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12 13 14 15	UL CHULA TWO LLC, Petitioner/Plaintiff, vs.	Case No. 37-2020-00041554-CU-WM-CTL [Related To Case Nos. 2020-00041802-CU- MC-CTL; 37-2020-00033446-CU-MC-CTL] PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF'S	
16 17	CITY OF CHULA VISTA, a California public entity; CHULA VISTA CITY MANAGER, and DOES 1-20,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND STAY OF DECISION	
 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	Respondents/Defendants, MARCH AND ASH CHULA VISTA, INC.; TD ENTERPRISE LLC; and DOES 23 through 50, Real Parties In Interest.	Hearing Date: Time:April 30, 2021 9:00 a.m.Judge: Dept.:Hon. Richard E. L. Strauss C-75 Action Filed: November 13, 2021 None Set	
24 25 26 27 28	4817-8615-9575.1		
		FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND STAY	

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		TABLE OF CONTENTS	<u>Page</u>
I.	Introc	action	1
II.	Factu	l Summary	2
	A.	Proposition 215, Proposition 64, And The City's Regulatory Scheme	2
	B.	Petitioner's Application	3
	C.	The Denial And Appeal	3
	D.	The City Allows Applicants From Other Districts To Invade District One	4
III.	A Pre	iminary Injunction Should Issue	5
	А.	Petitioner Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits	5
		1. Civil Zoning Violations Are Not Disqualifying As A Matter Of Law	[,] 6
		(a) Holistic Café Did Not Involve "Commercial" Cannabis Activity	7
		(b) $CVMC \ $ 5.19.050(A)(5)(g) Does Not Apply	8
		(c) CVMC § 5.19.050(A)(5)(f) Does Not Apply Either	10
		2. The City's Error Entitles Petitioner To Relief	11
	B.	The Balance Of Hardships Weighs Strongly In Favor Of An Injunction	11
		1. Petitioner Will Be Irreparably Harmed Unless The City Is Enjoined.	11
		(a) A Wrong Of A Repeated And Continuing Character	12
		(b) Inability To Quantify Loss	13
		2. Any Burden On The City Will Be Negligible	13
		3. The Balance Of The Equities Tips In Favor Of An Injunction	14
IV.	The C	ourt Should Stay The City's Decisions	15
V.	Conc	ision	15
4817-86	515-9575.1	i	

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW

1	<u>TABLE OF AUTHORITIES</u> <u>Cases</u>	Page
2		<u>1 uge</u>
3	Abrams v. Saint John's Hospital Health Center (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628	7
4	Butt V. State of California $(1992) A Cal Ath 668$	- 1 -
5		
0	City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153	9
7 8	City of Lake Forest v. Evergreen Holistic Collective (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1413	9
	City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729	
10	City of Sanger v. Super. Ct.	
11	(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 444	
12	Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432	
	Continental Banking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512	7
14	County of Los Angeles v. Alternative Medicinal Cannabis Collective	
15	(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 601	9
16 17	Dodge, Warren & Peters Insurance Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414	7
	Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171	14
19	Engle v. Oroville	1.5
20	(1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 266	15
21	Lubavitch Congregation v. City of Long Beach (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1388	7
22	Moorpark Homeowners' Association v. VRT Corp.	
23	(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396	7
24	San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1985) 170 Cal. 3d 438	7
	Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892	
26	Wind v. Herbert	
21	(1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 276	14
28	4817-8615-9575.1 ii	



I Statutory Authorities Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 26000 et seq.	
3 Code Civ. Proc., § 526	
4 Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(1)	
5 Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085	
7 Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(g) 8 Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 9 Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.81, subd. (d) 10 11 12 13 13 14 15 16 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 11 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 14 24 15 25 16 26 17 27 11 28 11 4817.8615.9575.1 111 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
8 Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 9 Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.81, subd. (d) 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 24 25 26 27 27 11 18 19 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 26 27 27 11 28 487.8615.9375.1 4817.8615.9375.1 111 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
9 Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.81, subd. (d) 10	
9 Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.81, subd. (d) 10	
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 #817.8615.9575.1 11 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>#17-8615-9375.1 11 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION </u>	
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 #17-8615-975.1 11 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 <u>817-8615-9575.1 11 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION </u>	
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 <u>817-8615-9575.1 iii</u> MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817.8615-9575.1 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 11 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 17 18 19 11 11 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 17 18</u>	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4817-8615-9575.1 <u>iii</u> MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1 11 11 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 13 14 14 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 10 11 11 11 12 13 14 14 15 16 17 18 18 19 10 10 10 11 11</u>	
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 18 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 17 18 18 18 19 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11</u>	
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1 iii</u> MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1	
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1 iii</u> MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION I	
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1 iii</u> <u>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1</u>	
23 24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1 iii</u> <u>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1</u>	
24 25 26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1</u> <u>iii</u> <u>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1</u>	
25 26 27 28 4817-8615-9575.1 iii MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION I	
26 27 28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1</u> <u>iii</u> <u>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1</u>	
27 28 4817-8615-9575.1 iii MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1	
28 <u>4817-8615-9575.1</u> <u>III</u> <u>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 1</u>	
4817-8615-9575.1 iii MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION	FOR

