarity to these evolving standards. With that, she accepted the Plea Agreement and I believed we were done.
128. In a wild turn of events that I can only describe as the most duplicitous bait and switch imaginable... Within days of Mr. Skeels convincing my attorney and I through his assurances of the terms of our plea agreement, the City filed a Lis Pendens on my property (April 18, 2017 - Over 1 year after the incident took place.) and began the process of selling it as a seized property asset, which I now became aware was what I had unknowingly agreed to in the Misdemeanor Health and Safety 11336 (a) code charge to which I had pled guilty in the Plea Agreement I had entered into with the City on April 5, 2017.
129. I immediately contacted Mr. Bryson and asked if he had known that, when I agreed to enter into this Plea Agreement, that it meant I was forfeiting my building and land to the

City. That had NEVER been discussed prior to my accepting the Plea Agreement. In fact, prior to accepting the Plea Agreement, Mr. Skeels had gone out of his way to go over the Plea Agreement in detail with us and had even added the language of how I would retain my Prop 215 rights over the course of my 3 years' probation. If Mr. Skeels knew then that I was giving up my building and land under this Plea Agreement, why wasn't it brought up at that time? Both Mr. Bryson and Mr. Skeels are officers of the court. Both had an obligation to tell me that's what my agreeing to a misdemeanor guilty plea of HS 11336 (a) meant and neither one did that. In fact, the last area of refuge I would have had prior to this Plea Agreement being accepted by the court would have been if Judge Cano had mentioned to me that the language we had added into the Plea Agreement where I retained my Prop 215 rights was meaningless in light of the fact that pleading guilty to this one charge meant I was not going to own the property anyway.
130. Mr. Bryson was as shocked as I was when he realized what we had agreed to. He told me that he had no idea that losing the building and land would be the consequence of entering into that deal with Mr. Skeels. With that, he wrote me a Declaration that stated that he was not aware and had he known that my losing the building and land was the consequence of entering into that Plea Agreement with the City, he would have advised against signing it. I received that Declaration from Mr. Bryson and dismissed him from any future representation.
131. I then reached out to Mr. Skeels and asked if he was aware that my agreeing to this single misdemeanor charge meant I would be giving up my property. He told me that he was not aware that that was the consequence either, but he would look into it and get back to me. I never heard back from him.
132. I then sought out and retained new counsel with attorney David Demian of the law firm Finch, Thorton \&and Baird (FTB) representing me in this matter.
133. In a phone call between Mr. Demian and Mr. Skeels that was made on speaker phone from a conference room at the FTB offices, thus allowing me to hear what was being discussed, I learned what Mr. Skeels's real position on the Asset Forfeiture matter that my Plea Agreement had represented was. Mr. Skeels informed Mr. Demian that he too was on speaker phone as there were other attorneys from his office listening in on the conversation.
134. Mr. Skeels's stated position during that call was that we had a deal in that Plea Agreement and it would stand. According to him, my only options were to elect to withdraw the Plea Agreement, after which the City would take me to trial on the 4 misdemeanor charges that I was originally charged with, or to agree to pay the City \(\$ 100,000\) and all charges would be dropped. What I was hearing was extortion, plain and simple.
135. Mr. Demian told Mr. Skeels that the \(\$ 100,000\) payment he was seeking was unacceptable and that the only thing that might work on my behalf would be to find a lesser amount in the interest of offsetting the legal fees I would have to incur in order to defend the 4 misdemeanor charges. Mr. Skeels asked what that amount might be and Mr. Demian responded with a counteroffer of \(\$ 5,000\), referring to that amount as a nuisance payoff that he had been authorized to submit on my behalf. Mr. Skeels rejected the counteroffer and told Mr. Demian to get back to him if and when we were serious.
136. What was clear to me during that conversation was that the City wanted a payout and what they had seized during the raid was not enough. The HS code section violation to which I had pled guilty was not widely understood. This was a new tool for the City to use to shut down illegal dispensaries and Mr. Skeels knew it. He was not willing to negotiate because he felt he didn't have to. Mr. Skeels had Mr. Demian on speaker phone in his office so he could make a point to those listening in on his side that the City did in fact have the upper hand in these negotiations and that Real Property Asset Forfeiture was a tactic they -41.
could employ in other cases where a landlord rented to a tenant who was not licensed to run a MMCC business. At one point in the conversation when Mr. Demian questioned Mr. Skeels's authority and skills in negotiating a settlement on behalf of the City, Mr. Skeels got upset that Mr. Demian would even question his professional qualifications. Mr. Demian, sensing that he had offended Mr. Skeels, immediately began apologizing and told Mr. Skeels that he would confer with me and respond with another offer. Mr. Skeels told Mr. Demian that the new offer would need to be near the \(\$ 100,000\) mark or it would be rejected, and we would be wasting precious time and the property would be sold out from underneath me as the law allowed.
137. After that conversation, Mr. Demian admitted he was not the best person to represent me in further negotiations in this matter with Mr. Skeels. I needed to retain co-counsel who had experience in successfully negotiating with Mr. Skeels. They had to be able to defend me in this matter should we go to trial and that would start with them withdrawing my Plea Agreement based on my having been enticed to do enter it under fraudulent representation and incompetent counsel. With Mr. Bryson's declaration in which he admitted not knowing what the consequences of HS 11336 (a) were, I was hopeful that if the threat of withdrawing the Plea Agreement came from the right lawyer, that Mr. Skeels would want to settle the matter without going to trial. With that in mind, I engaged the legal services of attorney Stephen G. Cline in anticipation of the Plea Agreement being withdrawn and my taking this matter to trial should Mr. Skeels and I not come to terms.
138. Mr. Cline reached out to Mr. Skeels by phone and told him that unless the City was willing to settle this matter for a much lower amount than the \(\$ 100,000\) they were seeking, he had every intention of going before Judge Cano to request a withdrawal of the Plea Agreement. Mr. Cline was prepared to defend his request based on the fact that the Real Property (building and land) Asset Forfeiture was not listed in the records of items seized in -42-
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the raid, nor was there ever any posting by either the officers or the City Attorney that the building and land were considered part of the seized items. In addition, the TRO that the City had requested had been denied which meant that I was not party to my tenant's business operations, I had incompetent legal representation when I entered into the Plea Agreement and finally, neither Mr. Skeels nor Judge Cano had made me aware that the consequence of signing the Plea Agreement was the forfeiture of my Real Property, which was valued at approximately \(\$ 500,000\) based on fair market value comparisons and up to 10 times that should it ever qualify for a licensed MMCC business.
139. I did not feel that Judge Cano would react well to what Mr. Cline was prepared to present to her if we did not reach a settlement and, if Mr. Skeels could be persuaded to relax his demands, it may not be necessary to do so.
140. After consideration, Mr. Skeels suggested that the amount be reduced to \(\$ 50,000\). Mr. Cline told him he would convey that message to me and get back to him. I felt that \(\$ 50,000\) was still outrageous in light of the reasons that Mr. Cline had presented to Mr. Skeels earlier, but when I considered the potential legal fees should this matter go to trial, I told Mr. Cline to return to Mr. Skeels with an offer of \(\$ 10,000\) but with an authorization limit of \(\$ 25,000\) should an increase be necessary.
141. Mr. Skeels rejected the offer of \(\$ 10,000\) and said we would have to agree to an amount closer to the \(\$ 50,000\) they were seeking, or this would go to trial. With that, Mr. Cline provided Mr. Skeels with our best and final offer of \(\$ 25,000\) and advised Mr. Skeels that, should that amount be unacceptable, we were prepared to go to trial and win based on the merits of our case.
142. Mr. Skeels accepted the \(\$ 25,000\) offer and the matter was turned back over to David Demian at FTB for finalization of the terms and document exchange. On October 4, 2017 a Stipulation for Judgement was executed showing the listed seized items from the raid and a
\(\$ 25,000\) payment for full satisfaction on my Real Property, which they had listed as 6176 6184 Federal Blvd. I only own the 6176 Federal Blvd property but the Stipulated Judgement also covered the rental property I had next door.
143. On January 2, 2018 I made the \(\$ 25,000\) payment to the City per the terms of the Stipulated Judgement using borrowed money.
144. What I take from this is that Mr. Skeels has now set a precedent in that a City can include the Real Property of the land owner in their seized assets regardless of whether or not that landowner had anything to do with the business their tenant was operating. While he wanted as much as he could get from me, it was more important to show those other prosecuting attorneys that this was a way of forcing landlords to assure their tenants were properly licensed when it comes to an MMCC dispensary. Landlords are now going to have to be those traffic cops which means that if the tenant has a license and then loses it during the course of the tenancy, that landlord may face the same asset seizure and forfeiture actions that I did, whether or not they were aware of their tenant's actions.

\section*{LARRY GERACI}
145. In late September 2016 I received a phone call from Mr. Larry Geraci. I had never met or heard of Mr. Geraci prior to that call. The purpose of Mr. Geraci's call was to inform me that he had become aware of my property from what he had seen from the Pure Meds situation and he wanted to know if I would be interested in selling him the property for the purposes of opening a licensed MMCC.
146. I told Mr. Geraci that the City had rezoned the property and that it was my understanding that it would no longer qualify for an MMCC business. Mr. Geraci told me that that was not necessarily the case and he would like me to consider what he had to say in a meeting that would be held at his office. I agreed to the meeting and met him in his office within a few days of his initial call.
147. I found that Mr. Geraci was a professional Financial Planner who operated out of nice offices in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. He told me that his core business was Financial and Tax Planning and that he represented clients in his professional capacity as an Enrolled Agent. Mr. Geraci was also a real estate investor/developer and one of his investments was buying specific properties in locations that can be converted into MMCC retail cannabis businesses.
148. I asked Mr. Geraci how many MMCC businesses he had in operation and he told me that he had multiple MMCC businesses whereby he would finance the purchase of the property and pay for the licensing to get the business MMCC compliant. Once completed, he would have others own and operate the MMCC business and he would get an ongoing equity position in that business. Mr. Geraci told me he preferred to remain in the background on these transactions since the perception of him being directly involved in cannabis business may harm his other business enterprises. That did not come as a surprise to me and I accepted that statement on face value.
149. Regarding the rezoning of my property, which from my understanding would now make my property ineligible for an MMCC business, Mr. Geraci told me that he had special knowledge and influence that would allow him to get my property through that process by having it rezoned back into an MMCC compliant zone and then submitting the CUP application so the MMCC could be run on that specific property. If anyone else had been telling me this, I would have not believed them but Mr. Geraci appeared to have the relationships, experience and financial wherewithal to make something like this happen. As he was a licensed financial professional who is held to the highest fiduciary standards, I was interested in pursuing these negotiations with him to see where they might lead.
150. At the time we were discussing his special relationships that would assist in getting my property rezoned to an MMCC compliant zone, I was completely unaware that the City -45 -
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of San Diego, which had rezoned my property to an ineligible MMCC compliant zone in January of 2016 while they were building a case against me and Pure Meds, had, once Pure Meds was shut down, once again rezoned the area and my property in April of 2016 without notifying me or any of the other property owners in the area.
151. Mr. Geraci had to have already known this prior to our first meeting in early October 2016 that included discussing his special relationships that could have my property rezoned. He didn't need any special relations as the rezone had already occurred. That's why he knew from the moment he met me that he could get the CUP Application accepted. He just wasn't positive he could get it approved. For that reason, he lied to me about needing to get the rezoning done before he could even submit the CUP Application. Mr. Geraci was a fraud from the moment I met him. I just didn't know that at the time.
152. During that first meeting, Mr. Geraci told me that, due to the issue I had had with having rented to an illegal dispensary, I would need to sell the property to him and he would submit the CUP application in one of his employee's names, Rebecca Berry, because she had a clean record and would not be denied once the process began.
153. Mr. Geraci asked me how much I would want for the property and I told him I would agree to \(\$ 800,000\) as long as I got an equity position in the monthly MMCC sales that amounted to \(\$ 10,000\) or \(10 \%\) of the net profits, whichever was greater and he agreed to that.
154. During October 2016 I met with Mr. Geraci at his office on several more occasions. We discussed in detail how, in addition to whatever he was willing to do to purchase and develop my 6176 property, I was interested in having him assist me in identifying other properties where I could expand my work with 151 Farms. Like Ray before him, I wanted him to understand that the only reason I wanted to sell the property was so that I could afford to move into a larger property. I had no interest in owning or -46-
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managing an MMCC business so if that side of the equation worked for him, within the terms and conditions we agreed to, I could stay focused on my goals with 151 Farms. It was to be a win/win situation for the both of us. Mr. Geraci agreed to that and I told him I would draft a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that would act as a working document to memorialize this conversation and serve as the basis of our agreement once his lawyer had prepared it.
155. We had orally agreed to, among other things, a sales price of \(\$ 800,000\) for the property contingent upon him obtaining the MMCC CUP approval from the City of San Diego and that was memorialized in the MOU I created and sent to Mr. Geraci. Upon approval of the MMCC CUP, the payments would be split into \(\$ 400,000\) for me and another \(\$ 400,000\) for Inda-Gro for relocation of the business. The terms for the relocation of the business were spelled out in a second working document I called the Service Contract. That Service Contract was sent along with the MOU and required that Mr. Geraci, if he were to actually acquire the property upon Approval of the CUP Application, would grant Inda-Gro the right to remain on the property at no rent until the plans were completed and accepted by the City of San Diego Development Services and he was ready to begin construction on the new MMCC. While Mr. Geraci never acknowledged either of my working documents in writing, he told me over the phone that he was fine with them and that they would be incorporated into a contract that his lawyer would prepare and I could make changes to the contract before we consummated our deal.
156. While I was waiting for his lawyer to send me the contract, Mr. Geraci asked me to come into his office on October 31, 2016. It was at this meeting that Mr. Geraci asked me to sign a City of San Diego CUP application form which listed Rebecca Berry as the qualifying applicant. Rebecca Barry was not present when I signed this and to my knowledge I have never even met her. Mr. Geraci told me he wanted this signed in preparation for when the
rezoning had been completed and the CUP Application could be submitted. According to him, it would not and could not be submitted until the rezoning had taken place.
157. During our phone calls Mr. Geraci told me that the terms I had outlined in the MOU and Service Agreement were acceptable and that he would have his lawyer prepare a contract that would include these terms and that a \(\$ 50,000\) non-refundable deposit which would not be contingent on the City of San Diego MMCC CUP approval would be paid at the time we signed that contract.
158. Mr. Geraci told me that, in anticipation of the contract, he would like to immediately begin the process of getting the property rezoned so that the CUP application could be submitted, and he could pay me the entire \(\$ 50,000\) as we had agreed.
159. Mr. Geraci told me that he would like me to stop by his office and sign a receipt for \(\$ 10,000\) which would be applied toward the \(\$ 50,000\) earnest money. He also told me that this signed receipt would allow him and/or his agents to begin the process of getting the City to rezone the property. The plan that Mr. Geraci had was that the rezoning might take 4-6 weeks and he did not want to pay the entire \(\$ 50,000\) until the rezoning had occurred and the CUP application could be submitted. This seemed reasonable to me and we set a meeting for November 2, 2016 in his office.
160. On November 2, 2016 when I arrived at the scheduled meeting with Mr. Geraci, he told me that he had already begun the initial process of getting the property rezoned and that the CUP application may be ready in as little as 2 weeks. With that, he had me sign a 3 sentence document that I considered a receipt which stated the \(\$ 800,000\) sales price and that 1 was accepting the \(\$ 10,000\) in a cash payment from him. He had a Notary Public certify that it was my signature on the document. What I was signing was not any sort of contract that held the terms we had discussed in my MOU and Service Agreement. It was most certainly not a Real Estate Contract as required by California law and Mr. Geraci, who held - 48 -

CA Real Estate License number 01141323 , knew that. During our meeting Mr. Geraci did not try to represent this as a final contract but as a receipt to get the rezoning process underway. I did not sense that he was trying to pull one over on me and felt that, in a professional capacity, he would not attempt something like that. I believed him and looked forward to seeing him make the things happen he said he and he alone had the skill sets to do. Nonetheless, when I got back to my office, I felt as though I should send him an email that would memorialize what was said to me when I signed that receipt.
161. Within hours of having signed the receipt I sent Mr. Geraci that email in which I asked him to acknowledge, in an email response, that what I just signed was not meant to be a final contract between us. Shortly thereafter I received his response stating that he had "no problem, no problem at all" acknowledging that this was not the final contract. Mr. Geraci's response to my email reassured me that he was operating in good faith and that the process, in the order he had described to me, had begun.
162. On November \(15,2016 \mathrm{Mr}\). Geraci asked me to sign another document that would allow me, as the property owner, to authorize his architect, Mr. Abhay Schweitzer, to view and copy records at the County of San Diego Tax Assessor's Office of Building Records. Signing that document requested by Mr. Geraci further led me to believe that I was the property owner until such time that the CUP Application was granted and I would sell the property to Mr. Geraci.
163. Over the course of the next several weeks I would, through phone conversations and various texts and emails, of which I have copies, inquire as to how the rezoning process was coming along. Mr. Geraci always responded that, while they were making progress, the rezoning had not yet been completed. He told me to be patient and that it would happen. He also said that he had a team working on this and that he had spent large sums of money, in all the right places, to see that the property would get rezoned. Again, I had no reason to
doubt him since he had professional credentials and fiduciary duties that I believed would have prevented him from lying. One thing, however, was certain. The original 2 weeks had expired, and I had not yet been paid the remaining \(\$ 40,000\) that he had promised.
164. In February 2017 I had several other parties contact me and inquire if my property was available for purchase. Those parties told me that my property was unique in that it fit the necessary requirements for an MMCC business. Each of these parties also told me that they too had special skills and connections that would ensure that this property was approved for an MMCC business. This made me wonder how many more people in the cannabis business had found out about my property. Had Mr. Geraci managed to get the rezoning done and just not told me so he wouldn't have to pay the \(\$ 40,000\) balance on the non-refundable deposit? Since I didn't know for sure what I had in Mr. Geraci, I told those interested in the property to submit written offers of which I received two that were worth considerably more than the offer that Mr. Geraci had made me. If I found that Mr. Geraci was not acting in good faith, I would have other offers to fall back on if the situation required it.
165. In February 2017, after still not receiving the contract that Mr. Geraci had promised me in November 2016, I demanded that he send it to me. It was becoming obvious that he was engaging in delay tactics and I wasn't sure why.
166. This got him moving and in late February 2017 I got a contract that his lawyer, Gina Austin of the Austin Law Group, had prepared on his behalf which I guess he expected me to sign without reading. This contract missed most of the elements that were in the MOU and Service Agreement, not the least of which was that in consideration for the sales price I had set, I would receive \(10 \%\) of the store's monthly net profits or \(\$ 10,000\) per month, whichever was greater. My radar was on full alert.
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167. I texted Mr. Geraci to ask if his lawyer had even read my MOU and the Service Agreement, the terms of which Mr. Geraci had agreed to include in the final contract, and he told me that she must have made a mistake and missed them in that draft. Mr. Geraci apologized and told me that he had not read the contract that Ms. Austin had prepared and that she had the working documents necessary to prepare our contract. With that, Mr. Geraci assured me that the revised version would include those terms and to expect it within a few days.
168. On March 3, 2016, I received the Side Agreement to his Contract and, while it did include more of the MOU and Service Agreement terms that Mr. Geraci and I had agreed to in our conversations, it still fell woefully short of what had been agreed to in my working documents which, per Mr. Geraci, his counsel had to work from. Ms. Austin had incorporated the \(10 \%\) or \(\$ 10,000\) language but there was still highly prejudicial language in the Side Agreement that I found unacceptable and was in no way was in the spirit of our early negotiations. For example, Ms. Austin called the \(\$ 10,000\) payment "the total agreed to amount" and stated that even that would have to be returned to Mr. Geraci in the event the CUP Application was not approved. This was not going well.
169. In addition to the obvious problems I was seeing from the contracts that Ms. Austin had prepared, Mr. Geraci was now requesting that we reduce the agreed upon \(\$ 10,000\) a month to \(\$ 5,000\) a month for 6 months until after the store had opened and they started to get some market share. It was now apparent to me that I needed to get to the bottom of this and verify whatever it was that Mr. Geraci had been telling me. What more evidence could there possibly be showing that the monthly equity stake was an integral term of the agreement we actually made months prior!?!
170. At this point it didn't matter what Mr. Geraci told me. What the contract prepared by Ms. Austin now proffered was that the \(\$ 10,000\) paid by Mr. Geraci was the total deposit -51-
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amount that was going to be paid. It was apparent that no matter what, Mr. Geraci was not to be trusted and he was running the clock and using his lawyer, Ms. Austin, as tools to defraud me of my property as the terms we had originally agreed upon were no longer acceptable to him. Nonetheless I had to know the current status of my property zoning to see where I stood.
171. Around March 15, 2017 I_decided to call the City of San Diego Development Services to find out for myself if my property had been rezoned back to an MMCC compliant zone or if, as Mr. Geraci kept telling me, it was still in process and the CUP had not yet been submitted. What I found out was astounding!
172. Ms. Firouzeh Tirandazi, Development Project Manager for the City of San Diego Development Services told me that my property had been rezoned to an MMCC compliant zone in April 2016.
173. Mr. Geraci had been lying to me since the beginning. When he had me sign the CUP application listing Rebecca Berry as the qualifying applicant in October 2016 he knew then that the rezoning had occurred and that he could submit the CUP Application immediately. And that's exactly what he did.
174. Per Ms. Tirandazi, the CUP Application with Ms. Berry's name on it that Mr. Geraci had me sign was submitted on October 31, 2016, just days before I signed his receipt of the \(\$ 10,000\) which I was paid on November 2,2016 . Mr. Geraci had needed me to sign that document so he could, at some point in tlie future, argue that the document I signed on November 2, 2016 was the one and only contract. Mr. Geraci had never intended to honor the terms to which we had agreed in my MOU and Service Agreement.
175. After my call to Ms. Tirandazi, I contacted Ms. Berry and Mr. Geraci to tell them that I had contacted her and now knew that Mr. Geraci had been lying to me all along and
that I had just discovered his fraud. Mr. Geraci contacted me by text to ask for a face-toface meeting.
176. On March 17, 2017 in an email I sent to Mr. Geraci, I declined his request for another face-to-face meeting and stipulated that all future communications between us be in writing. I demanded that he honor the terms of our MOU and Service Agreement, that the \(\$ 40,000\) balance of the non-refundable \(\$ 50,000\) be paid immediately and that, regarding the \(\$ 10,000\) or \(10 \%\) of the net profits, whichever was greater, we agree to use a 3rd party accountant to assure proper distribution. I required that Mr. Geraci accept these terms in writing no later than March 20, 2017 at 12:00 or I would cease any further business with him.
177. On March 21, 2017, having received no response from Mr. Geraci, I sold my property to Richard J. Martin for \(\$ 2,000,000\) and a guaranteed \(20 \%\) equity in a new MMCC business should it be established. The non-refundable earnest money was \(\$ 100,000\), which I have long since expended to use to pay legal fees I had incurred in the matter with Mr . Geraci. Unlike Mr. Geraci's so called contract, the sales contract with Mr. Martin was done on a notarized Commercial Property Purchase Agreement with an Addendum that acknowledged my MOU and the terms 1 set forth within it.
178. Also on March 21, 2017, after selling the property to Mr. Martin, I went to Development Services to meet with Ms. Tirandazi in person to see if the CUP application that they were processing with Ms. Berry's name on it could be transferred to me or an assignee of mine. Ms. Tirandazi told me that the current CUP Application they had in process for Ms. Berry had been signed by me and that the only way it could be reassigned was if Ms. Berry relinquished her rights to it or a court ordered them to reassign it. I knew that getting Mr. Geraci and Ms. Berry to relinquish their rights to the current CUP application in process was not an option so I asked Ms. Tirandazi if I could submit another

