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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Regan Furcolo (SBN 162956) <i>Email: <u>rfurcolo@wmfllp.com</u></i> Laura Stewart (SBN 198260) <i>Email: <u>lstewart@wmfllp.com</u></i> WALSH MCKEAN FURCOLO LLP 550 West C Street, Suite 950 San Diego, CA 92101-5420 Telephone: (619) 232-8486 Facsimile: (619) 232-2691 Attorneys for Defendant JESSICA MCELFRESH, an individual	
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
11	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
13	DARRYL COTTON, an individual,	CASE NO. 3:18-cv-00325-JO-DEB
14	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT JESSICA
15	v.	MCELFRESH'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION DISMISS
16	CYNTHIA BASHANT, an individual;	PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
17	JOEL WOHLFEIL, an individual;	
18	LARRY GERACI, an individual; REBECCA BERRY, an individual;	District Judge: Hon. Jinsook Ohta
19	MICHAEL WEINSTEIN, an individual;	Date: April 13, 2022
20	JESSICA MCELFRESH, an individual; and DAVID DEMIAN, an individual,	Time: 9:00 a.m. Courtroom: 3A
21	Defendants.	[NO ORAL ARGUMENT
22		ŘEQUESTED]
23		
24	TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF	
25	RECORD HEREIN:	
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28 WALSH MCKEAN FURCOLO LLP	1	l
550 W. C St. SUITE 950 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-5420 TELEPHONE (619) 232-8486	REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Case No. 3:18-cv-00325-JO-DEB	

1	Defendant JESSICA McELFRESH ("Ms. McElfresh") submits this reply to	
2	plaintiff DARRYL COTTON's ("plaintiff") Opposition to her Rule 12(b)(6)	
3	motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint:	
4	I.	
5	INTRODUCTION	
6	The Second Amended Complaint simply does not state a valid cause of	
7	action against Ms. McElfresh. Plaintiff's only argument with respect to Ms.	
8	McElfresh is that she, a private attorney, failed to disclose to plaintiff a prior	
9	existing relationship with Geraci. The facts alleged in the Second Amended	
10	Complaint actually show that Ms. McElfresh never represented plaintiff (she	
11	referred plaintiff's "litigation investor" to another attorney), so she would have no	
12	duty to disclose any conflict to plaintiff. But, even if she did, the failure to disclose	
13	a conflict is not sufficient to support a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C.	
14	§1983 (deprivation of a person's Constitutional rights under color of State law) or	
15	a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985 (prohibiting a witness from	
16	testifying in federal court).	
17	II.	
18	THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A	
19	VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST MS. MCELFRESH	
20	A. <u>The First Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983</u>	
21	The first cause of action in the Second Amended Complaint is for violation	
22	of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (deprivation of a person's Constitutional rights under color of	
23	State law).	
24	In his Opposition, plaintiff acknowledges that the defendants in this case,	
25	who are all private attorneys, are not State actors, but he argues that they acted	
26	under color of State law anyway because they conspired with a State actor, namely	
27	Tirandazi, to deprive him of a CUP.	
28		
COLO LLP	2 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT	

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Where a plaintiff alleges a private party conspired with state officers, the complaint must contain more than conclusory allegations of a conspiracy. *See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court*, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (conclusory allegations insufficient to consider a private attorney a state actor for purposes of § 1983); *Price v. Hawaii*, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); *Mosher v. Saalfeld*, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).

To establish liability against a private party based on a conspiracy with a State actor, the plaintiff must allege facts showing the essential elements of conspiracy, namely that the private party and the State actor (1) agreed to accomplish an illegal objective, i.e., had a "meeting of the minds"; (2) committed one or more acts in its furtherance; and (3) had the intent to commit the underlying offense. *Warwick v. University of the Pacific*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97207, citing *United States v. Penagos*, 823 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1987); *United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.*, 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).

Here, there are no factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint whatsoever to support that Ms. McElfresh had a meeting of the minds with Tirandazi to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. It is alleged that Tirandazi is the City official who prevented plaintiff from acquiring a CUP. There are no allegations that Ms. McElfresh had any connection with, knew, met or spoke to Tirandazi about anything at any time. Tirandazi is not even a party to this action.