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1 I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner and plaintiff UL Chula Two LLC ("Petitioner") applied to respondent and
defendant City of Chula Vista (hereafter, and collectively with respondent and defendant Chula
Vista City Manager, the "City") for a retail storefront cannabis business license on or about
January 18, 2019. On August 27, 2019, following a protracted background check and interview
process, Petitioner scored 900.3—the highest of any retail storefront applicant in the City's
District One. Only the two highest scoring applicants in each of the City's districts advance to the
next stage of the licensing process. Petitioner fully expected to advance to the next stage.

On May 6, 2020, more than another eight months later, the City issued a notice of decision
denying Petitioner's application. The City did so on the basis of an alleged civil zoning violation
by one of Petitioner's principals (Willie Senn) that took place in the City of San Diego over eight
years earlier, which the City determined was unlawful "commercial cannabis activity." In support
of its finding, the City relied upon a stipulated judgment in *City of San Diego v. The Holistic Café*, *Inc. (Holistic Café)*, San Diego Superior Court, Case No. 37-2012-00087648-CU-MC-CTL.

The City's decision was as baffling as it was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.
Although the City erred in numerous ways, for purposes of this motion, Petitioner focuses only on
the City's clear legal error. The City erred when it concluded that the Holistic Café, a lawful, *nonprofit medicinal* cannabis storefront, engaged in unlawful "commercial cannabis activity"
because it (along with Mr. Senn) settled a civil action alleging zoning violations that were wholly
unrelated to "commercial cannabis activity," let alone cannabis in any way, shape, or form.

21 By denying Petitioner's application, the City excluded its most qualified applicant who, 22 today, operates the most successful commercial cannabis storefront in the City of San Diego. 23 Unless the Court orders injunctive relief, the City will permit real parties in interest from *other* 24 *districts* to take Petitioner's place in the City's District One, which will cause irreparable harm not 25 only to Petitioner, but to the residents of the City's District One. Because any harm to the City is 26 substantially outweighed by harm to Petitioner, which is likely to prevail for the reasons discussed 27 below, a preliminary injunction should issue. Additionally, the Court should enter a stay of the 28 City's order denying Petitioner's application under Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5(g). 4817-8615-9575.1



II.

A.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

2

Proposition 215, Proposition 64, And The City's Regulatory Scheme

The citizens of the state of California passed Proposition 215 in 1996, which
decriminalized possession and cultivation of cannabis for medicinal purposes. Proposition 215
was followed by Senate Bill 420 in 2003, which among other things, authorized the California
Attorney General's Office to issue guidelines related to the distribution of medicinal cannabis
through nonprofit cooperatives. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.81, subd. (d).)

8 California voters passed Proposition 64 in 2016, which legalized commercial and adult
9 recreational cannabis use, and gave each locality the discretion to allow commercial cannabis
10 activities within their jurisdiction. Proposition 64 was followed by Senate Bill 94 in 2017, the
11 Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA), which established
12 California's regulatory and licensing system for the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and sale
13 of cannabis for medicinal and adult use. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 26000 *et seq.*)

On March 6, 2018, the City adopted Ordinance No. 3418,¹ which added Chapter 5.19 to
the Chula Vista Municipal Code (CVMC), in order to permit, license, and regulate commercial
cannabis activity within the City. (CVMC, § 5.19.010.) Pursuant to CVMC Chapter 5.19, any
person who desires to engage in lawful commercial cannabis activity or to operate a commercial
cannabis business within the City's jurisdiction must have a valid "State License" and a valid
"City License." (CVMC, § 5.19.030.)

The City established a two-phase licensing application process. (CVMC, § 5.19.050.)
Phase One involved a set of threshold qualifying criteria, a criminal background check, and a
merit-based scoring system. (CVMC, § 5.19.050, subd. (A)(7).) The City also enacted Cannabis
Regulations (Regs),² which were intended to "clarify and facilitate implementation of CVMC
Chapter 5.19." (Regs, § 0501, subds. (A)-(D).) The Regs describe the experience and liquid asset
requirements for applicants, and the requirements for a business plan, operating plan,
fingerprinting, and a background check. (Regs., § 0501, subds. (E)-(I).)

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- ¹ Ordinance 3418 is attached as <u>Exhibit 1</u> to the concurrently filed Appendix of Exhibits (App'x). ² The Regs are attached as <u>Exhibit 2</u> to the App'x. ^{4817-8615-9575.1} 2

B.