CUP application to run concurrent with the application in Ms. Berry's name. This way my application would already be in process once the City figured out that neither Mr. Geraci nor Ms. Berry had a Grant Deed in their name. Ms. Tirandazi told me that the City of San Diego's policy was that only one CUP application per address would be accepted and that, as Ms. Berry's was already being processed, I could not submit one at that time. Since I now knew that Mr. Geraci and Ms. Berry were not going to get final approval on the CUP without a Grant Deed in their name, I had to consider my legal options.
179. On March 22, 2017 I received a letter from Mr. Geraci's new attorney, Michael Weinstein, informing me that as a result of my having contacted Ms. Tirandazi to see about having Ms. Berry's CUP application reassigned, Mr. Geraci had instructed Mr. Weinstein to file a Lis Pendens on my property and a lawsuit against me seeking to have me honor what Mr. Geraci now considered to be the "end all be all contract" I had signed with him on November 2, 2016. While Mr. Weinstein threatened me with the great harm that would befall me should this matter go to trial, he also encouraged me to negotiate with them as he stated there was still time to do so. Because I had not received a response from Mr. Geraci by the deadline I had given him of March 20, 2017 and having subsequently sold the property to Mr. Martin, 1 had no intention of negotiating anything further with either Mr . Geraci or Mr. Weinstein.
180. Until I could resolve the CUP issue with the City of San Diego for what would now be the new property owner, Mr. Martin, I needed to see if there was a way to maintain the status of Ms. Berry's CUP application, so I wouldn't waste time submitting another application after Ms. Berry's application was deemed incomplete because the Grant Deed would never be in her or Mr. Geraci's name. As far as my hope to negotiate settlement involving Mr. Geraci relinquishing his rights to Ms. Berry's CUP, telling Mr. Weinstein that I had sold the property to Mr. Martin was not a good strategy.
181. On May 9, 2017 in an email Mr. Weinstein suggested a settlement whereby Mr. Geraci would, among other things, increase his offer to purchase the property to \(\$ 925,000\) and pay the \(\$ 50,000\) non-refundable earnest money but I would have no equity position in the new dispensary and, while Ms. Berry's CUP application was being processed, I would agree to cease all cannabis related cultivation activity on the property within 2 days of signing this agreement.
182. I found the May 9, 2017 settlement offer confusing. Why did Mr. Geraci care if I was cultivating cannabis on site? That had never come up before and now it was a condition of the "improved" settlement offer. Beyond that, Mr. Geraci proved that no matter who he had representing him, he was not to be trusted. There was no mention of the \(10 \%\) equity position with a \(\$ 10,000\) a month guaranteed minimum that was preeminent in our original negotiations. What Mr. Weinstein's settlement offer suggested to me was that, while his client was at his core a snake, something else was motivating him to be concerned about what my current activities entailed. I had seen and heard enough.
183. On May 12, 2017 I filed a Pro Se cross complaint thinking that that might convince Mr. Geraci to back down from what, in my mind, was an unwinnable situation for him regarding the purchase of my property. It did not, however, have that effect so I requested that David Demian represent me and take the case over.
184. On June 29, 2017 I filed a Notice of Substitution naming David Demian as new counsel on my behalf.
185. On September \(28,2017 \mathrm{Mr}\). Weinstein filed a Notice of Demurrer/Motion to Strike which was his attempt to limit the underlying agreements of my case to the single 3 sentence document I had signed on November 2, 2016 as the only document that should be
considered. He did not want anything else that transpired between me and Mr. Geraci to be considered.
186. On October 24, 2017 Judge Wohlfield issued a Tentative Ruling denying the Demurrer which was good news for me since my supporting documents against Mr. Geraci were primarily supported by the written communications that occurred after the November 2, 2017 document was signed.
187. With the Demurrer having been denied, my next concern was that the likelihood of Mr. Geraci getting the property after all the evidence was heard had to be of grave concern to him. If he were not to acquire the property, then all the work he was doing on the CUP application would be for naught and he would suffer financially. It is not unreasonable to think that Mr. Geraci might try to cut his losses by having Ms. Berry's CUP, which he completely controlled, purposely denied by instructing his agent(s) to create a scenario wherein that would be the result. In other words, if Mr. Geraci can't have this MMCC dispensary, no one else will either.
188. Should Mr. Geraci decide to sabotage Ms. Berry's CUP application, it would create a huge financial loss for both me and for Mr. Martin. I had to do something to protect my interests in the property by seeking protection from the court. By having the court appoint a Receiver who would give them oversight into what was happening on Ms. Berry's CUP, it would assure that the CUP process is followed and maintained. If Mr. Geraci felt he was going to prevail on the Breach of Contract claim he had against me, he would have not been opposed to my seeking a Temporary Restraining Order against him that would afford me this protection. That was not the case.
189. On December 7, 2017 Mr . Demian had a Writ of Mandate seeking to shorten the time to trial and a Temporary Restraining Order hearing whereby I would be protected if Mr. Geraci decided it was in his best financial interests to sabotage Ms. Berry's CUP as - 56 -
opposed to losing the Breach of Contract case he had against me now that his Demurrer had been denied and all of the evidence subsequent to the November 2, 2017 document would come into consideration. We believed that while our request for a Writ of Mandate may not be granted, the TRO would be granted.
190. Mr. Demian had 4 or 5 relevant arguments contained within his Points and Authorities in his TRO motion that were cogent and compelling to the court in granting the TRO (none of the relevant arguments towards granting the requested relief were apparently raised by him). Furthermore, Mr. Weinstein should have had no opposition to our request for a TRO if Mr. Geraci actually believed he would prevail in the Breach of Contract suit against me and he would be awarded the property under the terms of the November 2, 2017 document I signed. If, on the other hand, Mr. Geraci actually believed that he would lose the Breach of Contract suit now that all the evidence would be heard then Mr. Geraci knew he had to vigorously oppose our request for a TRO or he would not have an opportunity to sabotage Ms. Berry's CUP which was in process with the City of San Diego Development Services and in his complete control.
191. In making his decision on the TRO motion, Judge Wohlfield listened to the oral arguments raised by Mr. Weinstein and Mr. Demian. Mr. Demian only raised the least relevant point in his oral arguments before Judge Wohlfield, stating that we should be granted the TRO based entirely on the constitutional protections that are fundamental to property owners maintaining control of their property. The only reason Mr. Demian raised that singular point and not the others is because this was the point he was most familiar with from having successfully argued it in a similar case for another client. Mr. Demian was not prepared to argue the other, more pertinent issues relevant to my case in front of the court. Had Mr. Demian's oral arguments included a reference to Judge Wohlfied's previous ruling on the Demurrer and shown the real harm in not having the TRO for his client's court
supervised protection, it would have been simply a matter of Judge Wohlfield supporting his previous position in denying the Demurrer and looking at ANY of the supporting evidence that Mr. Demian would have asked him to reference prior to making his decision. Mr. Demian did none of that while Mr. Weinstein successfully argued that the TRO was not necessary as it could potentially harm Ms. Berry's CUP process and that Mr. Geraci was going to win the Breach of Contract case based solely on the November 2, 2017 document that 1 had signed.
192. Judge Wohlfield denied the TRO on the grounds that Mr. Demian had not provided him with sufficient evidence to warrant the court's protection of me prior to this matter being settled in trial.
193. Immediately after the hearing, Mr. Joe Hurtado who, as my litigation investor, was present to ensure that both my and Mr. Martin's legal interests were being protected met Mr. Demian in the hallway outside the courtroom. Mr. Hurtado was livid. Having the TRO denied due to the incompetence Mr. Demian had shown in the courtroom was egregious. For Mr. Demian not to bring the essential elements of the motion to Judge Wohlfield's attention while Mr. Weinstein successfully argued their Breach of Contract case was, according to Mr. Hurtado, "the worst performance he had ever seen by a lawyer!" Mr. Demian looked down at his shoes and mumbled something about how he had tried and had to leave to go to another meeting.
194. After Mr. Demian left, Mr. Hurtado called to tell me what had happened. I was livid too. There was no excusing Mr. Demian's performance. I immediately called Mr. Demian to hear for myself what he felt went wrong and he told me that "it did not go as he had hoped." With that Mr. Demian told me he thought this would be a good time for me to seek altemative counsel and informed me he would be withdrawing from the case.
195. On December 12, 2017, representing myself, I had a hearing in front of Judge Wohlfield for a Motion to Reconsider his ruling on the TRO. While I am not an attorney, I was fully prepared to argue the supporting elements of the motion that Mr. Demian had not raised and felt it would give the court the opportunity to see why I had an immediate interest in seeking court supervised protection through the TRO.
196. I arrived at the hearing and was immediately told by Judge Wohlfield, before I could even speak, that he was denying my Motion for Reconsideration on procedural grounds. I was not allowed to say anything. Mr. Weinstein applauded the denial stating that the Writ of Mandate was due to be heard on January 26, 2017 and having a TRO granted prior to that hearing was unnecessary. What I was not given the opportunity to say was that the reason I was there and representing myself was that if the court didn't intervene on my behalf immediately, the harm that Mr. Geraci could cause me would be done before that hearing. 197. When I walked out of the courtroom I felt like the world was closing in around me. I started feeling dizzy and had a hard time standing or even speaking. I thought it was temporary but since I was prone to seizures, I decided to go the hospital and have myself checked out. I did and was told was that I had suffered a Transient Ischemic Attack (TIA). A TIA is a mini-stroke which is caused when stress creates loss of blood to the brain. I am hoping I don't ever have another one of these as I felt helpless in its grasp.
198. I did not agree with Judge Wohlfield's decision. I did not feel that he had considered the elements which supported my urgency to be granted the TRO. In the interest of protecting myself from the harm Mr . Geraci was capable of inflicting on me, I had no choice but to seek an Appellate Court ruling on my TRO motion wherein they would consider all the facts and supporting evidence that Judge Wohlfield had not considered when denying me that protection.
199. On December 18, 2017 I filed a Notice with the Court that I will be appealing Judge Wohlfield's decision and will be requesting that the matter be expedited due to its urgency. 200. With everything I have been going through legally, the stresses that I find myself under have affected my health and those opportunities that I might have pursued for myself, my loved ones and my employees. I no longer sleep through the night and have anxiety attacks that are difficult to manage. I have had heart palpitations. I find that my focus and attention to the details necessary to run my business have suffered. My personal and professional relationships are in jeopardy.
201. In addition to the legal issues I'm dealing with, I have tried to maintain my Inda-Gro lighting business by introducing a new LED Grow light to our lineup for which I have applied for a provisional patent. Developing this new light and the software and controls that will run it have been somewhat cathartic in that it takes my mind off of the legal issues I'm confronting but by no means am I able to give Inda-Gro the attention it deserves when I'm consumed with the stresses I face daily as a result of Mr. Geraci and the pressure he has put on me.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED: /-20-18


I, DON CASEY, hereby declare as follows:
I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what \(I\) have written in this declaration.
1. In my career, I have been a collegiate basketball coach at Temple University, an NBA coach for the Los Angeles Clippers and the New Jersey Nets. I have also worked as an assistant coach with the Chicago Bulls (1982-1983) and Boston Celtics (1990-1996).
2. From 1993-2000 I was the vice-chairman of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports and was personally appointed by President Clinton.
3. Currently I am a board member and National Trustee for the ALS Foundation \({ }^{1}\).
4. After meeting and befriending Mr. Cotton, he has been working extensively on developing a very specifically genetically engineered strain of cannabis designed for those suffering from ALS.
5. He is calling this strain the "Casey Cut" as a tribute to my mother who died of ALS in 1969; it was a joint endeavor to help those suffering from this neurodegenerative disease.
6. Because of Darryl's efforts to aid those with ALS, I strongly support him and 151 Farms. I have brought ALS patients to whom Darryl has provided cannabis products at no charge in an attempt to alleviate their pain and suffering.
7. The goal of developing a highly concentrated cannabidiol strain of cannabis has the purpose of helping alleviate the pain and adverse effects ALS patients contend with while working to help repair the underlying neurodegenerative conditions that these patients suffer from.
\({ }^{1}\) Based in Washington, D.C., the ALS Association coordinates the federal and state advocacy programs, works dircetly with Congress, the White House, other federal agencies and other national organizations, and provides training and support for ALS Association advocates.

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Supporting Declaration
8. About a year ago Darryl told me he was selling his property for 2 million dollars. Now, I am finding out that not only is that not happening, there is litigation holding up his business prospects.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

1. I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
2. I have been HIV positive for over 30 years.
3. In 2009 I developed debilitating skin cancer. That is when I became familiar with the medical cannabis community.
4. I have elected to treat my HIV and cancer exclusively through using cannabis oil extracts and other cannabis-based derivatives.
5. Mr. Cotton has wonderful ethics and his moral compass is unparalleled. Having become familiar with people of all walks of life in the marijuana industry, I find Mr. Cotton to be in stark contrast to many of the characters I have come across. I have found most establishments are not actually patient-oriented and some seem borderline criminal. Greed, profit and self-serving platitudes are the rule despite the reality of patients' needs and the purpose behind Prop. 215 and the spirit behind people's support for Prop 64.
6. Let me be clear, Mr. Cotton is fully committed to helping people with a laser-focus on the medicinal purposes and benefits of cannabis specifically tailored to increasing the therapeutic benefits to those of us with chronic and terminal diseases.
7. Just this week I have had a severe flare up with my cancer and I don't know if I will be alive long enough to hear the results of Mr. Cotton's case. But what I do know is that Mr. Cotton and his dedication to helping people that are suffering is genuine and the relief that he helps provide is a comfort and a service that at this time hospitals simply do not provide.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct:

1/4/2018
Is/Michael McShane
(MICHAEL KEVIN MCSHANE)
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Supporting Declaration

I, Shawna Salazar, hereby declare:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
2. I met Darryl in 1999 when he was the proprietor of Fleet Electrical and I was hired to work as a dispatcher for his company.
3. Over time I got to know Darryl on a personal level and we became close to the point where we began dating and our relationship evolved into a personal one.
4. I am proud to say that we have now been in an exclusive personal relationship for over 17 years and I continue to work with him in his business ventures as my assistance is required.
5. As I know Darryl on both a personal and professional level, I am in a unique position to speak to how passionate he is in any venture he decides to pursue.
6. In 2010 he began focusing much of his attention and resources towards plant lighting and opened Inda-Gro, which manufactured induction grow lights. I saw that company grow in size and stature until he recognized that induction technology was being phased out and decided to expand the product line into LED plant lighting.
7. It has always been personally rewarding to see Darryl create these products and see his pride in knowing that the plant quality is improved based on his designs. This is especially true when it comes to medical cannabis since Darryl uses it personally to help combat his own condition of nocturnal seizures.
8. Many people have toured 151 Farms. This farm was created to not only prove our new products but to show the community how energy and water savings can be employed in an urban garden environment. Darryl's dream has always been to take this model to a larger audience and expand to a larger facility.
9. When Darryl told me in September 2016 about the property being sold to a businessman named Larry Geraci, I was at first hesitant as to what the impact would be on our business
and the employees that worked here. Darryl relieved me of those concerns when he told me that with the Geraci purchase we not only would we have a good deal on the property but that because Geraci was involved in other real estate ventures he would help to make us aware of a larger property that would serve to meet our future needs. Sadly, that has not been the case.
10. The stresses that the failed Geraci negotiations and subsequent litigation have put Darryl under have been indescribably hard to watch.
11. I have seen Darryl go from a happy, outgoing person to one who at times will stare into space and mumble to himself. He is short tempered and not available to those who used to be closest to him.
12. He spends most of his days and even nights at the office trying to fix what he sees as beyond his control.
13. He is fearful of losing everything he has worked for and nothing anyone says or does can bring him any consolation. Frankly, it is a horrible thing to watch and it has led to us not having much of a relationship any more.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. DATED: \(1 / 20 / 18\)


\section*{1, SEAN MAJOR, declare as follows:}
1. I was a sergeant in the United States Marine Corps. I served from 2009 to 2016 including a tour in Afghanistan.
2. I suffered 4 major traumatic brain injuries while in the service and currently suffer from PTSD.
3. Currently, I am prescribed more than 20 different variations of pills. Of all the medications, I find the holistic approach to reap the most benefits. I find far more relief in medical grade cannabis geared towards increasing the yield of cannabinoids proven to have a multitude of medical benefits rather than just high THC to get people "high." This type of medicine is what I see as the most promising future area for further medical and therapeutic research.
4. I believe high-CBD medical cannabis is safer and more effective for veterans' recuperation than pharmaceutical options, and both 1, and Darryl Cotton want to raise awareness and foster change.
5. In October 2015 I became the first, and to-date only, active duty Marine to be approved to use cannabis to treat my medical conditions. Since being granted an approval to use cannabis cultivation as a way to help combat the stresses that 1 have dealt with after having retumed from active service I have been devoted to spreading awareness.
6. Currently, I am in production of a documentary television program that is to be distributed through Netflix.
7. I have had multiple news outlets write articles about me and I speak nationally about organically grown cannabis, the Veteran community, and the positive benefits of cannabis on medical/psychological conditions that affect our wounded warriors.
8. I became acquitted to Darryl Cotton and 151 Farms after hearing the positive things Mr . Cotton is doing in developing sustainable gardens that combine healthy foods to be donated to the community with hops for San Diego's vibrant beer community and medical grade
cannabis for people like myself with legitimate medical needs that are not being adequately addressed by big pharmaceutical companies.
9. I reached out to Darryl and 151 Farms as a way to get involved with their work in growing medical cannabis for those who require it.
10. I have seen first-hand the care Mr. Cotton puts into his passion, which is helping people understand and receive, natural, non-pharmacological healing.
11. Mr. Cotton uses a sustainable method of using a "closed system" irrigation involving fish, to plants (cannabis and vegetables) and he donates the grown food back to poor communities in San Diego.
12. For all the above reasons I see what Mr. Cotton is doing as a service to his community and he is setting an example to the rest of the state on how card-carryings medical recommendation patients should be prioritized while also being socially engaged and aware.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED: January 22,2018
/s/Sean Major Sean Major

I, Cindy Jackson, hereby declare as follows:
I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
1. I have worked as a bookkeeper for Darryl Cotton since 1997. In that time, I have seen him grow from a small, sole proprietor, electrical contractor employing around 6 employees to becoming an incorporated, Union-shop employing more than 90 electricians and a successful equipment rental company.
2. When the economy slowed down in the mid-2000s the need for both companies' products and services dwindled. As a result, Darryl sold off the rental equipment and began to focus on his other passion: plant lighting.
3. In 2010, Darryl created Inda-Gro, and became a manufacturer of induction grow lights. His focus was on creating lights and controls to improve plant response in both quality and yield.
4. This company was especially important to him as it relates to cannabis cultivation since he has needed it to combat some of his own personal medical conditions.
5. In addition to being a businessman of the highest ethical standards, Darryl has always been interested in patients' rights and their access to medical cannabis. It is for this reason he has invested countless hours and money into seeing that all those who require fresh food and medical grade cannabis have the tools and the legal resources to do so.
6. Having known Darryl for as long as I have, I can honestly say that the Darryl I used to know is not the same person that I see today.
7. Ever since Darryl met Larry Geraci, he was led to believe that the purchase of the property at 6176 Fed. Blvd. would help Darryl expand operations and pursue greater opportunities.
8. The current legal entanglements with Mr. Geraci have caused Darryl and those of us who have been loyal to him and his causes stresses that are impossible to fully describe.
9. These extreme stresses, brought on by this litigation, are causing Darryl great physical, emotional, and financial harm that affects his ability to conduct business or plan on future endeavors. If there is any remedy that the court might provide to protect Mr. Cotton and his rights within the law, I would pray that the court do so.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED:



I, James Whitfield, hereby declare:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
2. I am 67 years old, a Navy veteran and I served my country for 20 years, 3 months and 14 days. As a result of my military service, I suffer from severe back, neck and leg pain.
3. Pharmaceutical drugs have not been at all useful in the repair or recovery of my painful conditions.
4. The one thing that does provide me with a great deal of relief is the regular use of organically grown medical cannabis which I began using rather than the opiates that had been prescribed to me. All the painkillers I was given were addictive and kept me from being able to maintain a solid and consistent coherency.
5. I have known Darryl Cotton and 151 Farms for nearly 20 years now. I support their ongoing efforts to educate others on the importance of having fresh food and cannabis available to those who seek it.
6. It has been extremely important for me to have access to fresh food and genetically specific cannabis to help alleviate my pain and suffering. As such, cannabis remains an important lifeline for me on a daily basis.
7. I fully support Darryl Cotton and his efforts to promote laws, policies and regulations that serve to protect patients' rights and access to medical-grade cannabis as a treatment for medical, physical and psychological conditions.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

- 1 -

I, Michael Scott McKim, hereby declare:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts \(I\) state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
2. I am a San Diego native.
3. I am a heavy equipment operator and have been a cannabis farmer for 20 years.
4. I have been the senior farm manager at many licensed mid-to-large cannabis farms in Northern California. As such, I have gained tremendous insight into the evolving business of cannabis as well as how the plant is grown and processed.
5. I left Northern California to look for likeminded farmers that value organically grown plants that would not potentially harm the medical cannabis patient as I became aware that the industry is becoming increasingly about making a profit and that plant quality and patients' needs are no longer priorities.
6. I was introduced to Darryl Cotton and 151 Farms in August 2017. I was so impressed with his passion, education and vision that I immediately offered to help him in any way I could.
7. Darryl has worked tirelessly in promoting these urban farms as a way to educate the community about the benefits of organically grown food, hops and medicine.
8. Darryl is a man of his word and he is driven by a sense of purpose that you rarely see in people. It is his vision to expand 151 Farms to larger markets that has given me a good sense of my own future opportunities.
9. I can see that Darryl is in a stressful legal battle with someone who apparently seeks to take advantage of Darryl by acquiring his property and benefitting from the notoriety that Darryl has created with 151 Farms in the urban farming community.
10. Recently Darryl has become extremely stressed out and not as available as he used to be. Clearly something must be done and I hope that there are legal mechanisms that can protect Darryl and those of us who share his passion and dreams.
- 1 -

Supporting Declaration

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
\(\qquad\)


1, Cheryl Morrow, hereby declare:
I have personal knowledge of the faets I state below, and if I were to be called as a witness, I could competently testify about what I have written in this declaration.
1. I am Editor-in-Chief of the San Diego Monitor News and have proudly been a consistent community supporter for 27 years. I have witnessed numerous valued activities with 151 Farms personally and have become a strong advocate.
2. Since Darryl Cotton and 151 Farms have come to my awareness, I have frequented the farm and have recommended the farm's usage to many San Diego residents with health issues. It only makes sense to support a system that gives alternatives of fresh food and environmental solutions as well as promoting health benefits to a community that has been ravaged by poor health options and poor food options. The public has grown dependent on our sound wellness options in pursuit of a healthier lifestyle and I have knowledge of these options as an urban garden advocate along with my many years in the cosmetics industry.
3. I have grown to trust Darryl Cotton with his superior knowledge on medical cannabis law and I respect his abiding by state and local government requirements. Ethically speaking, I feel that 151 Farms is the best model in the country and should be considered a model for all cannabis endeavors. Individuals who seek interest in this industry should seek out what Darryl Cotton has done with his undying courage and extremely time-consuming devotion.
4. I have seen many changes in growing techniques over the last few years and 151 Farms is the product of many farms that are adding value to their communities all over the world. I have seen people from abroad take tours of the farm who have been astounded by 151 Farms' sophistication while delivering compassion for its patients.
5. It is obvious that the legal actions have taken a toll on Darryl's passion regarding the day to day operations of the farm. However, Darryl is a model citizen in my opinion. My entire family has great respect for those who roll up their sleeves to be a part of the solutions and
not just problems. 151 Farms is a community asset. I have gained a wealth of knowledge about my own health preservation, so in saying all of this... God helps those who help themselves.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
\(\qquad\)
/s/ Cheryl Morrow Cheryl Morrow

Jacob P. Austin, SBN 290303
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Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton
(Representation Limited to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens)

\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION}

LARRY GERACI, an individual, Plaintiff,
vS.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1-10, Inclusive, Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual, Cross-Complainant,
vs.

LARRY GERACI, and individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive,

Cross-Defendants.