The only thing plaintiff complains about with respect to Ms. McElfresh is that she had a conflict of interest that she should have disclosed to him. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Ms. McElfresh failed to disclose to plaintiff that she had previously represented Geraci in connection with his CUP application. This is in direct contradiction to plaintiff's allegation that Ms. McElfresh referred his litigation investor to attorney David Demian because she did "not have the bandwidth" to represent plaintiff (SAC, ¶¶ 55-56), which shows that she did *not*

WALSH MCKEAN FURCOLO LLP 550 W. C St. SUITE 950 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-5420 TELEPHONE (619) 232-8486

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represent plaintiff, and would therefore have nothing to disclose to him. But, even assuming that Ms. McElfresh did represent plaintiff and had a duty to disclose a conflict of interest because of a previous connection to Geraci, which Ms. McElfresh categorically denies, the failure to disclose a conflict of interest is not an act to further a conspiracy with Tirandazi to deprive plaintiff of a CUP.

Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint does not state a valid cause of action against Ms. McElfresh for violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

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B. The Second Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985

The second cause of action in the Second Amended Complaint is for violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985 (prohibiting a witness from testifying in federal court).

In his Opposition, plaintiff does not argue that the defendants in this case 12 threatened Young with violence if she testified in court. It is difficult to ascertain 13 what plaintiff is arguing the defendants actually did, but he seems to be arguing 14 that they somehow either conspired with Nguyen (Young's attorney) to stop her 15 from testifying or with Magagna to threaten Young with violence to stop her from 16 testifying. Again, there are no factual allegations in the Second Amended 17 Complaint whatsoever to support either conclusion. The Second Amended 18 Complaint is devoid of any allegations about actions taken on the part of Ms. 19 McElfresh to further a conspiracy with Nguyen or Magagna to threaten Young. 20 There are no allegations that Ms. McElfresh had any connection with, knew, met 21 or spoke to Nguyen or Magagna at any time about anything. Young and Magagna 22 are not even parties to this action. 23

24 25 26 27 28 ULSH MCKEAN FURCOLO LLP 550 W. C SL SUITE 950 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-5420

HONE (619) 232-8486

Again, plaintiff alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that Ms. McElfresh referred his litigation investor to attorney David Demian because she did "not have the bandwidth" to represent plaintiff (SAC, ¶¶ 55-56), which shows that she did *not* represent plaintiff, and would therefore have nothing to disclose to him. But, again, even assuming that Ms. McElfresh did represent plaintiff and had

a duty to disclose a conflict of interest because of a previous connection to Geraci, 1 which Ms. McElfresh categorically denies, the failure to disclose a conflict of 2 interest is not an act to further a conspiracy with Young or Magagna to threaten a 3 witness with violence to prohibit her from testifying in federal court. 4 Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint does not state a valid cause of 5 action against Ms. McElfresh for violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985. 6 III. 7 LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE DENIED 8 Realizing that he has not adequately pled a cause of action against the 9 defendants in the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff asks the Court for leave to 10 amend ... again. The Court should not grant plaintiff leave to amend again 11 because the deficiencies in the Second Amended Complaint cannot be cured by 12 amendment. 13 IV. 14 **CONCLUSION** 15 For the foregoing reasons, Ms. McElfresh respectfully requests that the 16 Court grant her motion to dismiss plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint without 17 leave to amend. 18 19 WALSH MCKEAN FURCOLO LLP DATED: April 6, 2022 20 21 By: /s/ Laura Stewart 22 **REGAN FURCOLO** 23 LAURA STEWART Attorneys for Defendant 24 JESSICA MCELFRESH, an individual 25 Email: rfurcolo@wmfllp.com Email: lstewart@wmfllp.com 26 27 28 5 LSH MCKEAN FURCOLO LLP 550 W. C St. SUITE 950 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-5420 PHONE (619) 232-8486 Case No. 3:18-cv-00325-JO-DEB