Petitioner's Application

1	
2	Petitioner applied for a retail storefront license in the City's District One. (Ver. Pet. ¶ 23,
3	Ex. 1 to App'x.) On January 18, 2019, as required by the application and CVMC
4	5.19.050(A)(1)(j), one of Petitioner's principals, Willie Senn, signed an Affirmation and Consent
5	affirming that he "has not conducted, facilitated, caused, aided, abetted, suffered, or concealed
6	unlawful Commercial Cannabis Activity in the City or any other jurisdiction." (Ex. 4 to App'x.)
7	Contemporaneously, counsel for Petitioner voluntarily advised the City of a stipulated
8	judgment involving Mr. Senn that was dated December 14, 2012, in Holistic Café, supra. (Ex. 5
9	to App'x) The complaint alleged various civil zoning violations in the City of San Diego. (Ex. 3
10	to <i>id</i> .) The parties stipulated and agreed in <i>Holistic Café</i> that "[n]either this Stipulated Judgment
11	nor any of the statements or provisions contained herein shall be deemed to constitute an
12	admission or an adjudication of any of the allegations of the Complaint." (Ibid.)
13	Despite the disclosed Holistic Café matter, on June 10, 2019, the City notified Petitioner
14	that it had successfully completed Phases 1A and 1B, and invited Petitioner to proceed to Phase
15	1C: the interview. (Ex. 6 to App'x.) An interview was set for July 17, 2019. (Ver. Pet. ¶ 26, Ex.
16	1 to App'x.) Petitioner successfully completed the interview process. (<i>Ibid</i> .)
17	In total, approximately 136 applications were submitted to the City, 84 of which were for
18	retail storefront licenses. (Ver. Pet. ¶ 21, Ex. 1 to App'x.) Only eight storefront licenses were
19	available (two per each of the City's four districts). (CVMC, § 5.19.040, subd. (A).) The highest
20	initially scored applications proceeded to an interview process (as noted above, Phase 1C) to
21	further assess each scored category, and the City also awarded up to 500 additional points based
22	on the interview. (Ver. Pet. ¶ 22, Ex. 1 to App'x.) Petitioner's total score following the interview
23	was 900.3 points—the highest in the City's District One. (Ibid.)
24	C. <u>The Denial And Appeal</u>
25	On May 6, 2020, the City issued a Notice of Decision rejecting Petitioner's Application

25 On May 6, 2020 the City issued a Notice of Decision rejecting Petitioner's Application.
26 (Ex. 7 to App'x.) The City cited two sections of CVMC 5.19.050 as the basis for its decision:

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28

a.

adversely sanctioned or penalized by the City . . . for a material violation of state or local

First, the City cited CVMC § 5.19.050(A)(5)(f), stating, Mr. Senn "has been

laws or regulations related to Commercial Cannabis Activity" It went on to claim that "The City of San Diego sanctioned William [*sic*] Senn for violations of laws or regulations related to unlawful Commercial Cannabis Activity."

b. <u>Second</u>, the City cited CMVC § 5.19.050(A)(5)(g), stating, Mr. Senn has
"conducted, facilitated, caused, aided, abetted, suffered, or concealed unlawful
Commercial Cannabis Activity in the City or any other Jurisdiction" It went on to
claim that "William [*sic*] Senn was involved in unlawful Commercial Cannabis Activity in
the City of San Diego from approximately 2010 to 2012."

9 To be clear, the cursory Notice of Decision did not mention *Holistic Café* or any of the particular
10 facts or evidence that the City relied upon in reaching its conclusions in the Notice of Decision.

The Notice of Decision gave Petitioner until May 21, 2020 to appeal the decision. On May
21, 2020, Petitioner timely filed a Consolidated Request to Appeal with the City of Chula Vista.
(Ex. 8 to App'x.) A hearing was held on June 10, 2020, and the City served its "Findings and
Statement of Decision with Regard to Appeal of Notice of Decision Rejecting Application for
Cannabis License" ("Final Decision") on August 26, 2020. (Ex. 10 to App'x.) The Final
Decision denied Petitioner's appeal and concluded "the evidence shows the City reasonably and
properly denied Appellant's application." (*Ibid.*)

18 On September 3, 2020, Petitioner sent a written request for the administrative record of the
19 June 10, 2020 appeal proceedings. (Ex. 11 to App'x.) The administrative record has not yet been
20 received. (Brucker Dec. ¶ 2.)

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D. <u>The City Allows Applicants From Other Districts To Invade District One</u>

22Because the City denied *every* applicant in its District One, the City permitted March and23Ash Chula Vista, Inc. (from District Two) and TD Enterprise LLC (from District Four) to change24districts, select new locations in District One, and move to Phase II of the application process.