\section*{TO EACH PARTY AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL OF RECORD:}

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on April 5, 2018 at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department C-73 of the above-entitled Court located at 330 West Broadway, San Diego, California 92101, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton, by and through his counsel Jacob P. Austin, will appear and move this Court ex parte for an Order Shortening Time for the hearing on Darryl Cotton's Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) (wherein Mr. Cotton will move for an order (i) expunging the lis pendens filed in the above-referenced action and recorded in the official records at Office of the Recorder of San Diego County as Instrument No. 2017-0129756 on March 22, 2017, and (ii) awarding Defendant/Cross-Complainant reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this motion.); (2) compelling the attendance and testimony of Plaintiff and CrossDefendant Larry Geraci;

The motion is made upon the grounds that, in light of the evidence presented by Plaintiff, the Complaint lacks "probable validity" which can be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

The motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declarations of Darryl Cotton, and Jacob P. Austin, and the Request for Judicial Notice served and filed herewith, the pleadings and records on file in this action, and upon such other and further oral and documentary evidence which may be presented at the hearing on this Motion.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(a), so far as is known to moving party Cotton, the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the attorneys and parties in this case are:
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
Parties & Attorneys \\
Larry Geraci & Michael R. Weinstein \\
& FERRIS \& BRITTON, APC \\
& 501 West Broadway, Suite 1450 \\
& San Diego, CA 92121 \\
& Telephone: (619) 233-3131 \\
& Fax: (619) 232-9316 \\
Rebecca Berry & Michael R. Weinstein \\
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& 501 West Broadway, Suite 1450 \\
& San Diego, CA 92121 \\
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& Fax: (619) 232-9316 \\
&
\end{tabular}

\author{
Darryl Cotton Jacob P. Austin \\ (Representation Limited to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens) THE LAW OFFICE OF JACOB AUSTIN \\ 1455 Frazee Road, \#500 \\ San Diego, CA 92108 \\ Telephone: (619) 357-6850 \\ Fax: (888) 357-8501
}

This Application is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 and California Rules of Court, Rules 3.1200 through 3.1207, and 2.5.11, and based upon this Application, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declaration of Jacob P. Austin and Request for Judicial Notice in support hereof, the pleadings and records on file in this action, and upon such other and further oral and documentary evidence which may be presented at the hearing on this Motion. Timely notice for this Application was given by undersigned counsel to all parties to this action pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1203(a). (Declaration of Jacob P. Austin at \(\uparrow 4\).)

DATED: April 4, 2018
THE LAW OFFICE OF JACOB AUSTIN
JACOB P. AUSTIN
Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant
DARRYL COTTON

\section*{(Representation Limited to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens)}

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Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton
(Representation limited to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens)

\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION}

LARRY GERACI, an individual,

\section*{Plaintiff,}
vs.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
LARRY GERACI, and individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

\section*{CASE NO. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL}

\section*{MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND} AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDERS: (1) SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING ON DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS); AND (2)
COMPELLING THE ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI

DATE: April 5, 2018 TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: C-73
JUDGE: Honorable Joel R. Wohfeil
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIF LARRY GERACI

Defendant and Cross-Complainant Darryl Cotton ("Cotton") respectfully requests this Court GRANT Cotton's Ex-Parte Application for Order (1) Shortening Time on Cotton's Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) (the " \(\underline{L P}\) "); and (2) to Compel the Attendance and Testimony of Larry Geraci pursuant to CCP \(\S 405.30\) et seq.

\section*{INTRODUCTION}

Summarily, Plaintiff Larry Geraci ("Geraci") filed this action alleging Cotton is in breach of contract for the sale of Cotton's real property (the "Property") to Geraci. In his Complaint, pursuant to which the \(L P\) was filed, Geraci alleges the following four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract ("BOC"); (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Specific Performance; and (4) Declaratory Relief. (RJN 3.) The primary cause of action is the BOC (with the other causes arising therefrom), which is predicated and supported solely on the allegation a document executed on November 2, 2106 is the final written agreement for the purchase of the Property by Geraci (the "Receipt"). As alleged by Geraci in his Complaint: "On November 2, 2016, [Geraci] and [Cotton] entered into a written agreement for the purchase and sale of the [Property] on the terms and conditions stated therein." \({ }^{1}\)

However, that day, when the Receipt was executed, Geraci emailed a scanned copy to Cotton at 3:11 PM. Cotton reviewed it and realized it could be misconstrued as being the "final written agreement" for his Property and that it did not contain material terms (e.g., a \(10 \%\) equity stake in a contemplated business). \({ }^{2}\) Thus, at 6:55 PM later that same day, Cotton replied:

> Thank you for meeting today. Since we executed the Purchase Agreement in your office for the sale price of the property I just noticed the \(\mathbf{1 0 \%}\) equity position in the dispensary was not language added into that document. I just want to make sure that we're not missing that language in any final agreement as it is a factored element in my decision to sell the property. I'll be fine if you would simply acknowledge that here in a reply. [DC Decl. Ex. 1, p. 9 (emphasis added).]

At 9:13 p.m., Geraci replied: "No no problem at all" [Id. (emphasis added) (the "Confirmation Email").] Thus, on the same day that the Receipt was executed, Geraci himself confirmed unequivocally via email that the Receipt, a 3-sentence document, is not the final agreement for the Property. In March of 2017 Cotton found out that Geraci had fraudulently induced him into executing the Receipt and terminated the agreement with Geraci. Thereafter, Geraci filed this suit alleging the above. Cotton filed a Cross-Complaint

\footnotetext{
\({ }^{1}\) Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") Exhibit ("Ex.") 2 (Complaint ("Comp.") ब4.
\({ }^{2}\) Declaration of Darryl Cotton ("DC Decl.") \(\uparrow 19\).
}
to which Geraci demurred arguing the Statute of Frauds ("SOF") and/or the Parol Evidence Rule ("PER") should, inter alia, prevent the admission of the Confirmation Email. This Court properly denied Geraci's demurrer.

However, even assuming, arguendo, the Court had ruled otherwise in the first instance, Geraci's reliance on the SOF and the PER is misplaced. First, "The doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of frauds may be applied where necessary to prevent either unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment." Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 27. Here, as described below, both unconscionable injury and unjust enrichment will occur if Geraci can misrepresent the Receipt as the final agreement for the Property. Second, the PER does not bar evidence of fraudulent promises at variance with terms of the writing: "[I]t was never intended that the parol evidence rule should be used as a shield to prevent the proof of fraud." Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass'n (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1182 (quoting Ferguson v. Koch (1928) 204 Cal. 342, 347). \({ }^{3}\)

Despite the fantastical appearance of this case, the facts are the facts and they make it clear that Geraci is mispresenting the Receipt as the final agreement for the Property. He filed this Complaint with no probable cause to procedurally justify the filing of the \(L P\) on the Property and, thus, achieved his goal of clouding title and preventing the sale of the Property to a bona fide third-party purchaser; every day that this meritless litigation continues in the judicial system is a miscarriage of justice. And "reinforce[s] an already too common perception that the quality of justice a litigant can expect is proportional to the financial means at the litigant's disposal." Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California, 3 Cal. 4th 273, 287, 834 P.2d 119, 127-28 (1992). Geraci is wealthy (described more fully in the motion to expunge) - he has had at least two law firms and three senior attorneys representing him in this action. Cotton is facing severe financial hardship, especially as his only asset, the Property, is inaccessible as a source of capital because of the lis pendens filed against it. (DC Decl.
- 21.\()\)
/ / /
\({ }^{3}\) Notably, the California Supreme Court in Riverisland referenced Tenzer, supra, in reaching its holding: "Tenzer disapproved a 44-year-old line of cases to bring California law into accord with the Restatement Second of Torts, holding that a fraud action is not barred when the allegedly fraudulent promise is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Considerations that were persuasive in Tenzer also support our conclusion here. The Tenzer court decided the Restatement view was better as a matter of policy. [Citation.] It noted the principle that a rule intended to prevent fraud, in that case the statute of frauds, should not be applied so as to facilitate fraud. [Citation.]" Riverisland, supra, at 1183 (emphasis added).

\section*{DISCUSSION}

\section*{Counsel's Ethical Dilemma}

As a threshold issue, for the reasons described below, Counsel for Cotton respectfully requests this Court to please understand the incredibly awkward set of circumstances that necessitate this instant ex-parte motion and the description of the situation as believes it to be. Counsel believes he is ethically obligated to bring forth this motion in defense of his client to prevent immediate and unjustified irreparable harm. However, in advocating for his client, Counsel wants to be incredibly clear: he does not in any manner or form, directly or indirectly, intend to be disrespectful to this Court. Counsel is aware:

An attorney's oath requires that he "discharge the duties of an attorney ... to the best of his knowledge and ability." (Bus. \& Prof. Code, s 6067.) Among such duties, an attorney is required to "maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers," to "employ ... such means only as are consistent with truth," and to "abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." (Bus. \& Prof. Code, §6068, subds. (b), (d) and (f).)
Ramirez v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 402, 412 n12.

Prior to specifically stating Counsel's ethical dilemma, Counsel notes the following, declared under penalty of perjury provided in his supporting declaration herewith:

In preparation for representing Mr. Cotton on his Motion to Expunge the Notice of Action I have, inter alia, reviewed (i) every filing in both of Mr. Cotton's actions with Mr. Geraci (Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL) and the City of San Diego (37-2017-00037675-CU-WM-CTL); (ii) every document produced to and from Mr. Cotton via discovery; (iii) every single email to and from Mr. Cotton's professional and personal email accounts between October 1, 2016 and March 31, 2017; and (iv) interviewed over 17 individuals who were in constant written communications and/or working with Mr. Cotton on a daily basis during the same time period noted and which gave rise to the events leading and related to this action. [(The "Review of All Evidence") (emphasis added).] \({ }^{4}\)
Based on his Review of All Evidence, Counsel believes that it is beyond any reasonable doubt to conclude that this action was brought and maintained without any probable cause. There are numerous evidentiary items disclosed in pleadings and via discovery, whose authenticity are undisputed by Geraci, that Counsel believes each of which should dispositively address the instant action in favor of Cotton (more fully

\footnotetext{
\({ }^{4}\) Declaration of Jacob P. Austin ("JA Decl.") \(\uparrow 3\).
}
described in the motion to expunge the \(L P) .{ }^{5}\) Cotton has, in his pro se filings, consistently alleged the same (albeit in an inconsistent manner, with his arguments being laced with emotional pleas and non-related facts) arguments and facts. \({ }^{6}\) However, because this Court has not issued an Order specifically addressing, identifying or analyzing even one of the pieces of evidence that Counsel believes to be case-dispositive, it is not clear to Counsel, based on review of the record, why this Court has not been persuaded by Cotton's proffered evidence.

In the absence of knowing the reasoning for this Court's decisions, Counsel is left to rely on his review of the record and his understanding of applicable law. Simply and sincerely stated: Counsel finds it incomprehensible, to the point of almost disbelief, that this action has progressed to its current state. Thus, Counsel's ethical dilemma: he cannot reconcile what he believes to be, for the reasons described below, the following five facts:
1. This action was brought by Geraci without probable cause to procedurally justify the filing of the \(L P\) that was meant to (i) prevent the sale of Cotton's Property to a third-party and (ii) coerce Cotton into settling with Geraci regardless of the merits.
2. This Court has allowed this case to be maintained despite being presented with what Counsel believes to be undisputed and case-dispositive evidence that proves the lack of any probable cause for this action.
3. Based on his Review of All Evidence, counsel for Geraci, specifically Attorney Gina Austin ("Austin"), Scott Toothacre and Mr. Michael Weinstein ("Weinstein"), have acted unethically by, inter alia, filing and maintaining this action lacking any probable cause.
4. On January 25, 2018, at an oral hearing on a motion by Geraci to compel certain discovery requests from Cotton, this Court initiated the hearing by stating to Cotton that it was personally acquainted with counsel and did not believe that Austin and Weinstein would act in the unethical manner that Cotton had alleged in his opposition to that motion (DC Decl. q20.)
\({ }^{5}\) See, generally, RJN 6 (Cotton's opposition to motion to compel his responses to certain discovery requests in which he describes the litigation, its challenges from his perspective and in which he provides emails and texts with Geraci and supporting declarations from noteworthy individuals all of which unilaterally support his contentions).
\({ }^{6}\) Id.
5. This Court - based on Counsel's personal attendance of this Court's law and motion calendar on numerous occasions - is impartial, patient, fair, and seeks (when requested and possible) to balance the needs of litigants and counsel with the interests of the Court.

Again, Counsel cannot reconcile these facts. Counsel notes that Cotton has filed pro se a Complaint in the United States District Court, Southern District of California that is currently pending before The Honorable Gonzalo Curiel (Case No. 3:18-cv-00325). That federal action is stayed pending resolution of this action. Cotton has alleged causes of action against Geraci, Berry, Austin, Weinstein and Toothacre, and their respective law firms, Ferris \& Britton and Austin Legal Group, for, inter alia, Civil Conspiracy and RICO. In his federal Complaint, Cotton alleges this Court is biased against him. One of the main foci in the action before Judge Curiel will be whether Geraci and his counsel had probable cause to bring forth and maintain this action.

In Ramirez, supra, an attorney was suspended for submitting a brief accusing a judge of bias. To be absolutely and unequivocally clear, Counsel does not believe and is not alleging this Court is biased against Cotton. However, Counsel respectfully notes that if he is correct in his conclusion regarding the lack of probable cause in this case, and based on his Review of All Evidence, then it can appear that this Court is biased against Cotton. Thus, restated, Counsel's ethical dilemma is that he believes this Court's maintenance of this action is not reasonable in light of the evidence it has been presented; but he neither believes this Court to be biased against Cotton nor that it would allow its alleged relationship with counsel for Geraci, even if true, to affect its impartiality.

Cotton, as described below and as consistently alleged in his pro se filed pleadings, believes this Court is under a misunderstanding of the undisputed and case-dispositive nature of some of the evidence which has been presented to it. \({ }^{7}\) The testimony from numerous third-parties in attendance does prove that Cotton's former counsel did fail to raise the most material and case-dispositive piece of evidence in this action before this Court at oral hearing on December 7, 2017 on an Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. \({ }^{8}\) However, Cotton's theory is not tenable because the same evidence has been presented to this Court on numerous other occasions by Cotton since then and the Court still has not been persuaded.
\({ }^{7}\) See Id. at p.5, \(\ln .21-\mathrm{p} .11, \ln .9\).
\({ }^{8} I d\). at p. \(36, \ln .20-\mathrm{p} .37, \ln .10\).

Counsel has struggled intensely with how to approach this issue with the Court and reviewed numerous ethical opinions and cases. Ultimately, Counsel is relying on the following language from an oftencited case in numerous professional responsibility cases and treatises:

The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law [citation]. It is the imperative duty of an attorney to respectfully yield to the rulings of the court, whether right or wrong [citation]. "[I]f the ruling is adverse, it is not counsel's right to resist it or to insult the judge-his right is only respectfully to preserve his point for appeal." [Hawk v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 126 (quoting Sacher v. United States (1952) 343 U.S. 1, 9, 72 S.Ct. 451, 455, 96 L.Ed. 717).]

A lawyer should comply promptly with all orders and directives of the court, but he has a duty to have the record reflect adverse rulings or judicial conduct which he considers prejudicial to his client's interests and he has a right to make respectful requests for reconsideration of adverse rulings. (Standard 7.1, ABA Standards-Defense Function.) [Id. at 130.]

Thus, Counsel respectfully requests that this Court please not misinterpret this motion as intending any disrespect, but that it please look at the evidence and arguments herein (and the Motion to Expunge which more fully lays out the facts and the supporting evidence) with new eyes. Counsel's review of the record reveals what this Court is surely already aware of - Cotton's filings contain numerous very improbable and/or unrelated allegations that make him appear to be paranoid and delusional. \({ }^{9}\) With no disrespect intended to Cotton, in Counsel's opinion, his client does in fact have some beliefs which are not supported by reasonable evidence; however, some of Cotton's improbable allegations \(\underline{\text { are }}\) supported by material, credible evidence. As unbelievable as it appears, this case, though originally brought forth as a breach of contract case, is really about fraud, deceit, extra-judicial coercion and intimidation tactics - there is credible, third-party evidence and testimony to support Cotton's Civil Conspiracy and RICO allegations in his federal complaint at least against Geraci. \({ }^{10}\) Mr. Cotton was not a paranoid pro se litigant. At the very least, in this action, he is demonstrably a victim of a conspiracy meant to deprive him of his Property because, fortuitously as a result of the so-called "Green Rush" (cannabis industry boom) and its geographic location, it has recently become worth millions of dollars. \({ }^{11}\)

Lastly, Counsel notes he is almost exclusively a criminal defense attorney and never has engaged in civil proceedings of the type at issue here. He is compelled to bring forth the instant ex parte motion seeking

\footnotetext{
\({ }^{9}\) See, generally, RJN 6.
\({ }^{10}\) JA Decl. \(\$ 5\).
\({ }^{11}\) RJN 6, pp. 182-196 (Martin Sale Agreement containing terms and consideration for Mr. Cotton's property that was originally for, inter alia, \(\$ 2,000,000\) and a \(20 \%\) equity stake in the contemplated business.
}
to shorten time and other relief because he has personally witnessed - and can attest to - the continuously increasing deterioration of Cotton's mental and physical well-being over the last several months as a result of this litigation. Because he believes this action lacks probable cause, the financial, emotional and psychological harm that Cotton has and continues to suffer is simply appalling. Counsel feels ethically compelled to bring forth this motion or risk irreparable harm to his client's physical and mental health. (See DC Decl. Ex. 4.)

\section*{A. THE COURT MAY GRANT A MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME}

Generally, a motion must be served at least sixteen court days before the hearing. (CCP §1005(B). However, the Court may, in its discretion upon a showing of "good cause," shorten the time required for notice of motions. Id. As described herein, the Confirmation Email appears to dispositively prove that Geraci is mispresenting the Receipt as the final written agreement. Geraci has not provided any other evidence to support a finding of probable cause for his allegation that the Receipt is the final agreement for the Property. "" \([\mathrm{P}]\) robable cause requires evidence sufficient to prevail in the action or at least information reasonably warranting an inference there is such evidence.' [Puryear v. Golden Bear (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1195]. To put it another way, probable cause is lacking 'when a prospective plaintiff and counsel do not have evidence sufficient to uphold a favorable judgment or information affording an inference that such evidence can be obtained for trial."" Arcaro v. Silva \& Silva Ent. Corp. (1999) 77 Cal App.152, 156-157 (quoting Puryear, supra, at 1195). The only evidence ever put forth by Geraci to support his Complaint in almost a year is the Receipt and his own supporting declaration, neither of which provides "evidence sufficient to uphold a favorable judgment" or provides "information affording an inference that such evidence can be obtained for trial" considering Geraci's express representation to the contrary in the Confirmation Email. Id.

Cotton underwent an Independent Psychiatric Assessment ("IPA") by Dr. Markus Ploesser. Per Dr. Ploesser:

It is my professional opinion that Mr. Cotton currently meets criteria of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (F43.10), Intermittent Explosive Disorder (F63.81) and Major Depression (F32.2) . . . the level of emotional and physical distress faced by Mr. Cotton at this time is above and beyond the usual stress on any plaintiff being exposed to litigation. If causative triggers and threats against Mr. Cotton persist, there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Cotton may suffer irreparable harm with regards to his mental health. [DC Decl. Ex. 4, IPA q\|T 29, 32.]

Thus, Cotton has shown good cause as it strongly appears Geraci has no probable cause for this action and Cotton is, understandably, under intense psychological pressure as the victim of a conspiracy to deprive him of his Property via the judiciary system.

\section*{B. THE COURT IS SPECIFICALLY EMPOWERED TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF LARRY GERACI}

As stated by the California Supreme Court, "[T]he lis pendens procedure [is] susceptible to serious abuse, providing unscrupulous plaintiffs with a powerful lever to force the settlement of groundless or malicious suits." Malcolm v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 518, 524 . "Once a lis pendens is filed, it clouds the title and effectively prevents the property's transfer until the litigation is resolved or the lis pendens is expunged." BGJ Associates, LLC v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 952, 967. "Because of the potential for abuse and injustice to the property owner, the Legislature has provided statutory procedures (CCP §405.30 et seq.) by which a lis pendens may be removed ('expunged')." Weil \& Brown, Cal. Practice Guide, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2017) ("Rutter Guide") 99:422 (citing Shah v. McMahon (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 526, 529). "[T]he lis pendens procedure provides a means by which a court may dispose of meritless real estate claims at the preliminary stage of a case." Shah, supra, at 529 (emphasis added).

CCP \(\S 405.30\) et seq. was enacted to require proactive action by the trial court in the form of a "minitrial" on the merits in the preliminary stage of a case. As explained by the Court in Amalgamated Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1003, in analyzing the Legislature's intent in revising the \(L P\) laws in 1992 and enacting CCP §405.32:

The financial pressure created by a recorded lis pendens provided the opportunity for abuse, permitting parties with meritless cases to use it as a bullying tactic to extract unfair settlements. [ 7\(]\) The Code Comment thus states that section 405.32 "is intended to disapprove Malcolm. . . and other cases which have held that the court on a motion to expunge may not conduct a 'minitrial' on the merits of the case. This section is intended to change California law and to require judicial evaluation of the merits." (Code Com., 14A West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc., foll. §405.32, par. 3, p. 346, italics added.)

Amalgamated, supra, at 1012 (emphasis in original).
In Hilberg v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 539, 542, the Court stated: "We cannot ignore as judges what we know as lawyers - that the recording of a lis pendens is sometimes made not to prevent conveyance of property that is the subject of the lawsuit, but to coerce an opponent to settle regardless of the merits." (Citing Malcolm, supra, at 678.)

CCP §405.30 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
At any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party . . . may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice . . Evidence or declarations may be filed with the motion to expunge the notice. The court may permit evidence to be received in the form of oral testimony, and may make any orders it deems just to provide for discovery by any party affected by a motion to expunge the notice. [Emphasis added.]
"If conflicting evidence is presented, the judge must weigh the evidence in deciding whether plaintiff has sustained its burden." Rutter Guide \(\S 9: 436.2\). Materially summarized, Geraci and Cotton are in accord that on November 2, 2016: (i) an agreement was reached for the sale of the Property, and (ii) a document was executed by both parties on that day. However, the parties dispute what that executed document is. Cotton alleges the document, the Receipt, is just a "receipt" meant to memorialize his receipt of \(\$ 10,000\). Geraci, on the other hand, alleges the Receipt is the "final written agreement" for his purchase of the Property and that Cotton is lying about being entitled to, inter alia, a \(10 \%\) equity stake in the Property - a term not contained in the Receipt. Thus, the primary and case-dispositive issue in this action is a determination of whether the Receipt is a "receipt" as Cotton alleges or a "final agreement" for the Property as Geraci alleges. The evidence appears to be dispositively clear - Geraci is fraudulently misrepresenting the Receipt as a final agreement.

Geraci brought forth this suit alleging the Receipt is the final agreement. He also confirmed that the Receipt is not the final agreement in the Confirmation Email and continued to string Cotton along for months with drafts of contracts based on their agreed upon terms. CCP \(\S 405.30\) et. seq., was specifically enacted for this scenario - "The court may permit evidence to be received in the form of oral testimony, and may make any orders it deems just to provide for discovery by any party affected by motion to expunge the notice." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, "A court has inherent equity, supervisory and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation and conserve judicial resources. Courts can conduct hearings and formulate rules of procedure where justice so demands." Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 284-85 (internal citation omitted; emphasis added).

Here, although the action is framed as a breach of contract cause of action, this case is really about fraud and deceit. And one of the parties is making false representations to this Court. The Court should exercise its power, discover which party is attempting to manipulate the judicial system and sanction them accordingly. To this end, the Court should order the attendance and testimony of Larry Geraci. If Cotton is correct, the fact that the judiciary has been used as a tool of oppression represents an issue of great public concern, on these facts, this is not just a dispute between Geraci and Cotton.

\section*{IV. CONCLUSION}

Ultimately, Cotton is not requesting that the Court dismiss this action in his favor via this ex-parte motion. And, neither is Counsel for Cotton closed to the possibility that evidence and arguments have been made at ex-parte hearings which are not in the record or, perhaps, there is a construct of civil law applicable
here with which he is not familiar. Thus, respectfully requested, Cotton asks that this Court recognize his pro se status and his inability to have previously researched, prepared and submitted the attached Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) while under the pressure of the instant litigation. Because of the evidence presented herein, the most reasonable conclusion is that Geraci is fraudulently misrepresenting the Receipt and this action is unjust.

