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ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California,

County of San Diego

06/16/2017 at 12:40:00 PM

Clerk of the Superior Court By Jessica Pascual, Deputy Clerk

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

LARRY GERACI, an individual,

Plaintiff,

V.

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DARRYL COTTON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

DARRYL COTTON, an individual,

Cross-Complainant,

V.

LARRY GERACI, an individual, REBECCA BERRY, an individual, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 37-2017-00010073-CU-BC-CTL

Judge:

Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil

Dept.:

CROSS-DEFENDANT LARRY GERACI'S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT BY DARRYL COTTON

[IMAGED FILE]

Hearing Date:

July 14, 2017

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Complaint Filed:

March 21, 2017 Not Yet Set

Trial Date: Not

TO EACH PARTY AND TO THE ATTORNEY OF THE RECORD FOR EACH PARTY:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on July 14, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department C-73 of this Court, located at 330 West Broadway, San Diego, California, 92101, Cross-Defendant, LARRY GERACI (hereafter "Geraci"), will and hereby does move the Court to sustain his demurrer to the Cross-Complaint filed on May 12, 2017, by Defendant and Cross-Complainant, DARRYL COTTON (hereafter "Cotton" or "Cross-Complainant"), on each of

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the grounds set forth below.

DEMURRER

The Cross-Complaint's alleged first, second, eighth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action, and each of them, fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Cross-Defendant Geraci (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e)) on the grounds and for the reasons set forth below:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

- 1. The first cause of action for quiet title does not state a cause of action against Geraci because the allegations of the first cause of action are not verified under oath and an action to quiet title must be verified. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020).
- 2. The first cause of action for quiet title does not state a cause of action against Geraci because it fails to allege he took actions which created a legally adverse interest in the subject property. The Cross-Complaint alleges that Geraci's filing of his Complaint and the related Lis Pendens created the legally adverse interest. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 61) But such actions are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) and subdivision (b)(4) respectively.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

3. The second cause of action for slander of title does not state a cause of action because it is based on allegations of wrongful acts that are privileged as a matter of law. The elements of a slander of title cause of action are: (1) a publication; (2) which is without privilege or justification; (3) which is false; and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. (Alpha and Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 656, 664.) The wrongful acts alleged in support of his claim are the filing of the instant Complaint and the attendant filing and recording of a Lis Penden; however, the filing of a Complaint and the filing and recording of a Lis Pendens are each absolutely privileged pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) and subdivision (b)(4) respectively.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

4. The fifth cause of action for breach of contract does not state a cause of action because Cross-Complainant has failed to allege conduct which would be an actual breach. As the "breach,"

 Cross-Complainant merely alleges Geraci asserts the written November 2nd Agreement (a copy of which is attached to the Complaint) is the final agreement between the parties for the purchase and sale of the real property. (Cross-Complaint ¶98) However, Geraci's assertion that the written November 2nd Agreement is the final agreement between the parties for the purchase and sale of the subject real property cannot by itself be a breach of the differing agreement alleged by Cross-Complainant.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

The sixth cause of action for breach of oral contract does not state a cause of action because: a) Cross-Complainant has failed to allege conduct which would be an actual breach; b) there cannot be an oral contract which contradicts a written contract; and c) the alleged oral contract for the purchase and sale of the subject real property violates the Statute of Frauds. A contract coming within the statute of frauds is invalid unless it is memorialized by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent. (Civ. Code, § 1624; Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 544) An agreement for the sale of real property or an interest in real property comes within the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624(a)(3).)

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

The seventh cause of action for breach of the implied contract does not state a cause of action because Cross-Complainant has failed to allege conduct which would be an actual breach; there cannot be an implied contract which contradicts a written contract; and the alleged implied oral contract for the purchase and sale of the subject real property violates the Statute of Frauds. A contract coming within the statute of frauds is invalid unless it is memorialized by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent. (Civ. Code, § 1624; Secrest, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 544) An agreement for the sale of real property or an interest in real property comes within the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624(a)(3).)

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

The eighth cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not state a cause of action because it must be based on a contract. This claim appears to be based on Cross-Complainant's alleged oral and/or implied-in-fact contract claims which in-and-of-themselves

 are invalid for reasons stated herein, and therefore, cannot support the covenant claim. Additionally, if the covenant claim alleges nothing more than a breach of contract it is merely superfluous and may be disregarded. Additionally, this cause of action does not support an award of punitive damages as claimed in ¶ 118 of the Cross-Complaint.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

The tenth cause of action for civil conspiracy fails to state a cause of action because there is no such cause of action in California. (*Moran v. Endres*, (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 954.) Rather, conspiracy is "a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its preparation.' … 'A conspiracy cannot be alleged as a tort separate from the underlying wrong it is organized to achieve.' (Citation.)" (*Id.* at 954-955.)

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

The eleventh cause of action for an injunction fails to state a cause of action because there is no such cause of action in California. "Injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, and a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted. (Citation.)" (*Shell Oil Co. v. Richter* (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168; see also *County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973 (a permanent injunction is attendant to an underlying cause of action).)

For each of such reasons, Cross-Defendant Geraci moves for an order of this Court sustaining the demurrers to the first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth and eleventh causes of action without leave to amend unless Plaintiff can make a sufficient offer of proof that he can cure the pleading deficiencies.

The demurrers are based upon this Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, the attached supporting Request for Judicial Notice, the attached supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the records and files in this action, and such further matters that may be properly presented prior to or at the time of hearing on the motion.

NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that a tentative ruling is issued the day before the date set forth for hearing, this court follows rule 3.1308(a)(2) and no notice of intent to appear is required to appear for argument. The tentative ruling shall be made available at 3:30 p.m. on the court day prior to

the scheduled hearing. The tentative ruling may direct the parties to appear for oral argument, and may specify the issues on which the court wishes the parties to provide further argument. The tentative ruling may be obtained by calling the court tentative ruling number at (619) 450-7381 or by navigating to the court's website www.sandiego.courts.ca.gov. Dated: June 16, 2017 FERRIS & BRITTON, A Professional Corporation Scott H. Toothacre Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant LARRÝ GERACI