25 (Brucker Dec. ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. 14 to App'x.) March and Ash Chula Vista, Inc. and TD Enterprise LLC
26 are real parties in interest herein. (Brucker Dec. ¶ 5.) Although the City was open to a stipulation

- 27 providing for certain of the relief requested in this motion, the real parties in interest disagreed on
- 28 the appropriate scope of relief, and the parties were unable to reach a stipulation. (*Id.*)
 - 4817-8615-9575.1

III. <u>A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE</u>

2 Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 526, a preliminary injunction is appropriate 3 when *any* of the following appear by way of a verified complaint and/or declarations: (1) the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded; (2) continuance of some action would produce waste, 4 5 irreparable injury, or render a judgment ineffectual; (3) pecuniary compensation is inadequate relief; and/or (4) it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which 6 7 would afford adequate relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526.) California courts have consistently said 8 that the general purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to "preserve the status quo" until a final 9 determination of the merits of the action. (Continental Banking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 10 528; Lubavitch Congregation v. City of Long Beach (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1388, 1391.)

A trial court will consider two factors when determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction: (1) "the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of the case at trial" and
(2) "the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to
the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants the preliminary injunction."
(*Abrams v. Saint John's Hosp. Health Center* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 635-36; *14859 Moorpark Homeowners' Assn. v. VRT Corp.* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402.) "[T]he greater
the ... showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction." (*Butt v.*)

18 State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678; Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley

19 (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.)

20

A. <u>Petitioner Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits</u>

21 A court may grant a preliminary injunction upon a showing that it is "reasonably probable 22 that the moving party will prevail on the merits." (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1985) 170 Cal. 3d 438, 442.) Under this standard, all that is required is that the 23 24 moving party establish a "reasonable probability" (not certainty) that the moving party will 25 succeed on the merits. (Baypoint Mortg. Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Tr. (1985) 168 26 Cal.App.3d 818, 824.) Although the Petition describes five separate grounds for relief, each of 27 which alone entitles Petitioner to relief, for purposes of this motion (and because the record is not 28 vet complete), Petitioner will focus only on the first ground. 4817-8615-9575.1



1	1. <u>Civil Zoning Violations Are Not Disqualifying As A Matter Of Law</u>
2	The City's sole basis for rejecting Petitioner's application was an alleged civil zoning
3	violation from 2012 that the City incorrectly determined was disqualifying pursuant CVMC §§
4	5.19.050(A)(5)(f) and (g). Subdivision (f) states:
5	The Applicant, an Owner, a Manager, and/or an Officer has been adversely
6	sanctioned or penalized by the City, or any other city, county, or state, for a material violation of state or local laws or regulations related to Commercial
7	Cannabis Activity or to pharmaceutical or alcohol licensure."
8	Subdivision (g) states:
9	The Applicant, an Owner, a Manager, and/or an Officer has conducted, facilitated, caused, aided, abetted, suffered, or concealed unlawful Commercial Cannabis
10	Activity in the City or any other jurisdiction.
11	The alleged civil zoning violation from 2012—long after medicinal cannabis was legalized by
12	Proposition 215 in 1996 and well before commercial cannabis was legalized by Proposition 64 in
13	2016—involved the Holistic Café. It was a medicinal cannabis storefront that the City of San
14	Diego sought to close by asserting various zoning ordinance violations.
15	To be clear, none of the ordinances that the City of San Diego accused the Holistic Café of
16	violating actually barred a medicinal cannabis storefront (or even used the words marijuana or
17	cannabis for that matter). ³ Specifically, the complaint in <i>Holistic Café</i> alleged violations of San
18	Diego Municipal Code ("SDMC") §§ 1512.0305, 129.0202, 129.0302, 129.0802, 121.0302,
19	129.0111, 129.0314, 146.0104. (Ex. 12 to App'x.) Nearly all of these code sections relate to
20	structural, electrical, and signage requirements, each of which would have been easily curable.
21	But the City of San Diego also claimed, incorrectly, that Sections 121.0302 and 1512.0305
22	prohibited medicinal cannabis storefronts.
23	Together, SDMC §§ 121.0302 and 1512.0305 enact zoning rules for zone CN-1A in the
24	City of San Diego's Mid-City Communities Planned District. ⁴ Table 1512-03I therein lists all
25	permitted uses for buildings located in zone CN-1A and excludes all other uses (as opposed to
26	
27	$\frac{1}{3}$ In fact, the City of San Diego did not amend its zoning rules to address medicinal cannabis until
28	March 25, 2014, with the passage of Ordinance No. O-20356. ⁴ A copy of the Municipal Code in effect at the time is attached as Exhibit 13 to the App'x. 6 to the App'x.