Consequently, this Court should exercise its power and grant the relief requested herein to determine if Geraci and/or his counsel have sought to manipulate the judicial system to effectuate a miscarriage of justice. If Cotton is incorrect, Geraci suffers no harm or damage from having this motion granted. However, if Geraci cannot produce evidence other than the Receipt and his self-serving testimony and actions, then every day which passes is unconscionably causing Cotton ongoing financial and psychological harm.

Alternatively, should the Court decide to deny the relief requested herein, Cotton respectfully requests that this Court settle a legal dispute between Weinstein and Counsel for Cotton. This Court granted Geraci's request for a mandatory injunction. Cotton has communicated his intent to file a Notice of Appeal (NOA) and believes that upon its filing, this action will be automatically stayed while the Court of Appeals reviews the appeal. Weinstein has objected, arguing that Cotton must first file a noticed motion for a stay with this Court before a filed NOA will automatically stay this action. Cotton provided Weinstein case law explicitly stating that a noticed motion is not required if the trial court has already communicated its intention to deny the request, as is the case here. \({ }^{12}\) Weinstein did not provide legal authority in opposition for his statement that, if Cotton files an NOA, this case will not be automatically stayed. Should the Court deny this request, Cotton would like to immediately file an NOA to prevent agents of Geraci from having access to, and intruding upon, his Property - the location where he has built his businesses and worked for over 20 years.

DATED: April 4, 2018
THE LAW OFFICE OF JACOB AUSTIN


Attorney for Defendant and Cross-Complainant DARRYL COTTON

\footnotetext{
\({ }^{12}\) See Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of Cal. v. Paul (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 368, 374 (A third objection to the proceeding in this court was that the appellants had not first exhausted their right to seek a stay of proceedings in the lower court by failing to show a preliminary application to that end. [Citation.] In this latter connection, the attorney for defendants testified that he had informed the trial judge that he intended to ask him for a stay of proceedings after the entry of the preliminary injunction, but the trial judge told him that he would not grant it. The law does not require a useless act.")
}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline ATIORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY: STATE BAR NO: & FOR COURT USE ONLY \\
\hline NAME: JACOB P. AUSTIN [SBN 290303] & ELECTRONICALLY FILED \\
\hline firm name: The Law Office of Jacob Austin & Superior Court of California, \\
\hline Street address: 1455 Frazee Road, \#500 & County of San Diego \\
\hline city San Diego State: CA zIP CODE: 92108 & 04/05/2018 at 08:27:00 AM \\
\hline TELEPHONE NO:: (619) 357-6850 FAX NO: : (888) 357-8501 &  \\
\hline E-MAIL ADDRESS: JPA@JacobAustinEsq.com ATtORNEY FOR (name): Defendant/X-Complainant DARRYL COTTON (Ltd Scope of Rep) & \begin{tabular}{l}
Clerk of the Superior Court \\
By Vanessa Bahena,Deputy Clerk
\end{tabular} \\
\hline SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO & \\
\hline StReet address: 330 West Broadway & \\
\hline maling address: 330 West Broadway & \\
\hline CITY And zip Code: San Diego, CA 92101-2994 & \\
\hline branchname: Central Division - Civil & CASE NUMBER: \\
\hline PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: LARRY GERACI & 37-2017-0010073-CU-BC-CTL \\
\hline DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: DARRYL COTTON, et al. & \begin{tabular}{l}
JUDICIAL OFFICER: \\
The Honorable Joel R. Wholfei
\end{tabular} \\
\hline PROOF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE & DEPARTMENT: C-73 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
1. I am at least 18 years old.
a. My residence or business address is (specify): 1510 Front Street
San Diego, CA 92101
b. My electronic service address is (specify): ServeThePapersFast@gmail.com
2. I electronically served the following documents (exact titles):The documents served are listed in an attachment. (Form POS-050(D)/EFS-050(D) may be used for this purpose.)
3. I electronically served the documents listed in 2 as follows:
a. Name of person served: Michael R. Weinstein

On behalf of (name or names of parties represented, if person served is an attomey):
Plaintiff LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY
b. Electronic service address of person served: mweinstein@ferrisbritton.com
c. On (date): April 4, 2018
\(\mathbf{x}\) The documents listed in item 2 were served electronically on the persons and in the manner described in an attachment. (Form POS-050(P)/EFS-050(P) may be used for this purpose.)

Date: April 4, 2018
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

ZOE KERSEY
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF DECLARANT)
(SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT)

\section*{ATTACHMENT TO PROOF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE}

\section*{Documents Served:}
1. EX PARTE APPLICATION BY COTTON FOR ORDERS: (1) SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING ON DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [CCP 405.30 et seq.]; AND (2) COMPELLING THE ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF AND CROSS-DEFENDANT LARRY GERACI
2. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDERS: (1) SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING ON DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS); AND (2) COMPELLING THE ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI;
3. DECLARATION OF JACOB P. AUSTIN IN SUPPORT OF DARRYL COTTON'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDERS: (1) SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING ON DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS); AND (2) COMPELLING THE ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI;
4. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS);
5. DARRYL COTTON'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS);
6. DARRYL COTTON'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS);
7. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF: DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS); AND EX PARTE APPLICATION BY COTTON FOR ORDERS: (1) SHORTENING TIME FOR HEARING ON DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) [CCP 405.30 et seq.]; AND (2) COMPELLING THE ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF AND CROSS-DEFENDANT LARRY GERACI
8. [PROPOSED] ORDER EXPUNGING NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION AND AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT DARRYL COTTON;
9. SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY - CIVIL (Without Court Order); and
10. NOTICE OF LIMINTED SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION

\title{
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO \\ CENTRAL \\ MINUTE ORDER
}

DATE: 04/05/2018
TIME: 08:30:00 AM
DEPT: C-73
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Joel R. Wohlfeil
CLERK: Andrea Taylor
REPORTER/ERM:
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: R. Camberos
CASE NO: 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL CASE INIT.DATE: 03/21/2017
CASE TITLE: Larry Geraci vs Darryl Cotton [Imaged]
CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Breach of Contract/Warranty

EVENT TYPE: Ex Parte

\section*{APPEARANCES}

Michael R Weinstein, counsel, present for Respondent on Appeal,Cross - Defendant,Cross Complainant,Plaintiff(s).
Scott H Toothacre, counsel, present for Respondent on Appeal,Cross - Defendant,Cross Complainant,Plaintiff(s).
Darryl Cotton, self represented Defendant, present.
Attorney Jacob Austin specially appears on behalf of Darry Cotton.
Ex-parte application for order shortening time for hearing on motion to expunge notice of pendencey of action and compel attendance and testimony of Plaintiff requested by Defendant.

Court finds good cause to grant in part. Court will allow order shortening time to hear motion on 4/13/18. Plaintiff is granted leave to file opposition papers by noon on \(4 / 10 / 18\). No reply.

All other requests are denied without prejudice.
Attorney Austin's oral request to stay case due to appeal is denied.
Attorney Austin to give notice of ruling.

FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation
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Scott H. Toothacre (SBN 146530)
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Telephone: (619) 233-3131
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY

\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA}

\section*{COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION}

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
Judge:
Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil
Dept.: C-73

PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI'S
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS
[IMAGED FILE]
Hearing Date: April 13, 2018 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Filed:
Trial Date:

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Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, LARRY GERACI ("Geraci"), submits these points and authorities in opposition to the motion by Defendant and Cross-Complainant, DARRYL COTTON ("Cotton"), to expunge the lis pendens recorded more than one year ago at the outset of this action.

\section*{I. INTRODUCTION}

After having failed to comply with this court's prior orders directing Mr. Cotton to submit to his deposition and to respond to written discovery requests, Cotton moves this Court, on 8 days' notice, to expunge the lis pendens. Cotton's refusal to participate in discovery has substantially prejudiced Geraci and Berry in preparation of this case. Code of Civil Procedure, section 405.30, provides: "The court . . . may make any orders it deems just to provide for discovery by any party affected by a motion to expunge the notice." The court should continue this hearing until after Cotton submits to his deposition and answers the written discovery.

Despite the lack of discovery, based on the documentary evidence and the declarations of Geraci and Abhay Schweitzer, Geraci has met his burden of establishing the probable validity of the real property claims for: (1) specific performance; and (2) declaratory relief. \({ }^{1}\)

The simple matter is that Geraci and Cotton had an agreement for the purchase and sale of real property that they reduced to writing and signed before a Notary Public. That contract, which expressly states all the terms necessary for enforceability, is valid and binding on the parties and supports causes of action for specific performance and declaratory relief. That Cotton has subsequently found a buyer willing to pay \(\$ 1.2\) million above Geraci's purchase price is certainly motive for Mr. Cotton to attempt to wiggle out of his commitment, but it is not a legal defense to Geraci's specific performance, declaratory relief, or contract claims. Moreover, Geraci's willingness to discuss other proposals from Mr. Cotton over the ensuing several months in an attempt to appease Cotton who was threatening to interfere with the contract is not evidence that the November 2, 2016 written agreement (hereafter,

1 The only claims Geraci has brought which "affect title or possession" of real property for lis pendens purposes are his claims for (1) specific performance, and (2) declaratory relief. A buyer's suit to compel specific performance of a contract for sale of real property affects title or possession of real property. (Hilberg v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 539, 542.) A suit for declaratory relief as to rights in real property affects title or possession to real property. (Mason v. Superior Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 989, 996.) Geraci's claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing do not "affect title or possession" of real property for lis pendens purposes. Therefore, although Geraci has established a probable validity of prevailing on those claims, they need not be addressed in this opposition to Cotton's motion to expunge the lis pendens.
"Nov 2nd Written Agreement") is anything other than a valid, binding, enforceable contract. None of the negotiations or proposals after the Nov 2nd Written Agreement ever came to fruition; the parties simply could not agree on different or additional terms which were mutually satisfactory to both parties.

\section*{II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES}

Parties and nonparties with an interest in the real property affected by a notice of pendency may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the lis pendens. (Code Civ. Proc., \(\S 405.30\).) Courts "shall order the notice expunged if the court finds that the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim." (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.31.) Further, even where the plaintiff properly pleads a real property claim, the lis pendens must be expunged if the real property claim lacks evidentiary merit. (Palmer v. Zaklama (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377-1378.) Code of Civil Procedure, section 405.32 states "the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the 'probable validity' of the real property claim."

Thus, a lis pendens must be ordered expunged if it is improper because (a) the pleading on which it is based does not contain a "real property claim," (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.31) or (b) the party who recorded the lis pendens cannot establish the "probably validity" of the real property claim by a preponderance of the evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32). (See Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.) "Probable validity" of the claim for purposes of avoiding expungement means that it is more likely than not that the party who asserted the real property claim will obtain a judgment on the claim in his or her favor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.3; Howard S. Wright Cons. Co.v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 314, 319 fn. 5.) Although the defendant is the moving party, the burden is on the plaintiff/claimant opposing the expungement motion to establish the probable validity of the underlying real property claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., \(\S \S 405.30,405.32\); Howard S. Wright Const. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 319.)

\section*{III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND}

In approximately September of 2015, Geraci began lining up a team to assist in his efforts to develop and operate a Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative ("MMCC") business (a.k.a. a medical
marijuana dispensary) in San Diego County. At that time, he had not yet identified a property for the MMCC business. He hired a consultant to help locate and identify potential property sites for the business. He hired a design professional, Abhay Schweitzer of TECHNE. He hired a public affairs and public relations consultant with experience in the industry, Jim Bartell of Bartell \& Associates. In addition, he hired a land use attorney, Gina Austin of Austin Legal Group. (Geraci Decl. ब 2.)

The search to identify potential locations for the business was lengthy due to the restrictions and requirements to satisfy in order to comply with various ordinances. In approximately June 2016, the consultant told Geraci he had found a potential site for acquisition and development for use and operation as an MMCC. The site was located at 6176 Federal Blvd., City of San Diego, San Diego County, California, Assessor's Parcel No. 543-020-02-00 (the "Property"). The consultant put Mr. Geraci in contact with Mr. Cotton (who owned the property), and Mr. Geraci expressed his interest to Mr. Cotton in acquiring his Property if further investigation satisfied him that the Property might meet the requirements for a MMCC site. (Geraci Decl. ब 3.)

Mr. Geraci, through his consultants, spent months investigating issues related to whether the location might meet the requirements for a MMCC site. Although many issues were not resolved to a certainty, Mr. Geraci determined that he was still interested in acquiring the Property. (Geraci Decl. - 4.\()\)

Thereafter, Mr. Geraci approached Mr. Cotton to discuss the possibility of purchasing the Property. Specifically, Mr. Geraci was interested in purchasing the Property from Mr. Cotton contingent upon Mr. Geraci's obtaining approval of a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") for use as a MMCC. As the purchaser, Mr. Geraci was willing to bear the substantial expense of applying for and obtaining CUP approval and understood that if he did not obtain CUP approval then he would not close the purchase and he would lose his investment. (Geraci Decl. ब 5; Exh. 2 to the Notice of Lodgment in Support of Plaintiff Larry Geraci's Opposition to Defendant Darryl Cotton's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens (hereafter, "Geraci NOL").)

Mr. Cotton was willing to make the purchase and sale conditional upon CUP approval because if the condition were satisfied he would be receiving a much higher price than the Property's value in the absence of its approval for use as a medical marijuana dispensary. Mr. Geraci and Mr. Cotton
agreed on a down payment of \(\$ 10,000.00\) and a purchase price of \(\$ 800,000.00\). On November 2, 2016, Mr. Cotton and Mr. Geraci executed a written purchase and sale agreement before a Notary Public for the purchase of the Property by Geraci from Cotton on the terms and conditions stated in the written agreement (hereafter the "Nov 2nd Written Agreement"). Geraci tendered the \(\$ 10,000\) deposit to Mr. Cotton as acknowledged in the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. (Geraci Decl. 『 5)

In paragraph 5 of his supporting declaration, Darryl Cotton states:
"On November 2, 2016, Geraci and I met at Geraci's office to negotiate the final terms of the sale of the Property. At the meeting, we reached an oral agreement on the material terms for the sale of the Property (the "November Agreement"). The November Agreement consisted of the following: If the CUP was approved, then Geraci would, inter alia, provide me: (i) a total purchase price of \(\$ 800,000\); (ii) a \(10 \%\) equity stake in the MO ; and (iii) a minimum monthly equity distribution of \(\$ 10,000\). If the CUP was denied, I would keep an agreed upon \(\$ 50,000\) non-refundable deposit ("NRD") and the transaction would not close. In other words, the issuance of a CUP at the Property was a condition precedent for closing on the sale of the Property and, if the CUP was denied, I would keep my Property and the \(\$ 50,000\) NRD."

Mr. Cotton and Mr. Geraci did meet at Mr. Geraci's office on November 2, 2016, to negotiate the final terms of the sale of the Property and they reached an agreement on the final terms of the sale of the Property. That agreement was not oral. The parties put their agreement in writing in a simple and straightforward written agreement that they both signed before a Notary Public. (See Nov 2nd Written Agreement, Exh. 2 to Geraci NOL; Geraci Decl. © 6.)

The Nov 2nd Written Agreement states in its entirety:
11/02/2016
Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Darryl Cotton:
Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., CA for a sum of \(\$ 800,000\) to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary.)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of \(\$ 800,000.00\) and to remain in effect until the license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts [sic] on this property.
/s/
Larry Geraci
/s/
Darryl Cotton
(Geraci Decl. \| 6)
Mr. Geraci never agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(\$ 50,000.00\) non-refundable deposit. At the
meeting, Mr. Cotton stated he would like a \(\$ 50,000\) non-refundable deposit. Mr. Geraci said "no." Mr. Cotton then asked for a \(\$ 10,000\) non-refundable deposit, Mr. Geraci agreed, and that amount was put into the written agreement. After he signed the written agreement, Mr. Geraci paid Mr. Cotton the \(\$ 10,000\) cash as agreed. Had Mr. Geraci agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(\$ 50,000\) deposit, it would have been a very simple thing to change " \(\$ 10,000\) " to \(\$ 50,000\) " in the agreement before the parties signed it. (Geraci Decl. 『| 6.)

Mr. Geraci also never agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(10 \%\) equity stake in the marijuana dispensary or to pay Mr. Cotton a minimum monthly equity distribution of \(\$ 10,000\) as contended by Mr. Cotton. If Mr. Geraci had agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(10 \%\) equity stake in the marijuana dispensary and a minimum monthly equity distribution of \(\$ 10,000\), then it would have also been a simple thing to add a sentence or two to the agreement to say so. (Geraci Decl. ब 6.)

What Mr. Geraci did agree to was to pay Mr. Cotton a total purchase price of \(\$ 800,000\), with the balance of \(\$ 790,000\) due upon approval of a CUP. If the CUP was not approved, then Mr. Cotton would keep the Property and the \(\$ 10,000\); and that is how the agreement was written. (Geraci Decl. - 6.\()\)

Mr. Cotton refers to the Nov 2nd Written Agreement as a "Receipt." Calling the signed written agreement a "Receipt" was never discussed. There would have been no need for a written agreement signed before a Notary Public simply to document Geraci's payment to Cotton of a \(\$ 10,000\) down payment. In addition, had the intention been merely to document a written "Receipt" for the \(\$ 10,000\) payment, then the parties would have identified on the document that it was a "Receipt" and there would have been no need to put in all the material terms and conditions of the deal. Instead, the document is expressly called an "Agreement" because that is what the parties intended. (Geraci Decl. - 17.\()\)

As for Mr. Cotton's assertions regarding Gina Austin, Mr. Geraci did not promise to have attorney Gina Austin reduce the oral agreement to written agreements for execution. Instead, Mr. Cotton wanted to categorize or allocate the \(\$ 800,000\) into two different payments. At Mr. Cotton's request, Mr. Geraci agreed to pay him for the property into two parts: \(\$ 400,000\) as payment for the property and \(\$ 400,000\) as payment for the relocation of his business. As this would benefit Cotton for
tax purposes but would not affect the total purchase price or any other terms and conditions of the purchase, Mr. Geraci stated a willingness to later amend the agreement in that way. (Geraci Decl. व7.)

Prior to entering into the Nov 2nd Written Agreement, the parties discussed the CUP application and approval process and that Cotton's consent as property owner would be needed to submit with the CUP application. Mr. Geraci specifically advised Mr. Cotton that his assistant, Rebecca Berry, would act as his authorized agent to apply for the CUP on his behalf. Mr. Cotton agreed to Ms. Berry serving as the applicant on Mr. Geraci's behalf to attempt to obtain approval of a CUP for the operation of a MMCC or marijuana dispensary on the Property. On October 31, 2016, as owner of the Property, Mr. Cotton signed Form DS-318, the Ownership Disclosure Statement, for a Conditional Use Permit, by which he acknowledged that an application for a permit (CUP) would be filed with the City of San Diego on the subject Property with the intent to record an encumbrance against the property. The Ownership Disclosure Statement was also signed Rebecca Berry, who was serving as the CUP applicant on Mr. Geraci's behalf. Mr. Cotton provided consent and authorization as the parties had discussed that approval of a CUP would be a condition of the purchase and sale of the Property. (Geraci Decl. ๆ 8; Ownership Disclosure Statement signed October 31, 2016, Exh. 1 to Geraci NOL. \({ }^{2}\)

As noted above, Mr. Cotton had already put together a team for the MMCC project. The design professional, Abhay Schweitzer, and his firm, TECHNE, is and has been responsible for the design of the Project and the CUP application and approval process. Mr. Schweitzer was responsible for coordinating the efforts of the team to put together the CUP Application for the MMCC at the Property and Mr. Schweitzer has been and still is the principal person involved in dealings with the City of San Diego in connection with the CUP application approval process. Mr. Schweitzer's declaration (Declaration of Abhay Schweitzer in Support of Plaintiff Larry Geraci's Opposition to Motion to

\footnotetext{
2 Cotton has asserted from the outset of his lawsuit and, again, in paragraph 16 of his supporting declaration, that he did not discover until March 16, 2017, that Geraci had submitted the CUP Application back on October 31, 2016. That assertion is false and is belied by a November 16, 2016, text message Cotton sent to Geraci in which he asked Geraci, "Did they accept the CUP application?" Cotton was well aware at that time that Geraci (via Berry) submitted a CUP application and was awaiting the City's completion of its initial review of the completeness of the application. Until the City deems the CUP application complete it does not proceed to the next step-the review of the CUP application. Geraci kept Cotton apprised of the status of the CUP application and the problems being encountered (e.g., an initial zoning issue) from the outset. (Geraci Decl. ๆ 23; Exh. 7 to NOL.)
}

Expunge Lis Pendens) has been submitted concurrently herewith and describes in greater detail the CUP application submitted to the City of San Diego, which submission included the Ownership Disclosure Statement signed by Darryl Cotton and Rebecca Berry.

After the parties signed the Nov 2nd Written Agreement for Geraci's purchase of the Property, almost immediately Mr. Cotton began attempts to renegotiate the deal for the purchase of the Property. This literally occurred the evening of the day he signed the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. On November 2, 2016, at approximately 6:55 p.m., Cotton sent Geraci an email, which stated:

> Hi Larry,
> Thank you for meeting today. Since we examined the Purchase Agreement in your office for the sale price of the property I just noticed the \(10 \%\) equity position in the dispensary was not language added into that document. I just want to make sure that we're not missing that language in any final agreement as it is a factored element in my decision to sell the property. I'll be fine if you simply acknowledge that here in a reply.

Mr. Geraci receives emails on his phone. It was after 9:00 p.m. in the evening that he glanced at his phone and read the first sentence, "Thank you for meeting with me today." Mr. Geraci responded from his phone "No no problem at all." Mr. Geraci was responding to Mr. Cotton's thanking him for the meeting. (Geraci Dec. ब| 10.)

The next day, November 3, 2016, Mr. Geraci read the entire email and phoned Mr. Cotton because the total purchase price Mr. Geraci agreed to pay for the subject property was \(\$ 800,000\) and he never agreed to provide Mr. Cotton with a \(10 \%\) equity position in the dispensary as part of the purchase of the property. Mr. Geraci spoke with Mr. Cotton at approximately 12:40 p.m. for approximately 3 minutes. (Geraci Decl. ब 10; Call Detail from Geraci's firm's telephone provider, Exh. 3 to the Geraci NOL.) During that telephone call, Mr. Geraci told Mr. Cotton that a \(10 \%\) equity position in the dispensary was not part of the agreement as he had never agreed to pay him any other amounts above the \(\$ 800,000\) purchase price for the property. Mr. Cotton's response was to say something to the effect of "well, you don't get what you don't ask for." Mr. Cotton did not seem upset and he commented further to the effect that things are "looking pretty good-we all should make some money here." That was the end of the discussion. (Geraci Decl. ๆ10.)

To be clear, prior to signing the Nov 2nd Written Agreement, Mr. Cotton expressed a desire to
participate in different ways in the operation of the future MMCC business at the Property. Mr. Cotton is a hydroponic grower and purported to have useful experience he could provide regarding the operation of such a business. Prior to signing the Nov 2nd Written Agreement, the parties had preliminary discussions related to Cotton's desire to be involved in the operation of the business (not related to the purchase of the Property) and the parties discussed the possibility of compensation to Cotton (e.g., a percentage of the net profits) in exchange for his providing various services to the business-but an agreement was never reached as to the operation of the MMCC business. Those discussions were unrelated to the purchase and sale of the Property, which the parties never agreed to amend or modify. (Geraci Decl. ब 11.)