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW

identifying excluded uses). Notably, Table 1512-03I specifically allows for the operation of drug
 stores, pharmacies, liquor stores, bakeries, confectioneries, florists, variety stores, food stores, and
 dry goods stores without any reference to the types of products sold therein. Yet, the City of San
 Diego contended in *Holistic Café* that a medicinal cannabis storefront was not specifically listed
 as a permitted use. By this flawed logic, the City of San Diego could have also challenged any
 café because the words "coffee," "tea," and "scones" were also not specifically listed.

7 Moreover, during this 2010-2012 time period, localities and medical cannabis advocates 8 hotly debated and litigated whether local governments could use zoning regulations to ban legal 9 medicinal cannabis storefronts with varying results. (See City of Lake Forest v. Evergreen 10 Holistic Collective (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1413 [local governments cannot ban]; County of Los Angeles v. Alternative Medicinal Cannabis Collective (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 601 [local 11 12 governments cannot ban]; and City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153 [local 13 governments can ban].) It was not until 2013 that the California Supreme Court decided *City of* Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 761-14 15 762, which ruled that local governments could ban medical cannabis storefronts.

In any event, despite having several legal and factual defenses available to them at the
time, on December 14, 2012, the defendants in *Holistic Café*, including Mr. Senn, decided to settle
the matter and entered into a stipulated judgment that did *not* include any admission of liability.
Then, on May 3, 2019, the Superior Court in *Holistic Café* amended the judgment so as to
specifically permit the defendants therein to engage in commercial cannabis activities. (Ex. 9 to
App'x.) More importantly for purposes of this motion, the City committed clear legal error when
it concluded that the *Holistic Café* matter was a basis for rejecting Petitioner's application.

(a) Holistic Café Did Not Involve "Commercial" Cannabis Activity
Preliminarily, the scope of CVMC §§ 5.19.050(A)(5)(f) and (g) is limited to misconduct
surrounding "Commercial Cannabis Activity." This term is defined by the City as follows: "...
the commercial cultivation, possession, manufacture, distribution, processing, storing, laboratory
testing, packaging, labeling, transportation, delivery or sale of Cannabis or Cannabis Products."
(CVMC, § 5.19.020.) Critically, the City's definition relates only to "commercial" "Cannabis or
4817-8615-9575.1



Cannabis Products," not "Medicinal Cannabis" or "Medicinal Cannabis Product," which terms are
 separately defined in CVMC § 5.19.020. Indeed, the City's licensing scheme for commercial
 cannabis activities expressly *excludes* medicinal cannabis activities, thereby confirming an
 important distinction between what is commercial and what is medicinal under the City's own
 laws. (See, e.g., CVMC, § 5.19.090 ["A Storefront Retailer shall not Sell Medicinal Cannabis or
 Medicinal Cannabis Products."].)

Thus, because the Holistic Café was a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation (Ver. Pet. ¶ 75,
Ex. 1 to App'x.) organized in compliance with Attorney General guidelines for the lawful
distribution of medicinal cannabis (*id.*), neither CMVC §§ 5.19.050(A)(5)(f) nor (g) apply as a
matter of law, and the City erred in rejecting Petitioner's application on this basis. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 1858 ["In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been
omitted, or to omit what has been inserted . . ."].)

Furthermore, even if the specifically defined term "Commercial Cannabis Activity" could
be read as encompassing the nonprofit distribution of medicinal cannabis (it cannot), the alleged
civil zoning violations in *Holistic Café* are not disqualifying under CMVC §§ 5.19.050(A)(5)(f) or
(g) as a matter of law and the City committed clear legal error in finding the contrary.

18

(b) CVMC § 5.19.050(A)(5)(g) Does Not Apply

19 Analyzing subdivisions (f) and (g) out of order helps to explain how both should be read. 20 Subdivision (g) permits the City to reject an applicant if its owner, manager, or officer "conducted, 21 facilitated, caused, aided, abetted, suffered, or concealed unlawful Commercial Cannabis Activity." 22 To avoid absurd results and unintended consequences, the phrase "unlawful Commercial 23 Cannabis Activity" must be read to mean commercial cannabis activities that are unlawful under 24 the regulatory schemes enacted by the State and localities following the passage of Proposition 64 25 in 2016, and not just any activity that is unlawful in the abstract. For example, under CVMC § 26 5.19.050(A)(1)(e)(i), the manager of a commercial cannabis license applicant must have "[a] 27 minimum of 12 consecutive months, within the previous five years, as a Manager with managerial 28 oversight or direct engagement in the day-to-day operation of a lawful Commercial Cannabis 4817-8615-9575.1



1 Business in a jurisdiction permitting such Commercial Cannabis Activity." (CVMC, §

5.19.050(A)(1)(e)(i), italics added.) Yet, there are no jurisdictions permitting lawful commercial
cannabis activity anywhere in the United States because *all* cannabis activity is unlawful under
Federal law. (See, e.g., 21 U.S.C., § 811.) In fact, even if the City were to ignore Federal law
entirely, there were no lawful *commercial* cannabis businesses anywhere in the state of California
until its voters passed Proposition 64 in 2016.

7 Thus, it cannot be that *any* unlawful cannabis activities are disqualifying because that 8 would necessarily lead to the automatic disqualification of every single experienced applicant 9 whose experience in cannabis comes from managing a cannabis business (which is unlawful under 10 Federal Law) or from engaging in any commercial cannabis activities in California before 2016. (See City of Sanger v. Super. Ct. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 444, 448 [courts should decline to interpret 11 12 statutes in a manner that would frustrate the purposes of legislation or lead to absurd results].) 13 Rather, for subdivision (g) to make any sense (and to avoid an otherwise direct conflict with CVMC § 5.19.050(A)(1)(e)(i)), subdivision (g) must be interpreted so that the phrase "unlawful 14 Commercial Cannabis Activity" means activities that are unlawful under the regulatory schemes 15 16 enacted by the State and City after 2016 and 2018, respectively, which is when each jurisdiction 17 first coined the term "Commercial Cannabis Activity" in their respective codes.

18 Under this common sense reading of subdivision (g), an alleged violation of the City of 19 San Diego's general zoning ordinances from back in 2012—ordinances that did not expressly ban 20 otherwise lawful, nonprofit, medicinal cannabis storefronts under Senate Bill 420-cannot 21 possibly be deemed an *unlawful* Commercial Cannabis Activity, because that phrase should only 22 apply to activities deemed unlawful under the regulatory schemes enacted by the State and City 23 following the passage of Proposition 64. Had the City intended otherwise, it could have changed 24 the definition of Commercial Cannabis Activity to include nonprofit medicinal cannabis. It did 25 not. The City could have also dropped the term "commercial" so that the disqualification was expanded to any "unlawful Cannabis Activity." It did not. Under the only logical reading of 26 27 subdivision (g), the City clearly erred in denying Petitioner's application.



4817-8615-9575.1

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(c) CVMC § 5.19.050(A)(5)(f) Does Not Apply Either

2 With regard to CVMC 5.19.050 (A)(5)(f), the key language is the phrase "laws or 3 regulations related to Commercial Cannabis Activity." (Italics added.) There are two ways to read subdivision (f). The first is the broadest and vaguest way which, unfortunately, is the reading 4 5 that the City improperly applied. Under the City's misapplication of subdivision (f), the words "laws or regulations" are not limited to the laws or regulations "related to" the regulatory schemes 6 7 that defined the term "Commercial Cannabis Activity" and made commercial cannabis activity 8 lawful in the State of California and in the City for the very first time. Rather, the City's tortured 9 reading extends to any "laws or regulations" of general application, including laws and regulations 10 that have absolutely nothing to do with the regulation of commercial cannabis activity (or medicinal cannabis activity or even cannabis generally, for that matter). 11

12 Under this overbroad and unduly vague reading of subdivision (f), the City could, 13 theoretically, reject an applicant whose otherwise lawful and licensed medicinal cannabis business was sanctioned for violating wage and hour laws. The City could likewise reject an applicant who 14 15 received a speeding ticket while transporting medicinal cannabis. Or the City could reject an 16 applicant for violating a noise ordinance. It was using this overly broad and unduly vague reading 17 of subdivision (f) that the City erroneously concluded that any civil zoning violation at an 18 otherwise lawful, nonprofit medical cannabis storefront constituted a violation of law "related to 19 Commercial Cannabis Activity."

20 Alternatively, subdivision (f) can be read consistently with the clear intent of subdivision 21 (g), discussed above, which avoids these kinds of absurd results by interpreting the phrase "state 22 or local laws or regulations related to Commercial Cannabis Activity" to mean those laws and 23 regulations that were enacted along with the regulatory scheme that first defined the term 24 "Commercial Cannabis Activity" (at both the state and local level). This reading provides 25 applicants with fair notice of what is and what is not a disqualifying violation of law because applicants can review the Business and Professions Code and the CVMC and determine whether 26 27 they have, in fact, violated any of the myriad commercial cannabis laws and regulations enacted 28 following Proposition 64, MAUCRSA, or Ordinance No. 3418.



4817-8615-9575.1

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Under this proper reading of subdivision (f), a violation of the City of San Diego's general
 zoning regulations that did not expressly exclude otherwise lawful, nonprofit, medicinal cannabis
 storefronts under Proposition 215, but merely provided for a list of approved zoning uses on which
 medicinal cannabis was not explicitly listed (but was impliedly so, as discussed above), is not a
 violation of law *related to* Commercial Cannabis Activity as that phrase should be interpreted.