Beginning in or about mid-February 2017, and after the zoning issues had been resolved, Mr. Cotton began making increasing demands for compensation in connection with the sale. Mr. Geraci was several months into the CUP application process which could potentially take many more months to successfully complete (if it could be successfully completed and approval obtained) and he had already committed substantial resources to the project. Mr. Geraci became increasingly concerned that Mr. Cotton was going to interfere with the completion of that process to Mr. Geraci's detriment now that the zoning issues were resolved. To appease Mr. Cotton, Mr. Geraci tried his best to discuss and work out with Cotton some further compensation arrangement that was reasonable and avoid the risk that Mr. Cotton might try to "torpedo" the project and find another buyer. For example, on several successive occasions, Mr. Geraci had attorney Gina Austin draft written agreements that contained terms that Mr. Geraci could live with and hoped would be sufficient to satisfy Mr. Cotton's ever-increasing demands for additional compensation, but Mr. Cotton would reject them as unsatisfactory. Mr. Cotton continued to insist on, among other things, a \(10 \%\) equity position, to which Geraci was not willing to agree, as well as minimum monthly distributions in amounts that Geraci thought were unreasonable and to which he was unwilling to agree. Despite the back and forth communications during the period of approximately mid-February 2017 through approximately midMarch 2017, the parties were unable to re-negotiate terms for the purchase of the property to which they both agreed. The Nov 2nd Written Agreement was never amended or modified. Mr. Cotton emailed Mr. Geraci that Mr. Cotton felt that Mr. Geraci was not living up to his agreement and

Mr. Geraci responded that Mr. Cotton kept trying to change the deal. As a result, no re-negotiated written agreement regarding the purchase and sale of the property was ever signed by Mr. Geraci or Mr. Cotton after they had signed and agreed to the terms and conditions in the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. (Geraci Decl. 『| 12.)

Ultimately, Mr. Cotton was extremely unhappy with Mr. Geraci's refusal to accede to Mr. Cotton's demands and the failure to reach agreement regarding his possible involvement with the operation of the business to be operated at the Property and Mr. Geraci's refusal to modify or amend the terms and conditions agreed to in the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. Eventually, Mr. Cotton made it clear that he had no intention of living up to and performing his obligations under the Nov 2nd Written Agreement and affirmatively threatened to take action to halt the CUP application process. (Geraci Decl. © 13.)

Mr. Cotton thereafter made good on his threats. On the morning of March 21, 2017, Mr. Cotton had a conversation with Firouzeh Tirandazi at the City of San Diego, who was in charge of processing the CUP Application, regarding Mr. Cotton's interest in withdrawing the CUP Application. That discussion was confirmed in an 8:54 a.m. e-mail from Ms. Tirandazi to Mr. Cotton with a cc: to Rebecca Berry. (Geraci Decl. ब 14; Exh. 4 to Geraci NOL.)

That same day, March 21, 2017 at 3:18 p.m., Mr. Cotton emailed Mr. Geraci reinforcing that he would not honor the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. In that email Mr. Cotton stated that Mr. Geraci had no interest in the property and that "I will be entering into an agreement with a third party to sell my property and they will be taking on the potential costs associated with any litigation arising from this failed agreement with you." (Geraci Decl. 『 15; Exh. 5 to Geraci NOL.)

Four minutes later at \(3: 25\) p.m., Mr. Cotton e-mailed Ms. Tirandazi at the City, with a cc: to both Geraci and Rebecca Berry, stating falsely to Ms. Tirandazi: "... the potential buyer, Larry Gerasi [sic] (cc'ed herein), and I have failed to finalize the purchase of my property. As of today, there are no third-parties that have any direct, indirect or contingent interests in my property. The application currently pending on my property should be denied because the applicants have no legal access to my property." Mr. Cotton's email was false as the parties had a signed agreement for the purchase and sale of the Property - the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. (Geraci Decl. 91 15; Exh. 6 to Geraci NOL.)

Fortunately, the City determined Mr. Cotton did not have the authority to withdraw the CUP application without the consent of the applicant (Rebecca Berry, Geraci's authorized agent). (Geraci Decl. © 17.)

Due to Mr. Cotton's clearly stated intention to not perform his obligations under the written Agreement and in light of his affirmative steps taken to attempt to withdraw the CUP application, Mr. Geraci went forward on March 21, 2017, with the filing of his lawsuit against Mr. Cotton to enforce the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. (Geraci Decl. 『 18.)

Since the March 21, 2017 filing of the lawsuit, Mr. Geraci has continued to diligently pursue the CUP application and approval of the CUP. Despite Mr. Cotton's attempts to withdraw the CUP application, Mr. Geraci and his team have completed the initial phase of the CUP process whereby the City deemed the CUP application complete (although not yet approved) and determined it was located in an area with proper zoning. The CUP application process has not yet reached the stage of a formal City hearing and there has been no final determination to approve the CUP. The status of the CUP application is set forth in the Declaration of Abhay Schweitzer. (Geraci Decl. © 19.)

Mr. Cotton also has made good on the statement in his March 21, 2017 at 3:18 p.m. email that he would be "entering into an agreement with a third party to sell my property and they will be taking on the potential costs associated with any litigation arising from this failed agreement with you." (See Geraci Decl. ब 15; Exh. 5 to the Geraci NOL.) Documents produced early in the lawsuit by Mr. Cotton revealed that Mr. Cotton had been negotiating with other potential buyers of the Property to see if he could get a better deal than he had agreed to with Geraci. As of March 21, 2017, Mr. Cotton had already entered into a real estate purchase and sale agreement to sell the Property to another person, Richard John Martin II. (Geraci Decl. © 20.) Mr. Cotton has admitted in his moving papers to selling the property to another buyer. (Def. Memo. Of P's \& A's, p. 8, lines 18-23)

\section*{IV. GERACI HAS ESTABLISHED THE PROBABLE VALIDITY OF HIS CLAIMS}

As previously noted, the two claims that "affect title to property" are the specific performance and the declaratory relief causes of actions.

Specific performance of a contract may be decreed whenever: 1) its terms are sufficiently definite; 2) consideration is adequate; 3) there is substantial similarity of the requested performance to
the contractual terms; 4) there is mutuality of remedies; and 5) plaintiff's legal remedy is inadequate. (Blackburn v. Charnley (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 758, 766.)

Declaratory relief may be sought by any person under a contract, who desires a declaration of his rights or duties with respect to property in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, and may bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1062.5.)

Geraci has proffered evidence sufficient to sustain his burden to establish the "probable validity" of his claim. The factual basis of the two claims is identical, i.e., the parties signed a Nov 2 Written Agreement, which provided:

11/02/2016

\section*{Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Darryl Cotton:}

Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., CA for a sum of \(\$ 800,000\) to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary.)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of \(\$ 800,000.00\) and to remain in effect until the license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts [sic] on this property.
/s/
Larry Geraci
\(\overline{/ s /} / \overline{\text { Darryl Cotton }}\)
The parties even went so far as to have the document signed before a Notary Public. There is no question that the above-recited agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable agreement under California law. Each of the requisite elements is clearly met: 1) its terms are sufficiently definite, (the parties are identified; the property identified; the condition precedent identified; the down payment is identified; and the total purchase price is identified); 2) consideration is adequate (the has been no argument advanced by Mr. Cotton that \(\$ 800,000.00\) is inadequate consideration); 3) there is substantial similarity of the requested performance to the contractual terms; 4) there is mutuality of remedies (i.e., each party could have sued for breach of contract, specific performance and declaratory relief); and 5) plaintiff's legal remedy is inadequate (with regard to property claims, the legal remedy is
presumed inadequate; see Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 463.).
The facts also support the declaratory relief action under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1062.5 , as there is a valid written contract to which Mr. Geraci is a party. He is clearly entitled to seek declaratory relief with regard to his rights under that contract.

\section*{v. CONCLUSION}

Based on the foregoing argument and the evidence presented, this Court should deny the motion to expunge the lis pendens.

Dated: April 10, 2018
FERRIS \& BRITTON,
A Professional Corporation
By: Muboel M. Wemstein
Michael R. Weinstein
Scott H. Toothacre
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY

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\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA}

\section*{COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION}

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL

Judge:
Dept.:
Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil C-73

PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI'S OBJECTIONS TO REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS

\section*{[IMAGED FILE]}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\begin{tabular}{l} 
Hearing Date: \\
Hearing Time:
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l} 
April 13, 2018 \\
9:00 a.m.
\end{tabular} \\
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
Filed: & March 21, 2017 \\
Trial Date: & May 11, 2018
\end{tabular} \\
\end{tabular}

Plaintiff, LARRY GERACI, hereby objects to Defendant Darryl Cotton's Request for Judicial Notice in Support of his Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action ("Request for Judicial Notice").

Specifically, it is noted that Cotton fails to cite any evidence code section whatsoever in support of his Request for Judicial Notice. Nor does he cite any case law to support his Request for Judicial

Notice. As such, the Request for Judicial Notice should be denied outright.
Notwithstanding this general objection to the entirety of the Request For Judicial Notice, specific documents for which Cotton requests judicial notice are not relevant to the instant proceeding to expunge lis pendens, nor are they the proper subject of judicial notice.

Cotton requests judicial notice of the following documents:
1. Verified Petition for Alternative Writ of Mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) filed by Plaintiff on October 6, 2017;
2. Plaintiff Larry Geraci's Complaint for: 1) Breach of Contract; 2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 3) Specific Performance; and 4) Declaratory Relief filed March 21, 2017;
3. City of San Diego, Development Services Department Information Bulletin 170 (October 2017) (City Information Bulletin describing "the application process for a Marijuana Outlet");
4. Ownership Disclosure Statement - Form DS-318;
5. City of San Diego Development Services Department Parcel Information Report Report Number 101, dated March 20, 2018; and
6. Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Darryl Cotton's Response to (1) Motion by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Larry Geraci and Cross-Defendant Rebecca Berry to Compel the Deposition of Darryl Cotton, and (2) Motion by Real Parties in Interest, Larry Geraci and Rebecca Berry, to Compel the Deposition of Darryl Cotton, filed January 22, 2018.
I. JUDICIAL NOTICE SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE COTTON HAS PROVIDED NO INFORMATION FOR THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE PROPRIETY OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
Judicial notice should be denied because Cotton has provided no information to support his request. Section 453(b) of the California Evidence Code states that a court shall take judicial notice only when the requesting party "[f]urnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 453 (b).) A court may deny a request for judicial notice made without support. (Willis v. State of California (1994) 223 Cal.App.4th 291 [denying a request for judicial notice where request was made 'without appending any information whatsoever"].) ///

Here, Cotton's Request for Judicial Notice fails to include any supporting documentation or citation to any Evidence Code sections. Cotton also fails to indicate the relevance or purpose for taking judicial notice of these documents. He simply provides no indication as to the nature or scope of judicial notice being requested. Likewise, Cotton provides no legal justification for the Court to base its decision on the Request. As in Willis, Cotton's request is so deficient in supporting information that it must be denied. (See Willis, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.)

\section*{II. JUDICIAL NOTICE SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THE PROFFERED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY}

Judicial notice should be denied because the proffered documents contain inadmissible hearsay if they are offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein. A "court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of a court record or file." (Bach v. McNelis (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, 865; Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 ["While courts may notice official acts and public records, we do not take judicial notice of the truth of all matters stated therein."].)

Here, because Cotton does not specify his purpose for the Request, Plaintiff's must assume he intends to offer the exhibits for the truth of the matters stated therein. If so, the matters are inadmissible hearsay. "Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of the statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2001) 148 Cal.App. 4th 97, 113.)

Further, out-of-court statements may not be admitted in a request for judicial notice simply because these statements have been previously filed with the court: "What is meant by taking judicial notice of Court records? There exists a mistaken notion that this means taking judicial notice of the existence of facts asserted in every document of a court file, including pleadings and affidavits. However, a court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of a court record or file. A court may take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as order, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments." (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1568, emphasis in original [quoting 2 Jefferson's California Evidence

Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 47.2, p. 1757].) Because Cotton has submitted these hearsay statements for no purpose other than to take judicial notice of the truth of the facts stated in the documents, then judicial notice should be denied.

\section*{III. CONCLUSION}

Cotton's request for judicial notice should be denied. He has failed to provide any information to support his request as required by section 453(b) of the Evidence Code. Additionally, Cotton's use of these documents indicates that judicial notice would be improper because the subject matter constitutes inadmissible hearsay.

Dated: April 10, 2018
FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation

By:


Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY

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\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA}

\section*{COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION}

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
Judge: & Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil \\
Dept.: & C-73
\end{tabular}

DECLARATION OF LARRY GERACI IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS

\section*{[IMAGED FILE]}

\section*{Hearing Date: April 13, 2018 \\ Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.}

Filed:
Trial Date:
March 21, 2017
May 11, 2018

I, Larry Geraci, declare:
1. I am an adult individual residing in the County of San Diego, State of California, and I am one of the real parties in interest in this action. I have personal knowledge of the foregoing facts and if called as a witness could and would so testify.
2. In approximately September of 2015, I began lining up a team to assist in my efforts to develop and operate a Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperative (MMCC) business (aka a medical
marijuana dispensary) in San Diego County. At the time, I had not yet identified a property for the MMCC business. I hired a consultant, Neal Dutta of Apollo Realty, to help locate and identify potential property sites for the business. I hired a design professional, Abhay Schweitzer of TECHNE. I hired a public affairs and public relations consultant with experience in the industry, Jim Bartell of Bartell \& Associates. In addition, I hired a land use attorney, Gina Austin of Austin Legal Group.
3. The search to identify potential locations for the business took some time, as there are a number of requirements that had to be met. For example: a) only four (4) MMCCs are allowed in a City Council District; b) MMCCs are not allowed within 1,000 feet of public parks, churches, child care centers, playgrounds, City libraries, minor-oriented facilities, other MMCCs, residential facilities, or schools; c) MMCCs are not allowed within 100 feet of a residential zone; and d) the zoning had to be proper as MMCC's are allowed only in certain zones. In approximately June 2016, Neal Dutta identified to me real property owned by Darryl Cotton located at 6176 Federal Blvd., City of San Diego, San Diego County, California, Assessor's Parcel No. 543-020-02-00 (the "Property") as a potential site for acquisition and development for use and operation as a MMCC. And in approximately mid-July 2016 Mr. Dutta put me in contact with Mr. Cotton and I expressed my interest to Mr. Cotton in acquiring his Property if our further investigation satisfied us that the Property might meet the requirements for an MMCC site.
4. For several months after the initial contact, my consultant, Jim Bartell, investigated issues related to whether the location might meet the requirements for an MMCC site, including zoning issues and issues related to meeting the required distances from certain types of facilities and residential areas. For example, the City had plans for street widening in the area that potentially impacted the ability of the Property to meet the required distances. Although none of these issues were resolved to a certainty, I determined that I was still interested in acquiring the Property.
5. Thereafter I approached Mr. Cotton to discuss the possibility of my purchase of the Property. Specifically, I was interested in purchasing the Property from Mr. Cotton contingent upon my obtaining approval of a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") for use as a MMCC. As the purchaser, I was willing to bear the substantial expense of applying for and obtaining CUP approval and understood that if I did not obtain CUP approval then I would not close the purchase and I would lose my
investment. I was willing to pay a price for the Property based on what I anticipated it might be worth if I obtained CUP approval. Mr. Cotton told me that he was willing to make the purchase and sale conditional upon CUP approval because if the condition was satisfied he would be receiving a much higher price than the Property would be worth in the absence of its approval for use as a medical marijuana dispensary. We agreed on a down payment of \(\$ 10,000.00\) and a purchase price of \(\$ 800,000.00\). On November 2, 2016, Mr. Cotton and I executed a written purchase and sale agreement for my purchase of the Property from him on the terms and conditions stated in the agreement (hereafter the "Nov 2nd Written Agreement"). A true and correct copy of the Nov 2nd Written Agreement, which was executed before a notary, is attached as Exhibit 2 to Defendant and CrossDefendant, Larry Geraci's Notice of Lodgment in Support of Opposition to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens (hereafter the "Geraci NOL"). I tendered the \(\$ 10,000\) deposit to Mr. Cotton as acknowledged in the Nov 2nd Written Agreement.
6. In paragraph 5 of his supporting declaration, Darryl Cotton states:
"On November 2, 2016, Geraci and I met at Geraci's office to negotiate the final terms of the sale of the Property. At the meeting, we reached an oral agreement on the material terms for the sale of the Property (the "November Agreement"). The November Agreement consisted of the following: If the CUP was approved, then Geraci would, inter alia, provide me: (i) a total purchase price of \(\$ 800,000\); (ii) a \(10 \%\) equity stake in the MO ; and (iii) a minimum monthly equity distribution of \(\$ 10,000\). If the CUP was denied, I would keep an agreed upon \(\$ 50,000\) non-refundable deposit ("NRD") and the transaction would not close. In other words, the issuance of a CUP at the Property was a condition precedent for closing on the sale of the Property and, if the CUP was denied, I would keep my Property and the \(\$ 50,000\) NRD."

Darryl Cotton and I did meet at my office on November 2, 2016, to negotiate the final terms of the sale of the Property and we reached an agreement on the final terms of the sale of the Property. That agreement was not oral. We put our agreement in writing in a simple and straightforward written
agreement that we both signed before a notary. (See paragraph 5, supra, Nov \(2^{\text {nd }}\) Written Agreement, Exhibit 2 to Geraci NOL.) The written agreement states in its entirety:

\section*{11/02/2016}

Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Darryl Cotton:
Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd., CA for a sum of \(\$ 800,000\) to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary.)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of \(\$ 800,000.00\) and to remain in effect until the license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts [sic] on this property.


\section*{/s/ \\ Darryl Cotton}

I never agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(\$ 50,000.00\) non-refundable deposit. At the meeting, Mr. Cotton stated he would like a \(\$ 50,000\) non-refundable deposit. I said "no." Mr. Cotton then asked for a \(\$ 10,000\) non-refundable deposit and I said "ok" and that amount was put into the written agreement. After he signed the written agreement, I paid him the \(\$ 10,000\) cash as we had agreed. If I had agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(\$ 50,000\) deposit, it would have been a very simple thing to change " \(\$ 10,000\) " to \(\$ 50,000\) " in the agreement before we signed it.

I never agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(10 \%\) equity stake in the marijuana dispensary. I never agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a minimum monthly equity distribution of \(\$ 10,000\). If I had agreed to pay Mr. Cotton a \(10 \%\) equity stake in the marijuana dispensary and a minimum monthly equity distribution of \(\$ 10,000\), then it would have also been a simple thing to add a sentence or two to the agreement to say so.

What I did agree to was to pay Mr. Cotton a total purchase price of \(\$ 800,000\), with the balance of \(\$ 790,000\) due upon approval of a CUP. If the CUP was not approved, then he would keep the Property and the \(\$ 10,000\). So that is how the agreement was written.
7. In paragraph 6 of his supporting declaration, Darryl Cotton states:
"At the November 2, 2016, meeting we reached the November Agreement,
Geraci: (i) provided me with \(\$ 10,000\) in cash towards the NRD of \(\$ 50,000\), for
which I executed a document to record my receipt thereof (the "Receipt"); (ii)
promised to have his attorney, Gina Austin ("Austin"), promptly reduce the oral November Agreement to written agreements for execution; and (iii) promised to not submit the CUP to the City until he paid me the balance of the NRD."

I did pay Mr. Cotton the \(\$ 10,000\) cash after we signed the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. As stated above, I never agreed to a \(\$ 50,000\) deposit and, if I had, it would have been a simple thing to state that in our written agreement.

Mr. Cotton refers to the written agreement (i.e., the Nov 2nd Written Agreement) as a "Receipt." Calling the Agreement a "Receipt" was never discussed. There would have been no need for a written agreement before a notary simply to document my payment to him of \(\$ 10,000\). In addition, had the intention been merely to document a written "Receipt" for the \(\$ 10,000\) payment, then we could have identified on the document that it was a "Receipt" and there would have been no need to put in all the material terms and conditions of the deal. Instead, the document is expressly called an "Agreement" because that is what we intended.

I did not promise to have attorney Gina Austin reduce the oral agreement to written agreements for execution. What we did discuss was that Mr. Cotton wanted to categorize or allocate the \(\$ 800,000\). At his request, I agreed to pay him for the property into two parts: \(\$ 400,000\) as payment for the property and \(\$ 400,000\) as payment for the relocation of his business. As this would benefit him for tax purposes but would not affect the total purchase price or any other terms and conditions of the purchase, I stated a willingness to later amend the agreement in that way.

I did not promise to delay submitting the CUP to the City until I paid the alleged \(\$ 40,000\) balance of the deposit. I agreed to pay a \(\$ 10,000\) deposit only. Also, we had previously discussed the long lead-time to obtain CUP approval and that we had already begun the application submittal process as discussed in paragraph 8 below.
8. Prior entering into the Nov 2nd Written Agreement, Darryl Cotton and I discussed the CUP application and approval process and that his consent as property owner would be needed to submit with the CUP application. I discussed with him that my assistant Rebecca Berry would act as my authorized agent to apply for the CUP on my behalf. Mr. Cotton agreed to Ms. Berry serving as
the Applicant on my behalf to attempt to obtain approval of a CUP for the operation of a MMCC or marijuana dispensary on the Property. On October 31, 2016, as owner of the Property, Mr. Cotton signed Form DS-318, the Ownership Disclosure Statement for a Conditional Use Permit, by which he acknowledged that an application for a permit (CUP) would be filed with the City of San Diego on the subject Property with the intent to record an encumbrance against the property. The Ownership Disclosure Statement was also signed by my authorized agent and employee, Rebecca Berry, who was serving as the CUP applicant on my behalf. A true and correct copy of the Ownership Disclosure Statement signed on October 31, 2016, by Darryl Cotton and Rebecca Berry is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Geraci NOL. Mr. Cotton provided that consent and authorization as we had discussed that approval of a CUP would be a condition of the purchase and sale of the Property.
9. As noted above, I had already put together my team for the MMCC project. My design professional, Abhay Schweitzer, and his firm, TECHNE, is and has been responsible for the design of the Project and the CUP application and approval process. Mr. Schweitzer was responsible for coordinating the efforts of the team to put together the CUP Application for the MMCC at the Property and Mr. Schweitzer has been and still is the principal person involved in dealings with the City of San Diego in connection with the CUP Application approval process. Mr. Schweitzer's declaration (Declaration of Abhay Schweitzer in Support of Opposition to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens) has been submitted concurrently herewith and describes in greater detail the CUP Application submitted to the City of San Diego, which submission included the Ownership Disclosure Statement signed by Darryl Cotton and Rebecca Berry.
10. After we signed the Nov 2nd Written Agreement for my purchase of the Property, Mr. Cotton immediately began attempts to renegotiate our deal for the purchase of the Property. This literally occurred the evening of the day he signed the Nov 2nd Written Agreement.

On November 2, 2016, at approximately 6:55 p.m., Mr. Cotton sent me an email, which stated:
Hi Larry,
Thank you for meeting today. Since we examined the Purchase Agreement in your office for the sale price of the property I just noticed the \(10 \%\) equity position in the dispensary was not language added into that document. I just want to make sure that we're not missing that language in any final agreement as it is a factored element in \(m y\) decision to \(s\) ell the prop erty. I'll be fi ne if you sim ply acknowledge that here in a reply.

I receive m y emails on m y phone. It was after \(9: 00 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}\). in the evening that I glanced at \(\mathrm{m} y\) phone and read the first sentence, "T hank you for m eeting with me today." And I responded from my phone "No no problem at all." I was responding to his thanking me for the meeting.

The next day I read the entire em ail and I telephoned Mr. Cotton beca use the total purchase price I agreed to pay for the subject property was \(\$ 800,000\) and I had never agreed to provide him a \(10 \%\) equity position in the dispensary as part of my purchase of the property. I spoke with Mr. Cotton by telephone at approximately \(12: 40 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}\). for approximately 3-minutes. A true and correct copy of the Call Detail from my firm 's telephone provider s howing those two telephone calls is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Geraci NOL. During that telephone call I told Mr. Cotton that a \(10 \%\) equity position in the dispensary was not part of our agreement as I had never agreed to pay him any other amounts above the \(\$ 800,000\) purchase price for the property. Mr. Cotton's response was to say something to the effect of "well, you don't get what you don't ask for." He was not upset and he commented further to the effect that things are "looking pretty good-we all shou ld make some money here." And that was the end of the discussion.
11. To be clear, prior to signing the N ov 2nd Written Agreement, Mr. Cotton expressed a desire to participate in different ways in the operation of the future MMCC business at the Property. Mr. Cotton is a hydroponic grower and purported to have useful experi ence he could provide regarding the operation of such a business. Prior to s igning the Nov 2nd W ritten Agreement we had preliminary discussions related to his de sire to be involved in the operation of the business ( n ot re lated to the purchase of the Property) and we discussed the possibility of compensation to him (e.g., a percentage of the net profits) in exchange for his providing various services to the business-but we never reached an agreement as to those matters related to the operation of my future MMCC business. Those discussions were not related to the purchase and sale of the Property, which we never agreed to amend or modify.
12. Beginning in or about mid-February 2017, and after the zoning issues had been resolved, Mr. Cotton began making increasing demands for compensation in connection with the sale. We were several months into the CUP applic ation process which could potentially take m any more months to
successfully complete (if it could be successfully completed and approval obtained) and I had already committed substantial resources to the project. I was very concerned that Mr. Cotton was going to interfere with the completion of that process to my detriment now that the zoning issues were resolved. I tried my best to discuss and work out with him some further compensation arrangement that was reasonable and avoid the risk he might try to "torpedo" the project and find another buyer. For example, on several successive occasions I had my attorney draft written agreements that contained terms that I that I believed I could live with and hoped would be sufficient to satisfy his demands for additional compensation, but Mr. Cotton would reject them as not satisfactory. Mr. Cotton continued to insist on, among other things, a \(10 \%\) equity position, to which I was not willing to agree, as well as on minimum monthly distributions in amounts that I thought were unreasonable and to which I was unwilling to agree. Despite our back and forth communications during the period of approximately mid-February 2017 through approximately mid-March 2017, we were not able to re-negotiate terms for the purchase of the property to which we were both willing to agree. The Nov. 2nd Written Agreement was never amended or modified. Mr. Cotton emailed me that I was not living up to my agreement and I responded to him that he kept trying to change the deal. As a result, no re-negotiated written agreement regarding the purchase and sale of the property was ever signed by Mr. Cotton or me after we signed and agreed to the terms and conditions in the Nov 2d Written Agreement.
13. Ultimately, Mr. Cotton was extremely unhappy with my refusal to accede to his demands and the failure to reach agreement regarding his possible involvement with the operation of the business to be operated at the Property and my refusal to modify or amend the terms and conditions we agreed to in the Nov 2nd Written Agreement regarding my purchase from him of the Property. Mr. Cotton made clear that he had no intention of living up to and performing his obligations under the Agreement and affirmatively threatened to take action to halt the CUP application process.
14. Mr. Cotton thereafter made good on his threats. On the morning of March 21, 2017, Mr. Cotton had a conversation with Firouzeh Tirandazi at the City of San Diego, who was in charge of processing the CUP Application, regarding Mr. Cotton's interest in withdrawing the CUP Application. That discussion is confirmed in an 8:54 a.m. e-mail from Ms. Tirandazi to Mr. Cotton with a cc to

Rebecca Berry. A true and correct copy of that March 21, 2017, at 8:54 a.m. e-mail is attached as Exhibit 4 to the Geraci NOL.
15. That same day, March 21, 2017, at 3:18 p.m. Mr. Cotton emailed me, reinforcing that he would not honor the Nov 2nd Written Agreement. In his email he stated that I had no interest in his property and that "I will be entering into an agreement with a third party to sell my property and they will be taking on the potential costs associated with any litigation arising from this failed agreement with you. A true and correct copy of that March 21, 2017, at 3:18 p.m. e-mail is attached as Exhibit 5 to the Geraci NOL.
16. Four minutes later that same day, at 3:25 p.m., Mr. Cotton e-mailed Ms. Tirandazi at the City, with a cc to both me and Rebecca Berry, stating falsely to Ms. Tirandazi: "... the potential buyer, Larry Gerasi [sic] (cc'ed herein), and I have failed to finalize the purchase of my property. As of today, there are no third-parties that have any direct, indirect or contingent interests in my property. The application currently pending on my property should be denied because the applicants have no legal access to my property. A true and correct copy of that March 21, 2017, at 3:25 p.m. e-mail is attached as Exhibit 6 to the Geraci NOL. Mr. Cotton's email was false as we had a signed agreement for the purchase and sale of the Property - the Nov 2nd Written Agreement.
17. Fortunately, the City determined Mr. Cotton did not have the authority to withdraw the CUP application without the consent of the Applicant (Rebecca Berry, my authorized agent).
18. Due to Mr. Cotton's clearly stated intention to not perform his obligations under the written Agreement and in light of his affirmative steps taken to attempt to withdraw the CUP application, I went forward on March 21, 2017, with the filing of my lawsuit against Mr. Cotton to enforce the Nov \(2^{\text {nd }}\) Written Agreement.
19. Since the March 21, 2017 filing of my lawsuit, we have continued to diligently pursue our CUP Application and approval of the CUP. Despite Mr. Cotton's attempts to withdraw the CUP application, we have completed the initial phase of the CUP process whereby the City deemed the CUP application complete (although not yet approved) and determined it was located in an area with proper zoning. We have not yet reached the stage of a formal City hearing and there has been no final determination to approve the CUP. The current status of the CUP Application is set forth in the

Declaration of Abhay Schweitzer.
20. Mr. Cotton also has made good on the statement in his March 21, 2017, at 3:18 p.m. email (referenced in paragraph 15 above - see Exhibit 5 to the Geraci NOL) stating that he would be "entering into an agreement with a third party to sell my property and they will be taking on the potential costs associated with any litigation arising from this failed agreement with you. We have learned through documents produced in my lawsuit that well prior to March 21, 2017, Mr. Cotton had been negotiating with other potential buyers of the Property to see if he could get a better deal than he had agreed to with me. As of March 21, 2017, Cotton had already entered into a real estate purchase and sale agreement to sell the Property to another person, Richard John Martin II.
21. Although he entered into this alternate purchase agreement with Mr. Martin as early as March 21, 2017, to our knowledge in the nine (9) months since, neither Mr. Cotton nor Mr. Martin or other agent has submitted a separate CUP Application to the City for processing. During that time, we continued to process our CUP Application at great effort and expense.
22. During approximately the last 17 months, I have incurred substantial expenses in excess of \(\$ 150,000\) in pursuing the MMCC project and the related CUP application.
23. Finally, Mr. Cotton has asserted from the outset of his lawsuit and, again, in paragraph 16 of his supporting declaration, that he did not discover until March 16, 2017, that I had submitted the CUP Application back on October 31, 2016. That is a blatant lie. I kept Mr. Cotton apprised of the status of the CUP application and the problems we were encountering (e.g., an initial zoning issue) from the outset. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of a text message Mr. Cotton sent me on November 16, 2016, in which he asks me, "Did they accept the CUP application?" Mr. Cotton was well aware at that time that we had already submitted the CUP application and were awaiting the City's completion of its initial review of the completeness of the application. Until the City deems the CUP application complete it does not proceed to the next step-the review of the CUP application.
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this \$th day of April, 2018.


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\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA}

\section*{COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION}

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v .
LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
Judge: Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil Dept.: C-73

\section*{DECLARATION OF ABHAY SCHWEITZER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS}

\section*{[IMAGED FILE]}
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Hearing Date: \\
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April 13, 2018 \\
\(9: 00 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}\).
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Filed: & March 21,2017 \\
Trial Date: & May 11, 2018
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I, Abhay Schweitzer, declare:
1. I am over the age of 18 and am not a party to this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration. If called as a witness, I would testify competently thereto. I provide this declaration in support of the opposition by Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, Larry Geraci, to the motion to expunge the lis pendens.
2. I am a building designer in the state of California and a Principal with Techne, a design
firm I founded in approximately December 2010. Techne provides design services to clients throughout California. Our offices are located at \(395630^{\text {th }}\) Street, San Diego, CA 92104. Our firm has worked on approximately 30 medical marijuana projects over the past 5 years, including a number of Conditional Use Permits for Medical Marijuana Consumer Cooperatives (MMCC) in the City of San Diego ("City"). One of these projects was and is an application for a MMCC to be located at 6176 Federal Ave., San Diego, CA 92105 (the "Property").
3. On or about October 4, 2016, Rebecca Berry, whom I was and am informed was acting as the agent of Larry Geraci, hired my firm to provide design services in connection with the application for a MMCC to be developed and built at the Property (the "Project"). Those services included, but are not limited to, services in connection with the design of the Project and application for a Conditional Use Permit (the "CUP").]
4. The first step in obtaining a CUP is to submit an application to the City of San Diego. My firm along with other consultants (a Surveyor, a Landscape Architect, and a consultant responsible for preparing the noticing package and radius maps) prepared the CUP application for the client as well as prepared the supporting plans and documentation. My firm coordinated their work and incorporated it into the submittal.
5. On or after October 31, 2016, I submitted the application to the City for a CUP for a medical marijuana consumer cooperative to be located on the Property. The CUP application for the Project was submitted under the name of applicant, Rebecca Berry. The submittal of the CUP application required the submission of several forms to the City, including Form DS-318 signed by the property owner, Darryl Cotton, authorizing/consenting to the application. A true and correct copy of Form DS-318 that I submitted to the City is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Notice of Lodgment in Support of Plaintiff Larry Geraci's Opposition to Defendant Darryl Cotton's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens (hereinafter the "Geraci NOL"). Mr. Cotton's signed consent can be found on Form DS-318.
6. On the Ownership Disclosure Statement, I am informed and believe Cotton signed the form as "Owner" and Berry signed the form as "Tenant/Lessee." The form only has three boxes from which to choose when checking - "Owner", "Tenant/Lessee" and "Redevelopment Agency". The purpose of that signed section, Part 1, is to identify all persons with an interest in the property and
must be signed by all persons with an interest in the property.
7. The CUP application process generally involves several rounds of comments from the City in which the applicant is required to respond in order to "clear" the comment. This processing involved substantial communication back and forth with the City, with the City asking for additional information, or asking for changes, and our responding to those requests for additional information and making any necessary changes to the plans. I have been the principal person involved in dealings with the City of San Diego regarding the CUP application. My primary contact during the process had been Firouzeh Tirandazi, Development Project Manager, City of San Diego Development Services Department, tele (619) 446-5325, whom the City initially assigned to be the project manager for the CUP application. Recently the Project Manager has changed from Firouzeh Tirandazi to Cherlyn Cac.
8. We have been engaged in the application process for this CUP application for approximately seventeen (17) months so far.
9. At the outset of the review process a difficulty was encountered that delayed the processing of the application. The Project was located in an area zoned "CO" which supposedly included medical marijuana dispensary as a permitted use, but the City's zoning ordinance did not specifically state that was a permitted use. I am informed and believe that on February 22, 2017, the City passed a new regulation that amended the zoning ordinance to clarify that operating a medical marijuana dispensary was a permitted use in areas zoned "CO." I am informed and believe this regulation took effect on April 12, 2017, so by that date the zoning ordinance issue was cleared up and the City resumed its processing of the CUP application.
10. The CUP application for this Project has completed the initial phase of the process. This initial phase was completed when the City deemed the CUP application complete (although not yet approved) and determined the Project was located in an area with proper zoning. When this occurred, as required, notice of the proposed project was given to the public as follows: First, on March 27, 2017, the City posted a Notice of Application (or "NOA") for the Project on its website for 30 days and provided the NOA to me, on behalf of the applicant, for posting at the property; Second, the City mailed the Notice of Application to all properties within 300 feet of the subject property. Third, as applicant we posted the Notice of Application at the property line as was required.
11. Since the completion of the initial phase of the process we have been engaged in successive submissions and reviews and are presently engaged still in that submission and review process. The most recent comments from the City were received on October 20, 2017.
12. In connection with the CUP application there is an issue left to resolve regarding a street dedication. In my previous declaration submitted October 30, 2017, I stated that at that time I expected this issue to be resolved within the next six (6) weeks. The issue has not yet been resolved. A medical marijuana dispensary cannot be located within 100 feet of a residential zoned lot and the Property is located within 100 feet of a residential zoned lot. To overcome this barrier, we previously suggested to the City the following solution: that we make an irrevocable offer of dedication of 7 -feet of the Property to the City of San Diego which, when accepted, would mean the Property would be more than 100 feet from a residential neighborhood and thereby satisfy the requirement. Previously Jim Bartell met with the City's reviewer responsible for this issue, who indicated a tentative agreement with our proposed solution. However, the most recent comments issued by the City regarding the project still listed as "not cleared" the issue of the Property location being within 100 feet of a residential zoned lot. Thus, the City's reviewer has still not formally recommended approval of our proposed solution of an offer of dedication and that issue still needs to be "cleared". Nevertheless, I still expect the City's reviewer to ultimately "clear" the issue based on our suggested solution of an offer of dedication as there is no basis in the San Diego Municipal Code to deny our proposed offer of dedication. Currently, my best estimate of when I expect this issue to be "cleared" or resolved is on or about late June or early July 2018. What I mean by resolved is that point in time when the City staff responsible for this correction formally accepts our proposed solution and "clears" the comments from their review. However, the irrevocable offer of dedication is not effective until the proposed Conditional Use Permit is approved at the final instance and the irrevocable offer of dedication is properly recorded.
13. In connection with the CUP application another issue recently arose in that we have been required by the City to provide a geotechnical investigation for the Subject Property. The required geotechnical investigation will be performed by SCST, Inc. a professional engineering firm headquartered in San Diego, with whom I have contracted on behalf of Mr. Geraci and Ms. Berry.

SCST is comprised of over 130 professionals who provide geotechnical engineering, environmental science \& engineering, special inspection \& materials testing, and facilities consulting service. SCST is comprised of skilled geotechnical engineers, civil and environmental engineers, environmental scientists, engineering geologists, multi-credential inspectors and technicians. To conduct the necessary soils testing we are required to file a permit with the San Diego County Department of Environmental Health because the exploratory borings exceed 20 feet below ground surface. To obtain the permit we must include a signed Property Owner Consent form evidencing consent by the property owner, Darryl Cotton. I am informed and believe that the Court has issued an order permitting access to the Subject Property for soils testing and requiring Mr. Cotton to sign the Property Owner Consent form. As a result, we are proceeding to have the geotechnical investigation performed.
14. Once the City has cleared all the outstanding issues it will issue an environmental determination and the City Clerk will issue a Notice of Right to Appeal Environmental Determination ("NORA").
15. In my previous declaration submitted October 30, 2017, I stated that at that time I expected the NORA to be issued sometime in late December 2017 or January 2018. The NORA has not yet been issued. Currently, my best estimate is that the NORA will be issued a week or so after the City has cleared all cycle issues. My best estimate is about one week after the dedication issue is cleared, so sometime in July 2018.
16. The NORA must be published for 10 business days. If no interested party appeals the NORA, City staff will present the CUP for a determination on the merits by a Hearing Officer. The hearing is usually set on at least 30 days' notice so the City's Staff has time to prepare a report with its recommendations regarding the issues on which the hearing officer must make findings. If there is no appeal of the NORA, I expect the hearing before the hearing officer to be held on or about mid-to-late August 2018 or afterwards.
17. If the NORA is appealed it will be set for hearing before the City Council. Currently, it is my opinion that the earliest an appeal of the NORA could be heard before the City Council would be on or about mid-to-late August 2018 or afterwards. In all but one instance, the City Council has denied a NORA appeal related to a medical marijuana CUP application. The one NORA appeal that
was upheld is a project located in a flood zone.
18. If there is a NORA appeal and such appeal is denied by the City Council, then the earliest I would expect the CUP application to be heard by a hearing officer would be on or about mid-to-late September 2018.
19. If there is a NORA appeal and it is upheld by the City Council, the City Council would retain jurisdiction and the CUP application would be heard by the City Council for a final determination at some point after the NORA appeal. In that case the earliest I would expect this to occur would also be on or about mid-to-late September 2018.
20. To date we have not yet reached the stage of a City Council hearing and there has been no final determination to approve the CUP.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this \(\underline{q}^{\text {/ }}\) day of April, 2018.

Dated: \(\qquad\)


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\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA}

\section*{COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION}

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1
THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,
Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
Judge:
Dept.:
Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil C-73

\section*{DECLARATION OF MICHAEL R. WEINSTEIN IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS}
[IMAGED FILE]
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
Hearing Date: & April 13, 2018 \\
Hearing Time: & \(9: 00 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}\).
\end{tabular}

Filed:
Trial Date:

March 21, 2017
May 11, 2018

I, Michael R. Weinstein, declare:
1. I am an attorney with Ferris \& Britton, APC, the attorneys for Plaintiff and CrossDefendant, LARRY GERACI, and Cross-Defendant, REBECCA BERRY, in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration. If called as a witness, I would testify competently thereto. I provide this declaration in support of Mr. Geraci's opposition to Mr. Cotton's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens.
2. We have learned through documents produced in this lawsuit that well prior to March 21, 2017, Mr. Cotton had been negotiating with other potential buyers of the Property to see if he could get a better deal than he had agreed to with Geraci. As of March 21, 2017, Cotton had already entered into a real estate purchase and sale agreement to sell the Property to another person, a Richard John Martin II. A true and correct copy of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Darryl Cotton and Richard John Martin II, dated March 21, 2017, produced by Darryl Cotton, is attached as Exhibit 8 to the Notice of Lodgment in Support of Plaintiff Larry Geraci's Opposition to Motion to Expunge Lis Pendent (hereafter the "Geraci NOL").

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 10th day of April, 2018, in San Diego, California.


MICHAEL R. WEINSTEIN

FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation
Michael R. Weinstein (SBN 106464)
Scott H. Toothacre (SBN 146530)
501 West Broadway, Suite 1450
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 233-3131
Fax: (619) 232-9316
mweinstein@ferrisbritton.com
stoothacre@ferrisbritton.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY

\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA} COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1
THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,
Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
Judge: & Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil \\
Dept.: & C-73
\end{tabular}

NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS
[IMAGED FILE]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline Hearing Date: & April 13, 2018 \\
\hline Hearing Time: & 9:00 a.m. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Filed:
March 21, 2017
May 11, 2018

Plaintiff, LARRY GERACI, hereby lodges the following documents as exhibits to this Notice of Lodgment ("NOL") in support of his Opposition to Defendant Darryl Cotton's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Ex. } \\
& \text { No. }
\end{aligned}
\] & Exhibit Description & Evidentiary Foundation \\
\hline 1. & Ownership Disclosure Statement (Form DS318) signed by Darryl Cotton and Rebecca Berry, dated October 31, 2016, & \begin{tabular}{l}
Declaration of Larry Geraci, 9 8; \\
Declaration of Abhay Schweitzer, 95
\end{tabular} \\
\hline 2. & Written real estate purchase and sale agreement between Larry Geraci and Darryl Cotton dated November 2, 2016 (the "Nov 2nd Written Agreement") & Declaration of Larry Geraci, ¢ 5 \\
\hline 3. & Geraci's AT\&T Call Detail & Declaration of Larry Geraci, ¢ 10 \\
\hline 4. & Email to Darryl Cotton from Firouzeh Tirandazi, dated March 21, 2017 at 8:54 a.m. & Declaration of Larry Geraci, ¢ 14 \\
\hline 5. & Email to Larry Geraci from Darryl Cotton, dated March 21, 2017 at 3:18 p.m. & Declaration of Larry Geraci, 15 \\
\hline 6. & Email to Firouzeh Tirandazi from Darryl Cotton, dated March 21, 2017 at 3:25 p.m. & Declaration of Larry Geraci, ¢ 16 \\
\hline 7. & Text Message to Larry Geraci from Darryl Cotton, dated November 16, 2016 & Declaration of Larry Geraci, ¢ 23 \\
\hline 8. & Purchase and Sale Agreement between Darryl Cotton and Richard John Martin II, dated March 21, 2017 & Declaration of Michael R. Weinstein, \| 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Dated: April 10, 2018

FERRIS \& BRITTON, A Professional Corporation
By:
Michael R. Weinstein
Scott H. Toothacre
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY

\section*{EXHIBIT 1}

\section*{1168}


City of San Diego
Development Services
1222 First Ave., MS-302
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) \(446-5000\)

Approval Type: Check appropriate box for type of approval (s) requested: \(\Gamma\) Neighborhood Use Permit \(\Gamma\) Coastal Development Permit
I Neighborhood Development Permit \(\Gamma\) Site Development Permit \(\Gamma\) Planned Development Permit \(\sqrt{X}\) Conditional Use Permit -Variance \(\Gamma\) Tentative Map \(\Gamma\) Vesting Tentative Map \(\Gamma\) Map Waiver \(\Gamma\) Land Use Plan Amendment -
Project Title
Project No. For City Use Only
Federal Blyd. MMCC:
Project Address:
6176 Federal Blyd., San Diego, CA 92114

\section*{Part I - To be completed when property is held by Individual(s)}

By signing the Ownership Disclosure Statement, the owner(s) acknowledge that an application ior a permit, map or oither matter, as identified above, will be filed with the City of San Diego on the subject property, with the intent to record an encumbrance against the property. Please list below the owner(s) and tenant(s) (if applicable) of the above referenced property. The list must include the names and addresses of all persons who have an interest in the property, recorded or otherwise, and slate the type of property interest (e.g., tenants who will benefit from the permit, all individuals who own the property). A signature is required of al least one of the property owners. Attach additional pages if needed. A signature from the Assistant Executive Director of the San Diego Redevelopment Agency shall be required for all project parcels for which a Disposition and Development Agreement (DDA) has been approved / executed by the Cily Council. Note: The applicant is responsible for notifying the Project Manager of any changes in ownership during the time the application is being processed or considered. Changes in ownership are to be given to the Project Manager at least thirty days prior to any public hearing on the subject property. Failure to provide accurate and current ownership information could result in a delay in the hearing process.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline Additional pages attached \(\Gamma\) Yes \(\bar{X}\) No & \\
\hline Name of Individual (type or print): Darryl Cotton & Name of Individual (type or print): Rebecca Berry \\
\hline \} \text { Owner } \Gamma \text { Tenant/essee } \Gamma \text { Redevelopment Agency } & \(\Gamma\) Owner \(\mid \times\) Tenant/Lessec \(\Gamma\) Redevelopment Agency \\
\hline Street Address: 6176 Federal Blvd & Street Address:
5982 Gullstrand St \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
City/State/Zip: \\
San Diego Ca 92114
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{l}
City/State/Zip: \\
San Diego / Ca / 92122
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { Phone No: } \\
(\quad 619,954-4447 & \text { Fax No } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] & \begin{tabular}{ll} 
Phone No: \\
8589996882 & Fax No:
\end{tabular} \\
\hline Signature:
Date:
\(10-31-2016\) &  \\
\hline Name of Individual (type or print): & Name of Individual (type or print): \\
\hline \(\Gamma\) Owner \(\Gamma\) Tenantlessee \(\Gamma\) Redevelopment Agency & \(\Gamma\) Owner \(\Gamma\) TenanULessee \(\Gamma\) Redevelopment Agency \\
\hline Streel Address: & Street Address. \\
\hline City/State/Zip: & City/State/Zip. \\
\hline Phone No: Fax No: & Phone No. Fax No: \\
\hline Signalure: Date: & Signature: Date: \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{EXHIBIT 2}

Agreement between Larry Geraci or assignee and Darryl Cotton:

Darryl Cotton has agreed to sell the property located at 6176 Federal Blvd, CA for a sum of \(\$ 800,000.00\) to Larry Geraci or assignee on the approval of a Marijuana Dispensary. (CUP for a dispensary)

Ten Thousand dollars (cash) has been given in good faith earnest money to be applied to the sales price of \(\$ 800,000.00\) and to remain in effect until license is approved. Darryl Cotton has agreed to not enter into any other contacts on this property.