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2. <u>The City's Error Entitles Petitioner To Relief</u>

7 But for the City's clear legal error, Petitioner would have advanced to the second round of 8 the application process. Having exhausted all available administrative remedies and having no 9 other remedy available, Petitioner brought a Petition and Complaint for declaratory and injunctive 10 relief to compel the City to set aside its decisions dated May 6, 2020 and August 26, 2020 and permit Petitioner to proceed to Phase Two of the license application process. This is an 11 12 appropriate remedy given the City's error on these discrete issues of law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 13 1085, 1094.5.) Relief is likewise appropriate given the numerous other substantive and procedural 14 violations described in the Petition, however, Petitioner is cognizant that moving for injunctive relief on these other more factually intensive grounds may be premature as the City has yet to 15 16 prepare the administrative record for this Petition.

In any event, because the City continues to move forward with other applicants, including
two that were migrated into District One from other districts (i.e., real parties in interest March
and Ash Chula Vista, Inc. and TD Enterprise LLC) (Ex. 14 to App'x), the Court will not be able to
award Petitioner meaningful relief unless the Court enjoins the City from issuing any other
cannabis storefront licenses in the City's District One and, to the extent that Respondent has
already issued such licenses, declares such licenses null and void. Such relief is appropriate here
to preserve the status quo. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(1)-(5).)

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B. <u>The Balance Of Hardships Weighs Strongly In Favor Of An Injunction</u>

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1. Petitioner Will Be Irreparably Harmed Unless The City Is Enjoined

26 "Irreparable harm" means a "'wrong[] of a repeated and continuing character, or which
27 occasion damages estimable only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard ""



(Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171,
 1184, quoting Wind v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 276, 285.)

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(a) A Wrong Of A Repeated And Continuing Character

The City only permits eight storefront licenses—two for each of the City's four districts. 4 5 (CVMC, § 5.19.040, subd. (A).) Petitioner incurred the substantial time and expense necessary to 6 source and secure a location in the City's District One, and then applied for one of the two licenses 7 in January 2019, at the cost of thousands of dollars. To date, Petitioner has invested \$56,900 8 toward its license for a retail storefront. (Senn Dec. ¶ 5.) Out of an abundance of caution, and to 9 ensure that its substantial investment was not wasted, Petitioner disclosed the Holistic Café matter 10 to the City with its application on January 18, 2019 in case the City viewed it as a disqualifying event. (Ex. 5 to App'x.) Rather than issue a rejection at that time, the City allowed Petitioner's 11 12 application to advance to the interview stage and then ranked Petitioner the highest, most qualified 13 applicant in the City's District One, all the while extracting more incremental fees. Only after 14 doing so did the City abruptly deny Petitioner's application on May 6, 2020 and, after securing 15 more fees on appeal, rubber stamped the denial on appeal.

16 Since that date, the City has allowed two applicants from other districts, who did not 17 qualify to advance to stage two in their original districts (i.e., real parties in interest), to migrate 18 into District One and advance to Phase II of the application process there. If these two applicants 19 are issued licenses, no open spots will remain for Petitioner. Further, the application process has proceeded at a snail's pace since day one. Should the City open up more licenses in the future, 20 21 and that is not certain at all, it could take years before Petitioner is granted a license. And then, 22 even if Petitioner is granted what would be a third or even fourth license in the City's District One, 23 it will have a difficult time competing against already established "first-to-market" competitors 24 with a loyal customer base. (Cf. Donahue, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 1185 ["customers choose to 25 shop at a particular location based on custom and habit . . . a shopping center's success depends on 26 customer goodwill and a desire to return to the same location out of habit and loyalty."].) This is 27 particularly true in the cannabis industry. (Senn Dec. \P 3-6.)



4817-8615-9575.1

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Long story short, if the City's error in denying Petitioner's application is not corrected
 now, it is highly unlikely that Petitioner will ever receive a license worth applying for in the future
 given the substantial time and expense it takes to apply, the lost opportunity to be one of the first
 to market, and the uncertainty facing applicants following the City's multiple, cumulative errors in
 the application process laid out in the Petition.

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(b) Inability To Quantify Loss

Petitioner's principal, Willie Senn, operates a network of cannabis business in California
under the brand name Urbn Leaf. (Senn Dec. ¶¶ 1-2.) Urbn Leaf Bay Park is amongst the most
successful cannabis businesses in San Diego and the State of California. (*Id.*) It is because of this
depth and breadth of experience that Petitioner was able to put forward a strong application and
score the highest of any retail storefront applicant in the City's District One. (*Id.* ¶ 5.)