1171

\section*{ACKNOWLEDGMENT}

> A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of California
County of


On November 2,20110 before me, \(\frac{\text { Jessica } N \text { e well }}{\text { (insert name and title of the officer) }}\) Hindi
personally appeared \(\qquad\) Darkly Cotton and Lardy Geraa' who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the persons) whose name (s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signatures) on the instrument the persons), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.
 (Seal)

\section*{EXHIBIT 3}

\section*{1173}

TAX AND FINANCIAL CENTER 5402 RUFFIN RD STE 200
SAN DIEGO，CA 92123－1301

Page：A－87 of 181
Bill Cycle Date：11／02／16－12／01／16
Account： 835642301
Foundation Account：FAN 02761582
Invoice：835642301×12092016

Visit us online at：www．att．com／business
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline 间 & \multicolumn{7}{|c|}{\begin{tabular}{l}
858 956－4040 \\
TAX AND FINANCIAL CENTER
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline \multicolumn{8}{|l|}{Call Detail} \\
\hline & Place & & Rate & Featur & & Alrtine & LD／Addl \\
\hline Tlme & Called & Number Called & Code & & 日in & Charges & Charges \\
\hline \multicolumn{8}{|l|}{Wednesday， \(11 / 02\)} \\
\hline 08：48a & SWJG S CA & 619－7atat & SDDV & & 2 & 0，00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：01a & la jol ca & 858 & SDDV & & 4 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：04a & la jol ca &  & SDOV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：06a & SVDG S CA & 619 －\(\frac{\text { PDxC }}{}\) & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：09a & SWDG M CA & 858－87tict & SDDV & & 15 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：12p & SWDG M CA & 858－\(\frac{\text {－atuc }}{}\) & SDDV & & 6 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：18p & CORONA CA &  & SDDV & & 12 & 0，00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：30p & INCOMI CL & 619－954－4447 & SDDV & & 11 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：50p & SNDG S CA & 619 & SDDV & & ， & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：52p & SNOG S CA & 619－954－4447 & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：55p & INCOMI CL & \(858-\) & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：12p & SNDG S CA & \(619-\) & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：15p & la jol ca & 858. & SDDV & & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：17p & SIDG S CA & 619. & SODV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02；24p & InCOMI CL & 858. & SDDV & & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：27p & SNDG S CA & 619. & SDDV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：36p & INCOKI CL & 619. & SDOV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：45p & CORONA CA & 619. & SDDV & & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：47p & SNDG L CA & 858. & SDDV & & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：15p & INCOMI CL & \(858-\) & SDDV & & 5 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：20p & CORONA CA & 619. & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：21p & INCOMI CL & 619. & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：23p & CORONA CA & 619. & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：24p & SNDG 11 CA & 858. & SDDV & & 7 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：31p & ESCOND CA & 760. & SDOV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：32p & Inconi Cl & 619. & SDDV & & 9 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：41p & SNDG M CA & \(858-\) & SDDV & & 1 & 0,00 & 0，00 \\
\hline 03：45p & BLOCKED & 000 & SDDV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：05p & INCOMI CL & 619. & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：15p & Inconi CL & 619. & SDDV & & & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：16p & la jol ca & 858. & SDDV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：17p & SWDG S CA & 619. & SDDV & & 5 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：28p & INCOMI CL & 619. & SDDV & & 9 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：39p & INCOMI CL & 702 & SDDV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：44p & INCOMI CL & 917. & SDDV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 07：09p & la jol ca & \(858-\) & SDDV & & 6 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline \multicolumn{8}{|l|}{Thursday， \(11 / 03\)} \\
\hline 08：59a & INCOMI CL & \(858-\) & SDDV & & 4 & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：34a & SHDG M CA & \(858-\) & SDDV & & 14 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：48a & SNDG L CA & 858－ & SDDV & & 10 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 11：09a & SNDG M CA & 858. & SDDV & & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：40p & SHDG S CA & 619－954－4447 & SDDV & & 3 & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：43p & la jol ca & 858. & SDDV & & 6 & 0，00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：25p & INCOMI CL & 619. & SDDV & & I & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：32p & CORONA CA & 619. & SDDV & & 1 & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：33p & CORONA CA & 619. & SDDV & & 8 & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：47p & SWDC S CA & 619. & SDDV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：55p & INCOMI Cl & 858 － & SDDV & & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：22p & CORONA CA & 619－7xtin & SDDV & & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
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\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Tlue & \begin{tabular}{l}
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\end{tabular} & Nunber Called & \begin{tabular}{l}
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Charges
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\hline \multicolumn{7}{|l|}{Thursday，11／03} \\
\hline 02：27p & INCOKI CL & 619. & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：29p & LA JOL CA &  & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：38p & LA JOL CA & 858 是䞨 & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：43p & ESCOND CA & 760 Eaderct & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：03p & INCOMI CL &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：11p & INCOMI CL． &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：19p & CORONA CA &  & SDOV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：21p & INCOHI CL & 619－8ntciri & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：42p & INCOMI CL & 619 － & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：44p & INCOMI CL &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：45p & INCOMI CL & 858－7nicri & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：49p & SNEG M CA & 858－vas & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：52p & CORONA CA & 619 Emexte & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：55p & CORONA CA & 619． & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 06：06p & INCOMI CL &  & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 06：44p & INCOMI CL &  & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 07；19p & INCOMI CL &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 07：28p & INCOMI CL & 858－牙 & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 08：00p & LA JOL CA &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 08：01p & LA JOL CA & 858－751 & SDDV & 2 & 0，00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 08：27p & LA JOL CA & 858 －cimut & SDDV & 1 & 0，00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 08：48p & CORONA CA & 619 － & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 10：03p & INCOMI CL & 619－3ank & SDDV & 13 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 10：16p & SNDG 1 CA & 858 － & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline \multicolumn{7}{|l|}{Friday，11／04} \\
\hline 09：14a & SNDG H CA & 858. & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：38a & LA JOL CA & 858－83ikt & SDDV & 15 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 09：53a & SNDG S CA & 619 － & SDDV & 4 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 10：52a & LA JOL CA & 858－ & SDDV & 1 & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 10：53a & INCOMI CL & 858－ Vail \(^{\text {a }}\) & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 11：02a & INCOMI CL & 619． & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12；06p & ESCOND CA & 760－\(\frac{\text { anxtar }}{}\) & SDDV & 8 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：14p & SNDG 11 CA &  & SDDV & 6 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：20p & CORONA CA & 619 －\({ }^{\text {canacin }}\) & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：36p & INCOMI CL &  & SDDV & 1 & 0，00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：37p & SHDG S CA &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：37p & INCOMI Cl． &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：53p & INCOMI CL & 714－ & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 12：58p & INCOMI CL & 714 －mictim & SDDV & 4 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：08p & LA JOL CA &  & SDDV & 2 & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：10p & EL CAJ CA & 619－ & SDDV & 8 & 0，00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 01：22p & INCOMI CL & 714 － & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0,00 \\
\hline 02：39p & INCOMI CL & 619.8 －\({ }^{\text {andina }}\) & SDDV & 3 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 02：42p & OKLA C OK & 405．－－\({ }^{\text {andic }}\) & SDDV & 2 & 0,00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：06p & SNDG \(\\) CA & 858 － & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：08p & OKLA C OK & 405－－axicti & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：09p & CORONA CA & 619 －axict & SDDV & 2 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：11p & INCOMI CL & 619－ & SDDV & 8 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 03：33p & INCOMI Cl & 619－Panderim & SDDV & 10 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 04：04p & LA JOL CA &  & SDDV & 9 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 05：05p & INCOMI CL & 619－ & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 07：35p & OCSD C CA &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 07：36p & CORONA CA &  & SODV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline 07：37p & OCSD C CA &  & SDDV & 1 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{EXHIBIT 4}

\section*{1175}
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
To: & dcotton@fleetsystems.net[dcotton@fleetsystems.net] \\
Cc: & Becky Berry[Becky@tfcsd.net]; brianna@bhpsonline.com[brianna@bhpsonline.com] \\
From: & Tirandazi, Firouzeh \\
Sent: \(\quad\) Tue \(3 / 21 / 2017\) 8:54:01 AM \\
Importance: \(\quad\) Normal \\
Subject: & Federal Boulevard MMCC \\
Received: & Tue 3/21/2017 8:54:07 AM
\end{tabular}

\section*{Good Morning Mr. Cotton,}

As a follow-up to our conversation this morning regarding your potential interest as property owner in withdrawing the above referenced CUP application, I just noticed that you are not the financial responsible party for the subject application. As such, I will also need written acknowledgement from Ms. Rebecca Berry, the applicant, who is the financial responsible party, to withdraw the subject CUP application.

As requested, here is a link to the \(2 / 14\) Council docket and supporting material - Item No. 51: http://dockets.sandiego.gov/sirepub/pubmtgframe.aspx?meetid=3410\&doctype=Agenda

Regards,
Firouzeh Tirandazi
Development Project Manager
City of San Diego
Development Services Department
(619)446-5325
sandiego.gov
OpenDSD Now: Pay Invoices and Deposits Online

\section*{CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION}

This electronic mail message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the addressee(s) named above and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not an intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this e-mail to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail message in error, please immediately notify the sender by replying to this message or by telephone. Thank you.

\section*{EXHIBIT 5}

\section*{Contract Review}

Darryl Cotton <indagrodarryl@gmail.com>
Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 3:18 PM
To: Larry Geraci <Larry@tfcsd.net>
Larry, I have been in communications over the last 2 days with Firouzeh, the Development Project Manager for the City of San Diego who is handling CUP applications. She made it \(100 \%\) clear that there are no restrictions on my property and that there is no recommendation that a CUP application on my property be denied. In fact she told me the application had just passed the "Deemed Complete' phase and was entering the review process. She also confirmed that the application was paid for in October, before we even signed our agreement.

This is our last communication, you have failed to live up to your agreement and have continuously lied to me and kept pushing off creating final legal agreements because you wanted to push it off to get a response from the City without taking the risk of losing the non-refundable deposit in the event the CUP application is denied.

To be clear, as of now, you have no interest in my property, contingent or otherwise. I will be entering into an agreement with a third-party to sell my property and they will be taking on the potential costs associated with any litigation arising from this failed agreement with you.

Darryl Cotton

\section*{EXHIBIT 6}

\section*{1179}
```

To: Tirandazi, Firouzeh[FTirandazi@sandiego.gov]
3c: Becky Berry[Becky@tfcsd.net]; brianna@bhpsonline.com[brianna@bhpsonline.com]; Larry Geraci[Larry@tfcsd.net]
Hrom: Darryl Cotton
Sent: Tue 3/21/2017 3:25:24 PM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Re: PTS 520606 - Federal Blvd MMCC
Received: Tue 3/21/2017 3:25:29 PM

```

Hello Firouzeh,
As a follow-up to our recent conversations, the potential buyer, Larry Gerasi (cc'ed herein), and I have failed to finalize the purchase of my property. As of today, there are no third-parties that have any direct, indirect or contingent interests in my property. The application currently pending on my property should be denied because the applicants have no legal access to my property.

Thank you again for your help.
Best,
Darryl Cotton
On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 4:55 PM, Tirandazi, Firouzeh < FTirandazi@sandiego.gov> wrote:

Hello Mr. Cotton,

As requested, please find attached the Ownership Disclosure Statement signed by you (property owner), and Rebecca Berry (tenant/lessee) on October 31, 2016, submitted with the above referenced project application. I have copied Ms. Berry and the project Point of Contact (Bree Harris) on this email as well.

The project was deemed complete March 13, 2017 and is currently in the first review cycle. As property owner, if you wish to withdraw this application, please notify me in writing.

Regards,

\section*{Firouzeh Tirandazi}

Development Project Manager
City of San Diego
Development Services Department

\section*{CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION}

This electronic mail message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the addressee(s) named above and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not an intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this e-mail to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, disuibution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail message in error, please immediately notify the sender by replying to this message or by telephone. Thank you.

GERO036

\section*{EXHIBIT 7}

1182

Sent To:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

From:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

Sent To:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

From:
Daryl Fed \(\mathrm{B}(16199544447\) )

Sent To:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

Sent To:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

From:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

Sent To:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

Sent To:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)

\footnotetext{
From:
Daryl Fed B(16199544447)
}

I just sent you an email they just need a quick signature and send back to me if you can get that back ASAP I'd appreciate it thank you

Nov 16, 2016 16:20

\section*{How goes it?}

\section*{No news yet}

Nov 16, 2016 16:25:47

Did they accept the CUP application?

We're still getting through them excepting the
property

Once the property is approved then I believe we're set to go

Nov 16, 2016 16:30:33

Nov 18, 2016 11:58

Did you talk with matt on the cv dispensary?
Nov 18, 2016 11:58:05

Nov 18, 2016 12:26

> Yeah I did but he seriously didn't have any interest because he met with the Chula Vista city attorney

Nov 18, 2016 12:26:07

All those places are gonna be close down
Nov 18, 2016 12:26:13

Nov 30, 2016 19:26

Greetings.
Nov 30, 2016 19:26:18

\section*{EXHIBIT 8}

\section*{1184}

\title{
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND JOINT ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS \\ (NON-RESIDENTLAL) \\ (C A.R. Form CPA. Rovised 12/96)
}

Date Prepared: 03/21/2017
1. OFFER:
A. THIS IS AN OFFER FROM \(\qquad\)


C. THE PURCHASE PRICE Otianad is Iwa Million

E. Buryer and Seiker are reforfed to herem as the Parties "Erckers are nut Portivi is this Agroerrent
2. AGENCY:
 Form AD,

Listing Agen:
N/A
(P) Fint Name ₹ the dge\% of renech :nce. Ethe Sellet extusivity, or boin tire Buyer and Seinet.
Se'irg Agont N/A
(Pron rimp Nange) 1'mo Be sate

 at More than One Euyer or Sellor - Discloswte and Corment (C A.R Fam Prasi
3. FINANCE TERMS: auyer robresents that tunds will by goad wher dopos ted with tserow. Holidor.
A. INITIAL DEPOSIT: Deposit shai tee in the art ount of
(1) Buyer Direct Depost: Euyer shal celivet depost diceth, to Eacesos Heloet by thewtorte fur ds transter "D casher's check, Lipersonatcheck other__ vithin 3 gusmoss days ather Accestance tot
OR (2) : Huyue Deposit whth Agert Buyer has given then depoat: by perseral ahoze for to the azent suberiting the ctter ior to \(\qquad\) Ti. Mater payuble ©u
The ceposit stat be reld uncesred unta Nocestarse and then decositcy
with Excrow Holser w: thin 3 bua mess days after \(A\).centunce ( \(\sigma\).
Deposit ereeks given to ajent shall bo an onginal gignted check ane ne: s aray

B. INCREASED DEPOSIT: Ruyer shatl cepcsit wh Excrow Hoter an sereused cerpost in the amont 0 :. §
within Dayz Atar Acceptance or
 dopoci into the isudated sarrages amsunt in a separate icuidatec damages ciause ic A.R \(=\mathrm{zm}\)


 or [Buyur shall, wathin 3 (or \(\qquad\) ) Days ider \(A=\) coptanse Dewer to Setier zuer venfieat in
D. LOAN(S):

\(\$ \quad 1,800,200.00\) This loan wil: se convento: bil fonanerg of Sulter Emaneria (CA.R Form SFA) Tassurted
 loan shall bo of a foxed rate not to exceed. Bor, ar adusidbie die loan with indal jte not
 Pe ban amoun:

 (C.A.R FormAFA) aubjec: to financing. Otime This ban ehati be at a froce tate not to exceed - \(\%\) or 5 an adustabia tate loan wid mital tath rol to exated Regrutless of tha type of loan, Buyer shat poy poin to rolt to uxceest \(\qquad\) "t of trathan amaint
E. ADDIIONAL FINANCING TERMS: seo attached Addendum !


 (Versicator, at!azhed.)
1. APPRAISAL CONTINGENCY AND REMOVAL. This Agresment is or \(\hat{X}\) is vor) contingent upen a writun operisul in the
 If wriang, rerove tre apprasal sonsingency or eancel this Agreement wittin 17 (or ) Days Afies Aoctaplanco
J. LOAN TERMS:
(1) LOAN APPLLCATIONS: Witue 3 (or \(\qquad\)






 prize does not entide Buyar to exercise the cancelidion ngnt purbuant ia the fcan eantinger cy t suyet is witerase guating
 contingencies of tus Agreminem:
(3) LOAN CCNTINGENCY REMOVAL-

Whthe 21 (or

 the uppraisal cantingency.

 logal rerades









 purchase the Property and elose escrow as seubetied in ths Agramenent

\section*{4. SALE OF BUYER'S PROPERTY:}

 in the attached adcerdum; CA, R, form COP;
5. ADDENDA AND ADVISOHES.

Ba;k Up O"w AdJenjum IC. A. K. Fetm BUOI Cour: C nnfmetion Adeundur iC AR Fonm CCC:
Snstic Wall and Frogerty binument AdCondum (CAF Fant SUP1)

6. BUVER AND SELLER ADVISORIES

 -Trusifitrigury CA.R. Fem TA REO AdVAUV (CAR FOTM REO) Skon Sale 1-tomaton ang Aovisory (C.AR Form SSiA) Oren
6. OTHER TERMS: sme ottoched Addundum is is incorporated as part of contrat?

\section*{7. ALLOCATION OF COSTS}

 recommended or identified in the Roport

(2) Suyet - Seller shal zay ter the tollowing Rever preparuc \({ }^{2}\)
(3) Buyer - Sester onall day for 3u chawng kexpe vevarac \(\vec{u}_{i}\)
B. GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS AND RETROFIT:

 siate anc kea! Law, uniess Selle: is exirt::
Buyct sintatis \(X\) is \(\qquad\) 1
CPA REVISED \(12 / 1\) (PAGE 2 OF 11)

Properiy Aderess: 617C Fodoral Blvd, San Diego, CA 97114-1401
Ddie Karch 25, 2017
(2) (i)

Buybur Seler shan pray the cost of eematance woth any athe reports if tequifed as a condibon of cosing ese-gN unster any baw




C ESCROW AND TITLE-
(1) (it Suyer Seltor s all way escrow tes
(b) Ësoow Holder shat ber
(c) The Purbes snall, whthin 5 tor

(2) (a) Buyer Seller srall pay for owner's the in adtrce novry epecrud w paragroch 17 E
(b) Cwne's tige poliey to bo issued by

D OTHER COSTS,
(1) Buyer - S.tler shail vay Counry :rarste lax or tee
(2) - Suyer - Soliur shall pay Ci'y transfer tax or fec



(6) Buyer to piay 'ot an y HOA centrication toe.
(7) Suyer - Sellee shas pay for aniv perain inar stur 'ue
(8) - Buver - Seller shad pay for
(2) - Buger- Selier shall pay for
8. ITEMS INCLUDED IN AND EXCLUDEO FROM SAIE:


B. ITEMS INCLUDED IN SALE:
(1) An ExISIING; fixtures ane fitigss that are arached to the Proparty:








 seller warrarty of candition rugartiess of bive.

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 If any itum or syatom spoeifed in palagrapt 98 or atenvise ingluzeg it the ant is ieased or not awrest by Seller of



 \(\qquad\)

\section*{D. ÖTHERTTEMS:}



9. CLOSING AND POSSESSION:






 to Buyer on Close or Escrusw




 may be requed to pay a deposit to the Owners＇Ass ciation（OAO）to colam kevs th accesside OA fachises


11．SELLER DISCLOSURES：
A．NATURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES：Salier shall，withn the tme jpecilec in paragrazt＇e．t reciur． 2 b；Law




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（1）RENTAL SERVICE ACREEMENTS：（i）All cement eases tuntat agroomorti，servet wonme＇s，wh she agroomon＇s


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（4）SURVEYS．PLANS AND ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS：Lepies of suricys plans spucticaton ani erainoerity dosuments，it any．in Spiter＇s potsession or controi．

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D．NOTICE REGARDING GAS AND HAZARDOUS LIQUID TRANSMISSION PIPELINES．This netice is targ prov ted emp；to



 operators is searctable by \(21 P\) Code and county on thy NPMS trtame：Whb s．an
E．CONDOMINIUM／PLANNED DEVELOPMENT DISCLOSURES：
 in a planned devetogment of chier bemman interest subd wabl
 3 （or









 trome nens Howevor, a subscquent or amended disclosure stedf not be required for conditions and matoriat inaccuracies disclosed in reports ordered and paid for by Buyer.

\section*{14. CHANGES DURING ESCROW:}



 (2) Whem 5 (or




 ano serseral propert, not incoded in the sale shar be removed \(z_{y}\) Zisse Or Escrow




C. Buyer is strongly advised to conduct investigations of the entire Property in order to detormine its present zondition Solter may not be aware of all defects affecting the Propenty or other factors that Buyer considerk important Prenenty imptovoments may not be buif according to code in compliance with curtent Law, or have had permils issued.
16. BUYER'S INVESTIGAYION OF PROPERIY ANO MATTERS AFFECTING PROPERTY



















 Tiace avar abe to Buye








\section*{17 TITLE AND VESTING:}





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 record oragery sempelamely


 TAX CONSEQUENCES CONSULT AN APDROPRIATE PROFESSIO:AA

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16. TIME PERIODS: REMOVAL OF CONTINGENCIES. CANCELLATION RIGHIS: THE following time periods may only be uxtended. altered, modified or changed by mutual written agreement. Any romoval of contingencios or canceplation under this paragraph by either Buyer or Seller must be exprcised in good faith and in writing (C.A.R. Form CR or CC),
A. SELLER HAS: 7 (or \(\qquad\)



B. (1) BUYER HAS: 17 lor ) Days Atter Azcectince. in veas stherchisu agreat in perting. is











 Sejer mhy rot cancel this Agreemert purnart to paragraph : ec; 1
C SELLER RIGHT TO CANCEL:


 cepasa excep: to tees incured by Buyer






 return of Buyer's depost, excenet for teess inaurod by Bujer






















 enstructices. A Panty may bo subject to a civil penality of up to 51,000 for refusal to sign cancellation instructions it no q000 falth dispute exists as to whe Is entitlod to the deposited funds (Civil Code 51057 3).

Sanctannio : \(x\)






20. FINAL VERIFICATION OF CONDITION: Euyer sheall have the nght to make a final vanficaton g'ale P;opory; stan \(\mathbf{5}\) for - Days

 digrement (CAR Form VP).




 purchase phee. prarated pagments on Melo-Roos and other Spacial Assessment Estrut borde ant assessmen's act it in





\section*{22. BROKERS:}

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24. JOINT ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS TO ESCROW HOLDER:
A. The following paragraphs, or applicable portions thereof, of this Agreement constitute the joint escrow instructions of Biryar












Suyers t-atiats ( \(x\)
CPA REVISED 12is 5 AGE 7 OF 11)
 Accuptances (or Suypr and Seare wumbrie Escras.





C. Brokers are a pary in the ascrew for the scle purpose of compongaten pursuant to patagrach 2 La panc paragraph of at tre
 patagraan 22A, and urevocably instruct Esecow Holaer to disburse prose funds io Broxers at Close of Eenrow or purshant io

 Escrow Haidur's payment to Brokaf(3) of compenanhan pursiant io this Agreamaty


 vill Eacrow Holder, er (ii) I Buyer and Salker natruer Eserow Hober Iz cancer oscrow
 detrueece to Escrow Holder within 3 Days aticer mutualaree: in of the amenament
25. REMEDIES FOR BUYER'S BREACH OF CONTRACT:
A. Any clause added by the Partios specifying a remedy (such as release or forfeiture of deposit or making a veposit non. tefundable) for fallure of Buyer to completo the purchaso in violation of this Agreement shall be deemed invala untes; the clause independentif satisfies the statutory liquidatod damages requirements yot forth in the Civil Cove.
B. LIOUIDATED DAMAGES, it Euyer fails to complete this purchasu because of Buyer's defuath Selter shafl rotain as liquidated damagea. the doposit setualty paid. Buyor and Sallor agroe that this amount is a roasonablo sum given that it is impractical of extremely difficull to establish the amount of damages that woutd actually be sufferved by Seller in the event Buyer were to breact: thus Agreement Rolease of funds will require mutial, Signed reloase instructions from both Buyor and Sotier, judicial docision or arbitration sward AT TIME OF ANY INCREASED DEPOSTT BUYER ANO SELLER SHALL SIGN A SEPARATE LIDUITIATED DAMAGES PROVISION INCORPORATING THE INCREASED DEPOST AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES (C A R FRRM RID)
26. DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

Euyers invials


 Brokar(s), who, in wnitikg, agree to such mediation prior to, or within a earsonabie time ather, the disyutie or clam is presentod to



 THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IE INITALLES Exclusions from this mediation agreement are specified in paragraph 26C
B ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES: The Parties agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by noutral, binding arbitration. The Parties also agree to arbitrate any disputes or claims with Broker(s), who, in writing, agree to such arbitration prior to, or within a roasonsble time atter, the dispute or claim is presented to the Broker. The arbitrator shall be a retired judge or justice, or an attorney with at least 5 years of transactional real estate Law experience, unless the parties mutually agree to a different arbitrator. The Partios shall have the right to discovery in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure 61283.05. In all other respects, the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with Title 9 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Judgment upon the award of tha arbitrator(s) may bo entered into any court having jurisdiction. Enforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. Exclusions from this arbitration agreement are specified in paragraph 26C.
"NOTICE: BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION DECIDED EY NEUTRAL ARGITRATION AS PROVIDED BY CALIFORNIA LAW AND YOU ARE GIVING UP ANY RIGHTS YOU MIGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE LITIGATED IN A COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR JUDICIAL RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL, UNLESS THOSE RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE AREITRATION OF DISPUTES' PROVISION. IF YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO AREITRATION AFTER AGREEING TO THIS PROVISION, YOU MAY BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. YOUR AGREEMENT TO THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION IS VOLUNTARY""
"WE HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING AND AGREE TO SUBMIT DISPUTES ARISING OUI OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBITRATION DF DISPUTES' PROVISION IO NEUTRA I ARBITRATION."