12 While Petitioner fully expects an Urbn Leaf store in the City's District One to perform 13 with success similar to that of its Bay Park store and its stores throughout California, the fact of the matter is that there are barriers to quantifying loss when it comes to new enterprises. (See, 14 e.g., Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 907 ["[E]vidence of lost profits must be 15 16 unspeculative and in order to support a lost profits award the evidence must show 'with reasonable certainty both their occurrence and the extent thereof." (Citations.)]; see also Engle v. Oroville 17 18 (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 266, 273 ["Because of a justifiable doubt as to the success of new and 19 untried enterprises, more specific evidence of their probable profits is required than where the claim is for harm to an established business."].) Because of these barriers, the only safe way to 20 21 preserve Petitioner's rights is to maintain the status quo until the Court rules on the Petition.

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
2. <u>Any Burden On The City Will Be Negligible</u>

In contrast to shutting Petitioner out of the Chula Vista market or damaging its prospects therein, thereby denying the residents of Chula Vista access to a successful Urbn Leaf storefront, entering an injunction will cause little to no harm to the City. For example, the City has already moved at a snail's pace since first accepting applications two years ago. (Ex. 14 to App'x.) That the City may have to wait a few more months pending a dispositive hearing in this matter to issue licenses is a small price to pay when expediency has not been a concern of the City to date. 4817-8615-9575.1 13

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1 To the extent the City claims that delaying the already protracted application process will 2 cost it tax revenue, any such loses would be negated by positive tax revenues derived from an 3 Urbn Leaf location established by Petitioner in Chula Vista. Indeed, in 2019, the Urbn Leaf flagship location in Bay Park, San Diego paid \$2,662,164 in sales taxes to the City of San Diego. 4 5 (Senn Dec. ¶ 2.) Though not yet finalized, Urbn Leaf believes that in 2020, it outperformed its 2019 revenue and sales tax figures. (*Ibid.*) Additionally, any such claim from the City should be 6 7 viewed with great skepticism given the City's obvious lack of prior diligence in issuing licenses. 8 As for the real parties in interest that sought to migrate from their respective districts to the 9 City's District One, they were only permitted to do so under section 0501(N)(2)(e) of the Regs, 10 which permits applicants to switch districts once the City concludes that there are not enough qualified applicants to fill a given district's open licenses. Such migration would not have 11 12 occurred, for at least one of the two applicants, but for the fact that the City improperly rejected 13 Petitioner's application. Neither applicant should have cause to complain to the extent their migration was improper to begin with.⁵ 14 3. The Balance Of The Equities Tips In Favor Of An Injunction 15 16 In ruling on an injunction, courts must weigh the likelihood of injury to the plaintiff if the 17 injunction is improperly denied against the likelihood of injury to the defendant if the injunction is 18 improperly granted. (See Butt v. State of Cal. (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-78; Common Cause v. 19 *Bd. of Supervisors* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 441-42.) For Petitioner, denying the injunction will 20 potentially prevent it from ever opening an Urbn Leaf location in Chula Vista, leading to large but 21 potentially incalculable losses. For the City and any applicant awaiting the outcome of this matter, 22 the delay envisioned by a preliminary injunction will be short lived, as the case should be heard 23 promptly following the City's preparation of the administrative record. A short delay (on top of 24 an already delayed process), coupled with what should be a desire by the City to get things right, 25 tips the balance in favor of a narrowly tailored injunction, as requested here. 26

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4817-8615-9575.1 14 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

IV. THE COURT SHOULD STAY THE CITY'S DECISIONS

2 Petitioner's second cause of action is for administrative mandate. Under Code of Civil 3 Procedure § 1094.5(g), "... the court in which proceedings under this section are instituted may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision pending the judgment of the court 4 5 However, no such stay shall be imposed or continued if the court is satisfied that it is against the public interest." For the same reasons discussed above, the public interest favors allowing for the 6 7 most qualified applicant in District One to proceed forward with the licensing process, the equities 8 weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the Court should exercise its discretion to stay the City's May 6, 9 2020 Notice of Decision and August 26, 2020 Denial of Appeal in order to ensure that Petitioner's 10 "spot in line"—i.e., the status quo—is preserved.

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V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

12 For the aforementioned reasons, the Court should preliminarily enjoin the City and its 13 agents, officers, employees, and representatives from taking or failing to take any action that 14 would in any way interfere with the full and fair consideration of Petitioner's application for a retail storefront cannabis business license (Application ID 57074). Compliance with the Court's 15 16 order should include, but not be limited to, halting the issuance of any other cannabis licenses in 17 the City's District One. Further, to the extent that Respondent has already issued such licenses, 18 the Court's order should declare such licenses null and void. For these same reasons, the Court 19 should also stay the City's May 6, 2020 Notice of Decision denying Petitioner's application for a retail storefront cannabis business license (Application ID 57074), as well as its August 26, 2020 20 21 decision denying Petitioner's administrative appeal, under Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5(g). 22 DATED: January 19, 2021 Respectfully submitted, 23

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By:

GARY K. BRUCKER, JR. Attorneys for Petitioner/Plaintiff UL CHULA TWO LLC