\section*{C. ADDITIONAL MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TERMS:}
(1) EXCLUSIONS. The following matters are exeluded from modiation and abbitration: (1) a judietal or non-judicial forsclosure or other actlon or proceeding to enforce a dead of trust, mortgege or installment land sate contract as defined in Civil Code 62935; (ii) an unliswlul detainer action; and (iil) any matter that is whin the furisdietion o* a probate, smali claims or bankruptey court.
(2) PRESERVATION OF ACTIONS. The following shall not constitute a waivor nor violation of the medration and arbitration provisions: i) the filing of a court setion to preserve a statuto of limitations; (in) the filing of a court action to enable the recording of a notice of pending action, for ordor of atachenent, receivarship, injunction, or othor provisional remedias: or (iii) the filing of a mechanic's lien.
13) BROKERS; Brokers shall not be obligated nor cempelied to mediate or arbitrate whinss they agrea to do an in writing. Any Srokar(s) participating in mediation or arbitration shail not be decened a party to the Agrecment

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33. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: Th; AMP日









35. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNTY: Tro Propetly is bold in complanco with thdorat stote and iecal anatdecrimanatan laue
36. GOVERNING LAW: Itay Agrement shall be govethed by we _aws of we sute ol Crapma












 accordance with the Laws of the Stak of Cotforma, Nerther this Agreement nor any provision in it may be oxtondec amended, modified, alternd or ehanged, except in writing Signed by Buyer and Seller
39. DEFINITIONS: As usej in this Agreemert




Burgors intiane i
CPA REVISED 12 IJ)
COMMERCLAL PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT (CPA PAGE 9 or 1i)

 the paries
D. "Close Of Escrow" or "COE" mesns the tate the grant ceed or cthet u dence of tansfor of tite is rezsrecs
E. "Copy" means copy by any means vicluding photoscopy N.CR, lacsutile and eiectom.:


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 calandar date on which the sprectied event is schoduled to oceve

 Brokers an page ' 1 regardless of the method used i.e., masserger, mai, atadi. tax wher

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 (date):
 kepresentaire Copasiy Signa:ura Ziscoswe (C, A. R Form RCSC-B) for adniment toms.
Du \(\square\) BuyER


\section*{(Print namel Richard John Martin II}

Date
RUYER \(\qquad\)
(Print namo)
Adgivera Sgrature Actendum athenec (C. A.R. Form AS A
 Seller accepts the above offer and agrees to sell tee froperty on the atove tomas and cor cithons and oglees on me abuxt
 Eroker to Detiver a Signed Ccoy te Buyer.

\section*{- if creivec) SELIER'S ACCEPTANCE IS SURJECT TO ATTACHEU COUNTER OFFER (C A.R. FOTM SCO DI SMCOI DATEO}



\section*{cate \\ }

\section*{(Print namo) Darryt Cotton}
(Print name)
- Agetconel Signatur Autuncum atached (C: AR. Fom ASA)

 porsonatly recewed by Euyer or Buy or's abthorized agent on (Sate) a:
ASE FIA. A binding Agreement is croated when a Copy of Signed Accaptance is personally recerved by Buyer or Buyor's authorized agant whether or not confirmed in this document. Completion of this confirmation is not logally required in order to creato a binding Agreement; it is solely intended to evidence the data that Confirmation of Accoptance has occurrerd.

\section*{REAL ESTATE BROKERS:}
A. Real Estate Brokers are not parties to the Agreement between Buyer and Selter.
B. Agoncy rolationshipa are confirmed as stated in paragraph 2.
C. It specified in paragraph 3A(2). Agent who sitmitted tho :Her ior Buyet ochnowhodges rece pt of depcst:
D. COOPERATING BROKER COMPENSATION: Listing Eroker aprees to pay Cooperal-a Braker (Setting Firmi) ane Coopmoang


 specified in a separate wrimen agreement (CAR Form C3C). Dudarator of License and Tus (CAR. Form DL Fay Lu sent io document that lax revo:ing will bet thaired or that an exemption exists


\section*{ESCROW HOLDER ACKNOWLEDGMENT:}

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aderess
Procos. Fom Er man
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PRESENTATION OF OFFER:

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REJFGTION OF OFFER:
 \(\square\) (aste)

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 11 \(\qquad\)







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\begin{tabular}{|c|}
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\hline
\end{tabular} CPA REVISED I2/5 (PAGE 11 OF 11)

\section*{ADDENDUM}

No. 1

 to rescind). EOtret

\(\qquad\) s rotared n as "Uuyn Terar"


Thus Mamorandum of Undorstanding ("MOU is fully incorporated into thus purchasn agrecmont.
Soller shall roceive a \(20 \%\) uquity stake in the business / MMCC upon approval and completion.
Seller shall recelve on a monthly bosis, \(20 \%\) of the profits of the vusiness /MATCC or 510,000 , whichevpe is areater
The \(\mathbf{\$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0}\) earnest money deposit is non-rofundable and shall be Seller's to koop evon if the CUP application is zonied



Dato March 21, 2017
Diver:Tenant \(\qquad\)


Selet/a-ctiorc












ADM REVISED 1215 (PAGE 1 OF 1)

CAIIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION

\section*{ADDENDUM}
(C.A.R. Form ADM. Rovised 12:15)

OFKEALTORS.
No. 2

 to rescind). Other
dates. \(\qquad\) on proporty krewn as \(\qquad\) 6176 Finderal Bivd
Son Diogo, CA 92114-1407 \(\square\)
Richard John Martin II \(\qquad\) - is relecend is as "Buyutitamar:"


Momorandumi of Understanding and Agreomont
11 Itis Memorandum of Undorstanding and Agrooment I MOUA*) \(^{*}\) amends the sgreement reached by Buyer and Seller on March 21, 2017.
2) Notwithstanding any language in this purchaso sgreement to the contray, the provisions within this Moun shall be given effect and supersede any conflicting or ambiguous lanquage within this purchase agrecment.
3) Soller hereby transfors and sells to Buyer, with all tha associated rights and liabilities, his awnership, lights und miturests in the property and the associated CUP applicatlon pending before the City of San Diogo for \(\$ 500,000\). 1). Buyer shall immediarely provide sollor with a \(\$ 50,000\) non-refundable deposit.
5) The closing of this sate, including the payment of the balanse of the purchase price and ail the requirements stated herem, shall be completed upon the favorable resolution of the Larry Geraci lawsuit agams! Soller for the proporty 6) In addition, should a CUP application be aparoved at the property, Fuyer shall, pay Seller a one-time paymont of \(\$ 1,500,000\). Seller's previous agroement for an equity stoky in thubusiness is voided and Seller has no interest in tho property or the. CUP.
7) CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSE. SELLER WILL NOT DISCLOSE BUYER'S IDENTITY OR THIS AGREEMENT IN ANY FORM, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, UNTIL HE HAS RESOLVED THE LEGAL ACTION WITH GERACI. FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, THIS MEANS THAT SELLER WILL NOT INVOLVE OR MENTION BUYER IN ANY FORM TQ ANY THIRD-PARTIES, IN. ANY LITIGATION PROCEEOINGS ORIN ANY MATTERS REGARDING ALI EGATIONS OF CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTIONS SHOULD SELLER GREACH THIS PROVSION, SELLER HEREEY EXPRESSL, Y AGREES TO PAY TO BUYER 5200,000 FOR BREACH OF THIS PROVISION.

The loragoing terms anz conditions zre vereby agreed to, and we undersignec jranowiedge roceg: of a cont of :mis docurient.


BuyenTenan:






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- REAESTATE DUGGESS SERVNCES, INC.




ADM REVISED 1215 (PAGE 1 OF 1)
ADDENDUM IADM PAGE 1 OF 11

\section*{ADDENDUM}

OFKEALIUに
（C．A．R．Form ADM，Rovised 12：15）
No． 3

 to rascond Other


This addendum is fully Incorporarod into this purchase agreemont and amends tho agreement reached between the partus on March 21，2017，as amonded by oddendum 2 on April 15th， 2017.

Buyer heredy agroos to pormit Soller to disclose this agrenment in his response to Goracirs lawsuit
For tho avoidonce of doubt Seller will not have to pay the \(\$ 200,000\) fine for breach of tho Gonfidontiality provision proviouslis
agroed to． agroed to．




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ADM REVISED \(12 / 15\)（PAGE 1 OF 1）
ADDENDUM（ADM PAGE I OF 1 ）

FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation
Michael R. Weinstein (SBN 106464)
Scott H. Toothacre (SBN 146530)
501 West Broadway, Suite 1450
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 233-3131
Fax: (619) 232-9316
mweinstein@ferrisbritton.com
stoothacre@ferrisbritton.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI
and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY

\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA} COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
Judge:
Dept.:
Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil C-73

\section*{PROOF OF SERVICE}
[IMAGED FILE]

\section*{Hearing Date: April 13, 2018 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.}

Filed:
Trial Date:

March 21, 2017
May 11, 2018

I, Anna K. Lizano, declare that: I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the case; I am employed in, or am a resident of, the County of San Diego, California; and my business address is: 501 West Broadway, Suite 1450, San Diego, California 92101.

On, April 10, 2018, I served the following documents:
1. PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS;
2. DECLARATION OF LARRY GERACI IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS;
3. DECLARATION OF ABHAY SCHWEITZER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS;
4. MICHAEL R. WEINSTEIN SCHWEITZER IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS; and
5. NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS.
[X] EMAIL. Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by email, I caused the documents to be sent to the person at approximately 11:15 a.m. on the date above, to the following email addresses:

Darryl Cotton
6176 Federal Boulevard
San Diego, CA 92114
Tel: (619) 954-4447
Fax: (619) 229-9387
indagrodarryl@gmail.com
Defendant and Cross-Complainant
In Pro Per

Jacob Austin, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF JACOB AUSTIN
1455 Frazee Rd. Suite 500
San Diego, CA 92108 USA
Tel: (619) 357-6850
Fax: (888)357-8501
jpa@jacobaustinesq.com
(Courtesv Copv onlv)

I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was not successful.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: April 10, 2018
Anna K. Lizano

FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation
Michael R. Weinstein (SBN 106464)
Scott H. Toothacre (SBN 146530)
501 West Broadway, Suite 1450
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 233-3131
Fax: (619) 232-9316
mweinstein@ferrisbritton.com
stoothacre@ferrisbritton.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY

\section*{SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA} COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,
Cross-Complainant,
v.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA
BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1
THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,
Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
Judge: & Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil \\
Dept.: & C-73
\end{tabular}

PLAINTIFF LARRY GERACI'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE LODGED BY DEFENDANT DARRYL COTTON IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS

\section*{[IMAGED FILE]}

\section*{Hearing Date: \\ Hearing Time: \\ April 13, 2018 \\ 9:00 a.m.}

Filed:
Trial Date:

March 21, 2017
May 11, 2018

Plaintiff, LARRY GERACI, hereby objects to evidence lodged by Defendant, DARRYL COTTON, in support of his Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens).
\begin{tabular}{||l|l|}
\hline MATERIAL OBJECTED TO & \multicolumn{1}{c|}{ GROUNDS FOR OBJECTIONS } \\
\hline Cotton Declaration, I 3 in its entirety. & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Irrelevant to the motion to expunge lis pendens. \\
No evidence is admissible except relevant
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{1}
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{||l|l|}
\hline \multicolumn{1}{|c|}{ MATERIAL OBJECTED TO } & \multicolumn{1}{c|}{ GROUNDS FOR OBJECTIONS } \\
\hline & evidence. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 350.) \\
\hline Cotton Declaration, § 4 in its entirety. & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Irrelevant to the motion to expunge lis pendens. \\
No evidence is admissible except relevant \\
evidence. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 350.)
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Cotton Declaration, If 6 to the extent it mischaracterizes the written agreement as a "receipt".

Cotton Declaration, \| 7 to the extent it mischaracterizes the written agreement as a "receipt".

Cotton Declaration, \(\mathbb{I} 8\) to the extent it mischaracterizes the written agreement as a "receipt".

Cotton Declaration, \(\mathbb{I} 12\) to the extent it references the "Text Communications".

Cotton Declaration, \(\mathbb{I} 15\) to the extent it refers to the "Metadata Evidence."

Cotton Declaration, \(\mathbb{I} 16\) to the extent it refers to the "Parcel Information Report" provided by the City of San Diego, Development Services

Nowhere on the document does it reference that it is a "receipt". To the extent this is Cotton's opinion, it is inadmissible lay opinion evidence. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 800.) To the extent Cotton is offering his lay opinion, the Declaration fails to lay proper foundation for the opinion. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 702.)

Nowhere on the document does it reference that it is a "receipt". To the extent this is Cotton's opinion, it is inadmissible lay opinion evidence. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 800.) To the extent Cotton is offering his lay opinion, the Declaration fails to lay proper foundation for the opinion. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 702.)

Nowhere on the document does it reference that it is a "receipt". To the extent this is Cotton's opinion, it is inadmissible lay opinion evidence. (Cal. Evid. Code, §800.) To the extent Cotton is offering his lay opinion, the Declaration fails to lay proper foundation for the opinion. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 702.)

Lack of Foundation (Cal. Evid. Code, § 702); Hearsay (Cal. Evid. Code § 1200).

This is improper lay opinion in violation of California Evidence Code, section 800. It also lacks foundation in violation of California Evidence Code, section 702. Additionally, this evidence is irrelevant. (Cal. Evid. Code, \(\S 350\).)

Hearsay (Cal. Evid. Code, § 1200); Lack of Foundation (Cal. Evid. Code, § 702).
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline MATERIAL OBJECTED TO & GROUNDS FOR OBJECTIONS \\
\hline Department. & \\
\hline Cotton Declaration, \(\mathbb{I} 20\) to the extent it references that Judge Wohlfeil told Cotton that he knew Austin and Weinstein well and that he did not believe the would engaged in unethical actions. & Irrelevant (Cal. Evid. Code, § 350). \\
\hline Cotton Declaration, 『 21 in its entirety. & Completely irrelevant to any issue in this case. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 350). \\
\hline Cotton Declaration, If 22 to the extent it references an Independent Psychiatric Assessment of Mr. Cotton. & Irrelevant (Cal. Evid. Code, § 350). \\
\hline Exhibit 1-Summary of Emails. & Lacks foundation (Cal. Evid. Code, § 720); Hearsay (Cal. Evid. Code, § 1200). \\
\hline Exhibit 3 - To the extent this has been identified as Metadata. & Lacks foundation (Cal. Evid. Code § 720); Hearsay (Cal. Evid. Code, § 1200); Irrelevant (Cal. Evid. Code, § 350.) \\
\hline Exhibit 4. & Irrelevant (Cal. Evid. Code, § 350); Improper Expert Opinion as Cotton has failed to designate an expert witness in this case; Hearsay (Cal. Evid. Code, § 1200). \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Dated: April 10, 2018

FERRIS \& BRITTON
A Professional Corporation
By:

Michael R. Weinstein
Scott H. Toothacre
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant LARRY GERACI and Cross-Defendant REBECCA BERRY
\begin{tabular}{l|c}
\hline & PROOF OF \\
\begin{tabular}{l} 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA \\
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division 1 \\
Case Name: Cotton v. The Superior Court of San Diego \\
\\
County/Geraci et al. \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{c|}{ (Court of Appeal) } \\
\hline SERVICE \\
Court of Appeal Case Number: D073979 \\
Superior Court Case Number: 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{tabular}
1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.
2. My email address used to e-serve: zoe.g.villaroman@gmail.com
3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:

Title(s) of papers e-served:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Filing Type & \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{Document Title} \\
\hline EXHIBIT - EXHIBITS & \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{AMENDED Vol IV of Exhibits ISO Pet for WOM} \\
\hline EXHIBIT - EXHIBITS & \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{2ND AMENDED Vol V of Exhibits ISO Pet for WOM} \\
\hline PERSON SERVED & - EMAIL ADDRESS & Type & \[
\begin{gathered}
\hline \hline \text { DATE / } \\
\text { TIME } \\
\hline
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
Darryl Cotton \\
Darryl Cotton - Pro Se Pro Per
\end{tabular} & indagrodarryl@gmail.com & eService & \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline 5 / 24 / 2018 \\
12: 10: 33 \\
\text { PM } \\
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Darryl Cotton \\
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Pro Per
\end{tabular} & indagrodarryl@gmail.com & eService & \[
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\end{array}
\] \\
\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
Jana Will \\
San Diego City Attorney 00211064
\end{tabular} & jwill@sandiego.gov & \begin{tabular}{l}
e- \\
Service
\end{tabular} & \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline 5 / 24 / 2018 \\
12: 10: 33 \\
\text { PM } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline Michael Weinstein Ferris \& Britton 00106464 & mweinstein@ferrisbritton.com & Service & \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
5 / 24 / 2018 \\
12: 10: 33 \\
\text { PM } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline Michael Phelps Office of the City Attorney 00258246 & mphelps@sandiego.gov & eService & \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
5 / 24 / 2018 \\
12: 10: 33 \\
\text { PM } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline Scott Toothacre Ferris \& Britton 00146530 & stoothacre@ferrisbritton.com & eService & \[
\begin{aligned}
& 5 / 24 / 2018 \\
& 12: 10: 33 \\
& \text { PM } \\
& \hline
\end{aligned}
\] \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

This proof of service was automatically created, submitted and signed on my behalf
through my agreements with TrueFiling and its contents are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
--
/s/Zoe Villaroman
Signature
Villaroman, Zoe (Pro Per)
Last Name, First Name (PNum)

Darryl Cotton - Pro Se
Law Firm```


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Declaration of Darryl Cotton ("DC Decl.") I 1 ; Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") Exhibit ("Ex.") 1; (Verified Petition for Alternative Writ of Mandate) ("VP") 11 ; RJN Ex. 2 (Complaint ("Comp.") I4.
    ${ }^{2}$ A conditional use permit is administrative permission for uses not allowed as a matter of right in a zone, but subject to approval. (Cal. Zoning Practice, Types of Zoning Relief §7.64, p. 299 (Cont. Ed. Bar 1996.) The issuance of a conditional use permit may be subject to conditions. (J-Marion Company, Inc. v. County of Sacramento (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 517, 522.)
    ${ }^{3}$ RJN 3 (City of San Diego, Development Services Department Information Bulletin 170 (October 2017) (City Information Bulletin describing "the application process for a Marijuana Outlet")).

[^1]:    ${ }^{6}$ Cotton notes that for what Geraci alleges is a simple 3-sentence breach of contract suit, he has what appears to be, based on pleadings filed, at least three full-time attorneys frorn two separate and sizeable law firms - Ferris \& Britton and Austin Legal Group - representing him and engaging in litigation and discovery tactics that are demonstratively oppressive. "Oppression means the ultimate effect of the burden of responding to the discovery is incommensurate with the result sought. In considering whether the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, the court takes into account 'the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.' (Code Civ. Proc., §2019.030, subd. (a)(2).)' People v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 (case citations omitted). As proven herein, this case lacks probable cause. Thus, given Cotton is financially destitute and with no legal background, traveling to and from a deposition and responding to even basic interrogatories and requests for admissions (while doing so pro se) is oppressive because (i) the "discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative" (CCP $\S 2019.030$ ) as all material evidence is already in the record and (ii) "unduly burdensome [and] expensive, taking into account the needs of the case" (CCP §2019.030).

[^2]:    ${ }^{8}$ See Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 678; 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts §808 (1lth ed. 2017) (actual reliance is shown if the misrepresentation substantially influences a party's decision to act).

[^3]:    9 "Forbearance - the decision not to exercise a right or power - is sufficient consideration to support a contract and to overcome the statute of frauds. [Citation.] It is also sufficient to fulfill the element of reliance necessary to sustain a cause of action for fraud or negligent misrepresentation." Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, I74.
    ${ }^{10}$ Civ.C. § 1440 ; "[I]f a party to a contract expressly or by implication repudiates the contract before the time for his or her performance has arrived, an anticipatory breach is said to have occurred." Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 489; see I Witkin, Summary of California Law, Contracts $\S \S 861-868$; Restatement (Second) Contacts $\S \S 250-257$ (Anticipatory breach-also called "anticipatory repudiation" and "prospective nonperformance"-occurs when a party whose performance is not yet due makes clear that it does not intend to perform.).
    ${ }^{11}$ Cotton has filed a complaint in the United States District Court, Southern District of California which currently is pending before The Honorable Gonzalo Curiel (Case No. 3:18-cv-00325). The federal action is stayed pending resolution of this state action. Cotton has alleged causes of action against Mr. Geraci, Ms. Berry, Ms. Austin, Messrs. Weinstein and Toothacre, and their respective law firms, Ferris \& Britton and Austin Legal Group, for, inter alia, Civil Conspiracy and RICO. One of the primary issues in that suit will focus on whether Geraci had probable cause, in light of the Confirmation Email and the other evidence presented herein, to bring forth this suit; see, generally, RJN 6 (Cotton's attempt, in a submission that was procedurally an opposition to compel certain discovery requests, describe the challenges he has faced in this litigation and his relationship with counsel. His submission was supported by numerous declarations of individuals who interacted with him during the negotiations phase with Geraci and this litigation.).

[^4]:    ${ }^{1}$ See E. Stay by Writ of Supersedeas, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. App. \& Writs Ch. 7-E ("Stay" to preserve status quo following denial of TRO or injunction: Where a temporary restraining order or injunction has been denied and the defendant threatens to perform the act in question, a stay of the trial court order obviously will not "preserve the status quo." Here, the appellate court has authority to issue a "stay" (as distinguished from supersedeas) enjoining defendant from doing the action in question pending the appeal. [CCP § 923-court of appeal may "make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo" during pendency of an appeal; People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation \& Develop. Comm'n v. Town of Emeryville, supra, 69 C2d at 536-539, 72 CR at 792-794].).

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ See Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 335-336 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 290] ("Where, as here, a trial court is not explicitly required by law to state reasons for the decision rendered, the integrity of adjudication does not necessarily require an explanation; but that certainly does not mean a court should decline to provide any reasons for a ruling. "By and large it seems clear that the fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are *336 promoted by reasoned opinions. Without such opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation in the decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account their proofs and arguments. A less obvious point is that, where a decision enters into some continuing relationship, if no reasons are given the parties almost inevitably guess at reasons and act accordingly. Here the effectiveness of adjudication is impaired, not only because the results achieved may not be those intended by the arbiter, but also because his freedom of decision in future cases may be curtailed by the growth of practices based on a misinterpretation of decisions previously rendered." (Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1978) 92 Harv. L.Rev. 353, 388.)".)

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ Datig v. Dove Books, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 964, 980-981 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 719], as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 13, 1999)

[^7]:    ${ }^{10}$ E.Stay by Writ of Supersedeas, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. App. \& Writs Ch. 7-E
    ${ }^{11}$ See Declarations of Darryl Cotton

[^8]:    ${ }^{14}$ Datig v. Dove Books, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 964, 980-981 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 719], as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 13, 1999)
    -18-
    DARRYL COTTON'S VERIFIED OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO COMPEL

[^9]:    ${ }^{16}$ Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 280 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119]

[^10]:    ${ }^{18}$ Datig v. Dove Books, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 964, 982-983 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 719], as

[^11]:    NOTiCE: The information contained in the above message is confidential information solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, the reader is notified that any use, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify Inda-Gro immediately by telephone at 619.266.4004.
    $1 / 3$

